Source: http://jim.com/canon.htm  
Accessed 01 August 2001

The Khmer Rouge Canon 1975-1979:

The Standard Total Academic View on Cambodia

Footnotes

Part 1  Part 2  Part 3  Part 4  Part 5

1 Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (1978), p. 193.

2 Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (1984), p. 187.

3 Jackson, ed., Cambodia: 1975-1978, p. 3. He footnotes on the same page that this estimate "assumes 600,000-700,000 war-related deaths before the Khmer Rouge victory and a middle range-estimate of 5.8 million survivors at the beginning of 1979." (Jackson, p. 3n)

4 This thesis, entitled "Cambodia's Economic Development and History: A Contribution to the Study of Cambodia's Economy," is available from the Academic Achievement Division, UC Berkeley.

5 With the notable exceptions of Malcolm Caldwell (b. 1931), Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) and perhaps Edward Herman, these scholars were baby boomers who were either in graduate school or lecturing there. To put it more succinctly, these were the students of the generation that followed George Kahin McTurnin and David P. Chandler.

6 In essence, I borrow the idea of "standard total view" or STV from Michael Vickery. Vickery's STV stood for the media-Ponchaud-Barron-Paul view that terrible things like mass murder, genocide, and war crimes took place in Cambodia between 1975-1979. The standard total academic view or STAV is, in a sense, the mirror image of the STV.

7 Shawcross' The Quality of Mercy (1984), p. 53, excoriates the Indochina Resource Center.

8 This assumes 1.5 million deaths from a baseline population of 7.3 million.

9 Carney, "Unexpected Victory," in Jackson, p. 33.

10 For what is publicly available, see Ponchaud's "Author's Note for the English Translation" of Cambodia: Year Zero (1977); Lacouture, Survive le peuple cambodgien! (1978); Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm (1979). Independent from the authors who were involved in the debate, see Shawcross' "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster" in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays (1983). Since the exchange was both public and private, much of it could be hidden from view. It is downplayed by Chomsky and Herman.

11 Shawcross, "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea (1983).

12 Shawcross' 1984 book, The Quality of Mercy covers some of these aspects too.

13 Gunn and Lee, Cambodia Watching Down Under (1991), p. 72.

14 Ibid., p. 75.

15 Cambodian politics and studies is black and white. There is little gray. Kiernan calls it a "hall of mirrors."

16 It was partially translated by Laura Summers, "Cambodia's Economy and Problems of Industrialization" Indochina Chronicle, September-November 1976, and later in full as Cambodia's Economy and Industrialization in 1979.

17 Gunn and Lee, p. 75.

18 This long essay was subsequently republished as a separate book by a little known East Indian group, Janata Prachuranalu, purporting to be "Friends of Kampuchea."

19 Ponchaud, "Le Kampuchea Democratic: Une Revolution radicale," Mondes Asiatiques, August.

[20] Stephen Morris, the reader should note, has been "discredited," branded a "polemicist," worst, a "right-winger" and is guilty of "character assassination" as personally conveyed to me by Ben Kiernan, arguably the second leading scholar in Cambodia studies. Morris was graduate student, along with Kiernan, in Australia. He has vilified the Left with his "Chomsky on US Foreign Policy," Harvard International Review, 3, 4 (December-January 1981) and most recently with his editorial attacking Kiernan "The Wrong Man to Investigate Cambodia," Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1995. The WSJ classifies as vendetta scholarship.

21 Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea (1984), p. 99.

[22] Burchett collaborated with Sihanouk for My War with CIA (1973).

[23] Shawcross, "Cambodia: The verdict is guilty on Nixon and Kissinger," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 7, 1977.

[24] Gunn and Lee, Watching Cambodia Down Under (1991), p. 62.

[25] For insights into Khieu Samphan's share of responsibility under the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party of Kampuchea), see Heder, "Pol Pot and Khieu Samphan," 1991.

