| U.S. and Allied Efforts To Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II |
VII. Allied Negotiations With the Other Neutral Countries
A. Allied Negotiations With Sweden
U.S. and British efforts to enlist the Swedes in the Safehaven program began in 1944, but the two Allies were not united in their goals. Britain favored a more restrictive program, limited to controlling gold in the country. The United States advocated including all enemy assets as stipulated in Bretton Woods Resolution VI and using the prospect of renewed trade agreements with the Swedes as an inducement. In spite of these divisions, the Allies’ entreaties to Stockholm appeared to have some effect. In September the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) voiced its support for the Safehaven program noting that Sweden felt a responsibility to assist in the postwar recovery of Europe, and in February 1945 Sweden began a census of its gold and foreign exchange holdings to determine how much might be linked to Axis investors.
By Spring 1945 the British agreed to the broader U.S. objectives. A joint Safehaven proposal for Sweden was drafted, and the U.S. Missions in Lisbon and Madrid were advised to use it as the basis for their Safehaven talks. Informal talks in Stockholm began in late April. The Swedes noted their support for the principles of Bretton Woods VI and their desire to not "assist the Germans in hiding assets" in their country, but indicated some confusion over the details of the resolution. The Allies described the implications of the resolution for the Swedes and its importance in thwarting German plans for postwar resistance.
By the summer, these negotiations produced tangible results. Sweden passed a series of decrees to control German property by restricting its sale or dispersal, and expanded the range of their census to include all types of German property. In addition, to implement these decrees and penalize violators, an administrative and investigative body, the Foreign Capital Control Office (FCCO), was established. In January 1946, after Allied prodding, Sweden tightened these laws to include controls over German subsidiaries.
In November 1945 Sweden provided U.S. Treasury Department officials with reports concerning Swedish gold transactions during the war. In comparing these records with data on German gold holdings at the time of the Swedish purchases, Treasury believed that Sweden had acquired $22.7 million of looted Belgian gold. For negotiation purposes, the Allies reduced the claims to about $17 million.
On February 11, 1946, the U.S. Embassy informed the Swedish Government of the details of ACC Law No. 5, vesting title to the occupation authorities of German assets in other countries, and invited a delegation to Washington to discuss its implementation in Sweden. Although Sweden consented to the talks, it had grave concerns over the Allied claims to these assets. On April 5 the Swedish Foreign Office advised the Embassy that Sweden would have to put the decision to the Riksdag, where it would probably be defeated "based on belief that Allied claim not valid in international law and hence violation private property rights." In addition, the Swedes requested that their assets in the United States, frozen after the war, be released prior to negotiations and that they be allowed to inspect Swedish property in Germany. The Allies refused, claiming that both issues needed to be addressed in formal negotiations.
On March 8, 1946, British and French representatives met with officials from the Treasury and State Departments to discuss Swedish gold movements during the war. Although the United States had detailed accountings, the information about Swedish gold reserves was imprecise. The reserves had increased during the war, but the Allies could not determine if this was due to looted gold. In at least one instance, the Germans had attempted to sell gold looted from Belgium to Sweden, but the Swedes had apparently refused to buy.
By the end of March, the United States believed it had "almost complete information concerning German assets in Sweden" and began pushing for negotiations in Washington to determine their final disposition. The United States and Britain developed a joint strategy shortly thereafter, paying particular concern to their defense of ACC Law No. 5. The Allies argued that due to Germany’s surrender and the June 1945 Declaration of Berlin, they had assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany including all powers possessed by German Govt" and the "right to marshal its assets, internal and external." They presented this argument, along with a proposal to begin negotiations on May 13, in a note to Sweden on May 4. Starting negotiations so soon, State hoped, might inspire the Swiss to expedite their Safehaven talks. Although the Swedes remained unmoved by these arguments, they agreed to meet. As a "partial quid pro quo," however, they again requested that the Allies grant them the right to investigate the status of Swedish property in Germany. Although nothing formal was decided, by late April the Allies seemed inclined to approve the trade-off.
Formal negotiations began in Washington on May 29. The U.S. delegation was headed by Seymour Rubin, Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Economic Security Policy, and included representatives from the State and Treasury Departments. The British delegation was headed by Francis W. McCombe of the Foreign Office; the French delegation by Christian Valensi, Financial Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington; and the Swedish delegation by Judge Emil Sandstrom. Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton opened the conference with a statement in which he made clear that there was no intention in the discussions to attack Sweden’s role as a neutral during the war but rather he urged the delegates to concentrate on the large issues: the claims of innocent victims of a war of aggression to compensation from the holdings of the aggressor nation and the desire to obtain security and peace.
From the outset, Sweden concurred with the Allies on the danger that German assets might be used to promote a revival of Nazism, but continued to maintain that by international law they, not the ACC, had the right to decide how to liquidate these assets in Sweden. The British advocated basing an agreement on Sweden’s moral obligation to help in the reconstruction of Europe, and they convinced the U.S. delegates that if they persisted in arguing for the vesting order on the basis of international law, the issue would go to international arbitration, which the Allies would likely lose.
Negotiations continued into the summer, and on July 18 the two sides reached an accord. Of the estimated 378 million kroner (about $90.7 million) in German assets in Sweden, Sweden agreed to divide the proceeds from their liquidation as follows: 50 million kroner (about $12.5 million) would go to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (later the International Refugee Organization) for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of Nazism; 75 million kroner (about $18 million) would go to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA), excluding the amounts the United States, Britain, and France would get; 150 million kroner (about $36 million) would go for assistance in preventing disease and unrest in Germany. This last sum would be placed in a special account in the Swedish National Bank usable for purchases in Sweden or other countries of essential commodities for the German economy. In addition, the agreement permitted Swedes and German owners of liquidated property to be compensated in German currency; allowed for a Swedish mission to travel to the U.S., British, and French Zones of occupied Germany to inspect Swedish properties; called for the release of frozen Swedish assets in the United States (estimated at the time at $200 million) and the removal of any "blacklists;" and allowed the Allies to hold in reserve their claims to German state properties in Sweden.
