On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated air attacks on Yugoslavia (a federation of two
republics, Serbia and Montenegro) in order to impose a peace agreement in the Serbian
province of Kosovo, which has an ethnic Albanian majority. The Clinton Administration has
not formally withdrawn its standing insistence that Belgrade sign the peace agreement,
which would entail the deployment in Kosovo of some 28,000 NATO ground troops -- including
4,000 Americans -- to police the settlement. But in recent days the Clinton public line
has shifted to a demand that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic halt the offensive he
has launched in Kosovo, which has led to a growing humanitarian crisis in the region,
before there can be a stop to the bombing campaign.
One week into the bombing campaign, there is widespread discussion of options for
further actions. One option includes forging a closer relationship between the United
States and a controversial group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group which has been
cited in unofficial reports for alleged ties to drug cartels and Islamic terrorist
organizations. This paper will examine those allegations in the context of the currently
unfolding air campaign.
Results of Week One
The air assault is a product of a Clinton policy, which for months has been directed
toward intervention in Kosovo, in either the form of the use of air power or of the
introduction of a peacekeeping ground force -- or of air power followed by a ground force.
[For details on the turbulent history of Kosovo and of the direction of Clinton policy
leading to the current air campaign, see: RPC's "Senate to Vote Today on
Preventing Funding of Military Operations in Kosovo: Airstrikes Likely This Week,"
3/23/99; "Bombing, or
Ground Troops -- or Both: Clinton Kosovo Intervention Appears Imminent," 2/22/99;
and "Bosnia II: The Clinton
Administration Sets Course for NATO Intervention in Kosovo," 8/12/98.] Just hours
before the first bombs fell, the Senate voted 58 to 41 (with 38 Republicans voting in the
negative) to authorize air and missile strikes against Yugoslavia (S. Con. Res. 21). The
Senate then approved by voice vote a second resolution expressing support for members of
the U.S. Armed Forces engaged in military operations against Yugoslavia (S. Res. 74).
Prior to the air campaign, the stated goal of Clinton policy, as noted above, was
Belgrade's acceptance of the peace agreement signed by the Kosovo Albanian delegation
(which included representatives of the KLA) on March 17. Now, more than a week into the
air campaign, that goal appears even more elusive as the NATO attack has rallied Serbian
resistance to what they see as an unjustified foreign aggression.
Since the NATO bombing campaign began, Serbian security forces also have intensified an
offensive in Kosovo that began as the airstrikes appeared inevitable. According to
numerous media reports, tens of thousands of Albanians are fleeing the Serb army, and
police forces and paramilitary groups that, based on credible allegations, are committing
widespread atrocities, including summary executions, burnings of Albanian villages, and
assassination of human rights activists and community leaders. Allied officials have
denounced the apparently deliberate forced exodus of Albanian civilians as ethnic
cleansing and even genocide. But according to some refugee accounts, the NATO bombing is
also a factor in the exodus: "[M]ost residents of the provincial capital say they are
leaving of their own accord and are not being forced out at gunpoint, as residents of
several western cities and villages in Kosovo say has been happening to them. . . .
Pristina residents who made it to Macedonia said their city is still largely intact,
despite the targeting of ethnic Albanian businesses by Serbian gangs and several direct
hits from NATO air strikes in the city center" ["Cause of Kosovar Exodus from
Pristina Disputed: Serbs Are Forcing Exit, Some Claim; Others Go on Own,"
Washington Times, 3/31/99].
At the same time, the Clinton Administration, consistent with its track record on
Kosovo, has ignored credible but unconfirmed evidence from sources not connected to
Milosevic's Serbian government that the NATO campaign has resulted in far more civilian
damage than has been acknowledged.
Making Things Worse?
The Clinton Administration and NATO officials flatly reject any suggestion that their
policy has exacerbated an already bad situation on the ground in Kosovo. With neighboring
Albania and Macedonia in danger of being destabilized by a flood of refugees, questions
are being raised about NATO's ability to continue the campaign unless positive results are
evident soon:
"With critics arguing that the NATO campaign has made things worse, the alliance
must slow the Serbs' onslaught or watch public support and alliance unity unravel. U.S.
and NATO officials angrily rebutted the critics, arguing that Mr. Milosevic, the Serbian
leader, and his forces were already on the rampage before NATO strikes began."
["NATO Is Set to Target Sites in Belgrade," Wall Street Journal, 3/29/99]
If the immediate NATO goal has now shifted to stopping the Serb offensive in Kosovo,
observers point to three likely options [WSJ, 3/29/99]:
"Option One is to continue the air campaign, increasingly targeting Serb
frontline troops [in Kosovo], but it could be days before the onslaught is really
slowed." This option, which NATO has already begun to implement, is likely to entail
greater risk to NATO aircraft and crews, due to the lower and slower flightpaths needed to
deliver tactical strikes. Still, most observers doubt the offensive can be halted with air
power alone. Late reports indicate increased bombing of targets in Belgrade, the capital
of both the Yugoslav federation and the Serbian republic.
