Preventing War in Kosovo

TFF's Report from 1992

Executive Summary  

• The present state of economic, social and political affairs in Kosovo merits wide, urgent and carefully considered international attention and immediate humanitarian aid.
• It is a fragile calm we see today in Kosovo. There is still a political time and space for preventive diplomacy. The conflict holds very powerful and destructive potentials and will not go away. It will explode if nothing is done very soon.
• This report presents a series of conflict-mitigation ideas such as the establishment of various types of third-party mediation commissions working at the same time; a humanitarian presence; a human rights watch and international "adoption" of Kosovo; normalization of everyday life and demilitarization; UN peacekeeping; a trusteeship-like process, and some kind of condominium.
• It repeatedly emphasizes that everything relates to everything else in former Yugoslavia and that the Kosovo issue, although requiring specific solutions, must be seen in the context of all of former Yugoslavia.
• The actions of the international community vis-a-vis other conflicts in former Yugoslavia &endash; including an international military action &endash; will unavoidably have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and impede peace-making.
• The relevant issue is not who is to blame for what but, simply, that something be done to provide for basic need satisfaction and a nonviolent development in Kosovo's relationship with Serbia.
• If Serbia wants Serbs to live in Kosovo and the presence of Kosovo in Serbia it must develop a policy that is acceptable to the Kosovo Albanians.
• If the Kosovo Albanians insist on having their own independent state this state must be based on principles, ideas and practices which are acceptable to Serbia.
• Whatever these two parties can agree on it must be acceptable to other direct actors in this conflict, namely the Albanians in Macedonia, the Macedonian government and Albania.
• Albanian goals and strategies are exclusively non-violent and there exists a serious interest in exploring new conceptions of what it means to become a state.
• With some creative thinking and the help of third parties it will not be impossible to find a common ground for peaceful co-existence acceptable to both the Serbian and the Kosovo Albanian side.
• The international community bears responsibility for not stimulating or using military actions but, instead, helping identify peaceful solutions with peaceful means before it is too late.
• This report will be distributed to a select group of Serbs and Albanians at different levels in Kosovo and Belgrade. A new edition will be published on the basis of their comments and, if possible, a series of direct or indirect dialogues between the parties and the TFF team. We will simply explore, in an open-ended process, the extent to which agreement can be reached.

This is an interim report by a conflict-mitigation mission from the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, TFF, in Lund, Sweden visiting Kosovo* &endash; Prishtina and Mitrovica &endash; for the third time this year, from May 29 to 31, 1992.

We conducted a series of interviews with representatives of the Serbian and Albanian communities there and in Belgrade.

The report is sent to a number of Nordic and international organizations and individuals, particularly at the UN, as a service to those working with conflict-resolution and humanitarian aid planning.

It starts head on with the conflict assesses the risk that it will turn into large-scale warfare and addresses &endash; in an exploratory manner &endash; possible solutions.

Furthermore, it describes our impressions from talks with the Kosovan leadership on ways of defining a new type of independent state. The Appendices offer a background to the conflict.

We would appreciate your comments to the report and suggestions how the TFF and its team can be of further assistance to you.

The TFF is an independent non-profit foundation committed to conflict&endash;mitigation, peace research and education to improve conflict understanding at all levels and promote alternative security and global development based on nonviolence.

This work is financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden, the Futura Foundation in Stockholm and the Rowntree Charitable Trust in England. The TFF alone is responsible for the content of the reports.

This report was finalized on July 9, 1992

*) Kosovo is the usual English expression, Kosova is Albanian and Kosovo Mitohija or Kosmet is Serbian; our use of Kosovo does not reflect any side-taking.

TFF

The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research

Vegagatan 25, S- 224 57 Lund, Sweden

Phone +46-46-145909 • Fax +46-46-144512

1. Characteristics of the conflict

It is a complex structural conflict with a strong element of symbolic policies or drama. It is virtually deadlocked with no effective communication between the parties. This in itself makes it dangerous.

It is clearly asymmetric in terms of material and political power but probably less so in terms of subjectively perceived historical rights, morals and social values. Reducing the conflict to a matter only of national pride or only to revenues from the natural resource extraction would be straightforward misleading.

Albanians and Serbs have been locked into double minority/majority relations; thus, Kosovo Albanians made up roughly the same percentage (10%) of ex-Yugoslavia as Serbs make up of Kosovo. However, today's new Yugoslavia consists of Serbia proper (incl. Voivodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro, or 10.4 million people. Kosovo, in other words, has suddenly increased its share of Yugoslavia from 10 to 20%.

It is also a fairly unique conflict in the international system because one of the parties applies non-violent principles. In most historical cases, secession and various types of nationalism have been backed up by military force. As this report shows later, the Kosovo Albanians have a distinctly different perception of how to define their political goals and achieve them.

Some observers might say that the Kosovan policy aims at the illegal formation of a state within a state. Therefore, they would maintain, there is little to discuss but how to bring back working relations between the two. Our commission is convinced that such a formal "Realpolitik" attitude will bring no viable solution to the conflict.

2. Risks that the situation will explode

a) The other developments inside former Yugoslavia

The Kosovo conflict can neither be understood nor solved outside the larger context of former Yugoslavia and the Balkans. It may seem banal but deserves repeating that in former Yugoslavia everything is related to everything else. There will be no solution to the Kosovo problem without repercussions throughout in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and vice-versa. The Kosovo conflict &endash; more than any other conflict &endash; threatens to involve neighbouring countries.

If Kosovo is perceived of as a minority problem, other minority problems in former Yugoslavia provide a relevant context. If perceived of as a secession problem, there are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the Yugoslavian experience since mid-1991 as to the optimal ways of creating new states.

