8 Jan. 46
intentionally, and keenly in bringing the Nazis into
power and into the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the
German State.
I now come to the second allegation in the Indictment, that this
defendant participated in political planning and preparation with the
Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances; and again it might
help the Tribunal if I took these quite shortly, in order of aggression,
and stated briefly the constituent allegations that we make and the
references to matters before the Tribunal, referring the Tribunal only
to any new document which shall come along.
The first is the Anschluss with Austria, and there the Tribunal will
remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop was present at a meeting at
Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and Von Papen met the
Austrian Chancellor Von Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister, Guido
Schmidt. The Tribunal will find the official account of that interview
in Document 2461-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-132. What the Tribunal
will find, I submit, is the truthful account of the interview in Exhibit
Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS, which is the diary of the
Defendant Jodl; and the relevant entries are those for 11 and 12
February 1938. They are extremely short, and I shall read if the
Tribunal will be kind enough to allow me, they do show quite clearly the
case for the Prosecution about the pressure that was used in
Chancellor Schuschnigg's interview. It is at the foot of the first page
in the Document Book; Document 1780-PS is the number.
And on the 11th of February the Defendant Jodl writes:
"In the evening and on 12 February
General K" Keitel " with General Von Reichenau
and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are
being put under the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300
hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
"13 February: In the afternoon General K" Keitel
" asks Admiral C" Canaris "and myself to
come to his apartment. He tells us that the Führer's order is to
the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should
be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are
drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.
"14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Führer
arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII
and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is
created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations."