To improve the longer-term prospects for inter-Balkan
co-operation, measures should be adopted to relax visa
restrictions for entrepreneurs, publishers, academics and
others, whose activities will assist the developments of
socio-economic ties between the Balkan countries.
Tirana/London/Brussels, 1 March 2000.
Introduction
During the Kosovo crisis, Albania won international praise for
its generous response to the influx of more than 450,000
refugees from Kosovo. Despite remaining largely preoccupied
with their own domestic problems throughout most of the
crisis, the arrival of the refugees galvanised Albanians into
a new sense of national purpose. Shocked by the plight of
their ethnic kinsfolk, people collected clothing and food
parcels to take to the refugee reception centres, and
thousands of families took refugees into their homes. For once
Albanians in Albania saw there were some worse off than
themselves. As one Tirana resident put it: "We are poor
and have own dirty, messy politics, but at least we can go
home to our own beds at night."1
The signing of the Kumanovo agreement in mid June 1999,
marked the end of the war in Kosovo, and for Albania, the
beginning of the withdrawal of the large international
community that had gathered there. International relief
agencies, the world's media and the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)2,
whose hierarchy had established itself in Tirana during the
war, all followed the refugee pattern, leaving as quickly as
they had come.
For Albanians, the 'liberation' of Kosovo from Serb control
marked a key turning point in the destiny of ethnic Albanians
across the Southern Balkans. Although there was general relief
when the refugees eventually went back to Kosovo, many people
have since felt deflated by the vacuum caused by the
withdrawal of world attention. Tirana is now a city with an
atmosphere of forlorn emptiness; its inhabitants in a state of
anticlimax.
Kosovo might be free, but for many Albanians not much has
changed nine years on from the collapse of the one-party
state. Burdened by 45 years of impoverished isolation,
followed by spasms of violent uprisings, anarchic social
destruction and political chaos, Albania remains plagued by
endemic crime and corruption. Political rivalry is as intense
and malicious as ever, the population is still heavily armed,
the roads are still impassable and unemployment is growing.
The very concept of democracy remains in an embryonic stage.
The country's problems appear as intractable as ever with a
return to old party politics with the same personalities. The
re-election of the two dinosaurs of post-communist Albanian
politics - Sali Berisha and Fatos Nano - has confirmed the
continued predominance of the old guard in both Albania's
major parties. The undisguised hostility between Nano and
Berisha has already raised political tensions, and represents
another unwelcome distraction from Albania's grave problems.
Despite the recent positive moves by the state against
corruption and a slight improvement, albeit only by Albanian
standards, in public order, the main problems facing Albania
remain the absence of national reconciliation and the
reconstruction of functioning state institutions. The overall
security situation is still very poor with sporadic violent
incidents continuing to undermine the government's efforts to
bring internal stability to the country. The presence of 1,800
NATO personnel remains one of the few stabilising factors both
domestically and regionally.
In this paper, the International Crisis Group (ICG)
examines the impact of the Kosovo crisis on Albania, and
assesses the relevance of the redefined 'Albanian national
question' - both in terms of new regional initiatives for
closer co-operation, and the resurgence of old issues, such as
the Cham property rights claim. It tracks the ongoing
developments within the domestic setting, and outlines the
challenges ahead in the fields of security, law and order and
efforts to combat organised crime and illegal immigration.
