08/09/99
                By George J. Aditjondro
                Last Wednesday, 5 May, the autonomy proposal of Indonesia for
                East Timor was signed in Jakarta and Lissabon. In three months
                time, the East Timorese will cast their votes in a UN-supervised
                ‘direct ballot’ whether to accept or reject that proposal. A
                rejection, will automatically return control over the territory
                to Portugal, to continue the decolonisation process aborted by
                the Indonesian invasion, more than 23 years ago.
                Unfortunately, thousands of Indonesian troops and
                Indonesian-armed militia forces are currently roaming the
                streets in the towns and villages of East Timor, to force the
                people to accept that autonomy proposal, after killing hundreds
                of villagers and refugees in Alas, Liquica, Dili, and other
                places during the last six months, and injuring hundreds others.
                During the Bali summit with Acting President, B.J. Habibie,
                Prime Minister John Howard failed to emphasise to his
                counterpart the urgency to disarm those thugs and to withdraw
                the Indonesian troops, to create the necessary conditions for
                the UN-supervised ballot. Or, for that matter, to guarantee the
                safety of the UN personnel on the ground, which will include at
                least fifty Australian police agents.
                On the subject of these militias, our media tend to provide
                an image, as if the presence of these military-backed militias,
                simply reflect some splits within the ranks of the Indonesian
                government. Namely, between the good-willing Indonesian civilian
                president, Dr. B.J. Habibie, and the difficult-to-read
                Indonesian armed forces commander, General Wiranto. Or, deriving
                from Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s famous comment,
                divisions between "rogue elements" among the
                Indonesian army in East Timor, and General Wiranto who seems to
                be 100% behind the transitional president.
                This image is, I believe, very inaccurate. It completely
                overlooks the economic interests of the Jakarta oligarchy on the
                island of Timor, which cause this closely knit clique of former
                and active army generals and their families to abuse the fears
                of a handful of East Timorese leaders, who themselves have
                stuffed their pockets during their more than two decades of
                collaboration with Jakarta. Let me now briefly outline those
                business interests.
                First of all, East Timor is the Indonesian
                "province" with the second largest landholdings under
                control of the Soeharto family, namely 564,867 hectares. CNRT,
                the umbrella organisation of the East Timorese resistance, has
                made it clear, last March, that they plan to seize the millions
                of dollars worth of these properties, after independence has
                been obtained (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March).
                These landholdings stretch from the Western border to the
                Eastern tip of East Timor, consisting of a 50,000 hectares
                timber plantation allocated to Bob Hasan, one of the Soeharto
                family’s business operators, to tens of thousands of hectares
                of sugarcane plantations awarded to the kids on the Southern
                coast, stretching from Suai to Viqueque and to Los Palos in the
                district of Lautem. In addition, the best marble deposits in
                Manatuto, has been awarded to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Soeharto’s
                eldest daughter, who also has a monopoly over coffee production
                and export from East Timor, through a company of hers in Dili.
                These Soeharto interests are closely intertwined with the
                business interests of other generals who had served under
                Soeharto, both during the Seroja Operation to invade and annex
                East Timor, as well as in other military operations. Batara
                Indra, an Indonesian conglomerate backed by Ret. Generals Benny
                Moerdani and Dading Kalbuadi, the mastermind behind the killings
                of Australian-based journalists in Balibo and Dili, controls the
                sandalwood forests of East Timor, and the production of
                sandalwood oil for export to produce sandalwood perfumed soap in
                France and sandalwood powder for incense sticks for export to
                East Asia. Batara Indra also exports Buddhist statues to Taiwan
                and Catholic statues to Italy, made from East Timorese
                sandalwood and marble.
                Most of the hotels and the only cinema in Dili, are owned by
                Batara Indra, while all the large construction firms in Dili,
                which are involved in all the large infrastructure projects,
                including building the irrigation canals and ditches for
                Indonesian "transmigrants", either belong to Benny
                Moerdani’s Batara Indra Group, or to the Anak Liambau Group of
                the Jakarta-appointed governor, Jose Abilio Osorio-Soares.
                Supply of cement is now problem to all those contractors.
                Because two companies close to the Soehartos are their main
                suppliers: the Djajanti Group cement factory on the island of
                Seram, north of Timor, which is headed by a son of Ret. General
                Try Sutrisno, Soeharto’s former vice president, and the cement
                factory near Kupang on West Timor, which is owned by Ret.
                General Arnold Baramuli, whose son co-owns the alcohol sticker
                company of Soeharto’s grand-son, Ari Haryo Wibowo.
                The governor’s family is also closely intertwined with the
                Soeharto family’s businesses. Gil Alves, a brother-in-law of
                Governor Abilio, operates the alcohol sticker monopoly of Ari
                Haryo Wibowo, also known as Ari Sigit. In addition, as the
                chairperson of Yayasan Hati, a charity of former East Timorese
                collaborators during the Seroja Operation, Gil Alves is also
                involved in a drinking water company, Aquamor, and a textile
                company, PT Dilitex, which are closely linked with Siti Hediati
                Haryadi, Soeharto’s middle daughter who is married to the
                sacked General Prabowo Subianto.
                Now, looking at the who-is-who of the pro-integration militia
                and their leaders in East Timor, it is not difficult to find
                their links to the Soeharto family, or, to their own
                land-grabbing practices in East Timor.
                On top of the list is certainly Governor Abilio Osorio-Soares
                himself, formerly a protegee of General Prabowo Subianto, when
                the latter was still the top person in the Indonesian army’s
                special forces, Kopassus. Then you have Basilio Araujo, the
                spokeperson of the pro-integration forces, who graduated from
                the U.K. and is the deputy head of the provincial investment
                board (BKPMD), the body which makes the decision on who is
                allowed to invest in what field and where in East Timor.
                Next follows to former district heads in the border area,
                Joao Tavares, who had been involved in the border raids under
                then Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, and who as bupati (district head)
                of Maliana, took over many landholdings vacated by East Timorese
                who fled to Australia and Portugal. On the same level is Rui
                Lopes, the former district head of Covalima, whose hobby, apart
                from collecting landholdings, is also to collect horses and
                cattle. On a visit of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana to Suai, the
                capital of Covalima, Rui Lopes took Mrs. Rukmana to see the old
                oil wells in Suai Loro, south of the capital, near the coast and
                near one of Rui Lopes’ horse stables.
                Even the current army commander of East Timor, Colonel Tono
                Suratman (born in 1952), smacks of Soeharto connections. His
                family are the co-owners of a pearling company, PT Kima Surya
                Lestari Mutiara, with General Prabowo Subianto’s wife. This
                company has pearl diving operations offshore Flores and Lombok,
                west of Timor. Due to its high-level connections, this
                Suratman-Prabowo joint venture was allowed to operate within the
                boundaries of the Komodo national park, without even paying any
                royalties to the Nusa Tenggara Timur province.
                Lest we forget, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the head of the new
                "Timor Lorosae Front" is also not free from Soeharto
                family connections. Two years ago, together with another East
                Timorese collaborator, the Lissabon-based former Fretilin
                leader, Abilio Araujo, he has been promised to become a
                shareholder of a new cement factory to be built in Los Palos,
                using the electricity from a new hydropower plant to be built in
                the vicinities. The Indonesian counterpart of this cement
                factory is Budi Prakoso, whose brother, Setiawan Djody, was
                involved in Tommy Suharto’s Lamborghini deal. The patron of
                this proposed cement factory is Mrs. Rukmana herself, Soeharto’s
                former de facto foreign minister.
                In other words, the entire top brass of the Indonesian army
                and civilian bureaucracy in East Timor are closely interlinked
                with the former inner circle of Soeharto, which has in turn be
                taken over by his successor, Habibie. Even Wiranto is not free
                from Soeharto connections, since all the army charities which
                are now under his patronage, are co-shareholders of many of the
                Soeharto family’s timber concessions and telecommunication
                companies.
                One may ask, though, isn’t East Timor such a small piece of
                the economic pie, compared with all the other Indonesian
                provinces? The answer is yes, because the Soeharto family still
                control nine million hectares of landholdings all over
                Indonesia, as large as the island of Java. The bottom-line is,
                that the landholdings in East Timor overlap with the three known
                oil wells from the Portuguese time, namely Suai Loro in Covalima,
                Aliambata in Viqueque, and Pualaca in Manatuto. And between
                those three wells lie vast untapped oil reserves as well.
                The Soeharto family had also made their preparations to
                venture into the Timor Sea reserves. Last year, a new oil
                company was set up in Perth, called Genindo Western Petroleum
                Pty. Ltd., which is partly owned but directed by Bambang
                Trihatmodjo, Soeharto’s middle son. Bambang and his younger
                brother Tommy also own two Singapore-based oil and gas tanker
                fleets, who are plying the seas between Indonesia and Northeast
                Asia, and who would eagerly be involved in a similar trade
                between the Timor Gap and those rich Asian customers. In
                addition, Bambang is also co-owner of PT Elnusa, which is
                involved in building a base camp for the oil companies and
                related petro-chemical industries on either West or East Timor.
                Tommy, in addition to his tanker fleet, has his own
                aircharter company which has been waiting to chip into the Timor
                Gap wealth, where three wells—Elang, Kakatua, and Kakatua
                North—have already been producing 33,000 barrels of oil per
                day since July, last year. And many of the Soeharto clan
                business partners in Indonesia’s oil and gas fields, such as
                Mobil Oil, are also active in the Timor Sea, which could lead
                them into further joint ventures in this part of the world.
                This is why the Jakarta oligarchy—with the strong support
                from their East Timorese collaborators—are so keen in
                undermining a free and fair vote to determine East Timor’s
                future political status.
                After signing the autonomy package, the Habibie-Wiranto
                government has received a further boost to support the militias,
                in a more official way. Under the pretext of "socialising
                the autonomy package", the Jakarta-appointed governor has
                already allocated Rp 6 billion (roughly A$ 3000) for each
                district. Now, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense
                Departments have received a further blessing from Habibie to
                allocate funds to the pro-integration factions in East Timor,
                and turn a blind-eye in how they are going to "socialise"
                that autonomy package.
                Learning probably from Milosevic’s stubborn tactic to
                partition Kosovo, I believe that behind the militia tactics in
                East Timor there seems to hide a strategy to partition East
                Timor into a western half which support continued links with
                Indonesia and an eastern part that would be allowed to become
                independent. A partition, that would roughly follow the lines of
                the ‘oil-rich’ and ‘oil-poor’ parts of East Timor.
                Or, a strategy that would allow the entire territory to
                obtain its political independence, as long as the landholdings
                of the Soeharto family and their East Timorese collaborators
                would be respected by an independent East Timor state, and not
                be seized by the new government or by those properties rightful,
                traditional landowners.
                So, without a strong UN peace keeping force, and without the
                disarming of pro-Jakarta militias and the complete withdrawal of
                Indonesian troops, I am afraid that one of those scenarios may
                be materialised.
                Dr. George J. Aditjondro is a lecturer at the Department of
                Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Newcastle. His
                new book, "Is Oil Thicker than Blood? A Study of Oil
                Companies Interests and Western Complicity in Indonesia’s
                Annexation of East Timor" is going to be published by Nova
                Science in the USA, this month.