REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM
ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO

Part I

[Certain sections of the full report have been omitted here. Full report 
available from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/177e.pdf]

Part II

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, by which the Council decided to establish the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for an initial
period of 12 months. In paragraph 20 of that resolution, the Council requested
me to report at regular intervals on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIK.
The current report covers the activities of UNMIK and developments in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since my previous report of 23 December 1999

II. OVERVIEW

2. During the reporting period, UNMIK made further progress in forming
structures that will enable the people of Kosovo to participate in the interim
administration of the province and also initiated the process of establishing
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement. During the period, the process of transforming former
combatants progressed with the formal establishment of the Kosovo Protection
Corps (KPC). At the same time, the security situation, which had gradually
improved during the early part of the reporting period, became more tense and
volatile owing to the recent negative developments in Mitrovica. The situation
of minorities showed little improvement, with many remaining vulnerable to
attacks and discrimination as a result of their minority status.

A. Political situation

3. The three major Kosovo Albanian rival political parties - the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK) of Ibrahim Rugova, the party coalition of United
Democratic Movement of Rexhep Qosja and the Party for Democratic Progress of
Kosovo (PPDK) of Hashim Thaci (effectively the Rambouillet signatories) - are
now working together in a new cooperative relationship in the Interim
Administrative Council (IAC) and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure
(JIAS). At the same time, all Kosovo Albanian parties are preparing for

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eventual municipal elections in the course of the year. It is expected that,
with the commencement of the registration process, the number of Kosovo Albanian
political parties will increase.

4. The Kosovo Serb political landscape remains diversified and dominated by
divisions among three major political forces. The moderate Kosovo Serb National
Council (SNC) continues to function mainly in the Pristina and Gnjilane regions,
headed by Bishop Artemije, who recently visited the United Nations, and
Momcilo Trajkovic. SNC has maintained its opposition to the current leadership
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and is an active member of the Yugoslav
opposition. The Serb National Council (SNC) in Mitrovica is led by
Oliver Ivanovic and Vuko Antonijevic. SNC has been trying to maintain its
distance from both the current leadership in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Yugoslav opposition. Finally, the pro-Belgrade Serb National Assembly
is linked to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Committee for Cooperation with
UNMIK and is led by Mr. Odalovic. The Kosovo Serb political divisions
intensified following the agreement on 15 December 1999 to establish JIAS.
Although JIAS was initially rejected by all Kosovo Serb political forces, SNC
has taken steps towards participation (see para. 7 below). Within both the
Kosovo Bosniac and the Kosovo Turkish communities, political divisions persist.
These divisions have prevented these communities from participating actively
within JIAS.

5. The agreement to establish JIAS marked an important step towards the
sharing of administrative responsibility with the local population, including
through the appointment of local co-heads, in addition to those representing the
three signatory political parties. The position of local department co-heads
has been equally allocated to the three major political parties (five to each),
with four co-head posts reserved for minorities (two for Kosovo Serbs and one
each for Kosovo Bosniacs and Kosovo Turks) and one for an independent. Efforts
are also being made by my Special Representative to place women in positions of
leadership within JIAS, both at the central and municipal levels.

6. Since 15 December 1999, IAC has met, on average, twice a week. Initially,
it dealt with procedural and administrative questions in the course of setting
up JIAS. Now, IAC has become involved in discussing more substantive issues
such as the recent events in Mitrovica and draft regulations connected to the
preparation of the municipal elections. The work of IAC was hampered in early
February 2000 by friction linked to the dissolution of the parties’ respective
parallel structures and funds controlled by them. More recently, IAC members
have exercised constructive political leadership, distancing themselves from
actions such as a demonstration march to Mitrovica on 21 February.

