4 Jan. 46
appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a
diplomatic angle. It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the
neutrality of three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to
guarantee the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the "new
idea" projected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary
combination of cynicism and naïveté.
In the meantime, as Jodl's diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the 14
special staff" for the Norway invasion met for the first time and
got its instructions from Keitel. On 21 February Hitler put General Von
Falkenhorst in command of the Norway undertaking; and Jodl's diary
records that "Falkenhorst accepts gladly."
On 26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to Norway
or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do Norway first and
the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This decision proved final.
Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April and the success of the
adventure was certain by the 1st of May. The invasion of the Low
Countries took place 10 days later.
So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on the side
of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October 1940 Italy
attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the uncertain attitude of
Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany, particularly because the
attack of the Soviet Union was being planned and Germany felt she could
not risk an uncertain situation at her rear in the Balkans.
Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming to
Italy's aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d'etat of 26 March 1941
brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also. The
documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore, and there
is little that I need to add for my present purpose. The decisions were
made; the Armed Forces drew up the necessary plans and executed the
attacks. The onslaught was particularly unmerciful and ruthless against
Yugoslavia for the special purpose of frightening Turkey and Greece. The
final deployment instructions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in
Document R-95, Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before.
Two extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short:
"The political situation in the
Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt,
Yugoslavia has to be considered an enemy even should it make
declarations of loyalty at first.
"The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to
destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible."