REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO
[Certain sections of the full report have been omitted here. Full report available from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/177e.pdf]
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for an initial period of 12 months. In paragraph 20 of that resolution, the Council requested me to report at regular intervals on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIK. The current report covers the activities of UNMIK and developments in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since my previous report of 23 December 1999
2. During the reporting period, UNMIK made further progress in forming structures that will enable the people of Kosovo to participate in the interim administration of the province and also initiated the process of establishing provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement. During the period, the process of transforming former combatants progressed with the formal establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). At the same time, the security situation, which had gradually improved during the early part of the reporting period, became more tense and volatile owing to the recent negative developments in Mitrovica. The situation of minorities showed little improvement, with many remaining vulnerable to attacks and discrimination as a result of their minority status.
A. Political situation
3. The three major Kosovo Albanian rival political parties - the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) of Ibrahim Rugova, the party coalition of United Democratic Movement of Rexhep Qosja and the Party for Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK) of Hashim Thaci (effectively the Rambouillet signatories) - are now working together in a new cooperative relationship in the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). At the same time, all Kosovo Albanian parties are preparing for Page 2
eventual municipal elections in the course of the year. It is expected that, with the commencement of the registration process, the number of Kosovo Albanian political parties will increase.
4. The Kosovo Serb political landscape remains diversified and dominated by divisions among three major political forces. The moderate Kosovo Serb National Council (SNC) continues to function mainly in the Pristina and Gnjilane regions, headed by Bishop Artemije, who recently visited the United Nations, and Momcilo Trajkovic. SNC has maintained its opposition to the current leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and is an active member of the Yugoslav opposition. The Serb National Council (SNC) in Mitrovica is led by Oliver Ivanovic and Vuko Antonijevic. SNC has been trying to maintain its distance from both the current leadership in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav opposition. Finally, the pro-Belgrade Serb National Assembly is linked to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Committee for Cooperation with UNMIK and is led by Mr. Odalovic. The Kosovo Serb political divisions intensified following the agreement on 15 December 1999 to establish JIAS. Although JIAS was initially rejected by all Kosovo Serb political forces, SNC has taken steps towards participation (see para. 7 below). Within both the Kosovo Bosniac and the Kosovo Turkish communities, political divisions persist. These divisions have prevented these communities from participating actively within JIAS.
5. The agreement to establish JIAS marked an important step towards the sharing of administrative responsibility with the local population, including through the appointment of local co-heads, in addition to those representing the three signatory political parties. The position of local department co-heads has been equally allocated to the three major political parties (five to each), with four co-head posts reserved for minorities (two for Kosovo Serbs and one each for Kosovo Bosniacs and Kosovo Turks) and one for an independent. Efforts are also being made by my Special Representative to place women in positions of leadership within JIAS, both at the central and municipal levels. 6. Since 15 December 1999, IAC has met, on average, twice a week. Initially, it dealt with procedural and administrative questions in the course of setting up JIAS. Now, IAC has become involved in discussing more substantive issues such as the recent events in Mitrovica and draft regulations connected to the preparation of the municipal elections. The work of IAC was hampered in early February 2000 by friction linked to the dissolution of the parties’ respective parallel structures and funds controlled by them. More recently, IAC members have exercised constructive political leadership, distancing themselves from actions such as a demonstration march to Mitrovica on 21 February. 7. My Special Representative has intensified his efforts to ensure the participation of representatives of the Kosovo Serb community in JIAS. Towards this end, an agreement in principle was reached between UNMIK and the Kosovo Serb National Council (SNC) on the need to enhance security, increase the presence of UNMIK in Serb-populated areas and ensure greater access of the Kosovo Serb population to essential public services. In a letter dated 24 January from Bishop Artemije, SNC expressed its intention to accept this agreement and to finalize it within a 10-day time period. However, persisting political divisions within the Kosovo Serb community and the deterioration of Page 3 the security situation in Mitrovica hampered the efforts of my Special Representative to secure the participation of Kosovo Serb representatives in JIAS and prevented the finalization of the agreement. My Special Representative continues his intensive consultations with the Kosovo Serbs on this matter through regular contacts with their representatives. When Bishop Artemije visited New York, he met with the Deputy Secretary-General and had constructive discussions with her and other United Nations officials.