7. My Special Representative has intensified his efforts to ensure the
participation of representatives of the Kosovo Serb community in JIAS. Towards
this end, an agreement in principle was reached between UNMIK and the Kosovo
Serb National Council (SNC) on the need to enhance security, increase the
presence of UNMIK in Serb-populated areas and ensure greater access of the
Kosovo Serb population to essential public services. In a letter dated
24 January from Bishop Artemije, SNC expressed its intention to accept this
agreement and to finalize it within a 10-day time period. However, persisting
political divisions within the Kosovo Serb community and the deterioration of

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the security situation in Mitrovica hampered the efforts of my Special
Representative to secure the participation of Kosovo Serb representatives in
JIAS and prevented the finalization of the agreement. My Special Representative
continues his intensive consultations with the Kosovo Serbs on this matter
through regular contacts with their representatives. When Bishop Artemije
visited New York, he met with the Deputy Secretary-General and had constructive
discussions with her and other United Nations officials.

8. An UNMIK Task Force was established shortly after the signing of the
15 December agreement to develop a strategy to implement JIAS. In the initial
stages, the Task Force, working with IAC, identified 20 departments required to
administer Kosovo, with each department co-directed by an international and a
local co-head. The co-heads are under the supervision of a Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. There are 14 departments under the
Deputy Special Representative for civil administration, 4 under the Deputy
Special Representative for economic reconstruction and 2 under the Deputy
Special Representative for institution building. While the two co-heads share
in the interim administrative responsibilities of each department, the UNMIK
international co-head retains a unique and non-delegable responsibility to
ensure that the provisions and policy of resolution 1244 (1999) are implemented
throughout JIAS. So far, 14 Kosovo co-heads and 16 international co-heads have
been appointed. To date, three women have been appointed as local co-heads.
9. So far, the Departments of Health and Social Welfare, Education and
Science, Local Administration and the Central Fiscal Authority (Budget and
Finance) are operational with essential staff. The Departments of
Reconstruction, Utilities, Justice, Public Services and Democratic Governance
and Civil Society Support are expected to become operational in the coming
weeks.

10. JIAS has given fresh momentum to the process of forming municipal level
structures, with the majority established subsequent to the 15 December
agreement. As of 28 February, a total of 27 municipal councils had been
established (5 in the Mitrovica region, 5 in the Pec region, 7 in the Pristina
region, 3 in the Prizren region and 7 in the Gnjilane region). In addition, a
total of 12 administrative boards have been established to date (5 in the Pec
region, 2 in the Prizren region, 2 in the Pristina region and 3 in the Gnjilane
region). UNMIK municipal administrators in the remaining municipalities are
continuing consultations to finalize the remaining municipal councils and
administrative boards and to overcome disagreement among the various Kosovo
Albanian political parties over the distribution of representatives. The
limited participation of minorities within municipal structures remains a matter
of concern and has been hampered by their withdrawal of support in protest
against ethnically motivated acts of violence.

11. An important objective of UNMIK municipal administrators has been to
promote the development of a professional and impartial municipal civil service.
This is particularly relevant for the administrative boards which are
responsible for the effective and non-discriminatory provision of municipal
services. In this respect, efforts are being made to de-politicize the
selection of personnel and to apply criteria based on professional merit in the
municipal employment process.

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12. Under the JIAS agreement, all parallel structures of an executive,
legislative or judicial nature were required to be dissolved by 31 January 2000.
For the first time, after 10 years of a "dual" system of governance and
administration, a formal commitment to dissolve parallel structures was received
from the local Kosovo Albanian leadership. All parallel Kosovo Albanian bodies
declared that they had ceased to exist on 31 January and the so-called
"ministries" of the self-proclaimed "Interim Government" officially stopped
their work on that date. However, on the same day, the "Parliament" postponed
the decision on its future and the "Government" of "Prime Minister" Bukoshi
announced that it would only "suspend" its work. On 2 February, however,
Dr. Rugova, the LDK president, and the presidency of the "Parliament",
authoritatively declared that all of their structures had ceased to exist on
31 January. Two days later, Mr. Bukoshi made a similar announcement. However,
for many Kosovo Albanians, it has been difficult to get used to the dissolution
of the parallel structures. For a number of persons who were engaged in the
parallel structures, alternative employment is scarce.