Impact of the Kosovo Crisis in Albania
Overall, the Kosovo crisis had a number of positive
side-effects for Albania. On a practical level, the economy
received a much-needed boost, and the country witnessed an
unprecedented, if short-lived, surge of national solidarity,
with domestic politics for once taking a back seat. Virtually
all but the criminal sectors of the Albanian population
rallied to offer assistance to the Kosovo Albanian refugees.3
The Economy
According to the Bank of Albania, the Kosovo crisis had a
positive effect on the Albanian economy, helping to create a
current account surplus of 30 million USD in the second
quarter. The influx of nearly half a million refugees, the
import of Western food aid to feed them, and the deployment of
a substantial NATO military force, helped Albania achieve a
surplus in services of up to 80 million USD in the second
quarter - 4.6 times greater than in the previous quarter. A
bank official told Reuters, "Our evaluations show that
during their stay in Albania, the Kosovo population spent
considerable hard currency on top of that obtained from
foreign aid. The crisis also helped the country 'get visited'
by the world's media, international organisations, aid
agencies as well as foreign troops, who all bought services in
Albania."4
The north eastern district of Kukes experienced a decline
in official unemployment due to the opening of the country's
border with Kosovo. According to the government news agency
ATA, the number of registered jobless in the Kukes district
fell in 1999 from 6,240 to 5,300. The opening of the border
with Kosovo boosted the activities of local companies, and
therefore the size of the required labour force.5
At the international level, Albania certainly expects
substantial rewards for having put the whole country at NATO's
disposal, and having proven itself as a loyal and stable ally
of the international community. Indeed, in July 1999, as the
country eagerly waited for the results of the Sarajevo Balkans
Reconstruction Conference, the Speaker of the Parliament,
Skender Gjinushi, claimed that, "Albania and Kosovo
deserve to be in the centre of this project and the first to
get assistance because the Albanians suffered most during the
conflict."6
There is an obvious danger, however, of complacency being
born out of the attention Albania received during the Kosovo
crisis. A general lack of progress - as epitomised in the slow
pace of economic reform and the preoccupation with internal
political conflicts, could lead to Albania's exclusion on
these grounds alone from the European Union's Stability Pact.
Tirana will have to realise that as the focus of international
attention shifts, its preferential status shaped by the crisis
will almost certainly continue to wane.
Strengthening Community Ties
Arguably the most significant aspect of the crisis was the
arrival of some 450,000 Kosovo Albanians in Albania. For the
overwhelming majority this was their first ever visit to the
'motherland', which brought the vast majority of the two
Albanian communities into contact with each other for the
first time in their lives. According to a recent poll, Kosovo
refugees displaced to Albania during the conflict say their
stay and experiences there have intensified their feelings of
kinship and nationhood with their compatriots in Albania.
The overwhelming majority of the refugees were satisfied
with the treatment they received in Albania and, despite
Albania's lawless reputation, said they felt safe. A farmer
from Suva Reka explained: "We have never felt afraid of
anything here because we have come to our country and to our
brothers, you know it is our blood."7
Throughout the poll people instinctively used the words and
phrases such as 'brothers', the 'same blood', 'the same
family', 'one nation', etc. Nevertheless, many comments were
qualified with statements about the deficiencies of Albania's
democracy and institutions. Some clearly articulated the need
for Albania to put its own house in order. In response to the
question: "What kind of relations would you like the
Albanians of Kosovo to have with Albania in the future",
about 50 per cent of the refugees wanted unification with
Albania. Another 25 per cent did not speak about unification
but of relations based on closer ties.
Virtually all the refugees saw the future of the two
Albanian communities as having more intensified and integrated
relations on all levels. However, they did not use the concept
'Greater Albania'.8
An analysis of the poll found that 70 per cent said that their
opinions of Albania had changed for the better and an
overwhelming majority, 89.4 per cent, believed that Albania
had a role to play in the future of Kosovo. This opinion was
based on the fact that they were fellow nationals with a
common history, and as Albania was an internationally
recognised state and a UN member, it was therefore bound to be
able to play a contributory and creative role.
Tirana's role in Pan-Albanian Aspirations
Albania is now seeking a role as a regional hearth for
ethnic Albanians living in neighbouring countries. On a recent
visit to Tirana, the vice-chairman of the Kosovo Albanian
'Provisional Government', Mehmet Hajrizi, called on the
Albanian government to give a voice to the demands, in this
instance for early elections. Hajrizi told a press conference,
"Kosovo is not represented at international
organisations, where Albania has done a great job in the
past...and I think it should continue to assist Kosovo to
achieve prosperity and peace."9
Albania's influence over Kosovo, however, is much more
symbolic than practical. There is an undeniable sense of
wounded pride amongst Albanian officials, who feel they are
being sidelined by the West in regards to regional planning.
Albanian officials feel neglected by the international
community, particularly regarding the future of Kosovo.
"We have observed some hesitation to co-operate with
us,"10
Foreign Minister Paskal Milo said during a seminar in Tirana
on Balkan security. Milo said the West's disinterest in
Albania, "is caused by misunderstanding of a few official
statements or from some irresponsible statements" issued
by DP leader, Sali Berisha.11
Milo was attempting to distance the Albanian government from
Berisha's statements at the beginning of October, which
encouraged the notion of an "Albanian Federation" in
the Balkans.