Paragraphs 4 (a), (b), and (c) of the agreement addressed the question of looted property, including gold. Sweden agreed to "effect restitution to the Allies of all gold acquired by Sweden and proved to have been taken by the Germans from occupied countries, including any such gold transferred by the Swedish Riksbank to third countries." According to evidence gathered, Sweden would "restitute amounts to 7,155.32664 kilograms of fine gold [approximately $8.1 million], corresponding to the quantity of gold deriving from the Bank of Belgium which was acquired by the Swedish Riksbank," but Sweden would be held harmless "from any claims deriving from transfers from the Swedish Riksbank to third countries of gold to be restituted." In addition, the Allies could not make claims "with regard to any gold acquired by Sweden from Germany and transferred to third countries prior to June 1, 1945," or any additional claims after July 1, 1947.
In his report on these negotiations, Rubin noted that the talks proceeded smoothly and with an "absence of the bitterness" that characterized the Swiss negotiations. In comparison to the 50-50 split of German assets with the Swiss, the Swedes agreed to deliver almost 73 percent of their holdings. He commented that there had been little or no difficulty on reaching agreement in the gold negotiations with the Swedish delegation:
"It was agreed from the outset that any gold removed by Germany from the occupied areas, on whatever pretext or through whatever method, would be considered as having been looted. Discussion on the gold question were therefore reduced merely to the technical question of identification of the gold transferred by Germany to Sweden during the course of the war which had been removed from the occupied countries. The books on both sides were opened and, as a result, agreement was reached."
Sweden and the Allies moved quickly to implement the July 18 agreement. Sweden formally ratified it in November 1946. In July 1947 the Preparatory Commission of the IRO received a deposit of 50 million kroner (then worth about $12.5 million) for the support of non-repatriable refugees in Europe, of which a considerable portion was made available in sterling and other currencies that could be used for the rehabilitation and transportation of the refugees.
Shortly before the expiration of the July 1, 1947, deadline for gold claims, the Allies filed a request for the restitution of 638 looted Dutch gold bars (worth about $10 million) acquired by Sweden during the war. Sweden challenged a portion of these claims, arguing that some of the gold had been acquired before the January 1943 London Declaration. The Allies claimed, however, that the July 1946 agreement clearly stated that Sweden would restitute all looted gold. In subsequent discussions, the Swedes continued to argue that the agreement did not apply to looted gold acquired prior to 1943.
The debate over the Dutch bars continued into the 1950s. In December 1947 the Netherlands furnished its final data on looted gold bars to the Swedish Riksbank. Sweden declared the evidence inconclusive. In November 1951 State and Treasury seemed ready to accept Sweden’s argument but no action was taken. In fact, State did not even reply to a 1952 note from Sweden reiterating its claim that it was not accountable for any gold acquired prior to 1943. On May 19, 1954, the Swedes and Americans met to discuss the issue further, but nothing was apparently resolved. Ultimately, Sweden restituted about 6 tons of the gold (about $6.8 million) to the Netherlands in 1955.
Other problems arose in implementing the July 1946 agreement. By 1948 Sweden was still claiming that the Allies had no official rights under ACC Law No. 5, prompting the U.S. Embassy to present a formal note to Sweden again explaining the legal basis for the Allies’ claim. In addition, Sweden did not turn over the gold specified in the July 1946 agreement by the March 1948 deadline, claiming apparently that the gold had not been properly identified. On March 15 the U.S. Embassy responded by denying this assertion and requesting that the transfer be made to the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. The Allies discussed these compliance problems at the Conference on Economic Security held in Paris April 26-May 7, 1948, and left it up to the United States to respond.
On May 12, 1948, Sweden delivered a note to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm claiming that further investigations were needed to determine if their gold holdings included looted gold as defined in the July 1946 agreement. State discussed its response with the British and French Embassies in Washington, and in July the three Allies delivered separate but similar notes to Sweden. The Allies argued that all investigations had been completed by the Bank of France and the Riksbank soon after July 1946 and that no further investigation was needed.
Although Sweden had expeditiously fulfilled its obligation to the IRO in July 1947, it was not as forthcoming with the funds for the IARA. In September 1947 the IARA Assembly accepted a Swedish plan for distributing the 75 million kroner (about $18 million) due under the July 1946 accord with the Allies. This plan allowed Sweden to negotiate bilaterally with each member nation to decide how to satisfy its portion of the total. As of September 1952, Sweden had distributed all but 7 million kroner ($1.4 million at 1952 exchange rates) destined for Belgium and Luxembourg. Sweden had apparently asked these two countries to reimburse them for the 7 million kroner, but they refused. Accordingly, the Allies sent similar notes to Sweden asking that it turn the money directly over to the IARA for distribution. On July 28, 1953, the U.S. Embassy in London reported that in lieu of the 7 million kroner offer to the IRO, "the Swedes will pay 12,896,917 Swiss francs [about $3 million] to Kingsley." No further information on the settlement has been found.
In addition to settling the additional claims for Dutch gold in 1955, Sweden delivered the 7,155 kilograms of gold stipulated under the July 1946 agreement in December 1949.
B. Allied Negotiations With Portugal
During the course of the war, Portugal was an important source of wolfram, tin, manganese, mica, chrome, and antimony for the Third Reich’s war machine. Of these, wolfram was the most coveted by the Nazis. In February 1943 Germany concluded an agreement with Portugal to obtain 100 percent of the output of its German-owned wolfram mines and 50 percent of all other mines with the exception of those owned by Allied interests. Portugal, wary of the long-term value of the Deutschmark, requested payment in gold. The Allies contended that most of this gold had been looted from occupied countries and peoples after 1942.
On June 5, 1944, with the tide of war having turned against Germany, the Allies compelled Portugal to cease wolfram shipments, prompting Germany to begin liquidating German mining assets and cloaking them in Portuguese businesses. As of June 1946 the Allies estimated that approximately 50 million escudos (about $2 million) had been liquidated and invested in assets such as hotels, cinemas, and factories.
With the end of the war in sight, Portugal was more amenable to the Allies’ Safehaven demands. Heeding their requests to comply with Bretton Woods Resolution VI and the February 1944 Gold Declaration, on May 14, 1945, Lisbon enacted Decree Law 34,600, freezing all German assets in Portugal, creating a licensing system for unblocking these assets, providing for a census of these assets, prohibiting the trading of foreign currency notes, and establishing a penalty regime to enforce these provisions. On May 23 the decree was extended to all Portuguese colonies. Included in these frozen assets were the official state properties of the German Government in Portugal. On May 6, 1945, upon request of the U.S., British, and French Embassies, Portuguese officials seized German governmental buildings and their contents throughout Portugal and its colonies. One month later, they surrendered these properties to a tripartite committee, the Joint Allied Committee on German Affairs in Portugal, established to oversee their liquidation. Included in these seized assets were 5,000 gold sovereign coins found at the German Legation in Lisbon.
