Document UK-81

COPY OF AFFIDAVIT A

[Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen]

[This affidavit is substantially the same as the testimony given by Lahousen on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, 30 November and 1 December 1945.]

[Note: Only those sections of the affidavit that bear directly on his responsibilities and the charge in the Nuremberg Charter relating to war crimes have been included here

Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume VIII. USGPO, Washington, 1946/pp.587-596]

I, ERWIN LAHOUSEN, being first duly sworn according to law, upon my oath do depose and say:

1. I was a major general in the German Army when the war ended, at which time I surrendered myself to the American Army in Liezen, Austria on I4 May 1945. I served as a professional soldier in the Austrian Army from 1916 until the time of the Austrian Anschluss in 1938. At the time of the Anschluss, I was a lieutenant colonel in the Austrian Army assigned to duty with the Austrian General Staff. I was the first officer of the Federal Austrian Army to receive the training of an intelligence officer. I received that training in order to organize the military intelligence section in the department of National Defense.

In this position in the Austrian intelligence service, I was the responsible expert for the collaboration between the Austrian and German Army Intelligence Services. This was particularly directed against Czechoslovakia and our interests ran parallel in this matter. After the Anschluss, I was automatically taken over into the German Army. From my position in the department of National Defense, I was taken over into the OKW and was assigned to the Abwehr. I fulfilled the same duties in my new assignment, namely that of an officer of the purely military intelligence service. I served in this position from March 1938 until June 1943. ***

From approximately June 1938 to June 1943, I served as one of the section chiefs under Admiral Canaris and thus, also sometimes as his personal representative, as he was my immediate superior. In this capacity I came into frequent contact with Fieldmarshal Keitel, sometimes Jodl, and upon occasion with the Fuehrer as also with other leading representatives of the Wehrmacht.

During all of the time herein mentioned, I was a member of a small resistance group which was not only opposed to Hitler's program of aggressive warfare and his methods and other activities in which the Wehrmacht became engaged, but took active steps to prevent the execution of this program. ***

During the course of the Polish campaign on 12 September 1939, and just prior to the fall of Warsaw, I attended a conference in the Fuehrer's train at which were present Canaris, Keitel and Ribbentrop. After greeting us, Ribbentrop went on to discuss his views about possible methods to solve the Polish question.

Keitel went on' to discuss these possibilities in detail and differentiated between various possibilities for a solution of the Polish problem. A variation of one possibility under discussion included an order from Keitel to Canaris for the organization of an uprising in the Galician Ukraine which should have as its aim the extermination of Poles and Jews.

Canaris informed Keitel that he possessed information that extensive shootings had been planned in Poland with the aim to exterminate the aristocracy and the clergy, along with the Poles and Jews. Canaris went on to say that in the final analysis the world would hold the Wehrmacht responsible for this.

Keitel replied that this matter had already been decided on by the Fuehrer, who had determined that Poland would and must surrender unconditionally, and who had told the Supreme Commander of the Army that if the army did not want to have anything to do with this, then they would have to let the SS and 'Gestapo work alongside of them. Keitel continued to say that each military district would have a civil governor along with a military governor. The civil governors would be held responsible for "the extermination of the people" (Volkstuemliche Ausrettung) and the "political house-cleaning" (politische Flurbereinigung). ***

6. On or about 17 July, 1941, I attended a conference at which the following were present: General Reinecke, Chief of the Genera1 Office of the Armed Forces; Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller of the SD, representing the main office of Reich' Security; Colonel Breuer, representing the office in charge of prisoners of war and myself. Reinecke acted as chairman. The purpose of this conference was to discuss the whole complex of questions concernng the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. I attended the conference as the representative of Admiral Canaris, who had asked me to attend in his stead because of his strong antipathy for General Reinecke. The orders under discussion, some of which had already been issued, and some of which had been merely proposed, were those providing for the killing of all Russian prisoners of war who were regarded as contaminated by Bolshevism. The basis of these orders was that the soldier of the Red Army must be regarded as an ideological enemy of National Socialism and thus not to be treated like soldiers of other nations. As such he was not to receive any quarter. Several of the leading generals had refused to transmit or execute these orders and Canaris had instructed me to effect a withdrawal or moderation of those orders by the use of rational arguments which were to point out the stupidity of carrying out such orders. Canaris had cautioned me to base my arguments on an appeal to reason or to the rational judgment of those present, rather than on humanitarian grounds. Canaris stated that mention of the customs of international law or the niceties of human behavior would have been merely futile and might have caused the disappearance of Canaris and myself. Therefore, although both Canaris and I were convinced that the orders under discussion were merely the expression of senseless murder and brutality, I argued with those present the undesirable effects which these orders were having on other prisoners of war, whose surrender they were stopping. Furthermore, I mentioned that these orders were detrimental to the morale of the German troops because they witnessed those executions which were contradictory to their feelings. I also emphasized that these orders had a demoralizing effect on agents working for the Abwehr office and that these orders were in direct violation of' all principles of In-ternational law and I made known the fact that a protest in writing concerning this had been submitted by Admiral Buerkner's section.