8. An UNMIK Task Force was established shortly after the signing of the 15 December agreement to develop a strategy to implement JIAS. In the initial stages, the Task Force, working with IAC, identified 20 departments required to administer Kosovo, with each department co-directed by an international and a local co-head. The co-heads are under the supervision of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. There are 14 departments under the Deputy Special Representative for civil administration, 4 under the Deputy Special Representative for economic reconstruction and 2 under the Deputy Special Representative for institution building. While the two co-heads share in the interim administrative responsibilities of each department, the UNMIK international co-head retains a unique and non-delegable responsibility to ensure that the provisions and policy of resolution 1244 (1999) are implemented throughout JIAS. So far, 14 Kosovo co-heads and 16 international co-heads have been appointed. To date, three women have been appointed as local co-heads. 9. So far, the Departments of Health and Social Welfare, Education and Science, Local Administration and the Central Fiscal Authority (Budget and Finance) are operational with essential staff. The Departments of Reconstruction, Utilities, Justice, Public Services and Democratic Governance and Civil Society Support are expected to become operational in the coming weeks.
10. JIAS has given fresh momentum to the process of forming municipal level structures, with the majority established subsequent to the 15 December agreement. As of 28 February, a total of 27 municipal councils had been established (5 in the Mitrovica region, 5 in the Pec region, 7 in the Pristina region, 3 in the Prizren region and 7 in the Gnjilane region). In addition, a total of 12 administrative boards have been established to date (5 in the Pec region, 2 in the Prizren region, 2 in the Pristina region and 3 in the Gnjilane region). UNMIK municipal administrators in the remaining municipalities are continuing consultations to finalize the remaining municipal councils and administrative boards and to overcome disagreement among the various Kosovo Albanian political parties over the distribution of representatives. The limited participation of minorities within municipal structures remains a matter of concern and has been hampered by their withdrawal of support in protest against ethnically motivated acts of violence. 11. An important objective of UNMIK municipal administrators has been to promote the development of a professional and impartial municipal civil service. This is particularly relevant for the administrative boards which are responsible for the effective and non-discriminatory provision of municipal services. In this respect, efforts are being made to de-politicize the selection of personnel and to apply criteria based on professional merit in the municipal employment process. Page 4 12. Under the JIAS agreement, all parallel structures of an executive, legislative or judicial nature were required to be dissolved by 31 January 2000. For the first time, after 10 years of a "dual" system of governance and administration, a formal commitment to dissolve parallel structures was received from the local Kosovo Albanian leadership. All parallel Kosovo Albanian bodies declared that they had ceased to exist on 31 January and the so-called "ministries" of the self-proclaimed "Interim Government" officially stopped their work on that date. However, on the same day, the "Parliament" postponed the decision on its future and the "Government" of "Prime Minister" Bukoshi announced that it would only "suspend" its work. On 2 February, however, Dr. Rugova, the LDK president, and the presidency of the "Parliament", authoritatively declared that all of their structures had ceased to exist on 31 January. Two days later, Mr. Bukoshi made a similar announcement. However, for many Kosovo Albanians, it has been difficult to get used to the dissolution of the parallel structures. For a number of persons who were engaged in the parallel structures, alternative employment is scarce.
13. The integration of parallel administrative bodies into JIAS has been relatively smooth. UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have established mechanisms to monitor and enforce compliance, especially of the former parallel law enforcement structures. Entry requirements for the Kosovo Police Service make it difficult for persons previously involved in illegal activities, including law enforcement, to gain admission to this Service (see paras. 43-48 below). Requirements for admission to KPC also present a similar barrier. 14. Following the JIAS agreement, the Kosovo Transitional Council was enlarged from 12 to 35 members on 9 February to better reflect the pluralistic composition of Kosovo. Representatives of civil society, political parties, religious groups and national communities have been invited to participate. Special emphasis was given to encourage the participation of women, who had been inadequately represented in the political bodies. The enlarged Kosovo Transitional Council first met on 9 February and is currently meeting on a weekly basis under the chairmanship of my Special Representative or one of his deputies. Unfortunately, since the Kosovo Serb community has not made its final decision on participating in JIAS, it is - with the exception of a civil society member - not yet represented in KTC. 15. As mentioned in my two previous reports (S/1999/987, para. 23 and S/1999/1250, para. 4), UNMIK has also established a number of advisory bodies (e.g., the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters, the Media Advisory Board, the Joint Civil Commission on Education, the Joint Civil Commission on Health and the Economic Policy Board) through which the local population and leadership have been able to participate in the interim administration by providing advice to UNMIK on specific issues. These advisory bodies will now be dissolved or absorbed into JIAS.
16. UNMIK maintains open channels of communication with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both to address concrete issues and to ensure that UNMIK’s functions are transparent to the authorities concerned. In accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), the Yugoslav Government established the Committee for Cooperation with UNMIK in Pristina. The Committee President has regular meetings with senior representatives of UNMIK, KFOR and other Page 5 international agencies in Kosovo. The Committee has opened two additional sub-offices in the Mitrovica and Gnjilane regions. Practical cooperation between UNMIK and the Committee focuses on humanitarian assistance to the Kosovo Serb community.
17. The other channel of contact with the Yugoslav authorities is through the Joint Implementation Committee established within the framework of the Military-Technical Agreement. High-level Joint Implementation Committee liaison meetings, in which UNMIK representatives participate, take place on a weekly basis and constitute an important venue for exchanging information and discussing the security situation within the ground and air safety zones. 18. Intensive talks have also been conducted with the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the situation at the Blace border crossing point. A memorandum of understanding on custom issues between UNMIK and that Government will be concluded shortly to facilitate the crossing of goods at the Blace crossing going into and through Kosovo. In view of the critical energy situation in Kosovo, negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have also focused on the supply of electrical energy from and through that country.
19. Besides the existing UNMIK liaison office in Skopje, UNMIK has now opened a liaison office in Tirana, Albania (see S/1999/779, para. 52).
B. Security situation
20. There was a serious deterioration in the security situation in early February 2000. On 2 February, a clearly marked humanitarian shuttle bus belonging to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carrying 49 Kosovo Serb passengers was targeted by a rocket, resulting in two persons killed and three injured. The bus was driven by international Danish Refugee Council staff and escorted by two KFOR vehicles. Following the attack, violence broke out in northern Mitrovica on 3 and 4 February, resulting in eight deaths and at least 20 to 30 persons seriously injured. It also caused the displacement of over 1,650 Kosovo Albanians from northern Mitrovica and the reduction of the number of Kosovo Serbs in the southern part of the city to just 20 individuals, the majority of whom are living at a monastery under KFOR protection. Some 5,000 Kosovo Serbs remain in isolated enclaves in the southern outskirts of the city as well as approximately 2,000 Kosovo Albanians in the northern outskirts. UNMIK and non-governmental organizations were also affected by the violence. Both international and local staff had to be relocated and nine vehicles belonging to UNMIK, UNHCR, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international non-governmental organizations were burned or looted. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) office was burned and several non-governmental organization offices and one KFOR office were looted.
21. Following a period of tense calm, violence again broke out in Mitrovica on 13 and 14 February. On the morning of 13 February, a grenade attack against a Bosniac cafe in northern Mitrovica injured 7 persons. Shortly thereafter, gunfire broke out near the river, with snipers firing from apartment buildings Page 6 at KFOR positions on the ground. Two French KFOR soldiers were seriously wounded. During exchanges of gunfire between KFOR and various identified sniper positions, one suspected sniper was killed and another wounded - both Kosovo Albanians. A total of 46 persons, the majority of whom were Kosovo Albanians, were taken into custody in the course of KFOR operations. On 21 February, a public march of Kosovo Albanians from Pristina to Mitrovica also led to a confrontation with KFOR forces on the main bridge in Mitrovica. KFOR was obliged to use tear gas to prevent Kosovo Albanian demonstrators from crossing the bridge to northern Mitrovica. The demonstrators eventually agreed to disperse after being addressed jointly by my Special Representative, the KFOR Commander and the KPC Director.
22. Many Serbs believe that a de facto partition of Mitrovica would enhance their security, but it remains a fundamental provocation for Kosovo Albanians and is inimical to resolution 1244 (1999). The political and security imperatives of the two sides are, however, not irreconcilable if moderate interests on both sides can be engaged. Unfortunately, extremists on both sides helped thwart efforts in 1999 to achieve more open arrangements for the city.
23. My Special Representative has initiated a strategy designed to arrest the crisis and address fundamental, legitimate concerns on both sides. A four-phased process is now under active discussion with local leaders, emphasizing freedom of movement for ethnic Albanians, security for ethnic Serbs, and orderly returns for both. The initial focus will be on confidence-building measures that can build on common interests. Ultimately, the aim is to establish a visibly different administration for the city of Mitrovica - the joint administration of a "united city" which can serve as an example elsewhere in Kosovo. However, this political process will depend heavily on the efforts of KFOR and UNMIK police to provide a secure environment. In addition, expanded public services and accelerated economic revival are crucial, since northern Kosovo has received fewer international aid and civil administration resources than many other parts of Kosovo. 24. With the exception of events in Mitrovica, violent crime in Kosovo has generally continued to follow the slow downward trend that characterized the previous reporting period. However, an upsurge in grenade and arson attacks against Kosovo Serb enclaves was noted during and since the time of the violent outbreaks in Mitrovica. In addition, on 26 February, a prominent Kosovo Serb medical doctor, who was also a member of SNC in Gracanica, was killed in Gnjilane. On 29 February, in Srbica, a Russian Federation KFOR soldier, serving as a driver for two commanding officers who were attending an UNMIK-chaired meeting of the municipal council, was shot outside the UNMIK municipality building. The soldier subsequently died of his wounds. 25. Cross-boundary incursions by Yugoslav police were also reported during the period in the Gnjilane region from Albanian-dominated areas in Serbia. The area which lies east of the Kosovo boundary line is assessed by both UNMIK and KFOR to be extremely volatile at present. The situation there causes great concern. International patrols along Kosovo’s eastern boundary with Serbia have been stepped up and permanent boundary checkpoints established. Both KFOR and UNMIK police have reported seeing armed Albanians in military uniforms in the area of Dobrosin, which lies within the 5-kilometer exclusion zone. On 26 January, the Page 7 bodies of two ethnic Albanians were brought from Dobrosin to Gnjilane by family members, who stated that they had been shot while cutting wood. The Serbian police, however, stated that they had gone to Dobrosin to request security assistance from community leaders for a planned weapons search in the area. They further claimed that, upon leaving the meeting, they had been fired upon in the centre of town and one Serbian Police officer had been wounded. The Serbian police report that they had then returned fire at the attackers, resulting in the death of the two Albanians who were subsequently brought to Gnjilane. On 29 February, a United Nations vehicle was ambushed by a group of armed and uniformed men near Bujanovac in south-eastern Serbia, near the Kosovo border. The passengers, consisting of United Nations humanitarian and security personnel, had been in the area on a routine assessment of the humanitarian situation in the region. One United Nations staff member sustained serious injuries in the ambush. The perpetrators, who subsequently directed the United Nations personnel to a nearby KFOR checkpoint, identified themselves as indigenous to the predominantly Albanian populated villages in the area. KFOR and UNMIK police have increased their monitoring and surveillance of the area as a potential flashpoint.
C. Transformation of former combatants
26. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) continued to meet the commitments made respectively in the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of 21 June 1999 and the statement of principles of 19 September 1999. At the completion of demilitarization on 19 September 1999, almost 6,900 rifles, 300 pistols and 900 support weapons (e.g., machine guns and mortars) and 300 anti-tank weapons had been handed in by KLA. In addition, 1,300 rifles, 300 pistols, 81 support weapons and 18 anti-tank weapons had been confiscated from KLA members. Almost 2,800 assorted weapons were confiscated from non-KLA Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic groups. Some 700 weapons were left behind by departing Yugoslav forces. KFOR and UNMIK civilian police have continued to search for weapons and are confiscating around 10 to 15 weapons each week from members of all ethnic groups throughout Kosovo. 27. With demilitarization completed, the focus is now on the return of former KLA soldiers to civilian life. This is a long-term process. Considerable efforts are being made by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to enhance career opportunities for former soldiers by the provision of training and job-placement support. Beginning in July 1999, IOM began an Information Counselling and Referral Service, which provides information, technical assistance, training and referrals to employment opportunities to former combatants. 28. KPC was formally established on 21 January 2000 with the appointment by my Special Representative of 46 KPC leaders, including one woman, one member of a religious minority (Catholic) and one member of an ethnic minority (Bosniac). The total strength of KPC as of 25 February stood at 544 persons. The total authorized strength of 5,052 KPC members (including 2,000 reservists not on active duty) will be selected by early March. Some 10 per cent of the total KPC positions remain reserved for minorities. Page 8 29. UNMIK regional administrators have begun identifying humanitarian and public works projects for KPC, ranging from housing reconstruction and refuse collection, to ice and snow clearance. KPC members have already taken on such tasks in the Prizren, Mitrovica and Pristina regions. KFOR will continue to provide day-to-day oversight of these projects. 30. The total budget requirement for KPC operating costs for the year 2000 is DM 20,734,697, of which only DM 12,290,000 in contributions had been received as of 10 February. There have been no additional contributions since my previous report (see S/1999/1250). Additional funding is critically needed for infrastructure repair, basic equipment and project financing as well as for wages and salaries for KPC members. 31. The first training courses have begun for administrative personnel of KPC. Key and mid-level leaders will receive a basic orientation training, which will cover human rights, resource management, strategic planning and an introduction to emergency operations management. All members of KPC will undertake an introduction course from 6 March to 30 April, include basic orientation on the mission and mandate of UNMIK, respect for human rights and practical skills (e.g., mine awareness and communications). 32. Minority communities in Kosovo have expressed concern about KPC, not only with regard to its creation and composition, but also with regard to the proposed location of KPC buildings. The alleged involvement of enrolled or aspiring KPC members in illegal law enforcement activities, their participation in political rallies and other incidents of ethnic intolerance, such as their refusal to participate in swearing-in ceremonies where the Serbian language was used, remains an issue of concern for the minority communities in Kosovo (see para. 62 below). Unfortunately, as illustrated in the fourth joint UNHCR/OSCE assessment on the situation of minorities in Kosovo, reports of illegal activities by alleged KPC members are often unconfirmed and, even when the victims of such crimes can be identified, they are often too afraid to report them for fear of reprisals. As the overwhelming majority of its membership comes from the former KLA, it is imperative that the KPC reassure the minority communities in Kosovo of their multi-ethnic perspective and of their desire to provide benefits to all communities in Kosovo.
D. Overview of the Mission
33. As previously reported, the four "pillars" of UNMIK are: UNHCR, which heads the humanitarian affairs component; OSCE, which heads the institution-building component; the European Union, which heads the economic reconstruction component; and the United Nations, which heads the civil administration component.
34. The Executive Committee (see S/1999/1250, para. 20) continues to bring together on a daily basis my Special Representative, his Principal Deputy and the four Deputy Special Representatives representing the four components of UNMIK. An UNMIK strategic planning document, prepared by the Executive Committee’s Joint Planning Group, is used by my Special Representative as a tool to ensure timely, collaborative policy-making decisions. Page 9 35. Coordination and cooperation between the four components of UNMIK and the office of my Special Representative, as well as with other international and national partners, extends beyond the Executive Committee and the Joint Planning Group. A number of formal and informal working groups and task forces have been formed to address a variety of topics of mutual concern (e.g., the Utilities Task Force, the Fuel Task Force, the UNMIK Security Requirements Task Force, the Joint Administration Task Force, the Ad Hoc Task Force on Minorities and the inter-pillar planning working group on gender issues). 36. The Military Liaison Office continues its coordinating efforts with KFOR and other international agencies, as well as its monitoring and analysis of the general security situation in the Mission area. The UNMIK Situation Centre reports on and analyses the situation in Kosovo through information received from the UNMIK military liaison officers throughout Kosovo, including at KFOR headquarters.
III. UNMIK POLICE
37. Progress by UNMIK police in assuming law and order responsibilities during the reporting period was limited by the low numbers of new police officers arriving in Kosovo. As of 1 March, 2,361 officers were serving as part of the UNMIK police, which constitutes close to 65 per cent of the total authorized strength of 3,618 civilian and border police officers (not including the 1,100 authorized police officers in special police units). However, the number of new officers arriving in the Mission began to increase during the last part of the reporting period, with some 500 new officers expected by the end of March. UNMIK police personnel are presently distributed as follows (excluding those in training): 603 in the Pristina region; 306 in the Prizren region; 535 in the Mitrovica region; 189 in the Gnjilane region; 105 in the Pec region; 193 border police; 268 in the central headquarters in Pristina; and 71 in the UNMIK police KPS Development Unit.
38. UNMIK police has full executive law enforcement responsibility in the Pristina and Prizren regions as well as at the Pristina Airport international border crossing point. It has investigative authority in the Gnjilane and Mitrovica regions, as well as in Pec municipality and at the international border crossing points of Djeneral Jankovic (Blace) and Globocica. Furthermore, UNMIK police continue to run the Pristina and Mitrovica detention facilities. UNMIK police also continue to develop and implement joint security operations with KFOR. These operations are being enhanced in Mitrovica to include joint foot and vehicle patrols, cooperation in weapons and ordnance searches, and the building up of a joint operations centre. 39. A substantial shift of limited police resources to the Mitrovica region occurred in response to the violent outbreaks in that town in February. By the end of February, UNMIK police had reinforced the Mitrovica region with 310 additional police officers and diverted logistical resources to the area from the Pec region. As a result of this diversion, KFOR will, for the time being, continue to provide primary law and order services in the Pec region until UNMIK is able to reinforce the region with new police officers. Page 10 40. The deterioration of the security situation in Mitrovica again highlighted the policing gap resulting from the insufficient numbers of UNMIK police officers and the absence of special police units. Since no such units have yet arrived to the Mission area, responsibility for the management of major incidents of public disorder and unrest has, of necessity, remained with KFOR. However, at least three special police units are now expected to arrive in the Mission area in March.
41. UNMIK police continue to carry out investigations, patrolling and public order functions, border policing and traffic control. Increasing numbers of non-police tasks continue to demand up to 15 to 20 per cent of available UNMIK police resources at any time. Such tasks include the guarding of banks and other buildings, as well as guarding UNMIK money transfers. Additional requests to provide security for public transport, humanitarian convoys and courts and judicial personnel have been made which, if fulfilled, would require up to 80 per cent of the existing staff resources of UNMIK police. The need to identify alternative resources to fulfil such non-police security tasks, in order to free up limited UNMIK police resources for law and order functions has thus become a Mission priority. 42. UNMIK police also continue to work towards the development of professional capacities to counter organized crime affecting Kosovo and the region. A comprehensive criminal intelligence structure within UNMIK police, including both centralized and regional elements, will soon be established with the support of interested Member States. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has offered professional and logistical resources for this initiative, and other Member States have also expressed their intention to support it. 43. The development of a local police service in accordance with international and European standards has continued. A special section of the UNMIK police is tasked full-time with development of the future police for Kosovo, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The institution-building pillar (OSCE) provides education and training for KPS through the Kosovo Police Service school. The KPS training programme starts with a nine-week, 392-hour basic course at the KPS school. Upon graduation from the school, KPS cadets enter a 19-week field-training programme administered by UNMIK police, which includes additional classroom training coordinated jointly by UNMIK police and the KPS school. KPS field trainees serve as part of UNMIK police, under the supervision and command of the UNMIK Police Commissioner, until such time as they are assessed to be sufficiently trained to carry out police duties independently. 44. The KPS selection procedures have been refined to ensure that candidates with the best qualifications are identified for inclusion. The selection procedure is comprised of four criteria: minimum requirements, preferred qualifications, comprehensive examinations and psychological/physical fitness standards. Other factors are taken into consideration in the recruitment of each class, in particular the priority for appropriate ethnic and gender representation. Background checks are initiated when candidates are selected and continue during field training and a three-year probationary period. Page 11 45. As of 22 February, 347 KPS cadets were working on the streets of Kosovo. The third class of 235 students began their KPS school training on 22 February. The "production" of KPS cadets has been much slower than originally anticipated owing to continuing logistical and administrative obstacles. KPS is one of the few multi-ethnic institutions operating in Kosovo. UNMIK has set goals of 15 per cent minority representation and 25 per cent female representation for the future KPS. There were 8 Kosovo Serbs and 11 other minorities in the first class; 28 Kosovo Serbs and 14 other minorities in the second class; and 18 Kosovo Serbs and 5 other minorities in the third class. Women comprised 22 per cent of the first class, 19 per cent of the second class and 24 per cent of the third class. KPS field trainees have been provided with uniforms and, at the end of February, were issued sidearms and protective equipment. 46. The KPS field-training officer programme includes one-to-one mentoring, daily observation reports, bi-monthly evaluations, completion of daily activity logs and in-service classroom training of eight hours per week. To date, UNMIK police have trained 998 of its officers as field training officers. Each KPS cadet is continually monitored and evaluated by UNMIK police officers through the 19 weeks of field training, as well as the six subsequent weeks of career rotation and one week of comprehensive examinations. Successful completion of each of these stages will qualify cadets for subsequent phases of the KPS programme. 47. Since the inception of the KPS programme, there have been 24 disciplinary investigations involving KPS cadets. Nine cases were unfounded, six individuals were reprimanded for policy violations, one was suspended without pay for repeated policy violations, five have been temporarily suspended pending completion of investigations and three have been terminated for involvement in criminal activity either during or after the conflict. There have been five resignations. 48. KPS will eventually deploy to 29 police stations. Supply and logistics programmes have been developed for the service and some equipment has already arrived and has been distributed throughout Kosovo. Securing additional support for the equipping of the future KPS remains a high priority of UNMIK.
compiled by Dr S D Stein
Last update 03/05/2000
©S D Stein
ESS Home Page
Holocaust Index Page
Genocide Index Page