The State Department continued to be concerned about two aspects of the law: the Allies were excluded from the census and, more importantly, the law permitted the transfer of blocked assets to individuals for their "subsistence" and "the normal exercise of commercial and industrial activity." The Division of Economic Security Controls (ES) complained to the Embassy in Lisbon that this last aspect could prove a significant "loop-hole," permitting the Portuguese to grant excessive living allowances to Germans and the continued transfer of German assets. ES believed the Embassy did not make a serious enough effort to compel the Portuguese to amend the law, and in a June 19, 1946, report concluded that the Department’s worst "fears" had been realized—German firms continued to operate "without any serious handicaps" and much of Germany’s assets had been dissipated. Moreover, the Portuguese census had failed to uncover any holdings the Allies had not already identified.
On September 3, 1946, Allied and Portuguese technical-level negotiators met in Lisbon to begin working out how to assess, liquidate, and distribute German assets. The Allies submitted a draft accord to the Portuguese on September 9, who responded with a counterproposal 9 days later. In the midst of the talks, Allied negotiator Seymour Rubin reported to the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, John C. Wiley, that while the talks could be characterized as friendly, "serious disagreement" existed between the two sides. These were: 1) defining exactly what German assets would qualify for liquidation; 2) determining how much the Portuguese could claim for wartime losses against Germany; 3) deciding what role each side would play in overseeing liquidation; and 4) deciding how much gold, if any, Portugal would have to relinquish to the Allies. None of these issues was resolved during the Lisbon negotiations in 1946-1947.
From 1945 on, the Portuguese had shown little flexibility on the issue of looted gold, claiming that it was not their responsibility to return the gold that they had exchanged with Germany during the war for tangible assets. In fact, in at least one instance officials at the Bank of Portugal claimed that "no gold whatsoever was ever shipped from Germany to Portugal between April 1938 and May 1945." A July 1946 State Department report, based upon Allied reviews of wartime intelligence and investigations of German and Swiss Government and banking institutions, determined that Portugal had acquired a total of 123,827 kilograms of gold (or roughly 121.87 tons, valued at the time at $143.8 million) from the Swiss National Bank. Of that amount, 20,117 kilograms ($22.6 million) was definitely deemed to have been looted Belgian gold from the German Reichsbank’s deposit at the Swiss National Bank. For the remaining approximately 103,709 kilograms ($116.7 million), the Allies had substantial, but less conclusive proof that approximately 72 percent was looted. Consequently the report recommended that the Allies request from Portugal the full 20,117 kilograms of looted Belgian gold as well as 94,787 kilograms (about $106.6 million) of the probably looted gold.
At the talks in Lisbon, the Allies proposed that the Portuguese turn over 44,864 kilograms of gold (valued at roughly $50.5 million). This, they contended, was the amount of gold that the Portuguese had acquired from Germany after 1942, when it had become common knowledge throughout the world that Germany had expended its own gold reserves and was relying on looted gold. The Portuguese argued that they were not aware that Germany had expended its own reserves by 1942 and that they had purchased all their gold in "good faith" that it was not looted. Therefore, if they did discover some looted gold in the future, they would turn it over to the Allies only after being compensated from any liquidated German assets. The Allies found this proposal unacceptable. The most to which both sides could agree was to create a joint Subcommittee on Gold to review the Portuguese holdings and records.
After several months of bargaining, the Allies and the Portuguese reached a tentative accord on February 21, 1947. But the agreement dealt only with the liquidation of German assets and the Portuguese refused to implement its terms until some consensus was reached on the gold issue. The Portuguese agreed to deliver all German assets on their territory as of February 21, 1947, regardless of who had owned them, to the Allies for liquidation. Of the proceeds, 100 million escudos (about $4 million) was to go to the IARA to compensate non-repatriables. After reviewing Portuguese claims against Germany, the Allies determined that Portugal was entitled to receive approximately 140-180 million escudos (about $5.6-7.2 million) and would receive 50 million escudos (about $2 million) in proceeds as a first installment. The remaining assets were to be divided equally between the Allies and Portugal, with the Portuguese portion not to exceed 180 million escudos (about $7.2 million). To oversee the liquidation, the parties agreed to create a three-man commission, including one member appointed by the Allies, one by the Portuguese, and one selected by both.
The gold question continued to be the main obstacle to a final agreement. On March 10, 1947, the Subcommittee on Gold issued a 187-page report on the amount of gold acquired by the Portuguese from the Germans between January 1, 1939, and October 31, 1945. Relations within the Subcommittee, apparently, had not been harmonious. The Allies presented detailed evidence from captured German Reichsbank records showing from where gold had been looted and how it was resmelted. The Portuguese members, instead of providing written records as the Allies had expected, would only verbally confirm that the Bank of Portugal had in its possession bars bearing the identifying information provided by the Allies. Because of Portuguese restrictions on the Subcommittee’s mandate, the report did not deal with the issue of whether or not the gold had been looted, only that certain bars "of concern to the Allied Delegations had been acquired by the Bank of Portugal." Working within these confines, the Subcommittee reported that the Portuguese had acquired 3,859 bars of gold (about 46.76 fine weight tons valued at about $52.6 million). Of this amount, the Portuguese would only agree that 2,246 bars met all the criteria of the Allies’ evidence, 1,380 bars met most but not all the criteria, and 233 bars met none of the criteria. Although the report described 43.95 fine metric tons (about $49.5 million) as "of concern to the Allied Delegations," one U.S. delegate felt there was conclusive proof that at least 38.45 tons (about $48.23 million) was looted gold.
According to a summary of the March 1947 report, the investigators could not clearly trace the origins of 8.31 fine metric tons of gold (about $9.4 million). Of this, they surmised 5.5 tons (about $6.2 million) had been "produced by resmelting miscellaneous bars [of] Austrian and German gold coins, etc.¼ [which] possibly represent monetary gold legitimately acquired and owned by the Reich." The remaining 2.81 tons could "not be identified," and was "therefore¼ regarded as German pre-war or legitimately acquired gold." There is no mention in the report of non-monetary gold and it is not readily apparent why the investigators did not consider any of the 8.31 tons as such.
With the Subcommittee’s report in hand, the Allies decided to press for final negotiations on the gold issue. On March 29, they presented a note to the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting negotiations, but the Portuguese refused and formal negotiations were postponed. Informal contacts between the Portuguese and Allies continued into the summer, but by July 1947 the State Department began having reservations about its hard line with Portugal. In a July 19 telegram to the Embassy in Lisbon, State recommended compromise, noting that there was little "possibility of persuading the Portuguese to restitute full quantity gold [from the March 1947 report]¼ since economy could not stand such loss."
State’s concern for the Portuguese economy, however, was just one factor in its decision to retreat from the March 1947 amounts. Simultaneous negotiations had been going on between the United States and Portugal over the stationing of U.S. military aircraft at Lagens (Lajes) air base in the Azores islands off the coast of Portugal. The United States viewed this base as an important strategic asset. Negotiations over the base had broken off in September 1946, but the two sides resumed talks by June 1947.
Also over the summer, the Treasury and State Departments worked to come up with a reasonable gold offer for Lisbon. An August 29 memorandum indicated that the two agencies had agreed on $40 million, believing that this was the least the Allies could request without "running the risk of justified reproaches by the smaller claimant nations." But State and Ambassador Wiley argued that the figure was too high and would pose an unacceptable risk "before security negotiations" were completed." The State Department’s ambivalence about renewing the talks was reflected in a September 10 instruction to the Embassy. While leaving the decision to Wiley, it advised, "In view of imminent resumption of Azores talks, difficulties we will encounter with Portuguese in both negotiations and likelihood of Portuguese associating these two problems, we have assumed [that approaching the Portuguese at the Ambassadorial level]¼ should be held in abeyance until conclusion Azores negotiations permit adequate pressure on Portuguese to bring satisfactory gold settlement." Wiley decided to proceed with negotiations in November, but at the technical level so as not to impede the Azores talks.
While little of substance was accomplished during the November talks, both sides began to clarify their positions on the gold issue. The Allies officially presented their evidence from the Gold Subcommittee’s March 1947 report along with a request for 38,331 kilograms of gold (valued at $43.1 million). The Portuguese rejected the figures, refused to address the fact that the gold might have been looted, and continued to argue that since they had purchased the gold "in good faith" it did not matter that the Germans had looted it.
Unofficially, the Portuguese responded to the Allies’ proposal with an offer of 3.9 fine metric tons gold (about $4.4 million) with full indemnification. When pressed by the Allies for an additional meeting to get this offer on the record, however, they refused, claiming that such a meeting would accomplish nothing. Eager to reach a reasonable compromise, the Allies made an informal offer of 15 tons (about $16.95 million), 11 of which would be reimbursed from the proceeds of liquidated German assets. The two sides scheduled a tentative meeting for January 19, 1948, to discuss the figures further, but the United States canceled out of fear that they "would interfere with the... the Azores agreement." By that time, however, Portugal had informally indicated that it would not accept the proposal.
While Ambassador Wiley and State concurred that it would not be in the U.S. interest to press Portugal on the gold issue until the Azores deal was signed, Treasury was less willing to compromise, advocating increasing the Allied demand to $25 million in gold (about 22,216 kilograms). Wiley, writing to State about Treasury’s position, cautioned that the United States "must use care that we do not injure our own position while on a crusading rampage. I am certain that the Portuguese, although they have never mentioned the subject to me, do not expect us to apply any pressure¼ on gold—having in mind the concession which they are making to us in the Azores.¼ [They want] to settle the Azores and the gold question at the same time; and they have not as yet put the Lagens concession in writing!¼ Why, therefore, are we ‘demanding’ so much more [than the 12 ton offer that Britain and France agreed to recommend] when we stand to gain absolutely nothing for our efforts"
On February 2, 1948, Portugal and the United States signed a 5-year agreement allowing the United States to station military aircraft at Lagens air base in the Azores, but State continued to be unsure about pushing the Portuguese too hard on a gold settlement, as became apparent during a controversy over frozen Portuguese assets in the United States. Because no agreement had been reached with Portugal, its assets¾ estimated at $63.3 million as of February 1948¾ were still blocked. State and Treasury were considering offering to unblock them as a quid pro quo for a settlement on the Allies’ terms.
A controversy over these assets arose on February 2, when Treasury Secretary John Snyder sent a public letter to Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposing that assets still frozen in the United States be transferred to the Justice Department’s Office of Alien Property for a census within three months. Snyder concluded the letter: "Spanish and Portuguese assets are still blocked pending completion of the current negotiations...covering looted gold and German assets.¼ If the negotiations are not completed... within the 3-month period¼ [they will] remain blocked pending the conclusion of the negotiations."
The Portuguese press published a French translation of this statement which made it appear as though the assets would be blocked permanently, causing great consternation in Lisbon. Reporting on the controversy, Ambassador Wiley noted that "Salazar and Foreign Minister are extremely disturbed over this ‘unfriendly act’ so immediately after signing Azores agreement." He added that Snyder’s statement, "has created a serious problem in our relations and has most unhappy significance regarding present and future problems in Azores. If there ever was a moment when we should be seeking a gesture of appreciation to Portuguese¼ in view of what we have received in the Azores agreement, certainly this is it." Wiley recommended unblocking all assets that had no readily apparent German interests "immediately."
State felt it had to tread more carefully. On one side were the relatively friendly relations with Portugal and the ever-present concern over the Azores. In a May 1948 memorandum to the Secretary, OE noted that "the present objective of US policy is to maintain and improve the existing cordial relations with Portugal and to encourage¼ [its] cooperation in the economic and political rehabilitation of Western Europe." In addition, the 5-year Azores deal was an "interim arrangement" and the JCS was still interested in long-term base rights. On the other side was the concern for the postwar recovery of the U.S. Allies and moral commitments to the victims of Nazi Germany. Although the Department also felt it was best for overall bilateral relations with Portugal to unblock the assets, it recommended caution about the timing of such a move and wanted to "avoid any suggestion that Portugal’s intransigence¼ has earned her the premium of unblocking."
Treasury and State continued to debate the frozen assets issue through the summer. Finally, on August 25, 1948, State issued an ultimatum: Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett wrote to Treasury Secretary Snyder that the Department and the Embassy in Lisbon had concluded that the "overriding political and strategic considerations of our foreign policy make it essential" that the Portuguese assets be unblocked. A week later, Snyder conceded, changing the licensing procedures for Portuguese assets, ostensibly unblocking them.