26 Chandler, "Re: [The Killing Fields - Not a Noble Move]," e-mail communication, April 24, 1995.

[27] Summers, "Cambodia's Economy and Problems of Industrialization." Indochina Chronicle, September-November 1976.

28 Ibid., p. 25.

[29] As quoted in Caldwell, Kampuchea: Rational for a Rural Policy (1979), p. 17.

30 Etcheson, p. 36.

[31] Ibid., p. 117.

[32] By 1974, Cambodia imported as much rice as it exported only years earlier. The loss in output is double net export or import.

[33] As quoted in Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," Commonweal, April 1, 1977, p. 210

[34] Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," p. 210.

[35] Summers, "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," also titled "Consolidating the Cambodian Revolution," Current History, December 1975; Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," Current History, December 1976. "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," the manuscript was used, as recovered at the Indochina Archive. The page numbers thus conform to that manuscript.

36 Summers, "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," p. 1.

37 Ibid., p. 2.

[38] Ibid., p. 3.

[39] Summers, "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," p. 3.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., p. 4.

42 Summers, "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," p. 4.

[43] Ibid., p. 6.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Summers, "Cambodia: Consolidating the Revolution," p. 8.

[46] In chapter 4, the reader will see that there was paucity of coverage, according to Shawcross (1983). Additionally, media coverage in 1975 focused not on the welfare of Cambodians, but that of foreigners still interned in the French embassy in Cambodia, according to Ponchaud (1978).

47 Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," p. 210.

[48] Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," Current History, Dec. 1976, p. 213.

[49] Caldwell's 1973 book with Lek Hor Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, is significant in that it shows the inception of a revolutionary spirit, the beginning, as it were, of the end.

[50] Caldwell, "Inside Cambodia: the other side of the picture," London Times, July 20, 1977, p. 14.

[51] Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," p. 213.

[52] This view gained popularity during the Cold War. Soviet action was in fact reaction to American foreign policy.

[53] As quoted on in Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," p. 215.

[54] According to Gunn and Lee (1991), "Other committees which, in the main, emerged in intellectual defence of Democratic Kampuchea include the Upssala-based publishers of Kampuchea in Sweden with support sections throughout that country. Other support circles emerged in West Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia." (Gunn and Lee, p. 62)

[55] Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," p. 215.

[56] Ibid., p. 217.

57 Ibid., p.216.

[58] See, for instance, Mariano, "Forced Cambodia Labor Depicted," Washington Post, April 8, 1977.

[59] Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary State in Cambodia," p. 215.

[60] Ibid., p. 216.

61 Ibid., pp. 216-217.

62 Summers, "Defining the Revolutionary Sate in Cambodia," p. 217.

63 Ibid., p. 218.

[64] Porter and Hildebrand, Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution (1976), p. 7.

[65] Ibid., p. 11.

[66] The first book was a French book: Steinbach, Phnom Penh Libere (1976). A cursory look at the endnotes of the Porter and Hildebrand book indicates that it is used extensively as a source.

[67] Porter and Hildebrand use "Khmer Rouge" when they must quote its use, but prefer NUFK (FUNK).

[68] Porter and Hildebrand, p. 40.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., p. 41.

71 Jackson, ed., Cambodia: 1975-1978 (1989), p. 44.

72 Twinning, "The Economy," in Jackson, Cambodia: 1975-1978, pp. 114-115.

73 Porter and Hildebrand, pp. 42-43.

[74] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[75] Ibid., p. 44.

[76] Morris, "Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, and Cornell," National Interest, Summer 1989, p. 54.

[77] Porter and Hildebrand, pp. 47-48.

[78] Ibid., p. 50.

[79] Lacouture, Survive le peuple cambodgien! (1978), pp. 134-135.