Milo may also have been referring to the series of
cancelled visits to Albania by top American officials, who
cited the continued state of lawlessness in Albania as the
apparent cause of their cancellations. On 11 June 1999,
Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, decided not to make a
stop in Albania following her visit to Macedonia due to
security concerns. State Department officials claimed that
there was a great deal of 'lawlessness' in Albania, and that
the Albanian government was not able to guarantee the security
of high-ranking visitors,12
(she later made a visit in February 2000). Secretary of
Defence, William Cohen cancelled his trip to Tirana in July
for security reasons. Defence Department sources said the
Albania visit was cancelled because of 'a threat on the
ground'13
related to Islamic militants affiliated to Osama bin Laden. At
the end of August, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
Richard Holbrooke, cancelled his planned official visit to
Tirana, due it was said, to a technical fault in his aircraft.
Mr Holbrooke, however, flew to Sarajevo a few hours later on
the same plane. President Clinton avoided Albania altogether
on his recent trip to the Balkans.
Whilst agreeing that security issues were an obvious
factor, several Albanian politicians thought it more likely
that the visits were cancelled in protest against the support
of the Albanian government for the independence of Kosovo, and
for the 'Provisional Government' of Hashim Thaci. The
meetings, they explained, could have taken place for just one
hour at Tirana airport, which is far from any centre of
habitation and could easily have been sealed off.14
The National Question
The Albanian national question, which emerged so
dramatically onto the European scene at the beginning of the
1990s, is intrinsically bound up with the indeterminate status
of Kosovo and the political future of the ethnic Albanian
populations of Montenegro and Macedonia.
Whilst the crisis in Kosovo has focused world attention on
Albanian communities throughout the Southern Balkans, the
liberation of Kosovo has not, at least not yet, been
translated into demands from Tirana, Pristina or Tetova for
the creation of a 'Greater Albania'. What does exist is the
determination to become regional players politically and the
desire to improve the economic basis of Albanian communities
in the Southern Balkans. Albanians today are in no mood to
compromise over issues concerning their national interests,
having drawn the lesson from the Kosovo conflict that, with
concerted effort and determination, they can change their own
fate.
What then is this 'Greater Albania' that causes such alarm
amongst Albania's neighbours?15
Throughout the Southern Balkans maps are widely circulated of
territory that at one time comprised either the empires of
past rulers, such as the Serbs and the Bulgarians, or as is
the case with the Greeks and the Albanians, territory which is
claimed historically to have been predominantly inhabited by
people of their particular ethnicity. Those maps issued by
nationalist groups in Greece, claim territory as far north as
the central Albanian town of Elbasan, while 'Greater Albania',
or 'Ethnic Albania' as the Albanians prefer to call it,
comprises the territory of present-day Albania together with
Kosovo, Western Macedonia, south-eastern Montenegro, and the
north-western Epirus region of Greece - known to the Albanians
as Chameria. Without delving too far into the past, it is
necessary to look briefly at how the Albanian people came to
be divided in to these five territories. This may go some way
in clarifying what all Albanians refer to as the 'historical
injustices' inflicted upon them by depriving them of national
unification.
The Creation of Albania's Borders
The 'Albanian National Question' first manifested itself at
the Congress of Berlin in 1878, where the Great Powers agreed
that there was no such thing as an Albanian nation, but rather
the Albanians were merely inhabitants of a geographical area.
This fateful decision has haunted the Southern Balkans ever
since. Although after the Balkan Wars the Powers agreed in
principle to support the establishment of Albania as a new
political entity, the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors
nevertheless awarded the Balkan allies large areas of
Albanian-inhabited territory, regardless of its ethnic
composition.
Under the Protocol of Florence, most of present-day Kosovo,
including the towns of Pec,16
Prizren, Djakovica and Debar were ceded to Serbia, despite the
knowledge that apart from Shkoder these were the only market
towns for the north Albanian population. With Greece receiving
the southern region of Epirus, or Chameria, the Albanian State
was reduced to the central regions together with the town of
Shkoder. Neither economic nor cultural nor ethnographic
arguments determined the fate of Albania. The Florence Line
that decided the frontiers of the new Albanian State satisfied
neither the Albanians nor their Balkan neighbours. Serbia was
deprived of an Albanian port, Montenegro lost the town of
Shkoder, and Greece had to relinquish southern Albania having
been deprived of the Saranda district which, she argued, was
predominantly Greek and was the natural outlet to the sea for
the Greek region north of Janina.