My views were not accepted by any of those present at the meeting and the only result of my arguments was that Ob. Gru Fue Mueller said that if the German troops were disgusted with these killings they would thereafter take place outside of the camp and out of sight of our troops. An order to this effect was issued shortly after.

The special purpose commands of the SD decided whether a particular Russian prisoner of war had Bolshevist background or not and thus they decided who was to be executed. The decision was entirely arbitrary and left in the hands of whomsoever was in charge of the detail. The sorting of prisoners of war which of necessity preceded the executions was carried out according to purely personal and individual desires. I know through official channels that hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners of war were executed in accordance with these orders. I also learned from General Reinecke at the conference that Stalag guards had been equipped with whips and heavy sticks with which they were to discipline prisoners and he defended this as absolutely necessary. I also learned from Admiral Canaris that orders had been issued for the branding of Russian prisoners of war. The phrase "special treatment", as used in the terminology of the SD, signified "condemned to death". The carrying out of such orders, previous to the Russian campaign, had been the responsibility of organizations under the jurisdiction of the RSHA, such as the SD, the SIPO. At the time of the Russian campaign, however, the Wehrmacht, and thus the officers of the Wehrmacht became for the first time directly involved in the application of such orders and thus share the responsibility for their enforcement. It was the desire of Himmler, Heydrich, and their associates that the Wehrmacht should no longer "wear a white vest without spots", so to speak, and leave the execution of these orders to the SS and the SD, but that it must become directly involved in such atrocities which it did in fact.

I learned through official channels and therefore know that during the Russian campaign it was the original intention of the General Staff to bring Russian prisoners of war back into German territory and that preparations had been made for an early movement to the rear of these enormous masses of prisoners. I also learned through official channels that orders were issued changing these plans so that none of these prisoners could be brought back to Germany on the alleged ground that to do so would result in Bolshevist contamination. As a result thousands of these prisoners were left and subsequently all of them were either killed or died from starvation and disease. I also learned that cannibalism resulted on a large scale.

I learned through official channels and therefore know that Wehrmacht guards guarding Russian prisoners of war had strict orders to shoot in case anything improper happened and to do so without previous warning.

I learned through official channels and therefore know, that the execution of orders such as those for the mistreatment of the Russian prisoners of war were the responsibility of the SS, the SD, and various other police organizations. A high ranking dignitary of these organizations was attached to such army group for this purpose. However, stalags were operated by the Wehrmacht, and by tolerating the activities of the organizations of the Reich Security Main Office in such camps, they necessarily share in the responsibility for the measures carried out in such camps.

7. On numerous occasions in connection with the discharge of my duties, I took occasion, on Canaris' behalf, to register protest against the orders directing the killing of British commandos. I based these protests, not only upon the adverse effect of such killings on the soldiers of the socalled Brandenburg Regiment, but also on the ground that the orders were contrary to international law, as well as the Hague and Geneva Conventions. I also know that similar protests were made by the office of Admiral Buerkner. I also know that similar, protests were made orally and in writing to General Keitel. I further recall that a second protest was made by me on Canaris' behalf after a certain number of such executions had taken place, and also regarding the branding of Russian prisoners of war.

[signed] Erwin Lahousen.

Sworn to and signed before me on 21st January 1946 in Nurnberg, Germany.
[signed] Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.', Lt. Col. IGD.