"Option Two is to start considering intervening on the ground." In
recent days, the Clinton Administration has begun to shift its position on NATO ground
troops from a categorical assurance that ground troops would go in only to police a
peace settlement to hints that they might, depending on some unspecified
"conditions," be introduced into a combat environment. For example, in comments
on March 28, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry Shelton suggested that certain
"assessments" had been made, but that there was as yet no political agreement on
ground troops:
"There have been assessments made, but those assessments were based on varying
conditions that existed in Kosovo... At this point in time, there are no plans per se
to introduce ground troops." [NBC's "Meet the Press," 3/28/99]
"Option Three: arming the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army to carry the
war on the ground while NATO continues it from the air." This option, which would
make NATO the overt air force of the KLA, would also dash any possibility of a solution
that would not result in a change in Balkan borders, perhaps setting off a round of
widespread regional instability. Clinton Administrations officials have begun to suggest
that independence may now be justified in view of the Serb offensive. The KLA has been
explicit in its determination to not only achieve an independent Kosovo but to
"liberate" Albanian-inhabited areas of Montenegro (including the Montenegrin
capital, Podgorica), Macedonia (including the Macedonian capital, Skopje), and parts of
northern Greece; most of these areas were in fact annexed to Albania under Axis occupation
during World War II. (For a visual representation of the areas claimed by the KLA, see the
map at the website of the pro-KLA Albanian-American Civic League at www.aacl.com
Note that arming and training the KLA, as called for in Option Three, would highlight
serious questions about the nature of the KLA and of the Clinton Administration's
relationship with it.
The KLA: from 'Terrorists' to 'Partners'
The Kosovo Liberation Army "began on the radical fringe of Kosovar Albanian
politics, originally made up of diehard Marxist-Leninists (who were bankrolled in the old
days by the Stalinist dictatorship next door in Albania) as well as by descendants of the
fascist militias raised by the Italians in World War II" ["Fog of War -- Coping
With the Truth About Friend and Foe: Victims Not Quite Innocent," New York Times,
3/28/99]. The KLA made its military debut in February 1996 with the bombing of several
camps housing Serbian refugees from wars in Croatia and Bosnia [Jane's Intelligence
Review, 10/1/96]. The KLA (again according to the highly regarded Jane's,)
"does not take into consideration the political or economic importance of its
victims, nor does it seem at all capable of seriously hurting its enemy, the Serbian
police and army. Instead, the group has attacked Serbian police and civilians arbitrarily
at their weakest points. It has not come close to challenging the region's balance of
military power" [Jane's, 10/1/96].
The group expanded its operations with numerous attacks through 1996 but was given a
major boost with the collapse into chaos of neighboring Albania in 1997, which afforded
unlimited opportunities for the introduction of arms into Kosovo from adjoining areas of
northern Albania, which are effectively out of the control of the Albanian government in
Tirana. From its inception, the KLA has targeted not only Serbian security forces, who may
be seen as legitimate targets for a guerrilla insurgency, but Serbian and Albanian
civilians as well.
In view of such tactics, the Clinton Administration's then-special envoy for Kosovo,
Robert Gelbard, had little difficulty in condemning the KLA (also known by its Albanian
initials, UCK) in terms comparable to those he used for Serbian police repression:
" 'The violence we have seen growing is incredibly dangerous,' Gelbard said. He
criticized violence 'promulgated by the (Serb) police' and condemned the actions of an
ethnic Albanian underground group Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) which has claimed
responsibility for a series of attacks on Serb targets. 'We condemn very strongly
terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a terrorist group,'
Gelbard said." [Agence France Presse, 2/23/98]
Mr. Gelbard's remarks came just before a KLA attack on a Serbian police station led to
a retaliation that left dozens of Albanians dead, leading in turn to a rapid escalation of
the cycle of violence. Responding to criticism that his earlier remarks might have been
seen as Washington's "green light" to Belgrade that a crack-down on the KLA
would be acceptable, Mr. Gelbard offered to clarify to the House Committee on
International Relations:
"Questioned by lawmakers today on whether he still considered the group a
terrorist organization, Mr. Gelbard said that while it has committed 'terrorist acts,' it
has 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization.'
" [New York Times, 3/13/98]
The situation in Kosovo has since been transformed: what were once sporadic cases of
KLA attacks and often heavy-handed and indiscriminate Serbian responses has now become a
full-scale guerrilla war. That development appeared to be a vindication of what may have
been the KLA's strategy of escalating the level of violence to the point where outside
intervention would become a distinct possibility. Given the military imbalance, there is
reason to believe the KLA -- which is now calling for the introduction of NATO ground
troops into Kosovo [Associated Press, 3/27/99] -- may have always expected to
achieve its goals less because of the group's own prospects for military success than
because of a hoped-for outside intervention: As one fighter put it, "We hope that
NATO will intervene, like it did in Bosnia, to save us" ["Both Sides in the
Kosovo Conflict Seem Determined to Ignore Reality," New York Times, 6/22/98].
By early 1999, the Clinton Administration had completely staked the success of its
Kosovo policy on either the acceptance by both sides of a pre-drafted peace agreement that
would entail a NATO ground occupation of Kosovo, or, if the Albanians signed the agreement
while Belgrade refused, bombing of the Serbs. By committing itself so tightly to those two
alternatives, the Clinton Administration left itself with as little flexibility as it had
offered the Albanians and the Serbs.