13. The integration of parallel administrative bodies into JIAS has been
relatively smooth. UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have established
mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance, especially of the former parallel
law enforcement structures. Entry requirements for the Kosovo Police Service
make it difficult for persons previously involved in illegal activities,
including law enforcement, to gain admission to this Service (see paras. 43-48
below). Requirements for admission to KPC also present a similar barrier.

14. Following the JIAS agreement, the Kosovo Transitional Council was enlarged
from 12 to 35 members on 9 February to better reflect the pluralistic
composition of Kosovo. Representatives of civil society, political parties,
religious groups and national communities have been invited to participate.
Special emphasis was given to encourage the participation of women, who had been
inadequately represented in the political bodies. The enlarged Kosovo
Transitional Council first met on 9 February and is currently meeting on a
weekly basis under the chairmanship of my Special Representative or one of his
deputies. Unfortunately, since the Kosovo Serb community has not made its final
decision on participating in JIAS, it is - with the exception of a civil society
member - not yet represented in KTC.

15. As mentioned in my two previous reports (S/1999/987, para. 23 and
S/1999/1250, para. 4), UNMIK has also established a number of advisory bodies
(e.g., the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters, the Media Advisory
Board, the Joint Civil Commission on Education, the Joint Civil Commission on
Health and the Economic Policy Board) through which the local population and
leadership have been able to participate in the interim administration by
providing advice to UNMIK on specific issues. These advisory bodies will now be
dissolved or absorbed into JIAS.

16. UNMIK maintains open channels of communication with the authorities of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both to address concrete issues and to ensure
that UNMIK’s functions are transparent to the authorities concerned. In
accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), the Yugoslav Government established the
Committee for Cooperation with UNMIK in Pristina. The Committee President has
regular meetings with senior representatives of UNMIK, KFOR and other

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international agencies in Kosovo. The Committee has opened two additional
sub-offices in the Mitrovica and Gnjilane regions. Practical cooperation
between UNMIK and the Committee focuses on humanitarian assistance to the Kosovo
Serb community.

17. The other channel of contact with the Yugoslav authorities is through the
Joint Implementation Committee established within the framework of the
Military-Technical Agreement. High-level Joint Implementation Committee liaison
meetings, in which UNMIK representatives participate, take place on a weekly
basis and constitute an important venue for exchanging information and
discussing the security situation within the ground and air safety zones.
18. Intensive talks have also been conducted with the Government of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the situation at the Blace border crossing
point. A memorandum of understanding on custom issues between UNMIK and that
Government will be concluded shortly to facilitate the crossing of goods at the
Blace crossing going into and through Kosovo. In view of the critical energy
situation in Kosovo, negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
have also focused on the supply of electrical energy from and through that
country.

19. Besides the existing UNMIK liaison office in Skopje, UNMIK has now opened a
liaison office in Tirana, Albania (see S/1999/779, para. 52).

B. Security situation

20. There was a serious deterioration in the security situation in early
February 2000. On 2 February, a clearly marked humanitarian shuttle bus
belonging to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) carrying 49 Kosovo Serb passengers was targeted by a rocket, resulting
in two persons killed and three injured. The bus was driven by international
Danish Refugee Council staff and escorted by two KFOR vehicles. Following the
attack, violence broke out in northern Mitrovica on 3 and 4 February, resulting
in eight deaths and at least 20 to 30 persons seriously injured. It also caused
the displacement of over 1,650 Kosovo Albanians from northern Mitrovica and the
reduction of the number of Kosovo Serbs in the southern part of the city to just
20 individuals, the majority of whom are living at a monastery under KFOR
protection. Some 5,000 Kosovo Serbs remain in isolated enclaves in the southern
outskirts of the city as well as approximately 2,000 Kosovo Albanians in the
northern outskirts. UNMIK and non-governmental organizations were also affected
by the violence. Both international and local staff had to be relocated and
nine vehicles belonging to UNMIK, UNHCR, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international non-governmental organizations
were burned or looted. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
office was burned and several non-governmental organization offices and one KFOR
office were looted.