80 Porter and Hildebrand, p. 56.

[81] Kiernan himself is not canonized because none of his STAV works were available for review, but secondary sources indicate that he was quite favorable to the Khmer Rouge during their reign. See chapter 3 and 5 for more on this. The original sources, if available, would be Kiernan, "Revolution and Social Cohesion in Cambodia" presented to the ASEAN Seminar (at which Caldwell was the main speaker) and published under The ASEAN Papers, Townsville: James Cook University for Transnational Co-operative, Sydney, 1979; and "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia," Australian Outlook, December 1976. There were still many, many others who were STAV scholars. Some have recanted their views, as did Ben Kiernan. Others have yet to admit to having done anything wrong. Kiernan's apologetic piece in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in 1979 is be covered in chapter 5.

[82] Morris, "The Wrong Man to Investigate Cambodia," Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1975. The Kiernan quotation originates from a June 1975 Dyason House Paper.

83 Porter and Hildebrand, pp. 85-86.

[84] Ibid., p. 72.

[85] Ibid., p. 88.

86 Porter and Hildebrand, p. 97.

[87] Hering and Utrecht in Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia (1979), p. 10.

[88] Ibid., p. 12.

[89] See, for instance, Caldwell, "Inside Cambodia: the other side of the picture," London Times, July 20, 1977, p. 14, where he asserts that "only the most serious criminals were executed."

[90] Janata Prachuranalu, an organization which also published the essay alone in a book titled Kampuchea: Rational for a Rural Policy, also in 1979, will be used simultaneously, since there are minor differences, including different introductory notes by the editors. The monograph published at James Cook University was part of its Southeast Asian Monograph series and included the draft of "Cambodia: Rationale for a Rural Policy" in addition to two other articles on Southeast Asia also by Caldwell. The monograph was entitled Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia and edited by Bob Hering.

91 Hering and Utrecht in Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 2.

[92] Irvine, "Media Can't See the Mountains for the Molehills," AIM Report, No. 21, part I, November 1977.

93 Hering and Utrecht in Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 2.

[94] In their footnote regarding Ponchaud and Barron and Paul, Hering and Utrecht resort to ad hominem attacks. They write in "Ponchaud was frustrated by the loss of his parish in Cambodia. Like their fervently anti-Communist publisher, Reader's Digest, Barron and Anthony [Paul] aim at the annihilation of communism throughout the world." (Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 11n)

95 Preface to Caldwell, Kampuchea: Rationale for Rural Policy (1979), p. 2.

[96] Ibid., p. 9.

[97] As quoted by Utrecht in Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 8.

98 Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 23.

[99] Ben Kiernan "convinced Malcolm [Caldwell] of the serious fraud committed by Ponchaud, Barron and Anthony [Paul] in their reporting on Kampuchea after April 1975" (Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 7).

[100] Ibid.

101 Caldwell, "Cambodia: Rationale for a Rural Policy," Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 27.

[102] Caldwell, Kampuchea: Rationale for a Rural Policy, p. 38.

[103] Ibid., see endnotes.

104 Caldwell, "Cambodia," Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 46.

105 Caldwell, Kampuchea, p. 19.

[106] Morris, "The Wrong Man to Investigate Cambodia."

[107] Chandler, "Transformation in Cambodia," p. 210.

108 Caldwell, Kampuchea, p. 46.

109 Ibid., p. 28.

[110] Gunn and Lee, p. 75.

111 Caldwell, Kampuchea, p. 45.

[112] Ibid., p. 91.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Caldwell, Kampuchea, p. 91.

[115] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm (1979), p. 136.

[116] Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," Nation, June 25, 1977.

[117] As quoted in Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 347n.

[118] Chomsky and Herman thank Laura Summers, Ben Kiernan, Torben Retboll (who will be discussed in this chapter), among others, for "important information and helpful comments" (After the Cataclysm, p. 343n).

[119] Lacouture, "The Bloodiest Revolution," New York Review of Books, March 31, 1977, p. 10.

[120] Lacouture also helped Sihanouk publish L'Indochine vue de Pekin (Indochina viewed from Beijing) (1972), a book written while Sihanouk was in exile and leading (on the surface) the FUNK from Beijing China.