At that point for the Administration, cultivating the goodwill of the KLA -- as the
most extreme element on the Albanian side, and the element which had the weapons capable
of sinking any diplomatic initiative -- became an absolute imperative:
"In order to get the Albanians'... acceptance [of the peace plan], Ms. Albright
offered incentives intended to show that Washington is a friend of Kosovo...Officers in
the Kosovo Liberation Army would . . . be sent to the United States for training in
transforming themselves from a guerrilla group into a police force or a political entity,
much like the African National Congress did in South Africa." [New York Times,
2/24/99]
The Times' comparison of treatment of the KLA with that of the African National
Congress (ANC) -- a group with its own history of terror attacks on political opponents,
including members of the ethnic group it claims to represent -- is a telling one. In fact,
it points to the seemingly consistent Clinton policy of cultivating relationships with
groups known for terrorist violence -- not only the ANC, but the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) -- in what may be a strategy of
attempting to wean away a group from its penchant for violence by adopting its cause as an
element of U.S. policy.
By the time the NATO airstrikes began, the Clinton Administration's partnership with
the KLA was unambiguous:
"With ethnic Albanian Kosovars poised to sign a peace accord later Thursday, the
United States is moving quickly to help transform the Kosovo Liberation Army from a
rag-tag band of guerrilla fighters into a political force. . . . Washington clearly sees
it as a main hope for the troubled province's future. 'We want to develop a good
relationship with them as they transform themselves into a politically-oriented
organization,' deputy State Department spokesman James Foley said. 'We want to develop
closer and better ties with this organization.'
"A strong signal of this is the deference with which U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright treats the Kosovar Albanians' chief negotiator Hashim Thaci, a
30-year-old KLA commander. Albright dispatched her top aide and spokesman James Rubin to
Paris earlier this week to meet with Thaci and personally deliver to him an invitation for
members of his delegation to visit the United States. Rubin, who will attend the ceremony
at which the Kosovar Albanians will sign the accord, is expected to then return to
Washington with five members of the delegation, including Thaci. Thaci and Rubin have
developed a 'good rapport' during the Kosovo crisis, according to U.S. officials who note
that Thaci was the main delegate they convinced to sign the agreement even though the
Serbs have refused to do so. [ . . . ]
" '[W]e believe that we have a lot of advice and a lot of help that we can provide
to them if they become precisely the kind of political actor we would like to see them
become.' Foley stressed that the KLA would not be allowed to continue as a military force
but would have the chance to move forward in their quest for self government under a
'different context.' 'If we can help them and they want us to help them in that effort of
transformation, I think it's nothing that anybody can argue with.' "
Such an effusive embrace by top Clinton Administration officials of an organization
that only a year ago one of its own top officials labeled as "terrorist" is, to
say the least, a startling development.
Even more importantly, the new Clinton/KLA partnership may obscure troubling
allegations about the KLA that the Clinton Administration has thus far neglected to
address.
Charges of Drugs, Islamic Terror -- and a Note on Sources
No observer doubts that the large majority of fighters that have flocked to the KLA
during the past year or so (since it began large-scale military operations) are ordinary
Kosovo Albanians who desire what they see as the liberation of their homeland from foreign
rule. But that fact -- which amounts to a claim of innocence by association -- does not
fully explain the KLA's uncertain origins, political program, sources of funding, or
political alliances.
Among the most troubling aspects of the Clinton Administration's effective alliance
with the KLA are numerous reports from reputable unofficial sources -- including the
highly respected Jane's publications -- that the KLA is closely involved with:
- The extensive Albanian crime network that extends throughout Europe and into North
America, including allegations that a major portion of the KLA finances are derived from
that network, mainly proceeds from drug trafficking; and
- Terrorist organizations motivated by the ideology of radical Islam, including assets of
Iran and of the notorious Osama bin-Ladin -- who has vowed a global terrorist war against
Americans and American interests.
The final two sections of this paper give samples of these reports. (Many of these
reports are available in full at www.siri-us.com, the website of an independent think tank
called the Strategic Issues Research Institute of the United States, under
"Background Issues".) In presenting samples of such reports for the
consideration of Republican Senators and staff, RPC does not claim that these reports
constitute conclusive evidence of the KLA's drug or terror ties. Nor are these reports
necessarily conclusive as to the policy advisability of the Clinton Administration's
support for that organization. They do, however, raise serious questions about the context
in which decisions regarding American policy in the Balkans are being made by the Clinton
Administration.