21. Following a period of tense calm, violence again broke out in Mitrovica on
13 and 14 February. On the morning of 13 February, a grenade attack against a
Bosniac cafe in northern Mitrovica injured 7 persons. Shortly thereafter,
gunfire broke out near the river, with snipers firing from apartment buildings

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at KFOR positions on the ground. Two French KFOR soldiers were seriously
wounded. During exchanges of gunfire between KFOR and various identified sniper
positions, one suspected sniper was killed and another wounded - both Kosovo
Albanians. A total of 46 persons, the majority of whom were Kosovo Albanians,
were taken into custody in the course of KFOR operations. On 21 February, a
public march of Kosovo Albanians from Pristina to Mitrovica also led to a
confrontation with KFOR forces on the main bridge in Mitrovica. KFOR was
obliged to use tear gas to prevent Kosovo Albanian demonstrators from crossing
the bridge to northern Mitrovica. The demonstrators eventually agreed to
disperse after being addressed jointly by my Special Representative, the KFOR
Commander and the KPC Director.

22. Many Serbs believe that a de facto partition of Mitrovica would enhance
their security, but it remains a fundamental provocation for Kosovo Albanians
and is inimical to resolution 1244 (1999). The political and security
imperatives of the two sides are, however, not irreconcilable if moderate
interests on both sides can be engaged. Unfortunately, extremists on both sides
helped thwart efforts in 1999 to achieve more open arrangements for the city.

23. My Special Representative has initiated a strategy designed to arrest the
crisis and address fundamental, legitimate concerns on both sides. A
four-phased process is now under active discussion with local leaders,
emphasizing freedom of movement for ethnic Albanians, security for ethnic Serbs,
and orderly returns for both. The initial focus will be on confidence-building
measures that can build on common interests. Ultimately, the aim is to
establish a visibly different administration for the city of Mitrovica - the
joint administration of a "united city" which can serve as an example elsewhere
in Kosovo. However, this political process will depend heavily on the efforts
of KFOR and UNMIK police to provide a secure environment. In addition, expanded
public services and accelerated economic revival are crucial, since northern
Kosovo has received fewer international aid and civil administration resources
than many other parts of Kosovo.

24. With the exception of events in Mitrovica, violent crime in Kosovo has
generally continued to follow the slow downward trend that characterized the
previous reporting period. However, an upsurge in grenade and arson attacks
against Kosovo Serb enclaves was noted during and since the time of the violent
outbreaks in Mitrovica. In addition, on 26 February, a prominent Kosovo Serb
medical doctor, who was also a member of SNC in Gracanica, was killed in
Gnjilane. On 29 February, in Srbica, a Russian Federation KFOR soldier, serving
as a driver for two commanding officers who were attending an UNMIK-chaired
meeting of the municipal council, was shot outside the UNMIK municipality
building. The soldier subsequently died of his wounds.

25. Cross-boundary incursions by Yugoslav police were also reported during the
period in the Gnjilane region from Albanian-dominated areas in Serbia. The area
which lies east of the Kosovo boundary line is assessed by both UNMIK and KFOR
to be extremely volatile at present. The situation there causes great concern.
International patrols along Kosovo’s eastern boundary with Serbia have been
stepped up and permanent boundary checkpoints established. Both KFOR and UNMIK
police have reported seeing armed Albanians in military uniforms in the area of
Dobrosin, which lies within the 5-kilometer exclusion zone. On 26 January, the