There is the view that the chain of conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia began in Kosovo and will end there. In terms of history, politics and psychology that may well be true but in terms of power and military hardware this is not necessarily so. With the possible exception of handguns probably held by few there is no evidence that the Albanian people of Kosovo are armed. There are only very few and small political actors among the Kosovo Albanians who advocate military means to achieve their goals, should everything else fail.

There are reasons to believe that Belgrade would be rather reluctant to employ military means in this conflict, at least now. If it did it would not be a war but, rather, a massacre since Kosovo is not a military power in any sense. It would probably ignite a chain reaction involving neighbouring states.

Neither would one believe that the opening of such a war theatre is what Serbia or the new Yugoslavia desires while closely watched, isolated and pressured by the world community.

b) The particular psychology of Serbia as the wounded lion

Whatever views can be held about Serbia, the new Yugoslavia or the Milosevic government it can hardly be ignored that one of the largest net losers in the Yugoslav crisis is Serbia or the Serbs who made up 37% or 8,9 million of the population in what was Yugoslavia. The reason is that the establishment of a series of new states (having not solved their minority rights problems before international recognition) implies that about one-third of the Serbian nation ends up as minority citizens in independent Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina &endash; or what may eventually come out of this formation &endash; where nationalist politics dominates. From a Serbian point of view this was, and remains, a frightening perspective &endash; like it has been for other nations being divided throughout history against their will.

It must be expected that the present international political, economic, scientific and cultural isolation of Serbia, signifying a much too simplistic good guys-bad guy image in this extremely complex conflict, increasingly locks the Serbs into a "wounded lion" psychological mood.

Initiatives by the international community such as a military action or the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state would almost certainly lead to a hard-line, desperate reaction and open a new front towards the Balkans. That Kosovo is considered the "cradle" of Serbia is a strongly held national sentiment, and thus the risk cannot be ignored.

c) The risk that an incident or provocation will ignite a massacre

Small violent, terror-like events and deliberate provocations are familiar in the Yugoslav crisis. The present situation in Kosovo is so tense that very little will be needed to ignite a catastrophic chain of events.

This is a serious risk. The concern here focuses on whether the leading Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under the leadership of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova will be able to continue to provide national leadership and close the ranks behind its nonviolent policies.

There are Albanian political formations, however small, who advocate that if no other means soon yield desired results, the Kosovo-Albanians would see armed struggle as their only way out. This attitude could well interact destructively with Serbian extremist forces who would not mind using extensive violence to "solve" this problem.

It is our judgment that all parties and the international community should recognize that the present leadership in Kosovo is preferable to almost any alternative from a negotiation point of view.

d) The consequences of an international military intervention

The Kosovo conflict and the role of the Albanian people living there and in Macedonia and Albania is a key not only to the Yugoslav crisis but also to the possible future peaceful coexistence in the Balkans. Undoubtedly very strong national emotions are involved on all sides and they cannot be separated from wider strategic issues. It must become increasingly clear that the conflicts in this region have become a world order issue.

They are part and parcel of what is often referred to as the Balkan "powder keg." This term surely often conveys more of a Euro-centric arrogance than an understanding of the complexities in this region which has been molded, if not manipulated, throughout history by Europe. And the pattern is repeated today. Be this as it may: that the Balkans is host to some very complex, intertwined and violence-prone conflicts in and of itself is also part of the truth.

Any single conflict is part of a complex web of the total conflict formation of ex-Yugoslavia which hung in a delicate balance up to June 1991. The image of a chain reaction throughout the Yugoslav-Balkan system of conflicts is an extremely relevant one. Trying to deal with one conflict at a time as if it existed in a vacuum, as has been done by some international actors until now in the crises in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina has already aggravated the situation and shown itself to be counterproductive from a conflict-resolution viewpoint.

The frequent mention of "other measures," should the present sanctions fail to yield results desired by the international community, makes it impossible to exclude that military force will be used at some point. There seems to be the following options: It could be used in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the defence of the Muslims against Serbs and Croats or just to secure safe humanitarian deliveries; it could also be used against Serbia and Belgrade or, third, some of these options will be combined.

Taking into account the inescapable fact that in former Yugoslavia everything is related to everything else, there is no chance that a large international military action could avoid have devastating consequences: not only in terms of death and destruction but also in terms of political repercussions throughout the system, i.e., in Kosovo, too.

e) Regional, international strategic aspects (Turkey-Albania cooperation agreement, Bulgaria, Muslim Bosnia, etc.)

New conflict formations emerge, old ones intensify today. Due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Turkey's role as a regional major power is rapidly growing; it is a secularized Islamic nation strongly related to Western Europe while related equally strongly to the East for historical and cultural reasons. It is not difficult to see conflict bonds such as Turkey&endash;Bulgaria&endash;Macedonia (and perhaps Muslim Bosnia and Sanjak) and perhaps Albania on the one hand and Romania&endash;Yugoslavia&endash;Greece on the other.

Further, European dynamics may exercise an increasingly problematic influence. There can hardly be any doubt that the Yugoslav crisis has become part of the political struggle for control over the foreign and security policy of the future European Union. The extremely unclear civilian-military and political functions of and division of labour between old and new security bodies &endash; NATO, WEU, CSCE, NACC and their various sub-organizations &endash; and the volatility of their individual and collective relations with the United States and the United Nations cannot but increase the probability that moves counterproductive from a non-violent conflict-mitigation perspective will also be made in the future.

Macedonia is an important actor in this framework. Obviously, the government and president Gligorov see Serbia, Albania and Greece as considerable problems. Its Albanian minority constitutes some 21-23% according to official sources (but around 40% according to the Albanians). Macedonia's new constitution integrates them on an equal footing in contrast to many other new states.

However, Skopje indeed perceives of Kosovo as a problem. Macedonia now cultivates economic and other forms of cooperation with neighbouring states but all this may be of little avail should the Kosovo conflict flare up or more nationalistic forces take political control in Macedonia.

