central authorities of Berlin, have considered a solution for the Czech problem.

"After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this three ways of solution were indicated:

"a) German infiltration of Moravia and confinement of the Czech nationals to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in diminished form, will continue to exist.

"b) Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore, in the memorandum it is concluded that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable period of time.

"c) Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about half of the Czech nationals by the Germans insofar as these are of racial or otherwise valuable importance. This will also be caused, among other things, by increased employment of Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border districts), in other words, by dispersing the concentrations of Czech nationals.

"The other half of the Czech nationals must be deprived of their power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted and would become a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a possible rapid assimilation.

"Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be handled roughly and eliminated.

"The above development naturally pre-supposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

"Having been reported, the Führer has chosen solution (c) (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protector for years to come.

"From the above no particular conclusions are to be drawn by the Armed Forces. This is the line which has always been taken here. In this connection I refer to my memorandum submitted to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled 'The Czech Problem' (attached as annex).