4 Jan. 46
needless to say, at the highest level; and the making
of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as
well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision
was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their
assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These
general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups
and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign; and then there
would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top
staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine
the plans.
The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers
at OKW and OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on
the other hand, is graphically described in two statements by Field
Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit Number 4, which will be
Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document 3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal's
attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement
of 7 November 1945:
"In April 1939 I was instructed by
Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against
Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and
deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by
him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational
and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army
groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place
with them about details, in order to hear their desires and
recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy
of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of
army groups and of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as
well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to
obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of
military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common
practice for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his
subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of
ideas with them.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff
communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly,
with the armies; through army groups on strategic and tactical
matters; directly on questions affecting supply and administration of
conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no
territorial executive power. It had a relatively small staff, which
was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial
matters it was the