4 Jan. 46
I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence
is somewhat in error and should read:
"With reference to this essay Kapitän
zur See Krancke is working on 'Weserübung' at OKW."
"During the time which followed H" — Hagelin — "maintained
contact with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
His aim was to develop the Party Q" — Quisling" with a
view to making it capable of action and to give the Supreme Command of
the Navy information on the political developments in Norway and
military questions. In general he pressed the speeding up of
preparations, but considered that it was first necessary to expand the
organization."
I think that
is all I need read of that.
Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86, already
in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval War Staff discussed
the Norwegian project with Hitler — I am not going to read from
that document, Your Honors — at a meeting which the Defendants
Keitel and Jodl also attended. In the meantime Raeder was in touch with
the Defendant Rosenberg on the possibilities of using Quisling; and
Major Elwyn Jones very properly pointed out to the Tribunal the close
link between the service chiefs and the Nazi politicians. As a result of
all this, on Hitler's instructions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27
January 1940 stating that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake
charge of preparations for the Norway operation, to which he then gave
the code name Weserübung.
On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the general
plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is Document C-174,
Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones put in the record. The
directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt Fricke, who at that time was
head of the operations division of the naval war staff and who at the
end of 1941 became Chief of the naval war staff and in that capacity is
a member of the group as defined in the Indictment. So, as these
documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not
conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on
the contrary, it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff
and High Command group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up.
Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and
High Command group as to the Nazis.
As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders were
disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will remember that
at a conference between Hitler and the principal military leaders in May
1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, already in the
record, when the intention to attack