It was clearly communicated to our mission that Skopje does not see it feasible or even desirable to initiate or take part in tripartite negotiations between Belgrade, Prishtina and Skopje. Perhaps it cannot be expected of them, but it is somewhat difficult to envisage a durable solution without a mutual understanding between those who must be seen as potential participants in future conflicts.

In summary:

1. Our judgment is that it is a fragile calm we see today in Kosovo, one that could be ignited in hours and then it is bound to get totally out of hand.

2. There is still a political time and space for preventive diplomacy. The conflict holds very powerful and destructive potentials and will not go away. In other words, it will explode if nothing is done very soon to prevent this from happening.

3. The actions of the international community vis-a-vis other conflicts in former Yugoslavia will, under all circumstances, have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo. An international military action to further punish Belgrade is likely to have devastating consequences also for Kosovo.

3. Some conditions for solving the conflict

Much would be won if the main parties could draw three basic conclusions on the basis of what we have seen everywhere else in former Yugoslavia since 1991, namely that:

1) everybody loses more than they gain from warfare;

2) genuine solutions can only be political, economic and cultural;

3) Solutions of one conflict must be part of a larger scheme or process that takes into account all of what was Yugoslavia.

However, time does not seem ripe for that yet. But the appeal to common sense still stands. Until then:

a) Subjective perceptions of the parties must change

It is our judgment that the present Serbian repression in the region of Kosovo can not be justified in terms of the threat which Kosovo represents vis-a-vis Serbia. Rather, we believe that the repression is counterproductive from the point of view of long-term Serbian goals.

This having been said, there is no doubt that the Albanians in Kosovo &endash; and elsewhere for that matter &endash; must respect that Kosovo is an essential part of the self-understanding and identity of the Serbian nation. Likewise, the all-or-nothing approach of the 1980s was obviously counterproductive. In spite of all differences and history-based grievances Serbs and Albanians will have to live and work together in the future. Starting out by ignoring vital elements of the other side's identity is a dead-end.

Fortunately, the present leadership under Dr. Rugova seems to be perfectly aware of this. There is, in other words, a lesson to draw from the bad experience of the last decade and, thus, totally new approaches must be developed.

An independent Kosovo state merging with Albania definitely was and remains an unacceptable goal as seen by Serbia. But the Kosovo Albanians hardly threaten Serbia as a society or political system, they are not armed, they are not in focus of the world's attention.

Creating an extremely discriminating social and political system on top of an under- or maldeveloped economic structure, has brought Serbia nothing but this: A conviction among the Albanians, even moderate ones, that they will not even accept the status they once had. Neither will they, as some expressed, ever again accept some kind of rights or status that unilaterally can be taken away by Belgrade.

The situation must, therefore, be de-polarized rather than continue to polarize. Here both parties will have to yield, in their own interest and in the interest of their common future. Any attempt by either side to create an ethnically clean Kosovo will lead to violence not unlike what we have seen in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

It is obvious to the observer that both sides are looking to the past rather than to the future. They look at impossibilities and ways of locking the conflict rather than mitigating the situation and thereby facilitate negotiations.

When asked why there is practically no communication between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (neither between them in Kosovo which is voluntarily segregated societies, nor in contacts between Prishtina and Belgrade) the answer on both sides is: We have invited them time and again, really seriously and without conditions, but they didn't come or care to even respond. They have also sometimes invited us but how could we accept such invitations that were not sent in time, rushed through, with no agenda, etc. &endash; and how can you negotiate with people who behave like they do....?

These must be seen, of course, as "offers you must refuse." They provide evidence of the fact that mutual confidence is at a very low level today.

Thus, perceptions must be changed and the other side's legitimate viewpoints be integrated in proposals and strategies, instead of being systematically ignored.

There is no doubt that if the parties were offered a competent third party assistance in formulating their long-range goals and adapting their means and proposals accordingly, a more effective communication could be established. The complete lack of genuine communication at government level must be a grave concern to anyone working with conflict-resolution.

While there are and have been some attempts at the non-governmental level, they have not yet yielded any concrete results.

b) Goals and policies - both compatible and incompatible

The parties see their goals and interests as incompatible. Some of them are, but it must be emphasized that, from a third-party viewpoint, there are certainly also compatible interests. Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo would gain from devoting their human and material resources to cooperating about economic development and a fair sharing of the natural resources. Neither side can afford years of warfare and further animosity; both would gain from sharing the historical importance of the area. And both would gain from establishing normal relations, freedom of movement, transport, trade, etc.

However, the mutually exclusive perceptions dominate on both sides:

Whatever the other party does it is interpreted as a confirmation of this incompatibility, if not ill will. Therefore, goals and means will have to change on both &endash; or, rather, all &endash; sides. Thus:

• if Serbia wants Serbs to live in Kosovo and the presence of Kosovo in Serbia it must develop a policy that is acceptable to the Kosovo Albanians;

• if the Kosovo Albanians insist on having their own independent state this state must be based on principles, ideas and practices which are acceptable to Serbia;

• whatever these two parties can agree on it must be acceptable to other direct actors in this conflict, namely the Albanians in Macedonia, the Macedonian government, and Albania;

• a solution cannot be created without assessment of what it will imply for other conflicting parties in former Yugoslavia.

Thus, all parties must recognize that they will not get 100% what they desire, they must focus on what to give in on, on comparative advantages and disadvantages with different set of actions. None of them can achieve even a minimum of their own goals unless they are also compatible with at least some of the goals of the other party.