The final border which was eventually established in
November 1921 left more than half the Albanian nation outside
the Albanian state with almost half a million Albanians
included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and a
further 70,000 in Greece, thus creating what became the
world's largest irredenta. It is clear from documentary
evidence that the Ambassador's Conference was merely an
exercise to gain time, a barrier against further war, and that
the Powers did not expect the Albanian state to last long -
hence the casual, drawn out and haphazard manner in which the
frontier was finally arrived at.17
Is there a 'Greater Albania' in the making?
Against the backdrop of the ongoing conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, Albania's current leadership have acknowledged the
complexities involving the multiethnic nature of the Southern
Balkans and the subsequent threat this poses to the
socio-economic and political development of the region. As a
result therefore, all but a few extremists have adopted a
relatively responsible attitude towards nationalism. Albania's
President, Rexhep Meidani, 54, taught physics for four years,
from 1977 to 1980, at Pristina University, during which time
he developed strong ties with the Kosovo Albanians, witnessing
at first hand their difficult relationship with the Belgrade
authorities. He remains, however, an ardent opponent of
aggressive nationalism and sees an urgent need for
reconciliation and economic reconstruction of both Albania and
Kosovo in order to weaken nationalism.
Socialist Party leader, Fatos Nano, whilst calling for
closer political and economic ties amongst the Albanians
living in the Balkans, insists this would not involve changing
borders. Nano believes that ensuring freedom of movement
throughout the region is the best way to deflect nationalist
calls for establishing a 'Greater Albania'. He stresses the
fact that there is no need to redraw borders but to "make
them irrelevant."18
For all Albanians, the opening up of the border between
Albania and Kosovo has the same significance as the fall of
the Berlin Wall, in that it has provided the opportunity for
both communities to finally come together. The creation of
Albania's borders deprived virtually all her peripheral towns
of their natural geographical trading outlets. This has been a
primary cause of the economic decline and subsequent extreme
poverty of these areas. In order therefore to rectify this
'historical injustice', Albanian leaders are instigating a
number of socio-economic and political initiatives designed to
forge closer links between the two communities.
Economic Initiatives
Tirana is fully aware that the economic prosperity of
northern Albania depends upon the weakening of the border
structure between Albania and Kosovo. The Albanian government
is trying to do everything possible to link Albania and Kosovo
by road and rail so that the Yugoslav province will not need
trade and communication links from Serbia. In August 1999, the
then prime minister, Pandeli Majko, asked Albanians to deposit
money in a special bank account to help finance the
construction of a road to Pristina. The road, starting in the
Albanian port of Durrės, will link Tirana and Pristina via
the Morina border crossing in northern Albania. Majko also
offered the Albanian port of Durrės as Kosovo's port city, so
that Kosovo would have a port free of Belgrade's control.
Although Majko admitted that the government needed help from
its foreign partners to construct the 350-km (218 mile) road,
he said the Albanian people had to make the first
contributions. Majko said the development of ties between
Albania and Kosovo had become a top priority for his
government.19
The Albanian Development Fund has financed the
reconstruction of a 6.5-kilometre road linking north eastern
Albania with the Kosovo town of Djakovica. The road runs from
the town of Kruma to the border crossing at Prushi Pass.
Albania hopes that its impoverished north eastern area will
benefit from increased business with Kosovo. At present the
border crossing is not viable for the transfer of goods as it
can only be used by small cars. The new corridor is expected
not only to help Kosovo's economy but also to boost economic
activity in northern Albania generally. These areas have been
totally isolated, and their development suppressed, since the
border divided Albania from Kosovo and Montenegro in 1912.
Albanian railways (HSH) is nearing completion of a 200
million USD railway to connect the Albanian port of Durrės
with the town of Prizren in southern Kosovo. The link will
start from the town of Rreshen in the mountains of northern
Albania, pass through the valleys of Small Fan and the Black
Drin and enter Kosovo from the town of Kukes. Both Albanian
and Kosovo Albanian leaders have requested improved road and
rail connections with Durrės which hopefully will boost trade
from the internal Balkans to the Adriatic. Albania's
authorities have also agreed to the request of Kosovo Albanian
leader, Hashim Thaci, to allow concessions on Shengjin port,
which lies just south of the town of Shkoder.