All of these sources are unclassified and unconnected to official agencies of the U.S.
government, although some quote sources in intelligence agencies. Possible objections
could be raised that the relevant U.S. government agencies may not have made available
similar reports concerning the KLA. While it is not possible to discuss, in the context of
this paper, what information is or is not available from classified sources, the author of
this paper offers what he regards as two helpful observations. First, one should recognize
that the absence of reporting on a given topic may indicate that the information has not
been obtained, assembled, or disseminated by the agencies in question, but not necessarily
that it does not exist. That is, silence by official sources does not constitute disproof
of unofficial sources. The second and more troubling observation is that the Clinton
Administration has demonstrated, to an unprecedented degree, an unfortunate tendency -- in
some cases possibly involving an improper politicization of traditionally non-political
government agencies -- to manage or conceal inconvenient information that might call into
question some of its policies. Examples of this tendency include:
China espionage: Numerous critics have faulted the Clinton Administration's
less-than-forthcoming attitude towards the investigation of possible negligence regarding
Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear secrets; obstruction efforts may have included misuse of the
classification process. [For details, see RPC's "Contradictions Abound: Did the
Administration Respond 'Vigorously' to Chinese Nuclear Espionage?" 3/24/99; "The
Public Record: China's Theft of U.S. Nuclear Secrets," 3/12/99; and
"Commentators Hit Clinton Administration on Nuclear Technology Theft and Suspicious
China Ties," 3/12/99.] The effectiveness of the current Kosovo crisis in getting the
China espionage scandal off Page 1 has not gone unnoticed: "In the days leading up to
the initiation of hostilities with Serbia, it had become increasingly apparent that the
usual administration damage control techniques (official denials, misleading statements,
obstruction of inquiries, attacks on the accusers, etc.) were not working in the face of
cascading revelations that the Clinton team had abysmally failed to address [Chinese]
penetration of America's nuclear weapons laboratories.... The only option: change the
subject, regardless of the cost in American lives, national treasure, and long-term
interests" [Frank Gaffney, Jr., Center for Security Policy, "Hidden Trigger on
Guns of Intervention?" Washington Times, 3/30/99].
Mexico drug certification: The Clinton Administration has consistently certified
that Mexican authorities are cooperating with U.S. anti-drug efforts -- despite strong
evidence to the contrary. [See, for example, Los Angeles Times, 3/25/99; Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 2/27/99; and The San Francisco Chronicle, 2/26/99].
Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia: The Clinton Administration concealed its
active cooperation with the Iranians for arms shipments to the Muslim fundamentalist
regime of Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia in violation of the United Nations arms embargo on
the former Yugoslavia. [For details on the Clinton Administration's active connivance with
the Iranians, see RPC's "Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia
into Militant Islamic Base," 1/16/97.] This track record undermines the Clinton
Administration's insistence that Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council, is obligated to observe the same embargo with respect to Serbia [as stated by
State Department spokesman James Rubin, daily briefing, March 24, 1999].
Eradication of the Serbs in Krajina: The Clinton Administration has stalled
efforts to investigate what has been called the "biggest ethnic cleansing" of
the Balkan wars, one which the Clinton Administration may itself have helped to
facilitate:
"Investigators at the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague have
concluded that the Croatian Army carried out summary executions, indiscriminate shelling
of civilian populations and 'ethnic cleansing' during a 1995 assault that was a turning
point in the Balkan wars, according to tribunal documents. The investigators have
recommended that three Croatian generals be indicted, and an American official said this
week that the indictments could come within a few weeks. . . . Any indictment of Croatian
Army generals could prove politically troublesome for the Clinton Administration, which
has a delicate relationship with Croatia, an American ally in preserving the peace in
Bosnia with a poor human rights record. The August 1995 Croatian offensive, which drove
some 100,000 Serbs from a large swath of Croatia over four days, was carried out with the
tacit blessing of the United States by a Croatian Army that had been schooled in part by a
group of retired American military officers. Questions still remain about the full extent
of United States involvement. In the course of the three-year investigation into the
assault, the United States has failed to provide critical evidence requested by the
tribunal, according to tribunal documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some
there that Washington is uneasy about the investigation. Two senior Canadian military
officers, for example, who were in Croatia during the offensive, testified that the
assault, in which some 3,000 shells rained down on the city of Knin over 48 hours, was
indiscriminate and targeted civilians. . . . A section of the tribunal's 150-page report
is headed: 'The Indictment. Operation Storm, A Prima Facie Case.': 'During the course of
the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces and special police committed numerous
violations of international humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of
Knin and other cities,' the report says. 'During, and in the 100 days following the
military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and many hundreds
disappeared.' The crimes also included looting and burning, the report says."
["War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops 'Cleansed' the Serbs," New York Times,
3/21/99]
The Krajina episode -- the largest in the recent Yugoslav wars, at least until this
week in Kosovo -- exposes the hypocrisy of the Clinton claims as to why intervention in
Kosovo is a humanitarian imperative:
"Within four days, the Croatians drove out 150,000 Serbs, the largest [until this
week] ethnic cleansing of the entire Balkan wars. Investigators in the Hague have
concluded that this campaign was carried out with brutality, wanton murder, and
indiscriminate shelling of civilians. . . . Krajina is Kosovo writ large. And yet, at the
same time, the U.S. did not stop or even protest the Croatian action. The Clinton
Administration tacitly encouraged it." [Charles Krauthammer, "The Clinton
Doctrine," Time magazine, 4/5/99]
In short, the absence of official confirmation of the reports cited below can hardly be
considered the last word in the matter. And given this Administration's record, one might
treat with some degree of skepticism even a flat denial of KLA drug and terror ties --
which thus far has not been offered. As the Clinton Administration searches for new
options in its Kosovo policy, these reports about KLA should not be lightly dismissed.