It may take very long time to change the attitudes and perceptions of the general populace, but leaders &endash; governmental as well as non-governmental &endash; seem to be able to change more quickly and, thereby, to help bring about general attitude changes.

c) The Kosovo Albanian vision of a future state of Kosova

Fortunately, there is a constructive awareness about the need for some rather innovative thinking in the leadership of LDK, the leading political force. It is our impression that the LDK leadership headed by Dr. Rugova is intellectually as well a politically rather flexible, particularly when it comes to defining a state in such a manner that Serbia would be able to live with it.

The present leadership has attained widespread legitimacy through free, internationally observed elections and is now in the process of establishing a new constitution, parliamentary procedures and a government, etc. It is interesting that it does not adhere to a maximizing strategy but, rather, presents its views in roughly the following terms:

Kosova should become an open link between Serbia and Albania; the Albanian people will postpone, or defer to the long-range future, any unification with Albania and/or the Albanians in Macedonia, provided some kind of new state &endash; to be called something else than state &endash; can be developed. This state (for lack of better term) should have open borders with no passports, visa etc. and would abstain from developing any national military defence but provide for its own police power. It would remain strictly neutral.

Kosova would seek recognition as a new type of state and approach, as soon as possible, the European Community. The Serbs and other nations in Kosova would have all the rights they wish and would be granted status not of minority but of nationality with equal and full citizenship rights. No Serb living in Kosovo would be forced to emigrate. As a sign of good will, the new constitution grants all minorities, such as Serbs, Croats and Romanies a certain number of seats in the new parliament which exceeds their percentage of the population.

The LDK makes it abundantly clear that they do not seek revenge and that they do not want to create anything like the states of Slovenia, Croatia or Bosnia. Furthermore, in contrast to them, it will go by a step-by-step approach and there will be no attempt to create "ethnically pure" areas and Kosova will be "no Knin."

It is our impression that the Kosovan leadership is flexible when it comes to the modalities of practicing some kind of independence in the future. It recognizes the importance the Serbs attach to the region, to the monasteries and monuments and emphasizes that the Kosovo Albanians are closely attached to the area as well and have not damaged a single of these historical buildings &endash; like all parties have done to similar objects in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The LDK is also willing to discuss a kind of cantonization &endash; or other models &endash; for those areas, although very few, where Serbs constitute a substantial part of the population. We take it, likewise, that the method of holding referendum to decide where to draw a kind of administrative border with Serbia (should the parties not agree on the present delimitations) would be an acceptable one.

The economic philosophy on which the vision of a future independent Kosova is based is not spelled out in any detail, but clearly Kosova will be a multiparty system with a market-oriented economy, an expanded private sector from agriculture and household industries to larger enterprises and that it will seek to attract foreign investments on a larger scale than previously. It will direct its economic policies towards integration with the EC.

In short, it is our impression that there is a marked willingness to engage in creative problem-solving once it is acknowledged that Kosovo cannot remain in Serbia as today.

4. Some ideas for conflict-mitigation, violence prevention and possible step toward peaceful coexistence

Many constructive short and long-term initiatives will be needed. We point below to some possibilities, in a manner pretending to be no more than rough outlines of ideas in development. They do not at all exhaust the possibilities and some of them could be combined:

1) Various kinds of international commissions

To break the ice between the parties, some kind of third party assistance is now needed: an initiative that could further conflict-resolution and long-term peace-making. Most importantly, it would not only do fact-finding but also suggest a series of non-violent options and thereby systematically show to the parties and the international community that there are alternatives to warfare provided they are developed and implemented in time.

It could consist in an international commission of eminent former statesmen, of scientists, of intellectuals or people of goodwill from culture and arts.

It could also come about through the initiative of, let's say, the Nordic countries or some other smaller group of countries who can work with fact-finding, conflict analyses and provide good offices without being accused of having national interests in a particular solution to the Kosova problem. It is important that such a group of countries represent themselves in their individual capacity, and not any organization of which they are members.

The Nordic countries represent a good mix and have some experience in living with "soft borders" vis-a-vis each other.

Yet another possibility would be a group of informal conflict&endash;resolution experts who could carry through a kind of third-party citizens' diplomacy between Belgrade and Prishtina, governmental as well as non-governmental, and attempt to develop enough mutual confidence to bring the parties to a negotiation table.

Such a group, or more groups, should try to work with official representatives and power-elites as well as with non-governmental and informal groupings and thereby emphasize the obvious: that all parties must accept and be able to live with the solutions that are developed. The TFF is committed to be at service at this point.

There may be other types of commissions and initiatives, and some may be combined. In principle there are the following relevant types of mediators: 1) national governmental mediators, 2) international governmental organization mediators, e.g., the UN envoys, 3) non-governmental national mediators, 4) international non-governmental mediators. Each of them can work with government representatives or with non-government representatives in the conflict area, or with both.

In this perspective it may be worth contemplating the idea that more initiatives by more countries and organizations are carried out simultaneously and at various levels, "multitrack." Such a "redundancy" of parallel processes would secure that if one process is stalemated, others will continue unabated. And it would simply produce more constructive alternatives and options.

But again: It has to be done quickly since the present situation of non-communication promises fatal misunderstandings and even further polarization and deadlocking of the conflict.

2) Violence-prevention and normalization of societal life

No conflict-resolution or peace-making process will succeed if tension is not reduced now and violent step by either side prevented immediately. Among the measures one would like to see that:

• Everyday social life be normalized and Serbs and Albanians can talk, move, meet and participate in normal institutional life again, and do so in safety.

• Paramilitary forces be prohibited from all of Kosovo.

• Free speech and freedom of the press be re-established.

• Unesco, in cooperation with other international organizations, are tasked with protecting all aspects of Serbian and Albanian cultural heritage in Kosovo.

• The Serbian army remains in Kosovo, with the same number of troops as before 1989.

• Factories, schools, health institutions etc. are opened and Serbs and Albanians start cooperating again, production and general economic activity pick up again.

These and similar measures can develop as confidence-building measures within weeks from now and independent of the much more complex, long-term peace-making process.

3) Humanitarian presence

A kind of immediate humanitarian presence would serve two very important functions, apart from representing an innovation in UN activities: 1) it would permit the UN to be present and carry through analyses of the situation at a very important moment, and 2) it would permit the world community to express its positive solidarity with the suffering people in Kosovo by delivering aid &endash; something that we consider much more productive than distributing guilt or punishing actors.

As we have described above, the lack of health and social care is conspicuous. Many live under the poverty line and the society survives basically because foreign-based Albanians dispatch funds back home, because of a very tight family structure and because of new local self-help schemes.

This humanitarian presence does not have to be organized by the UN alone but could come about through the combined efforts of the UN, EC and volunteer humanitarian and aid organizations. Again, it has to be recognized that helping now will save huge human and material resources later.

4) A human rights watch &endash; Can Kosovo be adopted?

Like Amnesty International can adopt individual victims of violations to human rights, one may ask: Could one imagine ways in which the world community could adopt a collectivity such as Kosovo? It would imply that a small group of observers is permanently stationed in the area tasked with fact-finding and instant reporting to the European Council, the United Nations, the CSCE, human rights organizations or institutes and news agencies. It would further suggest remedies and sanctions against violations. This could be conceived as a protective measure for both the local Serbian and the local Albanian community.

The deployment of an international police force could also be contemplated at this moment.

5) UN peacekeeping

The situation is such that it ought to be possible to set up a United Nations observers' and/or peacekeeping operation; this would serve the important function of deterring large-scale violence and preventing outright war. The Kosovo leadership has already asked for observers also from the CSCE and will welcome any international force for this purpose. It is reasonable to think that Serbia, taking into account its present isolated position and the fact that Kosovo is an internal affair of Serbia/Yugoslavia, will be less enthusiastic. Be this as it may, Yugoslavia was the first "internal affair" in which the UN came to play a decisive and positive role through the UN secretary-general envoy Cyrus Vance and the deployment of UNPROFOR.

Some may argue, shortsightedly we think, that the United Nations does not have the resources for that. The counterarguments are, as everybody knows, that the human and material costs of repairing societies and relations after a war are infinitely higher than preventing war in the first place. The only thing the world can afford is violence-prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking, not war.

Second, the resource limitation is never used when starting wars, only when suggestions are made to the effect that peaceful means can be employed. Third, the UN is the only organization that has the mandate, the procedures and the experience needed to carry through these operations. If left to other organizations it will not be preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping and should, consequently, be avoided.

Finally, there is much talk about peacekeeping forces in European politics these days. Contrary to the United Nations peacekeepers, these proposals are linked to military institutions such as NATO, the new French-German brigade, and the West-European Union, WEU. It is surprising that the Yugoslav crisis has not stimulated a discussion in Europe about genuine &endash; i.e., basically non-military, self-defending forces modelled upon the UN but set up by European countries. Should that change soon, Europe of course is another possible peacekeeper in the Balkans.

6) Trusteeship leading to a new kind of state at an agreed point in time

This could be a two-step process designed to secure an orderly development towards a new trust-based relationship between Serbs and Albanians.

The idea is roughly the following: Kosova should be given the status of a trusteeship to be administered by Serbia as the trust or mandatory under the supervision of the United Nations to facilitate its independence as a new type of state as soon as possible, but at a date agreed to in advance by the parties.

We emphasize that this idea fetches inspiration from the old trusteeship function of the League of Nations and later the UN. We do not in any way imply that the present Serbian-Kosovo Albanian relationship is similar to that between the former colonial powers and their colonies.

Articles 75-91 of the UN Charter deals with trusteeship. There is now a host of countries, areas and regions in the international system in which the situation merits creative re-thinking of the trusteeship idea and adaptation to contemporary circumstances. The goals and purposes of the trusteeship system, namely to further peace, political, economic and social progress towards self-government and to protect human rights fit well with the particular situation in Kosova.

The UN would not be the only possible supervisor of such a process. It could become a new task for the CSCE or a new conflict-resolution institution set up by all-Europe. In what follows, however, we refer to the UN.

A possible arrangement would work like this: the UN General Assembly and its Trusteeship Council supervises the process towards self-government for Kosova for which Serbia would be the main responsible, the trust. Both could place grievances before the UN and both would be visited regularly with UN teams monitoring progress towards the goals.

The UN would further monitor and perhaps mediate in negotiations between the parties to solve the problems concerning borders, future relations, sharing of national debt, profits and other benefits, and it would supervise the re-introduction of human rights and the re-establishment of the educational, industrial, social sectors and various state sectors.

It would be the stated purpose that Kosovo can not be annexed by any other state nor unified with any other state, while at the same time it would become a new self-governing but "different" state at the end of the period.

This would offer Serbia an alternative to repression or warfare, it would give it a feeling of security that Serbs in Kosovo would not be marginalized and the two would have full access to historical monuments and places which, one would imagine, could be turned over as mini-protectorates of Unesco, securing full access for Serbia to what it considers its historical "cradle."

Furthermore, Serbia as a trust would be granted a considerable influence on the modalities to apply and, through the UN, would be guaranteed that Kosovo would remain independent, non-militarized and neutral. On the other hand, of course, Serbia would de facto and de jure let Kosovo go - alas, a Kosovo with which it would have orderly, well-planned and mutually beneficial relations.

From the Kosovan point of view the trusteeship model will guarantee the freedom from Serbia at a fixed point in time and UN supervision of the process would guarantee that repression stops. The trusteeship period will permit the Kosovars to prepare themselves for governing their own affairs and develop mutually beneficial economic, political and legal relations with Serbia.

7) Condominium &endash; or more simple, immediate agreements

One could also imagine that the process would lead to an independent state of Kosova functioning, at least for a period, under a condominium. A condominium implies that the government of one state is controlled by two or more other states. In this case, one could imagine Yugoslavia and Albania.

Another vision builds on a more simple quid-pro-quo: Serbia would guarantee that the autonomous region status would be re-established and made irrevocable for, let's say, 20 years as a quid-pro-quo for an Albanian constitutional promise of not seeking secession. As part of such an agreement the parties would work out the modalities of peaceful coexistence and cooperation and decide when to start negotiations on the period after twenty years.

G) and F) could be combined with some kinds of international guarantees or observers.

Undoubtedly, the modalities of the trusteeship or condominium idea will have to be developed. We can only draw a sketch here. The important point is that there are several alternatives to be explored with an open mind.

In principle, it could have the advantage of inviting both parties into a framework for orderly conflict-resolution and confidence-building which will prevent outbreak of violence in the future and permit both to show flexibility without in any way be forced to lose face. Finally, it would combine well with some of the other measures mentioned in this section.

8) The context

As stated above, there can be no lasting solution outside a broader Yugoslav-Balkan framework. But of course, there are various levels to work at and there is a time for each type of conflict and problem to be solved. Thus, we emphasize that whatever particular solution can be found in this conflict, the process and the results should be tested in such a larger context. Are we likely, for instance, to see a confederation of Serbia, Montenegro, Voivodina, Sandjak and Kosovo? How does a particular solution in Kosovo interact with the structure and relations of the future between Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina? How will it influence, and be influenced, with the future of Macedonia and its relations with Albania and Greece? What are we likely to see happen in Albania which is bound to go through a very tough period of transformation?

How are developments in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina likely to influence the prospects for peaceful solutions to the Kosovo dilemmas? If Serbia is willing to let Kosovo go, under specific circumstances, will it be seen as natural that Croatia should also let Kraijna go under specific circumstances? Would such steps motivate Serbs and Croats to put more or less pressure behind particular solutions in Bosnia-Hercegovina where, while this is being written, the Croats with Croatian support have established Herzeg-Bosnia as a state community in parallel with what the Serbs did earlier?

Turkey is now a major actor in this region. With the recent establishment in Istanbul of a common market with 11 states and some 400 million people, could it be that the Balkans will undergo very substantial changes due to such rapid transformations next to it? Which new alliances will be built?

Finally, all these countries, regions and peoples will have to work together in the future, in transport, energy supply, environmental policies, trade, investments, etc. Can we help them start cooperative projects that will tie them together in ways that will make peaceful cooperation far more attractive than warfare?

We have no readymade answers. But because everything is related to everything else in former Yugoslavia, possible answers must be contemplated before decisive steps are taken. Also in the case of Kosovo.

9) Dividing Kosovo?

This proposal has been circulating for some time both in Belgrade and in Prishtina. It is most often taken to mean that the territory should be divided and a new border be drawn. We think that this type of solution is unfortunate. It is bound to lead to new conflicts &endash; not the least about where to draw the boundary. Neither is it likely to help solve the existing problem of mutual mistrust. It is likely, instead, to separate the Serbs and Albanians from each and would risk create problems like those already manifest in e.g. Croatian-Serbian relations.

If Kosovo is divided it will have to be as a consequence of referendum where people are freely choosing where they want to belong. If used in Kosovo, this institution would have to be used all over former Yugoslavia &endash; something which quite a few actors would not accept on what they consider their territory.

If a division should take place it should be a functional division. Imagine that Kosovo performed some functions which were particularly important to Serbia and vice versa, that joint ventures were built on a functional, comparative advantage and profits sharing.

The idea would be that, as time goes by, the two parties could become trustful because they perform functions highly useful to the other and, like in Åland's relations with Finland and the rest of the Nordic region, they would not contemplate using violence against each other. But, then, there would be no need to have hard rather than soft borders and create exclusive solutions based on a territorial division.

Appendices

A. Short background to the conflict in Kosovo

The present tense situation is related to events in the 1970s and early 1980s, and behind them there is a much longer and complex history which we cannot deal with in this short report.

In the 1974 Yugoslav constitution Kosovo was given autonomy almost to the extent that it functioned, for all practical purposes, as an independent republic. It had one vote in the republican decision-making bodies and proportionately exerted an influence on Serbian political affairs that was unparalleled in Serbia's influence over Kosovo.

The Albanians in Kosovo, however, insisted on secession and the establishment of their own republic. Some demanded unification with their motherland, Albania (ideally, also together with the Albanians in Macedonia).

Kosovo is the poorest region of ex-Yugoslavia, and one of the poorest in Europe. One type of explanation offered is that in spite of the fact that the Yugoslav redistribution fund in which money predominantly flowed from Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia to Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, a huge local bureaucracy squandered the resources. It spent a considerable part of the funds on stately private and public buildings in Prishtina, on buying out the Serbian businessmen and purchasing a considerable part of the land in neighbouring Macedonia. An alternative explanation, offered by others, is that Kosovo is still so poor because its natural resources &endash; which are abundant particularly in mining industry in and around Metrovica where the Trepca mining industry complex, one of the largest in Europe, is situated &endash; have been extracted to the benefit of all the other republics, their value underpriced and labour underpaid or not paid at all.

Most likely there is some truth to both general explanations.

Today's socio-economic statistics are far from perfectly reliable, but in grosso modo they speak for themselves. On the next page follow some illustrative figures.

In socio-economic terms, Kosovo today is a double class society for both Serbs and Albanians. There is a Serbian upper and under class and there is an Albanian upper and under class. The social misery with the large underprivileged, predominantly Albanian, segments of Kosovo's population is appalling.

