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The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The
Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
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"The goal which attracted me was to clearly
show this veritable Hitler in his soundings of the future, in his hesitations
before the uncertain and in his inhibitions before "the ultimate consequences
à la Stalin"." The taking of ordinary decisions at Hitler's
level was described by B. v. Schirach, Führer of the Young People of the
Reich and, as of 1940, Gauleiter of Vienna: (74)
"Soon Bormann assured that stenographers
registered each of Hitler's words, even at table. Bormann piled up these notes
in enormous armoured closets, arranged according to subjects, names, dates...
All letters, requests, complaints addressed to Hitler finally landed on
Bormann's desk. Hitler saw but a small part of them. Bormann has himself
brought from these armoured closets the comments of Hitler concerning the
subject treated and afterwards edited the answers in the style and name of his
master. Hitler during the year had often expressed the most contradictory
opinions on the same subject: Bormann always chose the most extreme, the most
brutal. And Hitler always covered for Bormann." This role of
active intermediary that Martin Bormann played in the development of the
political and public life of the Third Reich did not concern the special
relations of Hitler with Himmler, Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner, successor of
Heydrich. But the way in which M. Bormann established decisions in Hitler's
name characterized the attitude of Hitler in general: Hitler taught and his
collaborators deduced the extreme decisions to be taken, except in foreign
policy and in the conduct of the war where Hitler acted personally.
We
may cite, too, F. Hossbach, liaison officer of the Wehrmacht with Hitler, who
observed Hitler's influencable [sic] character when confronted with
accomplished facts: (75)
"There is no doubt that following arbitrary
initiatives, taken on their own account by sections of the Party, things often
followed an orientation which, in the beginning, was not a agreement with
Hitlers [sic] own intentions. In these cases, he was more the party led than
leading; and, when they were over, he attributed to himself events which
previously he had wanted otherwise or had not wanted at all. However, he seized
with passion many accomplished facts with which he was confronted and
assimilated them." It is curious that it occurred to Hitler to
personally and publicly make known before the Reichstag his reputation of being
indecisive. On July 13, 1934, in an important speech, he commented on the
murderous action of June 30 and the following days against the SA (Röhm)
and against the politicians that he associated with the tendencies of the
latter. At a given moment of his speech, he formulated the argument that the SA
had advanced to incite people to revolt against the established Hitlerian
regime: (76)
"The necessity of a separate intervention
of the SA has been explained by the evocation of my inability to take
decisions, which would be overcome only if faits accomplis occurred."
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The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The
Beate Klarsfeld Foundation |
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Page 37 |
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