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bodies of two ethnic Albanians were brought from Dobrosin to Gnjilane by family
members, who stated that they had been shot while cutting wood. The Serbian
police, however, stated that they had gone to Dobrosin to request security
assistance from community leaders for a planned weapons search in the area.
They further claimed that, upon leaving the meeting, they had been fired upon in
the centre of town and one Serbian Police officer had been wounded. The Serbian
police report that they had then returned fire at the attackers, resulting in
the death of the two Albanians who were subsequently brought to Gnjilane. On
29 February, a United Nations vehicle was ambushed by a group of armed and
uniformed men near Bujanovac in south-eastern Serbia, near the Kosovo border.
The passengers, consisting of United Nations humanitarian and security
personnel, had been in the area on a routine assessment of the humanitarian
situation in the region. One United Nations staff member sustained serious
injuries in the ambush. The perpetrators, who subsequently directed the United
Nations personnel to a nearby KFOR checkpoint, identified themselves as
indigenous to the predominantly Albanian populated villages in the area. KFOR
and UNMIK police have increased their monitoring and surveillance of the area as
a potential flashpoint.

C. Transformation of former combatants

26. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) continued to meet the commitments made
respectively in the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of
21 June 1999 and the statement of principles of 19 September 1999. At the
completion of demilitarization on 19 September 1999, almost 6,900 rifles,
300 pistols and 900 support weapons (e.g., machine guns and mortars) and 300
anti-tank weapons had been handed in by KLA. In addition, 1,300 rifles,
300 pistols, 81 support weapons and 18 anti-tank weapons had been confiscated
from KLA members. Almost 2,800 assorted weapons were confiscated from non-KLA
Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic groups. Some 700 weapons were
left behind by departing Yugoslav forces. KFOR and UNMIK civilian police have
continued to search for weapons and are confiscating around 10 to 15 weapons
each week from members of all ethnic groups throughout Kosovo.

27. With demilitarization completed, the focus is now on the return of former
KLA soldiers to civilian life. This is a long-term process. Considerable
efforts are being made by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to
enhance career opportunities for former soldiers by the provision of training
and job-placement support. Beginning in July 1999, IOM began an Information
Counselling and Referral Service, which provides information, technical
assistance, training and referrals to employment opportunities to former
combatants.

28. KPC was formally established on 21 January 2000 with the appointment by my
Special Representative of 46 KPC leaders, including one woman, one member of a
religious minority (Catholic) and one member of an ethnic minority (Bosniac).
The total strength of KPC as of 25 February stood at 544 persons. The total
authorized strength of 5,052 KPC members (including 2,000 reservists not on
active duty) will be selected by early March. Some 10 per cent of the total KPC
positions remain reserved for minorities.

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29. UNMIK regional administrators have begun identifying humanitarian and
public works projects for KPC, ranging from housing reconstruction and refuse
collection, to ice and snow clearance. KPC members have already taken on such
tasks in the Prizren, Mitrovica and Pristina regions. KFOR will continue to
provide day-to-day oversight of these projects.

30. The total budget requirement for KPC operating costs for the year 2000 is
DM 20,734,697, of which only DM 12,290,000 in contributions had been received as
of 10 February. There have been no additional contributions since my previous
report (see S/1999/1250). Additional funding is critically needed for
infrastructure repair, basic equipment and project financing as well as for
wages and salaries for KPC members.

31. The first training courses have begun for administrative personnel of KPC.
Key and mid-level leaders will receive a basic orientation training, which will
cover human rights, resource management, strategic planning and an introduction
to emergency operations management. All members of KPC will undertake an
introduction course from 6 March to 30 April, include basic orientation on the
mission and mandate of UNMIK, respect for human rights and practical skills
(e.g., mine awareness and communications).

32. Minority communities in Kosovo have expressed concern about KPC, not only
with regard to its creation and composition, but also with regard to the
proposed location of KPC buildings. The alleged involvement of enrolled or
aspiring KPC members in illegal law enforcement activities, their participation
in political rallies and other incidents of ethnic intolerance, such as their
refusal to participate in swearing-in ceremonies where the Serbian language was
used, remains an issue of concern for the minority communities in Kosovo (see
para. 62 below). Unfortunately, as illustrated in the fourth joint UNHCR/OSCE
assessment on the situation of minorities in Kosovo, reports of illegal
activities by alleged KPC members are often unconfirmed and, even when the
victims of such crimes can be identified, they are often too afraid to report
them for fear of reprisals. As the overwhelming majority of its membership
comes from the former KLA, it is imperative that the KPC reassure the minority
communities in Kosovo of their multi-ethnic perspective and of their desire to
provide benefits to all communities in Kosovo.