[121] Another hotspot in the controversy involved William Shawcross, Gareth Porter, and François Ponchaud. Shawcross' "The Third Indochina War," New York Review of Books, April 6, 1978, excoriates both the Hildebrand-Porter book and the Barron-Paul book. He asserts that the two books are mirror images of one another because they used questionable sources but opposite ends. This drew blood from Chomsky and Herman who could not stand by while Porter was attacked. Porter himself kept busy at the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., writing letters to the editor which denounced their negative coverage of the new Kampuchea, and testifying at the 1977 May Congressional Hearings in which he denied there was a policy of "physically eliminating whole classes, of purging anyone who was connected with the Lon Nol government," etc., in the new Kampuchea. Porter's counterassault on Shawcross can be found in "An exchange on Cambodia," New York Review of Books, July 20, 1978.

[122] In chapter 4, the reader will discover that Chomsky and Herman in Manufacturing Consent (1988) selectively revise their own arguments in After the Cataclysm (1979) to prove that they "remain on target."

[123] Caldwell and Tan's book was not reviewed in chapter 2 because it was written in 1973, well before the "liberation" of Phnom Penh. However, it offers an important peek into Chomsky political development and serves as a background to justifying his canonization along with Herman for "Distortions at Fourth Hand" (Nation, 06/25/77) and After the Cataclysm.

124 Chomsky in "Preface" to Caldwell and Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War (1973), p. xi.

125 Chomsky, At War with Asia (1970), p. 187.

[126] Nixon, "I Could See No Reason to Live," Time, April 2, 1990. Nixon writes, "the events that followed our withdrawal from Vietnam, including the plight of the boat people and the more than 1 million slaughtered by the new communist rulers of Cambodia, showed that media critics who said we were on the wrong side were mistaken." In "Paying the Price," Time, April 2, 1990, Nixon's answer to the question: "Looking back on the Vietnam War, what second thoughts do you have?" is "I was asked that about [the invasion of] Cambodia once after a speech at Oxford. I said, "Yes, I wish I'd done it sooner." That was a shocker. And going further, Why didn't you do the May 8 bombing and mining sooner? Why didn't you do the December bombing sooner? And the point was, it should have been done sooner, but for one thing, I didn't feel first that the traffic would bear it within the Administration."

[127] Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 35.

[128] Barron and Paul, "Murder of a Gentle Land," Reader's Digest, February 1977, p. 228.

[129] Ibid., p. 261.

[130] As quoted in Gunn and Lee, Cambodia Watching Down Under (1991), p. 66.

131 Barron and Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land (1977), p. xv.

[132] Gunn and Lee, p. 66.

[133] Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 35.

[134] Chomsky and Herman's own acknowledgments for the chapter on Cambodia in After the Cataclysm leave much to be desired.

[135] Chomsky in a letter to editor Charlotte Saikowski of the Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1977.

[136] See, for instance, "Cambodia in the year zero," Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 1977; Buckley, "Don't stand for the Cambodian slaughter!," Washington Star, September 11, 1977; and "Counting the cost," Economist, July 1977.

[137] Chomsky in a letter to editor Charlotte Saikowski of the Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1977.

[138] As quoted in Gunn and Lee, p. 66. Referenced in News from Kampuchea, vol. 1, no. 2., June 1977.

139 Lacouture, "The Bloodiest Revolution," New York Review of Books, March 31, 1977, p. 10.

[140] Chomsky and Herman complain that Lacouture's French study on the "colonial period and the U.S. intervention [has] gone unreviewed, unnoticed, and untranslated" (After the Cataclysm, p. 343n).

141 Lacouture, "Cambodia: Corrections" New York Review of Books, May 26, 1977.

[142] Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," Nation, June 25, 1977.

[143] Ibid., p. 31.

[144] Ibid.

145 Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 31.

[146] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 358n.