With the Azores agreement in hand, the Allies decided to reopen the stalled gold negotiations. At the Paris Conference on Economic Security held April and May 1948, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France decided to present a unified front to the Portuguese, asking for 14.6 fine metric tons, about one-third of the amount the Allies deemed looted. On May 19 they presented identical notes to this effect to the Portuguese Foreign Minister in Lisbon. Portugal asked for time to study the proposal.
Six weeks later, on July 8, Portugal rejected the offer. The Portuguese response continued to ignore the issue of whether the gold had been looted, maintaining that since the gold had been purchased in "good faith," Portugal was not obliged to return it. Portugal did offer 328 gold bars (3.9 tons, about $4.4 million)¾ the only ones that had not been resmelted by the Germans, which were all that the Allies could legitimately prove had been looted. In exchange, the Portuguese asked that their initial installment for restitution for claims against Germany under the terms of the February 1947 agreement be increased from 50 to 100 million escudos ($2 to 4 million) and their portion of the proceeds from liquidation to pay off the remainder of those claims, plus the cost of the 3.9 tons of gold, be increased from 50 to 70 percent. The offer was unacceptable to the Allies, but again they felt they had no leverage. Instead, they did not respond and the negotiations collapsed.
On February 16, 1949, the United States approached the Portuguese with an offer to partially implement the terms of the February 1947 agreement. The United States asked the Portuguese to turn over all stipulated assets for liquidation, the proceeds of which would be placed in a blocked account until the "gold-issue" could be resolved. The concern on both sides by this point was that these assets were quickly losing their value and that little would be recouped by the time agreement could be reached. The Portuguese agreed and on April 21, 1949, promulgated decree law 37,377, which accomplished the transfer. In August 1949 Seymour Rubin visited Portugal in an effort to convince Lisbon to release the 100 million escudos ($4 million) held in the blocked account but earmarked "for the refugee sufferers from Nazi persecution." But Portugal refused until settlement of the looted gold question.
In November 1949, following discussions with Ambassador MacVeagh and the British Embassy, the Department agreed to a joint note suggesting that the Safehaven negotiations be sent to international arbitration. However, State told the British "in strictest confidence" that it wanted to delay this move until after conclusion of talks "re facilities in the Azores."
Informal negotiations on a final Safehaven accord appear to have continued through 1951, but intermittently and with no concrete results. The Allied Committee for German Assets in Portugal noted in an April 1951 report that Portuguese authorities had not been very cooperative, demanding documentation that the Allies deemed excessive and delaying reviews of appealed cases. The delays were having financial repercussions: in 1946 the Allies estimated the total value of all non-gold assets at around 500 million escudos (about $20 million); as of the April 1951 report, the value had decreased to 400 million escudos (about $12 million). The only assets that had been nearly completely liquidated were the German state assets turned over to the Allies in 1945. These had netted 43.889 million escudos (about $1.3 million). In addition, the Allies estimated that there were 27.942 million escudos (about $.84 million) in German assets in Portugal’s colonies, but they could not be certain because Portugal had never provided them with any firm information on these assets.
On July 17, 1951, the Department indicated to the Embassy in Lisbon that it was willing to settle on Portugal’s terms: "Department is anxious to eliminate as rapidly and to the fullest extent possible time consuming and now out-dated operations such as German external property problems still hanging over as deadwood from World War II." Underlying this change of position, was the "overriding importance of politico-military objectives" and the need to "relegate other matters to a¼ subservient [position]." Based on these priorities, the Department, after consultation with the British, recommended the following to break the deadlock:
State’s willingness to settle with Portugal on the gold issue was not shared throughout Washington. The Treasury Department was unhappy with the Portuguese offer of 3.9 tons and wanted to refer the issue to the IARA so that the various claimant countries could make their demands directly to Portugal. The two agencies debated the issue through the autumn. Finally, in an October 11, 1951, meeting, Treasury agreed to "go along" with State under the following conditions: they receive a letter "signed at the Assistant Secretary level, stating¼ that there are political considerations which warrant a settlement¼ at this time¼ and that any agreement¼ would not result in claims against" the United States; the United States get permission from the Netherlands for such an agreement; and that the United States make sure the Portuguese offer still stands. State agreed, and on November 1, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs James Bonbright sent a letter to this effect to Treasury Secretary Snyder. Along with the letter, Bonbright included a memorandum from Ambassador MacVeagh noting his concurrence in the settlement proposal. MacVeagh also noted that reaching a settlement was of the utmost importance considering the "NATO concept and the cooperative attitude of the Portuguese in the negotiations regarding the Azores."
State began discussions with the British and French on accepting the Portuguese offer in November 1951 but apparently nothing was resolved and the slow pace of negotiations continued.
In May 1953 the Allies and Portugal held a Safehaven conference. Portugal proposed that the Allies’ claims be satisfied by the Germans, presumably in lieu of having them settled out of liquidated assets in Portugal. The Allies rejected this offer and insisted that the Portuguese turn over 3.9 tons of gold, 100 million escudos ($3 million) for the IRO, and 75 million escudos ($2.25 million) for the IARA. As for being reimbursed for the gold, the Allies suggested that the Portuguese reimburse themselves from what remained after these funds were turned over to the Allies.
Another attempt at settlement came in July 1953. The two sides agreed that Portugal would give about 4 tons of gold to the TGC, 100 million escudos to the IRO, and 75 million escudos to the IARA. Implementation, however, was dependent upon Portugal and Germany reaching accord "similar to the Swiss-German agreement" of August 1952 to settle the former’s claims against the latter. These negotiations were expected in the "near future," but the issue remained unsettled for the next three years.
In October 1956 the two sides met again, and by November 3 approved a cash settlement of 132.5 million escudos ($3.98 million) for the German assets and monetary gold, pending final ratification by Germany and Portugal. Neither country, however, immediately ratified the agreement. Instead, the Portuguese and Germans conducted their own negotiations over Portugal’s wartime claims, reaching an accord on April 3, 1958, in which Germany agreed to pay Portugal $132.5 million for the gold it would turn over to the Tripartite Gold Commission and 250 million escudos for its claims. With this assurance, the Portuguese finally decided to settle its Safehaven obligations. On October 27, 1958, they signed an "Agreement¼ on German Assets in Portugal and on Certain Claims Regarding Monetary Gold," agreeing to turn over a total of 144.5 million escudos (about $4.3 million) to the Allies. Of this amount 12 million escudos (about $360,000) was to come from the blocked account established under the terms of the 1949 agreement. The remaining 132.5 million escudos (about $4 million) was to paid by the Portuguese in either escudos or the equivalent in gold up to 3,998.741 kilograms. The treaty came into force in October 1959, and the Portuguese turned over the full amount of gold by the end of the year.