D. Overview of the Mission

33. As previously reported, the four "pillars" of UNMIK are: UNHCR, which
heads the humanitarian affairs component; OSCE, which heads the institution-building
component; the European Union, which heads the economic reconstruction
component; and the United Nations, which heads the civil administration
component.

34. The Executive Committee (see S/1999/1250, para. 20) continues to bring
together on a daily basis my Special Representative, his Principal Deputy and
the four Deputy Special Representatives representing the four components of
UNMIK. An UNMIK strategic planning document, prepared by the Executive
Committee’s Joint Planning Group, is used by my Special Representative as a tool
to ensure timely, collaborative policy-making decisions.

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35. Coordination and cooperation between the four components of UNMIK and the
office of my Special Representative, as well as with other international and
national partners, extends beyond the Executive Committee and the Joint Planning
Group. A number of formal and informal working groups and task forces have been
formed to address a variety of topics of mutual concern (e.g., the Utilities
Task Force, the Fuel Task Force, the UNMIK Security Requirements Task Force, the
Joint Administration Task Force, the Ad Hoc Task Force on Minorities and the
inter-pillar planning working group on gender issues).
36. The Military Liaison Office continues its coordinating efforts with KFOR
and other international agencies, as well as its monitoring and analysis of the
general security situation in the Mission area. The UNMIK Situation Centre
reports on and analyses the situation in Kosovo through information received
from the UNMIK military liaison officers throughout Kosovo, including at KFOR
headquarters.

III. UNMIK POLICE

37. Progress by UNMIK police in assuming law and order responsibilities during
the reporting period was limited by the low numbers of new police officers
arriving in Kosovo. As of 1 March, 2,361 officers were serving as part of the
UNMIK police, which constitutes close to 65 per cent of the total authorized
strength of 3,618 civilian and border police officers (not including the 1,100
authorized police officers in special police units). However, the number of new
officers arriving in the Mission began to increase during the last part of the
reporting period, with some 500 new officers expected by the end of March.
UNMIK police personnel are presently distributed as follows (excluding those in
training): 603 in the Pristina region; 306 in the Prizren region; 535 in the
Mitrovica region; 189 in the Gnjilane region; 105 in the Pec region; 193 border
police; 268 in the central headquarters in Pristina; and 71 in the UNMIK police
KPS Development Unit.

38. UNMIK police has full executive law enforcement responsibility in the
Pristina and Prizren regions as well as at the Pristina Airport international
border crossing point. It has investigative authority in the Gnjilane and
Mitrovica regions, as well as in Pec municipality and at the international
border crossing points of Djeneral Jankovic (Blace) and Globocica. Furthermore,
UNMIK police continue to run the Pristina and Mitrovica detention facilities.
UNMIK police also continue to develop and implement joint security operations
with KFOR. These operations are being enhanced in Mitrovica to include joint
foot and vehicle patrols, cooperation in weapons and ordnance searches, and the
building up of a joint operations centre.

39. A substantial shift of limited police resources to the Mitrovica region
occurred in response to the violent outbreaks in that town in February. By the
end of February, UNMIK police had reinforced the Mitrovica region with 310
additional police officers and diverted logistical resources to the area from
the Pec region. As a result of this diversion, KFOR will, for the time being,
continue to provide primary law and order services in the Pec region until UNMIK
is able to reinforce the region with new police officers.

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40. The deterioration of the security situation in Mitrovica again highlighted
the policing gap resulting from the insufficient numbers of UNMIK police
officers and the absence of special police units. Since no such units have yet
arrived to the Mission area, responsibility for the management of major
incidents of public disorder and unrest has, of necessity, remained with KFOR.
However, at least three special police units are now expected to arrive in the
Mission area in March.