Reports on KLA Drug and Criminal Links
Elements informally known as the "Albanian mafia," composed largely of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo, have for several years been a feature of the criminal underworld in
a number of cities in Europe and North America; they have been particularly prominent in
the trade in illegal narcotics. [See, for example,"The Albanian Cartel: Filling the
Crime Void," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1995.] The cities where the
Albanian cartels are located are also fertile ground for fundraising for support of the
Albanian cause in Kosovo. [See, for example, "Albanians in Exile Send Millions of
Dollars to Support the KLA," BBC, 3/12/99.]
The reported link between drug activities and arms purchases for anti-Serb Albanian
forces in Kosovo predates the formation of the KLA, and indeed, may be seen as a key
resource that allowed the KLA to establish itself as a force in the first place:
"Narcotics smuggling has become a prime source of financing for civil wars already
under way -- or rapidly brewing -- in southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean,
according to a report issued here this week. The report, by the Paris-based Observatoire
Geopolitique des Drogues, or Geopolitical Observatory of Drugs, identifies belligerents in
the former Yugoslav republics and Turkey as key players in the region's accelerating
drugs-for-arms traffic. Albanian nationalists in ethnically tense Macedonia and the
Serbian province of Kosovo have built a vast heroin network, leading from the opium fields
of Pakistan to black-market arms dealers in Switzerland, which transports up to $2 billion
worth of the drug annually into the heart of Europe, the report says. More than 500 Kosovo
or Macedonian Albanians are in prison in Switzerland for drug- or arms-trafficking
offenses, and more than 1,000 others are under indictment. The arms are reportedly
stockpiled in Kosovo for eventual use against the Serbian government in Belgrade, which
imposed a violent crackdown on Albanian autonomy advocates in the province five years
ago." ["Separatists Supporting Themselves with Traffic in Narcotics," San
Francisco Chronicle, 6/10/94]
At the same time, many Albanians in the diaspora have made voluntary contributions to
the KLA and are offended at suggestions of drug money funding of that organization:
"Nick Ndrejaj, who retired from the real estate business, lives on a pension in
Daytona Beach, Fla. But the retiree has managed to scrape up some money to send to the
Kosovo Liberation Army, the rebel force that is opposing Yugoslav strongman Slobodan
Milosevic. 'It's hard, but we have had to do this all our lives,' says the elderly man.
Mr. Ndrejaj is one of many Albanians in America who are sending all they can spare to aid
their beleaguered compatriots in central Europe. The disaster in Kosovo is uniting the
minority into a major fund-raising and congressional lobbying effort. [ . . . ]
"Typical of the donors is Agim Jusufi, a building superintendent on Manhattan's
West Side. Mr. Jusufi gets a weekly paycheck. He describes himself as an ordinary 'working
man.' However, he has donated $5,000 to the KLA. 'It is always stressed that we should
donate when we can,' he says, 'We are in a grave moment, so we are raising money.' Jusufi
bridles over reports that drug money funds the KLA. There has been an Albanian
organized-crime element involved in the drug trade for decades. But, he says, in this
country, the money comes from hard-working immigrants. 'We have canceled checks to prove
it,' he says. " ["Pulling Political and Purse Strings," Christian
Science Monitor, 3/31/99]
Without access to the KLA's ledgers, it is hard to estimate what part of the group's
funds might come from legitimate sources and what part from drugs. One unnamed
intelligence source puts the percentage of drug money in the KLA's coffers at one-half
["Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels," The Times (London), 3/24/99].
The following is a sample of the reports linking the KLA to funding by narcotics-smuggling
crime organizations:
"The Kosovo Liberation Army, which has won the support of the West for its
guerrilla struggle against the heavy armour of the Serbs, is a Marxist-led force funded by
dubious sources, including drug money. That is the judgment of senior police officers
across Europe. An investigation by The Times has established that police forces in three
Western European countries, together with Europol, the European police authority, are
separately investigating growing evidence that drug money is funding the KLA's leap from
obscurity to power. The financing of the Kosovo guerrilla war poses critical questions and
it sorely tests claims to an 'ethical' foreign policy. Should the West back a guerrilla
army that appears to be partly financed by organised crime? Could the KLA's need for funds
be fuelling the heroin trade across Europe? . . . As well as diverting charitable
donations from exiled Kosovans, some of the KLA money is thought to come from drug
dealing. Sweden is investigating suspicions of a KLA drug connection. 'We have
intelligence leading us to believe that there could be a connection between drug money and
the Kosovo Liberation Army,' said Walter Kege, head of the drug enforcement unit in the
Swedish police intelligence service. Supporting intelligence has come from other states.