C. Allied Negotiations With Spain
During the war, Spain continued an active trading program with the Nazis in goods and raw materials (principally wolfram) and Germany invested heavily in the country. Allied efforts to end these practices became an intricate balancing act. On one side was the strategic significance of Gibraltar and Allied concern (particularly in London) that pressing Spain too hard, such as by limiting petroleum exports, might prompt them to seize Gibraltar for Germany. On the other side lay the Allies’ equally serious concerns that Spanish goods as well as their own oil might make its way into the Nazi war machine.
Early Allied estimates of German non-gold assets in Spain totaled 650 million pesetas (about $39 million), but exact calculations were hampered by the fact that the United States withdrew OSS operatives in the area in November 1945. To prevent the dissipation of these assets, the Allies began negotiations with Madrid in April 1945. The United States had previously presented two notes to Spain: the first, dated October 2, 1944, requested Spanish adherence to Bretton Woods Resolution VI; and the second, dated November 6, 1944, requested Spanish adherence to the Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944. When Spain did not respond promptly, the United States sent a third, more detailed, note on April 22, 1945, requesting the following: that Spain 1) announce publicly its intention to adhere fully to the terms of the agreements noted above; 2) immediately freeze all assets of persons of Axis or Axis-controlled countries; 3) immobilize and facilitate the return of any looted assets; 4) conduct a detailed census of all assets; 5) provide the United Nations full information concerning all persons in Spain with the nationality of Axis or Axis-controlled countries and all nationals who entered Spain since January 1, 1939; and 6) establish effective controls with respect to any transactions with the Axis or Axis-controlled countries. On May 5, 1945, under mounting pressure from the U.S. and U.K. Governments, the Spanish Government issued a decree freezing all German assets in Spain, arranged for the taking of a census of such assets, and set up administrative bodies to control them.
By the beginning of 1946, State reported that Spanish implementation of the Decree Law had "not been altogether satisfactory and the census has proved to be a complete farce." The United States issued an official declaration charging Spain with failure to implement Bretton Woods Resolution VI and the Gold Declaration and stating that Spain’s assets in the United States would continue to be blocked. Spain argued that this criticism was unwarranted and cited the "lack of appreciation abroad" for its efforts.
In May negotiations stalled because of Spanish reluctance to recognize the Allied Control Council as the successor to the German Government and its authority to take title to official and parastatal assets. On May 9 the State Department instructed the U.S. negotiator to "firmly point out to Spanish how strongly we feel over the long time [it] has taken to give necessary recognition to the ACC which they unconditionally promised in June 1945 which...has been successively renewed but now appears to be retracted."
By September 1946 the principal unresolved issues in the negotiations with Spain were: 1) representation of German private interests, 2) disposition of German private interests, 3) disposition of proceeds of the liquidation of German private interests, 4) gold, 5) loot other than gold, 6) patents and trademarks, 7) consular functions for Germans, and 8) repatriation. Allied negotiators also requested detailed information on Spain’s gold holdings. Spain replied that such information was normally treated as confidential, that it could not answer the Allies’ request without getting Allied help in locating gold possibly looted by Germany after the Spanish Civil War, and that it had probably settled any gold claims when it turned over two vessels to the Allies after the war.
In early 1947 a series of draft accords were exchanged. Discussions centered on a British proposal, with U.S. concurrence, for a lump sum settlement of the German assets rather than distribution of the proceeds on a percentage basis. The United States favored the lump sum settlement, believing it would avoid the delays caused by considering the liquidation of these assets on a case-by-case basis.
On May 16 Spain submitted a proposed accord; the Allies responded on May 21. The crux of the Allied response was the lump sum formula. If Spain accepted it, the U.S. negotiator opined, "our interests could be limited to the identification of German property and to the protection of our security objectives." But Spain’s reaction was "lukewarm." The Spanish negotiator worried that the formula would not adequately compensate Spain for claims against Germany and that the Allies’ estimate of the value of German assets (in the proposal they listed 700 million pesetas (about $42 million) as a maximum value, but privately they projected 500 to 600 million (about $30 to 36 million) ) were too high. In addition, he wanted some assurance that the Allies would abide by Spanish laws governing foreign holdings, provide Spain a fair share of any foreign exchange realized during liquidation, and revise the draft so that permanent German residents of Spain could still be purchasers. In the U.S. negotiator’s estimation, there was still "a wide gulf which must be bridged before a satisfactory accord can be reached."
By July negotiations stalled as both sides haggled over whether to base the lump sum settlement on the appraised value of German assets, favored by Spain, or the liquidation value, favored by the Allies. In addition Spain claimed 330 million Reichsmarks (about $33 million) in damages against Germany, but the Allied negotiators only considered 116 million (about $11.6 million) legitimate.
In December 1947 the U.S. Embassy in Madrid reported that substantial progress had been made in the negotiations. Spain proposed a method to identify and recover German property, which the Embassy deemed "practical and acceptable." But further negotiations were needed to resolve issues related to "the machinery of indemnification" and "the method of adjudication of properties" from a security standpoint. The Allies also made some progress in the gold negotiations. After two years of stalling and excuses, Spain finally provided records of its gold holdings from the Foreign Exchange Institute. The documents, supposedly, were riddled with discrepancies, but by the end of January 1948 the investigators determined that Spain had acquired at least 26.8 tons of fine weight gold (about $30.3 million) through the Swiss National Bank, Bank of Portugal, and Banco Aleman Trans-Atlantico.
The talks continued with little progress into early 1948. Spain insisted that expropriated European properties be liquidated at appraisal values. The United States alternatively insisted that the Spanish method serve "as a guide or base price only," and that "properties be sold at the highest prices obtainable." In addition, the negotiators sparred over the restitution of looted property including gold, a satisfactory procedure on the transfer of German schools to Spain, and the wording of an acceptable statement to Spain regarding its fulfillment of the terms of the Bretton Woods Resolution VI.
