8 Jan. 46

addressed to Keppler, who appears from this letter to have been an SS Gruppenführer, shows that prominent Nazis had declared themselves in favor of a Major Klausner to succeed Leopold as Landesleiter; and I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that in the left margin of the covering letter appear some red crayon marks in the characteristic color employed on several occasions, to our knowledge, by Göring and they would seem to show that Göring personally had seen these documents and that General Bodenschatz had brought them to his attention. In any event these letters again demonstrate that Göring was one of the principal conspirators in the Austrian affair.

When the time finally came, on 11 March 1938, to consummate the Anschluss, Göring was in complete command. Throughout the afternoon and evening of that day he directed by telephone the activities of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and of the other Nazi conspirators in Vienna. The pertinent portions of these telephone conversations, it will be remembered, were read into the record.

It will be recalled that early on the same evening of 11 March he dictated to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart the telegram which the latter was to send to Berlin, requesting the Nazi Government to send German troops to "prevent bloodshed." Two days later he was able to call the Defendant Ribbentrop in London and gleefully relate to him of his success and that "this story that we had given an ultimatum is just foolish gossip."

If I may interrupt for a moment, that passage I just alluded to was read into the record at Page 581 (Volume II, Page 424).

Similarly, Göring played an important role in the attack on Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss, he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way have a detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia and he had emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to improve these relations. In this connection Göring had used the expression, "Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort" ("I give you my word of honor")

. That expression was read previously into the record at Page 962 (Volume III, Page 192).

On the other hand, in his address to German airplane manufacturers on the 8th of July 1938, which I have already mentioned, he made his private views on this subject, which were hardly consistent with his solemn official statements, abundantly clear.

On the 14th of October 1938, shortly after the Munich Agreement, at a conference in the Air Ministry, Göring stated that the Sudetenland had to be exploited with all means and that he counted upon a complete industrial assimilation of Czechoslovakia.