4 Jan. 46

leaders to carry out such plans and engage in war, if in doing so they do not plan and launch and wage wars which are illegal because they are aggressive and in contravention of the Charter.

I am very far from saying that there may not be individual cases, involving some individual members of this group, where drawing the line between legal and illegal behavior might involve some difficulties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But I do not believe that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before this Tribunal, as to the criminality of the General Staff and High Command group as a group under Counts One and Two, or as to the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the group.

In the case of the Defendants Göring Keitel, and Jodl, the evidence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and wars is more or less constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder, and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage attack on Norway and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so far offered against Dönitz is less voluminous for the reason that he was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war.

But numerous other members of the General Staff and High Command group, including its other leaders, are shown to have participated knowingly and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars: Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Halder; Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl. In the nature of things these men knew all that was going on and participated fully, as the documents show. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg; Reichenau, and Von Schober, together with Göring were immediately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebiscite. At a later date we have seen Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehlshaber in the field, knowingly preparing for the attack on Poland; Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for their role during the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; Von Falkenhorst "gladly" accepting the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek has been recorded proposing that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland and simultaneously assuring Belgium that there is nothing to fear. On the naval side, Admiral Carls, member of the group, foresees at an early date that German policy is leading to a general European war, and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark is his brainchild; Krancke, later one of the group, is one of the chief planners of this attack; Schniewind is in the inner circle for the attack on Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for Weserübung and a few months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium and northern France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to vassalage.

Most of the 19 officers I have mentioned were at that time members of the group, as defined, and the few Who were not, subsequently