4 Jan. 46
"It can be justified and have a
chance of success only if it is prepared economically as well as
politically and militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for
Germany an outlet to the ocean."
Let us turn to the Air Force, having seen what the viewpoint of the Navy
was. Parts of the German Air Staff during this prewar period were
developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement
of the Reich. Document L-43, Exhibit Number GB-29, is a study prepared
by the chief of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called
the Organization Staff. The study in question is a recommendation for
the organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950. The
recommendation is based on certain assumptions, and one assumption was
that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which
was attached as an enclosure to this study. There is only one copy of
the map available, Your Honor.
The Court will note on this map that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included
within the borders of the Reich. The Court will also note, at Page 2 of
the Document itself — that is L-43 — that the author envisaged
the future peacetime organization of the German Air Force as comprising
seven group commands, four of which lie within the borders of Germany
proper at Berlin, Braunschweig, Munich, and Königsberg, but the
three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.
Before turning to particular acts of aggression by the German Armed
Forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and harmony
between the Nazis and the German military leaders. Without this
agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this
connection I want to direct the Tribunal's attention to an affidavit
Number 3 in Document Book I, which will be Document 3704-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-536, by Von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshal, Reich War
Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Forces until February
1938.
I will read the affidavit into the transcript:
"From 1919, and particularly from
1924, three essential territorial questions occupied attention in
Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr,
and Memel.
"I, myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the
question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if
necessary by force of arms. About 90 percent of the German people were
of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe
out the outrage perpetrated by the creation of the. Polish Corridor
and to