'We have yet to find direct evidence, but our experience tells us that the channels for
trading hard drugs are also used for weapons,' said one Swiss police commander. . . . One
Western intelligence report quoted by Berliner Zeitung says that DM900 million has reached
Kosovo since the guerrillas began operations and half the sum is said to be illegal drug
money. In particular, European countries are investigating the Albanian connection:
whether Kosovan Albanians living primarily in Germany and Switzerland are creaming off the
profits from inner-city heroin dealing and sending the cash to the KLA. Albania -- which
plays a key role in channelling money to the Kosovans -- is at the hub of Europe's drug
trade. An intelligence report which was prepared by Germany's Federal Criminal Agency
concluded: 'Ethnic Albanians are now the most prominent group in the distribution of
heroin in Western consumer countries.' Europol, which is based in The Hague, is preparing
a report for European interior and justice ministers on a connection between the KLA and
Albanian drug gangs. Police in the Czech Republic recently tracked down a Kosovo Albanian
drug dealer named Doboshi who had escaped from a Norwegian prison where he was serving 12
years for heroin trading. A raid on Doboshi's apartment turned up documents linking him
with arms purchases for the KLA." ["Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo
Rebels," The Times (London), 3/24/99]
"Western intelligence agencies believe the UCK [KLA] has been re-arming with the
aid of money from drug-smuggling through Albania, along with donations from the Albanian
diaspora in Western Europe and North America. . . . Albania has become the crime capital
of Europe. The most powerful groups in the country are organized criminals who use Albania
to grow, process, and store a large percentage of the illegal drugs destined for Western
Europe. . . . Albania's criminal gangs are actively supporting the war in Kosovo. Many of
them have family links to Albanian groups in Kosovo and support them with arms and other
supplies, either out of family solidarity or solely for profit. These links mean the UCK
fighters have a secure base area and reasonably good lines of communiction to the outside
world. Serb troops have tried to seal the border but with little success."
["Life in the Balkan 'Tinderbox' Remains as Dangerous as Ever," Jane's
Intelligence Review, 3/1/99]
"Drugs traffickers in Italy, in Germany, in Spain, in France, and in Norway:
Kosovo Albanians. The men from the Special Operations Section [ROS] of the carabinieri
[i.e., Italian national police], under the leadership of General Mario Mori, have
succeeded in neutralizing a fully fledged network of Albanian drugs traffickers. The
leader of this network is a certain Gashi Agim, aged 33, originally from Pristina, the
capital of the small region that is being torn apart by the struggle between on the one
hand the local population, 90 percent of whom are of Albanian ethnic origin and who are
calling for independence from Serbia, and [the Yugoslav government] on the other . . .
Gashi was arrested early this summer along with 124 drugs traffickers. 'Milan at this
juncture has become a crossroads of interests for many fighting groups,' a detective with
the ROS explained. 'These groups include also the Albanians from Kosovo who are among the
most dangerous traffickers in drugs and in arms. . . . The war in Kosovo has partly slowed
down the criminals' business because many Albanians have been forced to take care of their
families. Some of them are activists in the armed movement of the KLA fighters and have
gone home to fight. They feel Albanian. They are fighting to achieve annexation to
Albania. And it is precisely there that at least a part of the sea of money that the
Albanian drugs traffickers have amassed is reported to have ended up, to support the
families and to fund both certain political personalities and the anti-Serb movement. In
spring, a number of Albanian drugs traffickers actually went as far as to take part in the
organization of a rally in favor of independence for Kosovo. . . . Drugs, arms, and the
Koran: Could this be the murderous crime mix of the next few years?" ["Albanian
Mafia, This Is How It Helps The Kosovo Guerrilla Fighters," Corriere della Sera (Milan,
Italy), 10/15/98]
"A group of Kosovo Albanians smuggling arms back to their troubled province were
among 100 people arrested in a massive, countrywide anti-drug operation in Italy, police
here said Tuesday. All the 100 -- 90 of whom were arrested in Italy, the rest in other
European countries -- face weapons charges related to international drug trafficking.
Anti-Mafia prosecutors in Milan, who conducted the operation with paramilitary police
units, identified eight criminal structures active on an international scale. One hundred
kilos (220 pounds) of heroin and cocaine was seized in the bust across several Italian
regions. Investigators said the groups used Milan as a base, with cafes, restaurants,
garages and other firms acting as fronts. The Kosovar Albanian gang allegedly used drug
money to buy the weapons in Italy, which were then sent to Kosovo where a three-month
conflict is pitting Serbian forces against armed ethnic Albanians seeking independence.
