4 Jan. 46
"The great objectives in the building
up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the
antagonism of the Western Democracies. Fall Weiss constitutes only a
precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked
upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military
settlement with the Western opponents.
"The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war
with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.
"The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be
taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea
coast, as well as the air over them."
Let no one suggest that these are hypothetical plans or that the General
Staff and High Command group did not know what was in prospect. The
plans show on their face that they are no war game. But, to clinch this
point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman's so-called "pin-up"
document on Poland, Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. These are
Schmundt's notes on the conference in Hitler's study at the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939, when Hitler announced — and I
quote just one sentence:
"There is, therefore, no question of
sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at
the first suitable opportunity."
Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides: The
Defendant Göring Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; the Defendant
Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel, OKW; Von Brauchitsch,
Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Colonel General Milch, who was State
Secretary of the Air Ministry and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe;
General Bodenschatz, Göring's personal assistant; Rear Admiral
Schniewind, Chief of the naval war staff; Colonel Jeschonnek, Chief of
the Air Staff; Colonel Warlimont, Planning Staff. All of them, except
Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants, are members of the group.
So far these documents have shown us the initial and general planning
of the attack on Poland. These general plans, however, had to be
checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders who were to
carry out the attack.
I offer Document C-142, which will be Exhibit Number USA-538. This
document was issued in the middle of June 1939, and in this document Von
Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, passed on the general
outlines of the plan for the attack on Poland to the field
commanders-in-chief -to the Oberbefehlshaber of army groups and armies —
so that the field commanders could work out