After January 1948, the parties apparently agreed to deal with the negotiations over assets and gold separately. The Embassy in Madrid, apparently not yet apprised of the results of the Allied negotiations, reported that it had uncovered only "very insignificant quantities" and that therefore "nothing practical would be lost if the looted property article [were] eliminated" from the accord. The Spanish believed that the restitution of looted gold was an issue of "national pride," arguing that in the past it had returned, and would continue to return, all looted property found in Spain, presumably including looted gold, without the formality of an official agreement.
The United States, however, remained eager to reach a gold settlement. The Embassy informed Madrid in early February that the United States desired a strong Spanish economy and that once the "question of gold" was settled it would allow private investors to extend "very substantial" credits to Spanish industry. There were also potential, indirect strategic-military benefits in allowing U.S. private investment in Spain. In March, Defense came to State to discuss the feasibility of equipping three airfields in Spain to handle heavy bombers in emergency situations. State advised against direct U.S. funding, noting that anti-Franco sentiments in the United States were high enough that "it would be¼ unwise to make such an arrangement...even in secret." Instead, it recommended that once a gold settlement was reached the United States could permit "a privately financed civil aviation program" that could make the necessary improvements in these fields without political risk.
In February the U.S. Embassy reported that the draft accord as it stood was "the best we can expect from the Spanish and that we should attempt to wind this up as soon as possible," but three months of negotiations ensued before the final agreement was reached on March 10, 1948. In the final accord, Spain was to receive proceeds from the liquidation of German assets according to the following formula: 20 percent of the first 100 million pesetas (about $9 million) realized, 22½ percent of the next 100 million (about $9 million), 25 percent of the next, 27½ percent of the next, and 30 percent of any amount exceeding 400 million (about $36 million). The remaining proceeds were to be divided between the 18 members of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (IARA), with the United States and United Kingdom to receive 28 percent each and France to receive 16 percent. As of January 1952, roughly 400 million pesetas (about $36 million) had been distributed to IARA nations. None of the proceeds, however, was slated for non-repatriable victims, largely because the Allies believed at the time that they would be able to satisfy the $25 million stipulated in the Paris Reparations Agreement from Swiss, Swedish, and Portuguese liquidations and they did not believe that pesetas would prove much value to the International Refugee Organization (IRO).
The Allies also reached an agreement with Spain on looted gold through an exchange of notes on May 3. Spain agreed to turn over 101.6 kilograms of fine gold ($114,329) identified as looted from the Netherlands and any other looted gold identified before April 30, 1949. In exchange, it demanded that the Allies’ note and all public pronouncements acknowledge that Spain "had not been aware¼ [at] acquisition or subsequently" that the gold had been looted. On November 3, 1948, the Embassy in Madrid reported that the gold had been delivered and deposited in the Foreign Exchange Institute, freeing Spain from the restrictions imposed by the Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944.
In November 1949 the Allies registered a protest over Spain’s implementation of the accord. The Allies objected strongly to the use of competitive bidding for the acquisition of assets expropriated instead of the agreed upon practice of setting a "justiprecio," a just price. They reminded Spain that during the course of the negotiations, it had consistently argued against competitive bidding. The Allies further objected that Spain had retained a portion of the proceeds, a direct violation of the terms and intent of the accord.
On November 30, 1950, Spain threatened to suspend the 1948 accord unless Germany ratified it. Germany, with the Allies’ concurrence, responded in February 1951 that since the occupying powers were the supreme authority in Germany, German ratification was unnecessary. The debate continued into 1953, when it was addressed during negotiations between the Allies and Germany on German external assets. In 1958 the accord with Spain was officially terminated with an exchange of notes and the signing of a Protocol in Madrid on August 9, which entered into force on July 2, 1959.
D. Allied Negotiations With Turkey
Safehaven negotiations with Turkey took a somewhat different tack than those with Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal. Until February 1945, the Turks had been neutral, but joined the Allies for the last three months of the war. Turkey, therefore, insisted that the Allies’ Safehaven accords with the neutrals would not serve as a precedent for their own agreement. At this stage in the negotiations, the Allies believed that Turkey’s unique status would merely require changes to the text, but not in the substance of their Safehaven accords with the neutrals. In addition, they believed they had enough evidence that the Axis had hidden assets in Turkey and used it as a center of espionage during the war to warrant Safehaven controls. Furthermore, the United States believed that the Nazi Ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, had secreted in Turkey at the end of his tenure gold pieces, other valuables, and documents that could bear on the Nuremberg trials.
The United States began pressing Turkey to implement Safehaven controls in 1944. On November 4, State sent diplomatic notes to Turkey, warning that under the February 1944 Gold Declaration and Bretton Woods Resolution VI it should neither acquire nor store any additional German gold. On January 25, 1945, State instructed the U.S. Embassy in Ankara to warn the Turks that they should preserve German assets for disposition in accordance with Allied policy. The Turks, however, did not respond and as late as March had done nothing to control German assets in their territory.
As the war drew to a close, the Allies began assessing the value of enemy assets in Turkey. By April 1945, they estimated that there was $10 million in private and $25.5 million in state assets in the country. At the time, however, Turkey was demanding $5 million from private funds and $12 to $13 million from the state funds in compensation for their own claims against Germany. Fourteen months later, these figures were revised: State now estimated that there were $28 to $44 million in private and $23 million in state assets, against which Turkey was demanding a total of $15.5 million in compensation.
After several months of negotiations and revisions, the Allies presented their draft Safehaven accord to Ankara on March 28, 1946. Six months later, Turkey issued its official response. While claiming that it had already taken necessary measures to protect German assets and was happy to cooperate further, Turkey demanded that it receive most of the proceeds from the liquidation of the assets and retain full sovereignty over the enforcement and control of these assets and enemy personnel. State, while not pleased with the response, was not willing to press the Turks further. Instead, it instructed the U.S. Embassy to convince the Turks not to publicize these terms at the moment lest they complicate any future discussions.
After some initial feelers in April 1947, the two sides began official talks on June 2. The Turks indicated that they were willing to adhere to the January 1943 Declaration, February 1944 Gold Declaration, and Bretton Woods Resolution VI; however, they continued to maintain that because they had joined the Allies in the last months of the war they were not bound by the Paris Reparations Agreement and, therefore, that the bulk of liquidated German assets go to satisfy their claims against Germany. After a month of talks, the issue remained unresolved.
