The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW

Nurnberg, October 9, 1946

W. Keitel
Field Marshal, retired  

1. The Fuehrer personally assumed the rights which formerly belonged to the Minister of War, who left office at the end of January 1938. He had the immediate power of authority over the three sections of the armed forces, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and with Hitler as the Supreme Commander, all three Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were subordinated to him directly.

The Chief of the OKW had no power of command whatsoever over the section of the armed forces. The OKW as a military authority was subordinate to him. He was placed in charge of it in his capacity as "Chief" of the Military Operational Staff of the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer alone reserved for himself the sole right to decide all questions concerning the whole armed forces, such as strength, structure, organization, armament, and arms. The chiefs of the sections of the armed forces made their proposals or requisitions for desired armament and future movements directly to the Fuehrer. The Chief of the OKW, who was the deputy of the Fuehrer and was Supreme Commander in charge of the whole armed forces, dealt with general questions concerning the armed forces as a whole and with matters concerning administration. He acted also as the deputy of the Fuehrer towards the Reich ministries, but with the following limitations:

a. The Fuehrer gave the final approval and made the final decisions in basic matters.

b. In current affairs of a nonbasic nature, always, if an agreement could not be reached between the different parties (for instance Chiefs of the Sections of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the OKW).

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Fuehrer) conferred, with the limitations as outlined under a and b, all purely administrative functions upon the Chief of the OKW as far as they did not touch his sole privilege of supreme power of command. The Fuehrer definitely did not accept the unfortunate dualism that means the contrast between the authority of the ministries on one hand and the execution of the supreme command on the other hand. The post of the Minister of War was abolished, since the Fuehrer definitely disapproved of this dualism the Minister of War versus the Chief of the Supreme General Staff, which belonged to the old Prussian army. He also disapproved of the subordination of the supreme commands of the Air Force and Navy under the General Staff of the Army, which was attempted several times. The OKW as the military staff of the Fuehrer, who was its supreme commander, was put together after several internal changes, as follows :

   Note.-The Fuehrer usually had direct and personal contact with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, frequently with the Chief for Foreign Defense and, only occasionally, with the other leading Chiefs of the Directorate of the OKW.

These two latter under 11 and 12-if more than one branch of the service was concerned-were under the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, thereby maintaining their main functions in the army. Furthermore, attached to the OKW was the "National Socialist Political Guidance Staff", since the commencement of its existence (8/ l/ 44) until its dissolution (l/ 3/ 45) under General Reinecke, who was under the immediate order of the Fuehrer. With the beginning of the war itself, the Executive Staff of the Wehrmacht (General Staff of the Wehrmacht) naturally became predominant. Just as I, personally, was locally bound closely and constantly to the Fuehrer's person, and since the beginning of the war accompanied him on negotiations everywhere: the Chief of the Wehrmacht Executive Staff was indivisible also (WFST) at first with the sections, later on with the "Operations Sections" (L) under General Warlimont, and the permanent organs of liaison of the remaining sections as well as the OKW.

While the actions and occupations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and also the Poland Campaign were led alone by the Supreme Commander of the Army-directly under the Fuehrer-the "OKW/ WFST" went into action in strength for the first time in the occupation of Norway (cooperation of all the 3 sections of the Wehrmacht) as a leading organ of the Fuehrer.

In the West Campaign in 1940 and its decisive planning, the influence and strict handling of commands by the Fuehrer in person, also in a tactical respect, already made itself strongly felt. He did not exclusively converse orally with and give commands to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Sections anymore, but to an organism of uniform and authoritative command giving orders to the OKW Executive Staff in the Form of "Directives" which verified the oral commands and intensified them.( In regard to this, read my statement about the "Origin of Directives.")

The more justified the trust of the Fuehrer towards General Jodl became, during the time of their working together, the closer and more immediate became the personal exchange of thought and direct intercourse between Hitler and Jodl, who usually in my presence directly informed him (Hitler) of the military situation, and measures and orders to be issued as well as directly received orders. With the very particular and detail-absorbing exactness of the Fuehrer (probing) always into the last analysis in everything and on all subjects-this direct intercourse and the direct conversations with Jodl as "Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht" (Chief of Exec. Staff of the Wehrmacht) took a heavy burden from me. However, despite all, Hitler fundamentally wanted my presence at the daily reports on the military situation, which took place once or twice daily. Otherwise, I was to initial those orders to the effect that I had knowledge of them. The Fuehrer used to discuss more difficult and important questions as well as decisions with Colonel-General Jodl and myself, as well as with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Sections, and make his decisions accordingly. He did not like it when such discussions, unfortunately enlarged by himself, took place at the daily situation-reports in the circle of those present-mostly about 20 participants or more (amongst them the permanent representatives of the Reichs Marshal, Foreign Minister, Reichs Leader of the SS, the Commander in Chief 'of the Navy, etc.). Besides, Hitler found it completely unbearable when within this circle I possibly expressed myself in opposition to him, or in this case, to the opinions voiced by him, because this apparently seemed to him to be some kind of criticism of his views.

IV. [Note: The formatting is as in the original, the numbering of sections II and III having been left out] After also taking over the direct High Command of the Army, that is after the departure of Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch in December 1941, the Fuehrer led:

1. as before the total Wehrmacht with the Wehrmacht Executive Staff

2. the Army, especially at the eastern front with the Chief of the Army General Staff.

