8 Jan. 46

itself to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy. These are to be found in the documents which I have mentioned. And, again, unless the Tribunal desires, I shall not read any document that I summarize that way.

Now I have already mentioned that there had been contact with the Sudeten Germans. That was the long-term grievance that had to be exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. And so, between the 16th and 24th of September, we find the German Foreign Office, of which this defendant was at the head, stirring up trouble in Prague; and that is shown very clearly in Exhibits Numbers USA-97 to 101, which are Documents 2858-PS, 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS, and 2856-PS. I have read them in order of date. And it would be interesting for the Tribunal to look at these. They ought to follow quite shortly the document they have just been looking at, beginning with Document PS-2858. You will see the sort of thing of which I am reminding the Tribunal. Here you have the document of the 19th of September coming from the Foreign Office to the German Embassy in Prague:

"Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy during the next day."

And the others deal with questions of arrest and the action that would be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make the position more difficult.

That was the contribution which this defendant made to the pre-Munich crisis. After, as the Tribunal will remember, on the 29th of September 1938, the Munich Agreement was signed. That is GB-23, Document TC-23, which I have already read to the Tribunal.

And, after that — I just remind the Tribunal of an interesting document which shows the sort of action which the Wehrmacht expected and the advice that the Wehrmacht expected from the Foreign Office.

You have, on the 1st of October, Document C-2, which is Exhibit Number USA-90, and that is a long document putting forward an almost infinite variety of breaches of international law, which were likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia; and on all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office is sought. That, of course, remained a hypothetical question at that time because no war resulted.

Then, if the Tribunal please, we come to the second stage in the acquiring of Czechoslovakia: That is, having obtained the Sudetenland, arranging so that there would be a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would give an excuse for taking the rest. The Tribunal will remember the importance of this because it is the first time that the