By September 1947 Allied investigators had determined that Turkey had purchased at least 3,047 kilograms (almost 3 tons or $3.4 million) of looted Belgian gold from Switzerland. (The Allies suspected that Turkey also had 8 tons in gold ingots of low fineness and 3 tons of looted European gold coins (totaling about $12.43 million), most of which came from the Latin Union.) The Allies considering pressing this claim. Turkey argued, however, that it had purchased the gold in good faith that it was not looted and therefore was not obligated to return it.
On August 12, 1947, the Allies presented their terms to Ankara. In addition to professing adherence to the three agreements noted above, they asked Turkey to agree to return the property of Germany’s victims, deliver to the Allies all monetary gold proven to have been looted by the Germans, place controls on German assets, and begin liquidating these assets. In addition, they asked that the Turks not use these assets to settle their own claims against Germany until an agreement on this issue could be negotiated. Turkey responded on December 30, agreeing to most of the Allies’ terms, but stipulating that it would only turn over proceeds from the liquidation of German assets once its claims against Germany had been satisfied. Ten days later, the Allies presented similar notes to the Turks, officially requesting that they turn over 249 bars of looted Belgian gold and investigate the origins of 32,000 gold coins and 243 kilograms of gold ingots believed to have been looted by the Germans.
After studying the proposal, on March 25 State presented an Aide-Mémoire to the British and French Embassies recommending that the Allies accept these terms, but the British convinced the United States to push for additional talks. The Allies made a number of requests for renewed negotiations into 1950, but the Turks would not respond. Instead, they claimed they were awaiting passage of a bill in their National Assembly, which they had submitted in November 1949, granting them the authority to negotiate a Safehaven agreement. On March 25, 1950, the National Assembly adjourned without passing the Safehaven legislation. Frustrated by the lack of progress and convinced that the Turkish Government was using the bill as a means of delaying the return of looted gold, the Allies considered separating the gold issue from German assets and pushing for new negotiations.
By spring 1951 the Allies had agreed to relinquish their claims to German assets in Turkey in return for settlement of the gold issue. In early 1952 the United Kingdom proposed that the Allies reaffirm this position by removing Turkey from Allied Control Council Law No. 5 and Allied High Commission Law No. 63, thus allowing it to negotiate directly with Germany on the future of German assets in Turkey without worry about legal claims of the Allies and requiring Germany to reimburse Turkey for any gold turned over to the Allies. After further discussions with British officials, the Department agreed to inform Turkey that if the gold issue were settled, the Allies would drop claims to German assets in Turkey and would consider justified a Turkish claim against those assets for the value of the gold turned over.
On May 21, 1952, the Allied governments transmitted a note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that agreed to settle the gold issue for $1 million. In return the Allies would relinquish their claim to German assets in Turkey, remove Turkey from AHC Law 63, and consider justified Turkey’s recompense to itself for the proceeds from liquidation of German assets. Ultimately, Turkey never turned over any monetary gold to the Tripartite Gold Commission.
E. Allied Negotiations With Argentina
Despite the findings set forth in the February 1946 State Department Argentine "Blue Book," including Argentina’s failure to control the transfer of German funds from Europe, negotiations on German external assets were never pursued with the Argentine Government. Such negotiations were at first contemplated, at least as a possibility, at the time of the appointment of Seymour Rubin in May 1946 to lead negotiations on German assets with the European neutrals. Treasury officials believed that Argentina was one of the countries that remained subject to the February 1944 Gold Declaration, even though it had accepted the principles of the Declaration by adhering to the Act of Chapultepec.
Argentina had delayed adhering to the Gold Declaration until March 1945, raising suspicions among Treasury and State Department officials that the pro-Axis Farrell- Peron government might have acquired looted gold from either Germany or the European neutral countries during that one-year hiatus. By the end of 1946, Treasury officials were pessimistic about the success of a Safehaven program in Argentina and did not expect the Argentine Government to come forward with information about its gold acquisitions, owing in part to the strained relations between the United States and Argentina.
Following publication of the "Blue Book," the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, George S. Messersmith, undertook to turn around U.S. policy toward Argentina. In a series of top secret despatches and letters to Secretary of State Byrnes, Messersmith urged that the United States place its relationship with Argentina on a "completely friendly, collaborative, and constructive basis" by the end of 1946. Messersmith also contended that Argentine leaders were actively and concretely handling the problems of enemy property and aliens, and that there was no doubt about the determination of the Argentine Government to proceed with liquidation of this property. In February 1947 the Embassy reported that all identified enemy assets had been taken over by the Argentine Government. The State Department’s initial response to Messersmith’s recommendations was positive but cautious. The Department wanted to see compliance based on specific measures against certain prominent individuals or enemy-controlled enterprises, rather than on hypothetical grounds. By 1947, Washington officials dealing with Safehaven matters had apparently turned their attention away from German assets in Argentina.
In May 1947 Argentina announced its intention to ship about $170 million in gold to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ostensibly to sell it to the United States. Treasury, concerned that Argentina might have accepted looted assets, including gold, after the Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944, asked State to approach the Argentine Government about its gold acquisitions from Germany as a precondition to authorizing the transfer of the gold to the United States. But because the Treasury Department planned to accept only Argentine gold bearing U.S. assay marks, State officials turned down Treasury’s request.
The Treasury Department continued to insist that it could not purchase Argentine gold without U.S. assay marks until it had verified that it was not looted, while some sections of the State Department believed that Argentina’s acceptance of the Gold Declaration in 1945 should be sufficient. In early October 1947 Argentine plans to ship gold in excess of its U.S. assay marked gold gave urgency to the question. State acquiesced to Treasury’s request to ask Argentina for a statement of wartime gold acquisitions at an interdepartmental meeting on looted gold on October 3, 1947. A cable sent a few days later asked only for Argentina’s certification that it had not acquired gold from Axis or neutral countries. The Argentine Central Bank gave verbal assurances (to be confirmed in writing) that the gold complied with the Gold Declaration, and on October 11, 1947, the Treasury Department reached the conclusion, based upon the reports from the Embassy in Buenos Aires on these discussions with Central Bank officials, that Argentina had not acquired any gold that had been looted by Germany. This sufficed to clear the sale of the Argentine gold through the Federal Reserve on October 23, 1947.