Another separate group of Egyptians with links to Calabrian and Albanian gangs were
arrested on suspicions of laundering money through Switzerland for use by fundamentalists
in Egypt." ["Major Italian Drug Bust Breaks Kosovo Arms Trafficking,"
Agence France-Presse, 6/9/98]
"The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has claimed responsibility for more than 50
attacks on Serbs and Albanians loyal to the Belgrade government, but little is known about
the separatist group. . . . Details of the KLA, which the United States calls a terrorist
organization, are sketchy at best. Western intelligence sources believe there are no more
than several hundred members under arms with military training. Serbian police estimate
there are at least 2,000 well-armed men. The KLA is said to rely heavily on a huge network
of informers and sympathizers, enabling it to blend easily among the population. The
Western sources also believe the core of the organization consists of Albanians who fled
into exile in the 1970s and based their operation in Switzerland, where its funding is
gathered from all over the world. 'If the West wants to nip the KLA in the bud, all it has
to do is crack down on its financial nerve center in Switzerland,' one source said. Part
of the funding, this source believes, comes from the powerful Albanian mafia organizations
that deal in narcotics, prostitution and arms smuggling across Europe. The KLA has
admitted having training bases in northern Albania, which the Albanian government does not
condone but is powerless to stop." ["Speculation Plentiful, Facts Few About
Kosovo Separatist Group," Baltimore Sun, 3/6/98]
"The bulk of the financing of the UCK [KLA] seems to originate from two sources:
drug-related operations and Kosovo Albanian emigres in the West. The former Yugoslavia has
always been on the main European drug transit route. With the break-up of that country,
the route has been somewhat modified; West-Europe-bound narcotics now enter Macedonia and
Albania and are then distributed towards Western Europe through Kosovo, Montenegro,
Bosnia, and Croatia."[Jane's Intelligence Review, "Another Balkans
Bloodbath? -- Part One," 2/1/98]
"Socially organized in extended families bound together in clan alliances, Kosovar
Albanians dominate the Albanian mafia in the southern Balkans. Other than Kosovo, the
Albanian mafia is also active in northern Albania and western Macedonia. In this context,
the so-called 'Balkan Medellin' is made up of a number of geographically connected border
towns . . . . If left unchecked, this growing Albanian narco-terrorism could lead to a
Colombian syndrome in the southern Balkans, or the emergence of a situation in which the
Albanian mafia becomes powerful enough to control one or more states in the region. In
practical terms, this will involve either Albania or Macedonia, or both. Politically, this
is now being done by channelling growing foreign exchange (forex) profits from
narco-terrorism into local governments and political parties. In Albania, the ruling
Democratic Party (DP) led by President Sali Berisha is now widely suspected of tacitly
tolerating and even directly profiting from drug-trafficking for wider politico-economic
reasons, namely the financing of secessionist political parties and other groupings in
Kosovo and Macedonia." ["The Balkan Medellin," Jane's 3/1/95;
Albanian then-president Berisha lost power in 1997 and is now a known KLA patron in
northern Albania.]
Reports on Islamic Terror Links
The KLA's main staging area is in the vicinity of the town of Tropoje in northern
Albania [Jane's International Defense Review, 2/1/99]. Tropoje, the hometown and
current base of former Albanian president Sali Berisha, a major KLA patron, is also a
known center for Islamic terrorists connected with Saudi renegade Osama bin-Ladin. [For a
report on the presence of bin-Ladin assets in Tropoje and connections to anti-American
Islamic terrorism, see "U.S. Blasts' Possible Mideast Ties: Alleged Terrorists
Investigated in Albania, Washington Post, 8/12/98.]
The following reports note the presence of foreign mujahedin (i.e., Islamic holy
warriors) in the Kosovo war, some of them jihad veterans from Bosnia, Chechnya, and
Afghanistan. Some of the reports specifically cite assets of Iran or bin-Ladin, or both,
in support of the KLA. To some, "mujahedin" does not necessarily equal
"terrorists." But since the foreign fighters have not been considerate enough to
provide an organizational chart detailing the exact relationship among the various groups,
the reported presence of foreign fighters together with known terrorists in the KLA's
stronghold at least raises serious questions about the implications for the Clinton
Administration's increasingly close ties to the KLA:
"Serbian officials say Mujahideen have formed groups that remained behind
in Bosnia. Groups from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Chechnya are also involved in Albanian
guerrilla operations. A document found on the body of Alija Rabic, an Albanian UCK member
killed in a border crossing incident last July, indicated he was guiding a 50-man group
from Albania into Kosovo. The group included one Yemeni and 16 Saudis, six of whom bore
passports with Macedonian Albanian names. Other UCK rebels killed crossing the Albanian
frontier have carried Bosnian Muslim Federation papers." [Jane's International
Defense Review, "Unhealthy Climate in Kosovo as Guerrillas Gear Up for a Summer
Confrontation," 2/1/99]
"Mujahidin fighters have joined the Kosovo Liberation Army, dimming prospects of a
peaceful solution to the conflict and fuelling fears of heightened violence next spring..
. . . Their arrival in Kosovo may force Washington to review its policy in the Serbian
province and will deepen Western dismay with the KLA and its tactics. . . . 'Captain
Dula', the local KLA commander, was clearly embarrassed at the unexpected presence of
foreign journalists and said that he had little idea who was sending the Mujahidin or
where they came from; only that it was neither Kosovo nor Albania. 'I've got no
information about them,' Captain Dula said. 'We don't talk about it.' . . . American
diplomats in the region, especially Robert Gelbard, the special envoy, have often
expressed fears of an Islamic hardline infiltration into the Kosovo independence movement.
. . . American intelligence has raised the possibility of a link between Osama bin Laden,
the Saudi expatriate blamed for the bombing in August of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam, and the KLA. Several of Bin Laden's supporters were arrested in Tirana, the
Albanian capital, and deported this summer, and the chaotic conditions in the country have
allowed Muslim extremists to settle there, often under the guise of humanitarian workers.
