4 Jan. 46
impression that these threats of force might be
expected to create. About a month later armed intervention was
precipitated by Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria.
Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans
for the invasion of Austria, these plans being known as "Case Otto,"
in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary under
the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us as follows on Page 2:
"By surprise and without consulting
his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March,
which should bring a strong majority for the Legitimists in the
absence of plan or preparation.
"Führer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night,
March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring General Von Reichenau is
called back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von Schober is
ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with
Gauleiter Bürckel in the Palatinate."
The General Von Schober referred to succeeded General Von Reichenau as
Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and later was Commander of the 11th Army in
Russia and was a member of the group as defined in the Indictment.
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of
aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in
advance. This is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated
by an outside event, that being Schuschnigg's order for the plebiscite.
But, although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning
was lacking, the foregoing documents make clear the participation of the
military leaders at all stages.
At the small policy meeting of November 1937, when Hitler's general
program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others
present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign
Secretary.
In February Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were all present to help
subject Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others
immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military
threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance
of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the actual invasion took place, it
was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the
Armed Forces, and we are indebted to the Defendant Jodl for a clear
statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to
join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence.
In his lecture in November 1943 to the Gauleiter, which appears in
Document L-172, which is Exhibit Number USA-34, Jodl explained —
this is Page 5, Paragraph 3 of the translation: