4 Jan. 46
very great successes of the first month of
the war could serve, in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to
strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent
that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection to ending
the war immediately, insofar as the present achievement with arms is
not jeopardized by the peace treaty.
"It is not the object of this memorandum to study the
possibilities in this direction, or even to take them into
consideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to,
the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object of
which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy is
concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German Reich. In
opposition to this the German war aim is the final military dispatch
of the West, that is, destruction of the power and ability of the
Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation
and further development of the German people in Europe. As far as the
outside world is concerned, however, this internal aim will have to
undergo various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psychological
point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is and remains the
destruction of our Western enemies."
I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the subheading
"Reasons":
"The successes of the Polish campaign
have made possible first of all a war on a single front, awaited for
past decades without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany
is able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving
only a few covering troops in the East. The remaining European states
are neutral either because they fear for their own fates or lack
interest in the conflict as such or are interested in a certain
outcome of the war, which prevents them from taking part at all, or at
any rate too soon. The following is to be firmly borne in mind ... "
At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of references
to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the foot of Page 3:
"Belgium and Holland: Both countries
are interested in preserving their neutrality but incapable of
withstanding prolonged pressure from England and France. The
preservation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and
thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their very life,
depend wholly upon the will of England and France. Therefore in their
decisions, in their attitude, and in their actions both countries are
dependent upon the West in the highest degree. If England and France
promise themselves a