. . . 'I interviewed one guy from Saudi Arabia who said that it was his eighth jihad,' a
Dutch journalist said." ["U.S. Alarmed as Mujahidin Join Kosovo Rebels," The
Times (London), 11/26/98]
"Diplomats in the region say Bosnia was the first bastion of Islamic power. The
autonomous Yugoslav region of Kosovo promises to be the second. During the current
rebellion against the Yugoslav army, the ethnic Albanians in the province, most of whom
are Moslem, have been provided with financial and military support from Islamic countries.
They are being bolstered by hundreds of Iranian fighters, or Mujahadeen, who infiltrate
from nearby Albania and call themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army. US defense officials
say the support includes that of Osama Bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist accused of
masterminding the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. A Defense
Department statement on August 20 said Bin Laden's Al Qa'ida organization supports Moslem
fighters in both Bosnia and Kosovo. . . . The KLA strength was not the southern Kosovo
region, which over the centuries turned from a majority of Serbs to ethnic Albanians. The
KLA, however, was strong in neighboring Albania, which today has virtually no central
government. The crisis in Albania led Iran to quickly move in to fill the vacuum. Iranian
Revolutionary Guards began to train KLA members. . . . Selected groups of Albanians were
sent to Iran to study that country's version of militant Islam. So far, Yugoslav officials
and Western diplomats agree that millions of dollars have been funnelled through Bosnia
and Albania to buy arms for the KLA. The money is raised from both Islamic governments and
from Islamic communities in Western Europe, particularly Germany. . . . 'Iran has been
active in helping out the Kosovo rebels,' Ephraim Kam, deputy director of Tel Aviv
University's Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, said. 'Iran sees Kosovo and Albania as
containing Moslem communities that require help and Teheran is willing to do it.' But much
of the training of the KLA remains based in Bosnia. Intelligence sources say mercenaries
and volunteers for the separatist movement have been recruited and paid handsome salaries.
. . . The trainers and fighters in the KLA include many of the Iranians who fought in
Bosnia in the early 1990s. Intelligence sources place their number at 7,000, many of whom
have married Bosnian women. There are also Afghans, Algerians, Chechens, and
Egyptians." ["Kosovo Seen as New Islamic Bastion," Jerusalem Post,
9/14/98]
". . . By late 1997, the Tehran-sponsored training and preparations of the
Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK -- Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves -- in Albanian, OVK in
Serbian), as well as the transfer of weapons and experts via Albania, were being
increased. Significantly, Tehran's primary objective in Kosovo has evolved from merely
assisting a Muslim minority in distress to furthering the consolidation of the Islamic
strategic axis along the Sarajevo-to-Tirane line. And only by expanding and escalating
subversive and Islamist-political presence can this objective be attained. . . In the Fall
of 1997, the uppermost leadership in Tehran ordered the IRGC [Revolutionary Guards] High
Command to launch a major program for shipping large quantities of weapons and other
military supplies to the Albanian clandestine organisations in Kosovo. [The supreme
Iranian spiritual leader, the Ayatollah] Khamene'i's instructions specifically stipulated
that the comprehensive military assistance was aimed to enable the Muslims 'to achieve the
independence' of the province of Kosovo. . . . [B]y early December 1997, Iranian
intelligence had already delivered the first shipments of hand grenades, machine-guns,
assault rifles, night vision equipment, and communications gear from stockpiles in Albania
into Kosovo. The mere fact that the Iranians could despatch the first supplies within a
few days and in absolute secrecy reflect extensive advance preparations made in Albania in
anticipation for such instructions from Tehran. Moreover, the Iranians began sending
promising Albanian and UCK commanders for advanced military training in al-Quds [special]
forces and IRGC camps in Iran. Meanwhile, weapons shipments continue. Thus, Tehran is well
on its way to establishing a bridgehead in Kosovo. . . The liberation army was to be only
the first phase in building military power. Ultimately, the Kosovo Albanians must field
such heavy weapons as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, and rocket launchers,
if they hope to evict the Serbian forces from Kosovo. . . . The spate of UCK terrorism
during the Fall of 1997, . . . should be considered intentional provocations against the
Serbian police aimed to elicit a massive retaliation that would in turn lead to a popular
uprising. Thus, the ongoing terrorism campaign in Kosovo should be considered the initial
phases in implementing the call for an uprising. Iran-sponsored activists have already
spread the word through Kosovo that the liberation war has already broken out. If current
trends prevail, the increasingly Islamist UCK will soon become the main factor in
overturning the long-term status quo in the region. Concurrently, the terrorist activities
have become part of everyday life throughout Kosovo. Given the extent of the propaganda
campaign and the assistance provided by Iran, the spread of terrorism should indeed be
considered the beginning of an armed rebellion that threatens a major escalation."
["Italy Becomes Iran's New Base for Terrorist Operations," by Yossef Bodansky, Defense
and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy (London), February 1998. Bodansky is Director of
the House Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. This report
was written in late 1997, before the KLA's offensive in early 1998.]
Document compiled by Dr S D Stein