4 Jan. 46
Plans for the liquidation of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia were made soon after Munich. Ultimately the absorption of
the remainder was accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the
Defendant Keitel participated, for the usual purpose of demonstrating
that German armed might was ready to enforce the threats — as shown
by two documents already in, and which I need not read: Document
2802-PS, Exhibit Number USA-117; and 2798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-118.
And once again the Defendant Jodl, in his 1943 lecture, Document L-172,
Exhibit Number USA-34, tells us clearly and in one sentence why the
objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as close to the hearts of
the German military leaders as to the hearts of the Nazi:
"The bloodless solution of the Czech
conflict in the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939 and the
annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in
such a way that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem
on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises."
And this serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg and Blaskowitz,
from which I have already read. The whole group of German staff and
front officers believed that the question of the Polish Corridor "would
have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms," they
told us. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly
desired," they have told us.
I turn now to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a particularly
interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and High
Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature of the attack
have already been introduced by Colonel Griffith-Jones of the British
Delegation. I propose to approach it from a slightly different angle,
inasmuch as these documents serve as an excellent case study of the
functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in
the Indictment.
This attack was carefully timed and planned, and in the documents one
can observe the staff work step by step. Colonel Griffith-Jones read
from a series of directives from Hitler and Keitel, embodied in Document
C-120, Exhibit Number GB-1, involving "Fall Weiss", which was
the code word for the plan of attack on Poland. That is a whole series
of documents, and the series starts — C-120 — with a
reissuance of a document called, "Directive for the Uniform
Preparation for War by the Armed Forces."
We have encountered this periodically reissued directive previously.
That was a sort of form for standing instructions to the Armed Forces
laying out what their tasks during the coming period would be.