Kosovo became an autonomous province (like Voivodina) in 1974. A major feature in the conflict with Serbia was that various political groups, predominantly consisting of students and professors from the considerable Albanian intelligentsia, expressed their nationalist discontent. At least some of them argued for the creation of an independent state and unification with Albania. By the Serbs, but even by the political establishment in other parts of Yugoslavia, this was seen as a threat to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, as "organizing against the people and the state." Thousands were arrested and many people were detained and imprisoned for years and some non-violent demonstrations met with violence.

Social unrest lead by students and workers exploded in 1981 and was repressed immediately by Belgrade. The Minority Rights Group in London states in a recent analysis that as many as 7.000 Albanians have been arrested and imprisoned in Kosovo for nationalist activity since 1981. Sources vary again but most seem to offer the figure of 1.000 killed in 1981, predominantly Albanians.

The Serbian side has alleged that "genocide" took place. This seems to be an exaggeration but around 30.000 Serbs and Montenegrins seem to have left Kosovo between 1971 and 1981 and continued to do so in large numbers, complaining of physical attacks and intimidation. The ever deepening economic crisis of the region likewise forced many to leave.

From 1988, the Serbian nationalist sentiments growing under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic and set focus on Kosovo. Tension grew because of a series of incidents and provocations, troops were sent into Kosovo in 1989 and Albanians expelled from all important administrative jobs, successively also from the social and educational sector and even from employment in industry and services. Increasingly Serbia took control and Albanians Slovene and Croat contingents withdrew from the federal militia units.

Selected socio-economic facts

• According to official estimates Kosovo's population ranges about 2 million or 9% of former Yugoslavia (the same proportion as Serbs make up in Kosovo). The Albanians who make up around 90% (with Serbs around 10%) did not participate in the last census but claim the Albanian population to be larger. The 1981 census which is the only reasonably reliable one gave the following figures: total population 1,584.441, Albanians 1.226,736 (77%) and Serbs 209.497 (13%), others 148.208 (9%) such as Montenegrin, Turkish, Muslim and Romani populations.

• Over time the proportion of Albanians has increased &endash; from 67% in 1961 &endash; while there has also been a considerable emigration of Albanians out of Kosovo; thus, Albanian sources estimate that 250.000 to have left in the period 1975-1988 and 200.000 during 1989-1991. Demographic estimates by the Albanians suggest that in twenty years there will be 10 million Albanians in the Balkans.

• Over time the proportion of Serbs has decreased. The Serbs made up 24% of the population in 1961, 13% in 1981, and around or less than 10% today; they claim that repression has made life basically unattractive, if not impossible, in Kosovo. Likewise, the region's economic stagnation made it attractive to leave.

• The Kosova Helsinki Committee claims that the birth rate and the infant mortality rate are the highest in Europe, although figures vary. More than 50% of the people are below 20 years of age and the average age is 24.

• While Kosovo accounts for approximately 9% of the population of Yugoslavia, its gross national income is less than 2% of former Yugoslavia's.

• If we take GNP per capita in Kosovo to be 100, that of Slovenia in 1984 was 766, Croatia 478, Serbia without Voivodina and Kosovo 375 and Macedonia 249.

• Unemployment is much higher here than in any other part of Yugoslavia which means that only approximately 12% of Kosovo's population are employed today while the unemployment as proportion of the labour force was estimated in 1988 to be 55%. (That is, when Albanians started to be forced out of their occupations.) While the unemployment rate in the 1970s for, let's say, Slovenia was around 3% it was 30% in Kosovo.

• The illiteracy level is well above 20%.

• It is estimated that about 400.000 Albanian pupils of all levels are out of the educational system at the moment.

• Only 41% of the population of Kosovo is connected to the water supply system and only 28% are connected to the sewage system.

In May 1990 all Albanians left Kosovo's government in protest. When trying to block the new Serbian constitution which abolished the autonomy of Kosovo, they were barred from entrance and &endash; in response &endash; adopted a declaration of self-determination for Kosovo. In September 1990 Kosovo deputies met in Kacanak and adopted a new constitution proclaiming Kosova an equal republic in the Yugoslav federation and stating that it is a democratic state of Albanians and national minorities such as Serbs, Turks, Romanies and others living in Kosovo. The act was condemned as criminal by Belgrade.

A later referendum held in Kosovo has shown an overwhelming majority (87% of the votes) in favour of independence from Serbia and on May 24, 1992 free multiparty elections were held with some international observers present. The Democratic League of Kosova won a great majority of the seats and its president, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, became president of the Republic of Kosova. Although this process was, largely, only met with verbal condemnations and some Serbian police harassment, the first session of the new assembly was effectively prevented from taking place on June 26 by Serbian police forces.

B. The perceptions and strategies of the parties

The general Serbian view

Many would argue that it is impossible to describe an "official" or general view of the parties' perception that does justice to the variety found at the individual level. But without an attempt to do so, the reader will not be able to understand what this conflict is about. Therefore, we offer the following description of attitudes and viewpoints that we have met frequently.

The general Serbian view can be summarized in this way:

The Albanians in Kosovo were granted the best of possible constitutional rights, an autonomy so comprehensive that everything was possible except leaving Yugoslavia. The demand for an independent republic and the advocacy by various political circles that the goal must be unification with Albania undermined all confidence and was seen in Belgrade as a lack of loyalty endangering the unity of Yugoslavia as a state. It simply had to be stopped.

Strikes and riots developed and an increasing number of local Serbs were maltreated and economic underdevelopment just grew worse. Serbian investigators claim that Serbs and Montenegrins left due to political and administrative pressures and harassment from Albanian administrative, political and political authorities, particularly in overwhelmingly Albanian areas. Serbs felt that they had little to do but to leave Kosovo. Belgrade had to enforce tight control.

That Kosovo is "the cradle of Serbia," i.e. the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom, cannot be disputed and there is no way in which it can be separated from Serbia.