For this he gave the reason, that especially in a situation which had become critical, he wanted to take the responsibility for the Army in the East and its difficult stand during the Partisan uprising and fight, and to bind it to his person and to his destiny before the people and their history. The Army itself would welcome the Fuehrer's assuming the Supreme Command of the Army, to my knowledge, with the exception of a few officers, mostly elderly. It would be welcome already, because the corps of officers would have the immediate attention and representation concerning the interest of the Army, and the Fuehrer's expected protection against enemies from the outside or against being neglected in some other way, and also against other parts of the German Army and the Waffen-SS. And so a dualism in the leadership of the whole Army and of the battle sectors developed progressively in which the Fuehrer acted : he commanded :

a. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and in the entire leadership on all fronts.

b. Hitler, as Supreme Commander of the Army, was leading the East Front as a whole and as individual sectors.

Hitler made use of the Executive Staff of the Armed Forces within the OKW on all fields of battle with the exception of the eastern front. The expression "OKW Battlefront" became familiar. To the contrary on the Eastern Front (with the exception of Finland and the Balkans) where the Fuehrer personally prevented the influence of the WFSt by his immediate personal dealings with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. The Fuehrer dealt knowingly and purposely in two ways: he wanted certain competition concerning the disposition of troops and distribution of ordnance supplies of all kinds in order to have personal inside knowledge to reach his own final decision in case of unavoidable controversies, regarding claims and demands of the east front and the "OKW Battlefronts." Obviously it definitely could not be done without the WFSt which intentionally was kept small, and without the very able and competent General Staff of the Army with its subordinate, the Quartermaster General, who continuously took care of the troops of the Army on all fields of battle and who had to take care of and supervise the shipment of all requisitions regarding personnel, matters of material and supplies. General Buhle, Chief of the Army Staff at the OKW, was acting in the capacity as a liaison officer between the Ministry of Armament (Speer), Inspector General of the armored troops, Commander of the Reserve Army in the Reich and Quartermaster General (Army); he was also the submitter of the requests of the WFSt and the orders of the Fuehrer.

V. In February 1938, at the abdication of Minister of War, the Fuehrer purposely avoided :

1. To designate a new Reich War Minister

2. To pronounce me his Chief of the OKW and at the same time Minister of the Reich.

Note. In contrast to this: the Reichs Minister of War and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery, Lammers; the Minister of State and Chief of the Presidential Bureau of Chancellery of the President of the Reich, Meissner; the minister of the Reich and the deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess, etc.

Even so, just like the three Supreme Commanders of the three sections of the armed forces, like Goering as Minister of the Air Forces, I came after the Supreme Commanders of the different sections of the armed forces. It has already been established that I should not have a superior rank or power with the exception of being the Chief of Staff, which would have been the case as with the Minister of the Reich, at least in a sense of a purely ministerial matter. I participated only in one single session of the Cabinet of the German Government on the 4th of February 1938 (I accompanied the Fuehrer in order to be introduced in the capacity as his Chief of the OKW), just as General Oberst v. Brauchitsch, who was promoted the same day to the Supreme Commander of the Army. At this time I did not have this rank yet. I only became "General Oberst" [Full General] in the fall of '38 remarkably at the same time, with the Secretary of State, Milch, in the Ministry of Aviation.

In my special position as Chief of the OKW with the Fuehrer I represented towards the Reichs Ministries the "Supreme Authority of the Reich," to which the high commands of the Wehrmachts sections belonged also, which was centralized for all Armed Forces, and I only negotiated in basic questions with the Ministers; otherwise with the Secretaries of State.

I don't doubt that my participation would have been required in the cabinet sessions, if they had still taken place at the time of my appointment as Chief of the OKW; at least then, when the Armed Forces played a part in the subject of the negotiations. As Reichsminister, I was not granted a seat and vote in the cabinet by any special decree of the Fuehrer. It would never have been practical, because no further meetings of the Reichs Government (cabinet sessions) were taking place.

On the 1st of September 1939 a decree of the Fuehrer was issued regarding the "Council of Ministers for the Reichs Defense" under the presidency of Reichs-Marshal Goering. Within this Council of Ministers I was appointed Representative for the Wehrmacht. I have only attended 2 or 3 sessions of this Gremium. Later on, decrees were circulated in. writing. Those which exceptionally dealt directly with the Wehrmacht, I have co-signed, but not those general war measures of civilian sectors or of armament, since this was being taken care of by a special ministry. The council of Ministers-when at all-met in Berlin ; I was constantly in the Fuehrer's company in the headquarters or at the front. In urgent measures, directly dealing with the Wehrmacht, I have never made use of the Council of Ministers for the Reichs Defense in regard to applications or suggestions. The Fuehrer, as Supreme Commander and War Lord with unlimited legislative powers, enforced without participation of the Council of Ministers. I submitted such decrees to him without . the usual co-signing of the ministers, which, anyway, is not being used within the Wehrmacht.

The opinion advanced to me several times, that perhaps I had been a member of the Reich Government with the rights responsibilities of a Reichs Minister, is completely wrong.

[signed] W. Keitel
Fieldmarshal, retired.