[147] The validity of these photographs has, to this day, not been determined. David Chandler himself, does not know, but thinks it no longer matters anymore.

[148] Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 31.

[149] It is ironic, though, that Chomsky and Herman themselves turn to the U.S. State Department when they want to downplay the magnitude of atrocities.

[150] Ibid., p. 44.

151 Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (1978), p. xiii.

152 Ibid., pp. xiv-xv.

153 Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 33.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid., p. 35.

156 Chomsky and Herman, "Distortions at Fourth Hand," p. 35.

157 Lacouture, Survive le peuple cambodgien! (1978), p. 5.

158 Ibid., p. 135.

[159] Since it is believed that in 1978, the Khmer Rouge intensified their purges and clamped down even harder on their enemies, the death toll of up and until 1977 was probably not 1.2 million but less. However, it is still remarkable that this estimate is very close to the final non-trivial death toll estimate of 1.5 to 1.6 million.

[160] Lacouture, Survive le peuple cambodgien!, pp. 136-137.

[161] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 140.

[162] Retboll, "Kampuchea and the Reader's Digest," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 11, No. 3, June-September, 1979, pp. 22-27. Chomsky served as either as an editor to or on the board of the BCAS. He was also on the advisory board of The Malcolm Caldwell Memorial Trust Fund. BCAS paid tribute to the late Caldwell as the Chomsky of England.

[163] Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Cambodia Too Much," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 11, no. 4, October-December, 1979.

[164] Retboll, p. 24.

165 Ibid., p. 26.

166 Herman, "Chomsky and the Khmer Rouge," New York Review of Books, March 27, 1988.

[167] Ibid. It would seem that the death of 750,000 Cambodians, the statistic Herman refers to in his letter, constitutes a mere 10 percent of the population, hence not a majority.

[168] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 293.

[169] See, for instance, Twinning, "The Economy," in Jackson, ed., Cambodia: 1975-1978 (1989).

170 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 293.

[171] Ibid., p. 135.

[172] Ibid., p. 140.

[173] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 140.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Ponchaud in a letter to Noam Chomsky, August 17, 1977, p. 9.

[176] Ibid., p. 173.

[177] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 136.

178 Ibid., p. 140.

[179] Pin Yathay published his own book in 1980 entitled L'Utopie meurtriere.

[180] Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 141.

[181] Ibid., p. 173.

182 Ibid., pp. 149-150.

[183] There is remarkable irony in the fact that the Khmer Rouge used precisely the threat of U.S. bombs to scare its residents into an evacuation. There were, of course, no bombings.

184 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 152.

[185] Ibid., p. 160.

186 Lacouture, Survive le peuple cambodgien!, pp. 134-135.

187 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, pp. 248-249.

[188] Ibid.

189 Ibid., pp. 293-294.

[190] As quoted in Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 347n.

[191] Chomsky, At War with Asia (1970), p. 187.

[192] Coda to Joan Baez' song "Diamonds and Rust."

[193] Porter and Hildebrand cite, for instance, "Cruelty in Cambodia," Wall Street Journal, May 15, 1975; "Exodus in Cambodia," Washington Star, May 11, 1975; Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "U.N. Ignores Cambodia Death March," Washington Post, June 23, 1975; William Safire, "Get out of Town," New York Times, May 12, 1975; Tom Wicker, "Revolution in Cambodia," New York Times, May 12, 1975; and for editorials see "Cambodia's Crime," New York Times, July 9, 1975; Max Lerner, "A New Hard Communism," New York Post, May 14, 1975; "The Murder of Phnom Penh," Chicago Tribune, May 10, 1975.

194 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 135.

[195] Irvine, AIM Report, November 1977, Part I, No. 21, p. 1.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Ibid., p. 2.

[198] The AIM Report, it must be noted, took only two newspapers and three networks, granted all of which are major mainstream sources of news. Chomsky and Herman note a number of other, more diverse, sources ranging from the New Republic to the Economist that have, they argue, contributed to a media frenzy over Cambodia.

