4 Jan. 46
"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn,
brought with it not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also
had the effect both of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of
materially improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right
into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and air base for
the Allies, in particular Russia) Czechoslovakia herself was now
enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so
unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any vigorous attack
before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive."
The foregoing extract from Jodl's speech makes a good transition to the
case of Czechoslovakia " Case Green," or "Fall Grün''
I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the
general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and
the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing
participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the
group.
Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between Hitler and
the four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-25, may be called to mind. Austria and Czechoslovakia were then
listed as the most proximate victims of German aggression. After the
absorption of Austria, Hitler as head of the State and Keitel as Chief
of all the Armed Forces lost no time in turning their attention to
Czechoslovakia. From this point on nearly the whole story is contained
in the Schmundt file, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl's
diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources
of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of
the military defendants and the General Staff and High Command group.
They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure
military technicians, that they were not interested in or not informed
about political and diplomatic considerations-that they prepared plans
for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say
all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not
estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions, that they carried out
politically conceived orders like military automatons, with no idea
whether the wars they launched were aggressive or not.
When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respectfully suggest:
Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl's diary. They make it
abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between
the Nazis and the generals, that the military leaders were fully posted
on the aggressive intentions and fully