*1 UN Doc S/25274 [10 February 1992], at Annex I; First Interim Report at paragraphs 65 and 66.
*2 Phase I was intended to involve interviews conducted in all the states of the former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia, which is part of phase II). Phase II involves interviews conducted in states hosting refugees outside the area.
*3 Including those by innumerable journalists in addition to NGOs such as Amnesty International, Equality Now, Helsinki Watch, the World Council of Churches and intergovernmental organisations such as the European Community (as it then was). Within the United Nations a mission was carried out in January 1993 by medical experts working under the mandate of the Commission on Human Right's Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 February 1993). See also the Special Rapporteur's most recent report (E/CN.4/1994/47) and the Report of the Secretary General on rape and the abuse of women in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1994/5).
*4 Sixth Periodic Report: UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/110, at para. 54.
*5 This dissemination approach finds echoes in that used by the Truth Commission for El Salvador in an ultra-sensitive political climate to invite potential victim-witnesses to give information regarding grave acts of violence (a major difference with the current project is its use of the mass media). The Interviews Coordinator directly observed this while acting as a human rights monitor in ONUSAL. Seven thousand statements were received in the Truth Commission's offices as a result of their dissemination campaign; see From Madness to Hope: The Twelve Year War in El Salvador, 1992/1993, at 41 of the original Spanish text.
*6 When teams were to be based outside Zagreb, the Interviews Co- ordinator set up contacts with NGOs, etc., in the area in advance of the team's arrival. A meeting with all the relevant local actors was set up for the first day of the team's work to introduce the interviewing team and to build on the earlier contacts made to arrange interviews. For this initial meeting, the teams were accompanied by the Interviews Coordinator, Mr. Osorio or Ms. Maja Draznovic (who both have extensive experience in this type of field work) to assist them in this initial period. In addition, to allow the teams time to settle in before they undertook their own scheduling for the succeeding days, interviews for the first few days would sometimes be scheduled there by the Interviews Co-ordinator (through contacts in Zagreb).
*7 Where it was obvious that this was repeatedly happening with a team outside Zagreb, after discussions with the teams involved (who were probably becoming a little frustrated) the Interviews Coordinator would invite them to return to Zagreb where they would join the scheduling programme of the Interviews Coordinator.
*8 It goes without saying that most contact persons use the term «massacre» very loosely to cover everything such as a shell hitting a town to the witness' relative being killed in battle.
*9 This should serve as a reminder of the depth of the suffering of these victim-witnesses and of the need for utmost concern in working with them.
*10 This is discussed elsewhere, Memorandum from the Interviews Co- ordinator to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts of 21 March 1994.
*11 Video-taping of witnesses is a particularly sensitive issue in the context of rape victims, and for this additional reason this procedure not be adopted.
*12 Statement by the President made at a briefing to members of Diplomatic Missions, at the end of the Second Session 17 January to 11 February 1994, IT 29; See Rules of Procedure and Evidence IT/32, 14 March 1994.
*13 These camps were actually located in FRY, in the region of Vojvodina. However, since the population of these camps was primarily from Croatia, they are discussed in this section.
*14 These paragraphs are drawn from the Memorandum of the Investigation Coordinator to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts of 10 January 1994.
*15 See, id.
*16 Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal, invokes the responsibility of superiors where:
«. . . if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.»
*17 The case of Omarska is an interesting one in this context because international journalists obtained permission to visit the camp from the highest levels of the Bosnian Serb leadership. The journalists exposed the horror of the camp and effectively forced its closure. The circumstances of this access given to international journalists should be investigated as it may (or may not) be evidence of a lack of knowledge by superiors of the nature of the camp (otherwise, the argument goes, why would access be granted to the journalists).
*18 In particular, it does not contain contacts for BiH nor for FRY.
*19 Major Bob Moquin (Canada), Zagreb, 28 February 1994, during the briefings for the project participants.
*20 See Memoranda from the Interviews Co-ordinator to the Chairman of the Commission regarding the inherent limits of the Plan of Action dated 10 January 1994; as well as 13 February 1994. Although it should be noted that because of the sheer scale of the project, with 223 interviews carried out, it was possible to achieve some focus, for example, regarding the 19 women interviewed from the Kotor Varos area.
*21 Although the Interviews Coordinator is not yet aware of how this will function.
*22 This appendix is taken verbatim from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth ed. American Psychiatric Association ed., 1994).
*23 Id. at 227.
*24 See, id. at 335.
*25 Id. at 684-85.
*26 Id. at 481.
*27 Id. at 626-27.
*28 Id. at 449-50.
*29 Id.
*30 Id. at 427-29.