199 A second part to the report was published, according to Chomsky and Herman, in May 1978 and "reprinted as a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post (2 June 1978). Accuracy in Media, which publishes the AIM Report, is a well-financed right-wing group which is concerned that the media do not adhere to the doctrines of state propaganda with sufficient loyalty, and under the guise of defending "accuracy" exerts pressures of various kinds to overcome this unfortunate situation. The alleged failure of the media to give sufficient attention to "the Cambodian holocaust" is one of their staples. [Emphasis added.]" (Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 346n) What is truly unfortunate is how easily Chomsky and Herman resort to ad hominem attacks which undermine their own credibility.

200 Hildebrand, "Kampuchean refugee challenges terror stories circulated in the U.S.A.," New York Guardian, March 30, 1977. A smaller headline states, "Massacre stories a big lie."

201 Porter, letter to the editor, Washington Star, late May 1977. The letter was in response to an editorial entitled "The Lessons of Cambodia," Washington Star, May 14, 1977.

202 The review is available at the University of California Indochina Archive, in the Cambodian vault, in Berkeley, CA.

203 Antoshin, "Kampuchea: On the new path," New Times, October 1977, p. 20.

204 Kondracke, "How Much Blood Makes a Bloodbath?," New Republic, October 1, 1977, p. 22.

205 Kamm, "Refugees Depict Cambodia As Grim, Work-Gang Land," New York Times, October 31, 1977.

206 Shawcross, "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays (1983).

207 Ibid., p. 237.

208 Ibid., pp. 238-239.

209 Shawcross, "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," p. 233.

210 Ibid., p. 234.

211 As quoted in Shawcross, p. 233.

212 Shawcross, "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," p. 241.

213 As quoted in Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 152.

214 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 345n.

215 Gunn and Lee, p. 71.

216 Samphan, message to the conference, Documents from the Kampuchea Conference (1980), p. 12.

217 Ashley, "Pol Pot, Peasants and Peace: Continuity and Change in Khmer Rouge Political Thinking,"IAS Chulaongkorn University paper seris no. 004, October 1992, p. 19.

218 Hildebrand, "Cambodia's independence struggle and Asian perspectives on the crisis in South East Asia," Documents from the Kampuchea Conference, p. 65.

219 Ashley, pp. 19-20.

220 Hildebrand, "Cambodia's independence struggle and Asian perspectives on the crisis in South East Asia," p, 66.

221 Ibid.

222 Ibid.

223 Hildebrand, "Cambodia's independence struggle and Asian perspectives on the crisis in South East Asia," p, 66.

224 Ibid., p. 74.

225 Ibid.

226 As quoted in Morris, "Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, and Cornell," p. 59.

227 Chomsky and Herman, After the Cataclysm, p. 143.

228 Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (1978), p. xiv.

229 See, for instance, "Little Evidence of 1968 Tet Massacre in Hue (Vietnam)" (letter to the editor), New York Times, vol. 137, October 29, 1987; and "Cambodian resistance: to what end?," Christian Science Monitor, vol. 77, February 12, 1985.

230 Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 11, no. 4, October-December 1979, p. 11.

231 Ibid., p. 15.

232 Ibid.

233 Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much," p. 16.

234 Ibid., p. 17.

235 Ibid.

236 Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much," p. 17.

237 Morris, "Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, and Cornell," p. 60.

238 Becker, When the War Was Over (1986), p. 433.

239 Ibid., p. 436.

240 See David Hawk's "The Photographic Record," in Jackson, Cambodia: 1975-1978. According to Hawk, "Tuol Sleng was an examination center at the hub of a nationwide system of imprisonment, interrogation, torture and execution. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 1979, Pol Pot's forces retreated so precipitously that they left behind tens of thousands of pages of archives from S-21 `bureaucracy of death.' These meticulously kept records indicate that nearly twenty thousand were executed (literally `smashed to bits') at Tuol Sleng" (Hawk, pp. 209-210).

241 Becker, p. 447.

242 Bell and Selden, "Malcolm Caldwell, 1931-1978," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 11, no. 3, July-September 1979, p. 19-21.

243 Ibid., p. 19.

244 Ibid. The Journal of Contemporary Asia's 1975-1979 contributions to the STAV have not been covered in the "Khmer Rouge Canon" for lack of time. Like News from Kampuchea, the JCA is yet another testament to the ubiquity of the STAV on Cambodia.

245 Bell and Selden, p. 20. The Journal of Contemporary Asia's 1975-1979 contributions to the STAV have not been covered in the "Khmer Rouge Canon" for lack of time. The JCA was a major powerhouse for the Khmer revolution and continues to operate to this day. Like News from Kampuchea, the JCA is yet another testament to the ubiquity of the STAV on Cambodia.

246 Bell and Selden, p. 20.

247 Becker, pp. 432-433.

248 Ibid., p. 433.

249 Herman, "Chomsky and the Khmer Rouge," New York Review of Books, March 27, 1988.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Herman, "Chomsky and the Khmer Rouge."

253 Ibid

254 Ibid.

255 Chomsky, At War with Asia, p. 187.

256 Sharp, "Re Chomsky, and my screwup," personal e-mail, February 21, 1995.

257 Many of the endnotes in that chapter refer the reader to their handiwork in After the Cataclysm.

258 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (1988), pp. 290-291.

259 Ibid., p. 265.

260 Ibid.

261 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 267.

262 CORKR's statistics claim 825,000 rural Khmer deaths out of 1.671 million deaths. The proportion is forty-nine percent.

263 Chomsky and Herman do a good job of quoting themselves out of context. They re-engineer the chapter on Cambodia in After the Cataclysm to make themselves appear quite more concerned with the gruesome atrocities for which they devote, in reality, very little ink.

264 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent, p. 281.

265 Ibid., table 2-1 and 2-3.

266 Shawcross, "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," p. 241.

[267] Sihanouk, War and Hope (1980), p. 37.

[268] Kiernan was not canonized because his works were unavailable for review. His BCAS article states plainly that he no longer supports Pol Pot's faction of the Khmer Rouge, thus implying that he supported that faction in the past. From that article, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, and Cambodia Watching Down Under, see Kiernan, "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia," Australian Outlook, December 1976; "Revolution and Social Cohesion in Cambodia," ASEAN Seminar, Sydney, 1-4 September 1977; and News from Kampuchea 1977-1978.

[269] Kiernan, "Vietnam and the Governments and Peoples of Kampuchea," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 11, no. 4, October-December 1979, p. 19.

270 Ibid., p. 19.

[271] As quoted in "Introductory Note," Caldwell, Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 8.

[272] Gunn and Lee, Cambodia Watching Down Under (1991), p. 62.

[273] Ibid., p. 63.

[274] Ibid.

275 Gunn and Lee, p. 64.

[276] Elsewhere, Gunn and Lee actually laud the points made by Chomsky and Herman on the media. They take part in the same attacks on the media that became hallmarks of the Chomsky and Herman school: "The radical exodus from the Cambodian capital was widely regarded in the Western media as proof of a "bloodbath", or at least the prelude to a more sustained campaign by the western media that would soon blossom into the horror story that was to follow. Rumour quickly became fact and individual refugee stories were rapidly generalized into a total picture. The word of a few journalists set the tone, a case in point being Sydney Shandberg of the New York Times" (Gunn and Lee, p. 59).

277 Kiernan, p. 19.

278 Caldwell, "Cambodia: Rationale for a Rural Policy," Malcolm Caldwell's South-East Asia, p. 103.

Document compiled by Dr S D Stein
Last update 26/03/02 11:33:06
Stuart.Stein@uwe.ac.uk
©S D Stein

Faculty of Economics and Social Science Home Page