4 Jan. 46
In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of
what the Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of
political and diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly,
indications of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to
make the military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They
constitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and
they strongly demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive
diplomacy and military planning.
Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April 1939,
in which the preparation of the plans for the Polish war is ordered.
Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to Brauchitsch at
OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Göring at OKL; and two to
Warlimont in the planning branch of OKW.
Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by 1
September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was adhered
to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly brought out
by a part of one of these documents which has not previously been read;
that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and it is to be found at Page 4.
The sub-heading is "Political Requirements and Aims":
"German relations with Poland
continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should
Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on
the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude
towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary,
notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.
"The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength and
create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of
national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part
of the Reich territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.
"The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland
only.
"The development of increasing internal crises in France and the
resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the
not too distant future.
"Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do this,
cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would
imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.
"The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by
German military exigencies.
"On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain ally.
Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis."
Sub-heading 2, "Military Conclusions":