Thus, it is the nationalist and secessionist character of the Kosovo Albanian movement and its claims for Kosovo's unification with Albania that explains and legitimizes the control Serbia now exerts in order to protect and support the Serbian minority and its rights in Kosovo. Not only have Serbs been forced to leave but the high birth rate of the Albanians is also deliberately used as a political power tool. Apart from that, Albanians from Albania immigrated to Kosovo in large numbers.

True, they may say, Albanians have been kicked out but it is not true that they have been so because they were forced to declare their loyalty with Belgrade. Many have also simply refused to cooperate, left the parliament, their work places and schools as a deliberate protesting strategy, as a non-cooperation tactic. Likewise, as a part of this non-cooperation policy, the Albanians have refused to participate in census and elections. Furthermore, Albanians have tried to build anti-Serbian alliances with the Slovenes and Croats.

The general view, by the way, is repeated by the new prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milan Panic, who was quoted on July 7, 1992 for stating that no compromise conducive to secession of Kosovo, was acceptable and that national minorities should be given all the rights envisaged by international conventions, but not the right to secede.

The Albanian general view

The Albanian general view can be described in this manner:

True, many of the most important Orthodox monuments and Serbia's history are related to Kosovo, but so is the history of Albanians. They are the only remaining direct descendants of the Illyrians who are believed to have settled in the Balkan peninsula around 1000 BC.

The Albanian nation has been split and live now in Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and, of course, in Albania. Like anyone else the Albanian nation has a right, with peaceful means, to work for unification.

Albanian students and many others, such as journalists and the police, have been thrown out by the Serbian administrators. All rights have been taken away and today Kosovo is virtually an apartheid system or a colonial system barring every one of Albanian origin from participating in normal social life. Almost every citizen has a direct or indirect experience with more or less brutal treatment by Serbian police or other authorities.

Although the Albanians increase proportionately in Kosovo, it is not true that Serbs have been victimized by oppression and their rights are fully guaranteed in the new constitution of the Republic of Kosova. Albanians want peaceful co-existence and not an ethnically cleaned Kosova.

However, the general Albanian view would be, after the systematic social war Serbia has carried out on the Kosova Albanian people since 1981 and after having abolished the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, there is no way in which Albanians will, in the future, accept a new similar autonomy. Although the autonomous status might have been acceptable then, they would not be satisfied with its re-introduction today. They will simply never accept anything that can be taken away from them ever again by the Serbs or anyone else.

The leadership and people in Kosovo will only use non-violent means to achieve their goals, something which is remarkable considering the warrior tradition that the Albanians themselves acknowledge.

Albanians make a distinction between Serbs who have traditionally lived in Kosovo and who "know the truth" and those Serbs who have come down from Belgrade as the extended power holders and substitute workers.

Albanian strategy

According to the Albanians in Kosovo there is a need for creating parallel institutions, street or apartment schools, private Albanian-operated health care facilities. It is an almost Gandhian nonviolence strategy building on suffering, enduring suffering to persuade the other side that he is doing wrong. At the same time they develop the desired "underground" society which a) cannot be repressed and b) will secure that everything is in place the day independence becomes possible, c) creates sympathy with the international community and puts the repression in perspective. In addition, d) the nonviolent stance represents no threat but should a war break out, the world can see that Albanians did not start it.

It is important to point out that the Albanian political and social strategy has lead to the establishment of an alternative national leadership through elections, the establishment of a parliament and various governmental bodies, independent unions, health care, schooling, and, to some extent, foreign diplomacy.

The finances seem to derive from three sources &endash; a) quite some Albanians are business people and have undoubtedly accumulated a surplus wealth over the years, b) Albanians living abroad supply a considerable surplus and c) the culturally based family system builds on solidarity, self-help, strong loyalties, duties and obligations.

This overall strategy should not be ignored when discussing what can be done in terms of preventive diplomacy in the future. It could be added that part of the strategy is to be eager to speak with foreigners and communicate with the international society in low-budget ways such as extensive use of fax messages.

Serbian strategy

On the Serbian side, in Prishtina as well in Belgrade, a similar information policy has not been identified. It is our hypothesis that Serbian officials here see the Kosovo issue as an entirely internal matter and, consequently, see no important purpose in informing the world about their views. Second, it seems that those who know about the current Serbian repression are aware that it is actually counterproductive, but see no other ways out of this deadlocked conflict.

In addition, it is our impression that few Serbs are sufficiently aware of the repression in Kosovo, that many have either never been there or have not visited the region for years. Likewise, we found it comparatively difficult to identify officials in Belgrade, not to speak of Serbian administrators in Prishtina, who were willing or able to give interviews and supply systematic information about the official long-term goals and strategy of the Serbian side.

It is not easy to discern a coherent long-term Serbian strategy specifying what shall be achieved by the present repression in the region. To increase the proportion of Serbs living in Kosovo, of course, is one goal, But it does not seem to enjoy much success. To show force and determination and thereby seek to break the political morale of the Albanians there may be another. A third may be simply to keep the situation undecided as long as the Serbian leadership has to be more attentive to other conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia. Also, Kosovo plays a more important symbolic and historical role in internal Serbian politics than do, for example, the Kraijna problem.

The government in Belgrade have offered to start negotiations several times. However, according to Albanian officials there have been too little time to prepare, to short time to discuss, or preconditions have, as they see it, been unacceptable.

There have also been a few non-governmental attempts to get a negotiation process started in 1992. Intellectuals have met, parts of the Serbian opposition and Albanians in Kosovo (and Serbs and Montenegrins) have participated in roundtable discussions. However, on both sides there seems to exist a considerable risk that those who have a dialogue with the other side are considered traitors. Albanians in Kosovo regret repeatedly that the Belgrade opposition, in their view, has not mounted a struggle with their government in support of Kosovo's independence.