It is not only government-sponsored initiatives that are
being implemented: local people themselves are reactivating
traditional links between Albania and Kosovo. The Gorani
minority20
in the northern Kukes district has funded by itself the
construction of a road to connect their villages with the
southern tip of Kosovo, where their ethnic brethren live.
People in the Gorani village of Borja have paved the three-kilometre
long road to the border and then on to the village of
Globocica in Kosovo.
Political and Cultural Initiatives
On the political front Albanian leaders have been striving
to build a joint forum of Albanian political parties in
Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. In December, Fatos
Nano referred to the possible drafting of a common political
calendar between Tirana, Pristina and Tetova that would
provide a pan-national integration strategy to integrate all
Albanians. According to Nano, the foundations of this
initiative were laid out in Tetova by himself and Hashim Thaci,
together with the leader of the Macedonian Albanian Democratic
Party, Arben Xhaferi. "It will be a movement not in
support of a Greater Albania but will serve the great European
Albanians," Nano explained.21
In recent months, Hashim Thaci also met with President Rexhep
Meidani, Premier Ilir Meta, Fatos Nanos, as well as opposition
leader Sali Berisha.22
At a press conference Thaci stated that, "These official
meetings have been made in the framework of unifying our
national political stands towards the international
community."23
Meanwhile, plans for the social and cultural integration
between the Albanians of the Southern Balkans are gathering
pace. Last August Pandeli Majko asked officials in Tirana to
draw up plans to unify the education systems of Albania and
Kosovo, and to intensify co-operation between the universities
of Tirana, Pristina and Tetova.24
Three Tirana universities will soon sign an agreement of
co-operation with Pristina University, which will enable an
exchange of teaching staff, organising joint research
projects, as well as workshops aimed at co-ordinating a
unified university curriculum. Moves towards including the
education programs of ethnic Albanians in Montenegro are also
being discussed.
The Montenegrin Albanians are very keen to see a quick
implementation of a unified pan-Albanian education system.
According to the President of the Democratic Union of
Montenegrin Albanians, Luigj Juncaj, Albanians in Montenegro
are not content with their education system. He believes that
education is the key to the protection of national rights:
"We want the same curriculum for all Albanians in the
Balkans. The three subjects language, literature and history
are to us the most important because with these subjects you
can strengthen knowledge about Albanian culture, heritage and
national consciousness."25
The Albanian government has officially repeated its earlier
demand to UN officials in Kosovo that it be allowed to open a
diplomatic or 'information' office in Pristina. Given that
several European countries and the US have already established
offices in the Kosovo capital, the Tirana authorities are
insisting that the request be granted. The Albanian government
has come under increasing pressure from the general public for
its failure to open an office in Pristina in order to exert
its influence over pan-Albanian issues.
The Cham Issue
Now that Kosovo has effectively been 'liberated', many
Albanians feel that it is time to turn their attentions to
that other great national concern - the restitution of
property rights of the Cham people. The Chams are the ethnic
Albanian, and predominantly Muslim, population of the region
of north-eastern Greece known to all Albanians as Chameria -
an area of Epirus extending between Butrint and the mouth of
the Acheron river, and eastward to the Pindus mountains. The
name 'Chameria' comes from the ancient Illyrian name for the
Thyamis river, which traversed the territory of the ancient
Illyrian tribe of Tesprotes. Chameria was part of the Roman
Empire before being conquered by Byzantium. After the Ottoman
invasion in the 15th century the mostly Albanian population of
northern Chameria - from Konispol to the Gliqi river -
converted to Islam, whilst those living south of the Gliqi
down to Preveza Bay remained Orthodox Christians. In 1913 the
Ambassador's Conference allotted the Chameria region to
Greece, so today only seven Cham villages, centred on the
village of Konispol, are in Albania itself.
