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inter-dependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and
suggested coordinated action.
I want to quote now only the last paragraph on Page 5, a difficult bit
of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.
"The Reich Foreign Minister then
touched upon the question, explicitly designated as theoretical, that
the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts
by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy
were fundamentally determined on this. After signing of the Three
Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion arises, also jointly in
this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the
United States, and under certain conditions swing public opinion
towards isolation. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which
America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the
signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda.
The question, however, was in no way acute at the time."
Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference with the
Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible involvement
of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our
Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced as Exhibit USA-152;
and I have read it into the record. The relevant statements appear in
the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1 and the first full paragraph on Page
2 of the English translation. I shall not take the Tribunal's time to
read them again.
I should like to refer to one more document to show that the Nazi
conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese
to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States
and could lead to the United States' involvement in the contemplated Far
Eastern conflict. This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference
between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4
April 1941. 1 have already offered, in my opening statement to the
Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document 1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at
that time a considerable portion of it into the record. Unless the Court
prefers that I do not do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to
re-read a few brief passages.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages which I
read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read at this point show
not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States
in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a
knowledge on their part that the Japanese