41. UNMIK police continue to carry out investigations, patrolling and public
order functions, border policing and traffic control. Increasing numbers of
non-police tasks continue to demand up to 15 to 20 per cent of available UNMIK
police resources at any time. Such tasks include the guarding of banks and
other buildings, as well as guarding UNMIK money transfers. Additional requests
to provide security for public transport, humanitarian convoys and courts and
judicial personnel have been made which, if fulfilled, would require up to
80 per cent of the existing staff resources of UNMIK police. The need to
identify alternative resources to fulfil such non-police security tasks, in
order to free up limited UNMIK police resources for law and order functions has
thus become a Mission priority.

42. UNMIK police also continue to work towards the development of professional
capacities to counter organized crime affecting Kosovo and the region. A
comprehensive criminal intelligence structure within UNMIK police, including
both centralized and regional elements, will soon be established with the
support of interested Member States. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland has offered professional and logistical resources for this
initiative, and other Member States have also expressed their intention to
support it.

43. The development of a local police service in accordance with international
and European standards has continued. A special section of the UNMIK police is
tasked full-time with development of the future police for Kosovo, the Kosovo
Police Service (KPS). The institution-building pillar (OSCE) provides education
and training for KPS through the Kosovo Police Service school. The KPS training
programme starts with a nine-week, 392-hour basic course at the KPS school.
Upon graduation from the school, KPS cadets enter a 19-week field-training
programme administered by UNMIK police, which includes additional classroom
training coordinated jointly by UNMIK police and the KPS school. KPS field
trainees serve as part of UNMIK police, under the supervision and command of the
UNMIK Police Commissioner, until such time as they are assessed to be
sufficiently trained to carry out police duties independently.

44. The KPS selection procedures have been refined to ensure that candidates
with the best qualifications are identified for inclusion. The selection
procedure is comprised of four criteria: minimum requirements, preferred
qualifications, comprehensive examinations and psychological/physical fitness
standards. Other factors are taken into consideration in the recruitment of
each class, in particular the priority for appropriate ethnic and gender
representation. Background checks are initiated when candidates are selected
and continue during field training and a three-year probationary period.

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45. As of 22 February, 347 KPS cadets were working on the streets of Kosovo.
The third class of 235 students began their KPS school training on 22 February.
The "production" of KPS cadets has been much slower than originally anticipated
owing to continuing logistical and administrative obstacles. KPS is one of the
few multi-ethnic institutions operating in Kosovo. UNMIK has set goals of
15 per cent minority representation and 25 per cent female representation for
the future KPS. There were 8 Kosovo Serbs and 11 other minorities in the first
class; 28 Kosovo Serbs and 14 other minorities in the second class; and 18
Kosovo Serbs and 5 other minorities in the third class. Women comprised
22 per cent of the first class, 19 per cent of the second class and 24 per cent
of the third class. KPS field trainees have been provided with uniforms and, at
the end of February, were issued sidearms and protective equipment.

46. The KPS field-training officer programme includes one-to-one mentoring,
daily observation reports, bi-monthly evaluations, completion of daily activity
logs and in-service classroom training of eight hours per week. To date, UNMIK
police have trained 998 of its officers as field training officers. Each KPS
cadet is continually monitored and evaluated by UNMIK police officers through
the 19 weeks of field training, as well as the six subsequent weeks of career
rotation and one week of comprehensive examinations. Successful completion of
each of these stages will qualify cadets for subsequent phases of the KPS
programme.

47. Since the inception of the KPS programme, there have been 24 disciplinary
investigations involving KPS cadets. Nine cases were unfounded, six individuals
were reprimanded for policy violations, one was suspended without pay for
repeated policy violations, five have been temporarily suspended pending
completion of investigations and three have been terminated for involvement in
criminal activity either during or after the conflict. There have been five
resignations.

48. KPS will eventually deploy to 29 police stations. Supply and logistics
programmes have been developed for the service and some equipment has already
arrived and has been distributed throughout Kosovo. Securing additional support
for the equipping of the future KPS remains a high priority of UNMIK.

Part II