Between 1921 and 1926, the Greek government set about
trying to deport Albanian Muslims from Chameria in order to
allot their lands to Greeks who had been deported from Asia
Minor during Kemal Ataturk's revolution.26
In an attempt, in 1944, to establish an ethnically pure border
region, the Greek government unleashed a campaign in Chameria,
which resulted in around 35,000 Chami fleeing to Albania and
others to Turkey. The Greek authorities then approved a law
sanctioning the expropriation of Cham property, citing the
collaboration of their community with the occupying German
forces as a main reason for the decision. The law is still in
force in Greece. Whatever the truth of this allegation, which
has to an extent been supported by some of the British Liaison
Officers based with the Greek Resistance movements27
, the forced movement of the entire population has left a
lingering sense of injustice amongst Albanians in general,
which has contributed to continuing poor bilateral relations
between Albania and Greece.
The Cham issue has remained dormant with none of the
post-war Albanian governments venturing to make it a key issue
in relations with its southern neighbour. Today, the issue is
seen - as was Kosovo, as one more 'historical injustice'
suffered by the Albanian people that has to be corrected.
After the collapse of Communism, the Chams in Albania set up
the `Chameria Association' dedicated to the return of their
expropriated lands in Greece. The then Greek foreign minister,
Karolas Papoulias, said in the summer of 1991 that a bilateral
commission should settle these demands. The chances of forming
one, however, are very slim since under current Greek law
there is no legal means of challenging requisition (or
expropriation) of land by the Greek state. In the meantime,
the issue has been taken by the Tirana government to the
International Court of Justice, in an effort to secure
financial compensation for lost Cham property. There has been
little progress to date.
Since the end of the Kosovo conflict, support for the Chams
has grown ever more vocal. The Chameria Association is
successfully wooing support to the Cham cause, and is even
working on legal procedures to sue the Greek government at the
European Court of Human Rights. The Chams are frustrated and
angered by the Greek government's refusal to discuss their
demands. During the recent meeting between the new Albanian
Premier Ilir Meta and his Greek counterpart Costas Simitis, a
controversy arose when Simitis, answering to questions from
journalists at a joint press conference, said that the Greek
government considered the Cham issue as a closed chapter.28
Back in Tirana, the opposition DP lost no time entering the
fray, accusing Premier Meta of signing an alleged agreement
with the Greeks over coverage of the Cham issue in Albanian
history books.29
The prevailing perception was that this was a clear attempt to
erase the issue from the minds of future Albanian students. At
the end of December, the Chairman of the Foreign Parliamentary
Committee, Sabri Godo, urged the International Court of Human
Rights, as well as the Albanian authorities to work out with
Greece a solution to the property rights of the Chams.30
According to a spokesman for the Cham Association in Tirana,
the total value of Cham property at the end of the World War
II was estimated at 340 million USD, whilst the current market
value could reach 2.5 billion USD. The Cham Association wants
to see the 60 year old Greek law authorising the confiscation
of Cham property to be declared null and void, and the Cham
people fully compensated for their loss, thus paving the way
for "better and more just relations between Albania and
Greece."31
On a recent tour of southern Albania, DP leader Sali
Berisha threatened to put relations with Greece on hold if it
did not comply with two key demands: more cultural rights for
the Albanians living in Greece, and the resolution of the
property issue of the Cham population expelled from Greece
after the Second World War. In a rally in the southern town of
Saranda, Berisha told supporters that Greece should open an
Albanian language school in the northern Greek town of
Filiates, and warned that without a solution to the Cham
properties issue relations between the two countries would
remain stagnant. He also vowed that a solution to the Cham
issue would be a precondition for better relations with Greece
if and when his party comes to power.32
A growing number of Albanians feel that now is the time, in
the wake of the world's acknowledgement of the human rights
abuses in Kosovo, for the Albanian government to direct the
international community's attention to the plight of the Chams.
The independent daily Koha Jone applauded Premier Meta for
bringing up the Cham issue in his discussions with Costas
Simitis. The paper concluded that for the first time in the
history of Greek-Albanian relations, a Socialist Premier had
openly objected to Athens' preferred position of ignoring the
whole issue of the Cham's property claims.
It seems certain that calls to re-instate the property
rights of the Cham population will be a growing concern for
official Albanian policy. With the widespread and increasingly
indignant support of both left and right in Albania, this is
clearly an issue that is not going to go away.
