|
|
 |
The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The
Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
| |
|
| |
 |
Back |
 |
Contents |
Page 32 |
|
Home
Page |
Forward |
 |
| |
| |
But the author ends his treatise with a prognostic
which leaves a doubt in the air as to the very principle of a Jewish reserve:
"In the meantime, the war imposes its own
problems on us and the victory will confront the German people with new tasks,
still greater, most of which will be more important than the problem of a
Jewish reserve. The last word has not yet been pronounced, but it will be at
the appropriate time and by an authoritative source in order to definitively
liberate the people and the Reich from the malediction of Europe: the Jew on
the eastern border." One has the impression that the author wanted
to lead public opinion to believe that the German people would have neither
time nor energy to lose in taking care of the settlement of the Jews and that
Hitler would know how to pronounce the word which would assure their
disappearance in the most radical of manners. Isn't this how we must interpret
the unutterable "final goal" that Heydrich announced on September 21, 1939? The
following observation is in fact found in the report on the inspection trip
that Seyss Inquart, deputy of Governor General Frank, made to the General
Government in November 1940. It concerns the eventuality of a Jewish reserve in
the region of Lublin:
"This region, with its swampy character,
could quite possibly, according to the reflections of District Governor
Schmidt, be used as a Jewish reserve, a measure which would probably greatly
decimate the Jews." (64).
Relating to this it is to be noted that Heydrich, in his memorandum of
September 21, 1939, to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, insinuated that the
mysterious final goal would be attrained [sic] by the living conditions that
these measures would bring about for the Jews.
The plan for a Jewish
reserve in the General Government was given up as of 1940 (LXXXVIII-67).
Between summer 1940, after the brilliant victory in the West, and
autumn 1941, the ideas concerning "the final solution" to be given to the
Jewish question were not fixed. It was hoped that the power represented by the
victorious Reich would oblige the other nations to grant the Reich space for a
Jewish reserve. The plan for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar included Jews from
Poland as well as from Western Europe. That did not prevent the continued
concentration of Jews in the General Government until March 1941. Eichmann was
able to tell of an order from Hitler to evacuate 300,000 of them, a figure
which was far from being attained at the time.
(65) As the deportations of Jews concerned mainly the Austrian territories
and the Protectorate, Eichmann with his two Zentralstellen in these two
countries was greatly involved in this operation. In addition to the Jews,
Poles were massively deported from Poland annexed to the General Government.
All of this movement of populations provoked the furor of the Governor General,
H. Frank. To counter these reproaches against the chaotic action of the
Sipo-SD, Heydrich created within the Gestapo (the RSHA IV) a section IV D4 to
organize this action. He named Eichmann its chief. Dannecker was
|
|
| |
| |
| |
The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The
Beate Klarsfeld Foundation |
|
Back |
Page 32 |
Forward |
|
|