Albanian Politics: From One Crisis To Another
The controversial elections of May 1996, the collapse of
the pyramid banking schemes which brought the country to the
brink of civil war in 1997, and the attempted coup d'etat in
September 1998, have caused Albania to lurch from one crisis
directly to another, and stifled the development of democratic
pluralism. These events have also formed the backdrop of the
continuing bitter hostility between the ruling Socialist-led
coalition and the main opposition Democratic Party, led by
ex-president Sali Berisha. Mistrust, suspicion and enmity
between these two political rivals will likely continue to mar
the run up to next year's elections.
Background to the Present Crisis
The parliamentary election of May 1996 was conducted amidst
a climate of acute tension, manipulation and intimidation by
the then governing DP. Although the overwhelming majority of
international election monitors agreed that serious
irregularities had occurred in the polling process, the DP
declared itself the clear victor - ignoring Western diplomatic
pleas to re-run the election to stave off mounting popular
anger, not only at the conduct of the elections, but also at
the increasingly dictatorial and authoritarian rule of
President Berisha.
For the next six months civil unrest was stalled only due
to the population's belief that instant wealth was achievable
by sinking their life savings into fraudulent pyramid
investment schemes. The sudden and dramatic collapse of these
schemes, and the subsequent violent uprising in the spring of
1997, forced Berisha to face political reality and cave in to
Opposition and international demands for new parliamentary
elections. Despite vigorous protests, Berisha reluctantly
conceded defeat as the Socialists, led by Fatos Nano, won a
convincing victory.
Any notion of political reconciliation, however, was put
into sharp reverse in September 1998 when, following the
assassination of Azem Hajdari, a popular founder member of the
DP, an attempted coup d'etat by opposition forces plunged the
country once more to the brink of civil chaos.33
The real motive for the coup attempt was the bitter personal
feud between Nano and Berisha. Nano, a Prime Minister in the
first post-Communist government in 1991, was imprisoned by
Berisha in 1993 for allegedly misappropriating state funds: he
was later freed by supporters during the 1997 uprising that
forced Berisha from power.
The profound anger which led to the uprising, and the
anarchic social disorder that followed, has scarred every
facet of Albanian life since and left ordinary people deeply
traumatised. Speculation over Berisha's involvement in
Hajdari's assassination - and Berisha's own refusal to let the
matter rest - have continually focused attention on events
surrounding Hajdari's death. All this has served to undermine
any other initiatives on which the Government or the
Opposition might otherwise have focused.
Hajdari's murder, and the martyrdom status he has since
acquired, will therefore hold Albanian politics hostage until
his killers are brought to justice. This is proving
increasingly difficult, since it now appears almost certain
that Hajdari's killers have themselves been killed. The recent
spate of killings in the Tropoja district has conveniently
eliminated several witnesses to Hajdari's death. On 4 November
in Tropoja district, two of the supposed assassins of Hajdari
were killed and another wounded. DP supporters persistently
claim that members of the then Socialist government of Fatos
Nano were responsible for killing Hajdari.
According to the pro-DP daily Albania, the killings, as
well as others committed in the Tropoja district, were aimed
at "liquidating the political authors and assassins of
Hajdari. They were being undertaken to hide the involvement in
this assassination of senior leaders of the Albanian State and
the majority in power." The paper went on to say that the
"elimination of the executioners is another direct
attempt by police and the government to remove any evidence or
witnesses linked to the crime."34
Two brothers of Berisha's former bodyguard, Izet Haxhia,
wanted for leading the attempted coup, have openly accused
Berisha of being involved in Hajdari's killing and other
criminal acts. Isamedin Haxhia, appointed by Berisha as
commander of the operation he ordered against insurgents in
the city of Vlore during the March 1997 revolts, and whom he
blamed for failing to carry out those orders, has published an
open letter in the daily Koha Jone openly accusing Berisha of
organising bloody plans to forcibly crush the March 1997
uprising.
In their statements, the two brothers Ismet and Isamedin
who, like Berisha and Hajdari, are from the northern town of
Tropoja, did not produce any evidence about the accusations.
But the Attorney General Arben Rakipi, said recently that
investigations into the 14 September 1998 failed coup d'etat
were continuing and that the Hajdari case would be resolved in
the near future.35
Berisha has so far refused several prosecution summons,
claiming he could not co-operate with what he calls a
politically biased prosecution office. Until Haxhia's
accusations in Koha Jone, Berisha had been accused of being
involved in murder, but had not been directly implicated in
any specific case.
Part II
Document
compiled by Dr S D Stein