Source: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/indonesi.html
Accessed 09 September 1999

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U.S. Department of State

Indonesia Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices for 1998: Part I

Part II

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999.

Blue Bar rule

INDONESIA

Indonesia's authoritarian political system came under sustained challenge during 1998, resulting in President Soeharto's departure from office and opening an opportunity for meaningful political and economic reforms. The ultimate result of this reform effort remains unclear. Two months after his reelection to a seventh 5-year term in March, popular pressure forced Soeharto to resign in favor of his hand-picked Vice President, B.J. Habibie. The new President immediately announced a series of steps to address domestic and international human rights concerns. With many citizens questioning his legitimacy because of his close association with Soeharto, President Habibie formed a cabinet that drew heavily on holdovers from the last Soeharto Cabinet. In response to demands for early elections, Habibie pledged to advance parliamentary elections by 3 years, to hold them under fundamentally revised electoral laws, and to complete selection of a new president by the end of 1999. The Government allowed new political parties to form and adopted a more responsive attitude toward groups demanding improved protections for human rights. The economic crisis generated friction among social and ethnic groups, and the state ideology of "Pancasila," which stresses consultation and consensus, was not used as blatantly as in the past to limit dissent and enforce social and political cohesion. The judiciary remained subordinated to the executive and suffers from pervasive corruption.

The armed forces have broad nonmilitary powers under a "dual function" concept that accords them a political and social role in government. The primary mission of the 450,000-member armed forces, which includes 175,000 police, is maintenance of internal security and stability. In the more open post-Soeharto climate, the dual function doctrine came under challenge from student and other social groups. In the absence of effective institutional safeguards, and despite some improvement over the course of the year, the military and police continued to commit numerous serious human rights abuses.

The country's severe economic crisis led to massive unemployment, food shortages, and a significant drop in living standards, as well as a rise in crime, looting, and other symptoms of social breakdown. Widespread corruption remained a problem. Major unrest spurred demands both for the Government to act more effectively to address social and economic inequities and to curb disorders. In rural areas, discontent often focused on the grievances of small landowners, especially those forced off their land by powerful economic and military interests. In some regions, exploitation of natural resources entailed significant environmental degradation with adverse social consequences.

The Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses. Its performance improved after the resignation of President Soeharto, when it endorsed broadened press freedom, released numerous political prisoners, signed or ratified important human rights and labor conventions, and security forces more frequently exercised restraint in responding to demonstrations. In addition, it faced mounting public pressure to strengthen protections for human, labor, and civil rights. Security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings throughout the year, including of unarmed civilians, in particular in East Timor and Irian Jaya. Security forces shot and killed four unarmed students participating in a peaceful demonstration at Trisakti University on May 12. Two police officers were sentenced to short jail terms for not following orders, although they were not charged with these killings. Many viewed them as scapegoats, since evidence indicated that other military units were responsible. Security forces also fired upon and killed protestors during November demonstrations. The abduction of political and human rights activists was a serious problem through May. During Soeharto's final year in office, at least 20 such activists disappeared. The armed forces in August acknowledged responsibility for illegally kidnaping nine activists who already had been released, several of whom said that they were tortured while in detention. At least 12 activists remained missing as of year's end. Punishments short of criminal sanction were imposed on three high-ranking officers in connection with these kidnapings, and the court martial of 11 other lower ranking military personnel began in December. Security forces continued to torture, abuse, and otherwise mistreat persons. The Parliament ratified the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in July, but legal protections against torture are still inadequate. During massive riots in mid-May, mobs targeted the ethnic Chinese community, which was not protected by the authorities. Following the riots, allegations of mass rape of ethnic Chinese women were made, forcing the Government to establish a fact-finding team to investigate the riots and rapes. The team found that elements of the military had been involved in the riots, some of which were deliberately provoked. It also verified 66 rapes of women, the majority of whom were Sino-Indonesian, as well as numerous other acts of violence against women. The armed forces publicly acknowledged several areas of past human rights violations and launched still ongoing investigations into some of the worst violations. Security forces continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. The judiciary is pervaded by corruption, and remains subordinated to the executive branch. Security forces regularly violated citizens' right to privacy. Prison conditions remained harsh.

The Government's limits on freedom of speech and the press loosened considerably during the first 5 months of the year. Prior to Soeharto's resignation, public criticism of the Government intensified and received broad coverage in the press. The media also carried regular reports of calls for political and economic reform and for Soeharto to step down. Following Soeharto's resignation, press freedom expanded significantly but still lacks institutionalized protections. The Government continued to impose significant limitations on freedom of assembly and association during the first 5 months of the year. Although students generally were permitted to demonstrate on campus during this period, security forces frequently used force to prevent them from taking protests off campus and occasionally entered the campuses and beat student demonstrators. In the period prior to the March presidential election, security authorities broke up numerous protests, including peaceful demonstrations, leading to the arrest, trial, and conviction of activists. Many demonstrations took place during the second half of the year by students and others without interference from security forces. However, throughout the year, there were numerous instances where security forces reacted harshly in dealing with demonstrations or in disputes with citizens, leading in many cases to injury, and in some cases to the killing of demonstrators. For much of the year, security forces generally refrained from using lethal force in responding to major riots; however, they frequently were criticized for not acting in time to protect citizens and property from the large-scale destruction that occurred. Numerous demonstrations occurred following Soeharto's resignation, and the new Government in July issued a controversial decree restricting demonstrations. The Government bowed to popular pressure by rescinding the decree in August. A new law on freedom of expression passed by the legislature in October required 3-days' advance notice to police of demonstrations and contained other provisions governing the conduct of demonstrations. It was enforced unevenly.

The Government legally provides for religious freedom for five designated religions; unrecognized religions are subject to restrictions. Attacks against minority houses of worship continued, and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents. Attacks on mosques also occurred. The Government to a limited extent continued to restrict freedom of movement. Domestic human rights organizations played a significant and increased role in advocating improved human rights conditions; some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) reported monitoring and interference by the authorities. Discrimination against women, the disabled, and ethnic minorities, and violence against women are endemic problems. Child abuse and child prostitution are problems, and female genital mutilation (FGM) persists in some areas. Interreligious violence and violence against ethnic minorities also were a problems.

The Government took several positive steps in regard to worker rights, although enforcement of labor standards remained weak. The military and police continued to intervene in labor disputes, canceled union meetings, intimidated workers, and beat and injured union demonstrators. At least one worker died as a result of such injuries. Economic pressures forced a significant number of children out of school and likely increased the number of children working. Millions of children work, often under poor conditions. Forced and bonded labor, including by children, remains a problem. Some children forced to work under conditions of bonded labor reportedly suffer abuse. However, despite worsening conditions for workers due to the economic crisis, the Government took several positive steps in regard to worker rights. The Government released the country's best known labor leader from detention and withdrew all charges against him. The Government also ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 87 on freedom of association, allowed new and previously unrecognized independent trade unions to operate, and postponed implementation of a controversial manpower law to permit revision and public consultation.

With the demise of the Soeharto regime, United Nations-sponsored Portuguese-Indonesian talks on East Timor gained new momentum, as the two sides agreed to discuss an Indonesian plan to offer special status for East Timor, which went well beyond what had been considered by the previous government. However, as of year's end, negotiators had not bridged the gap between the Government's insistence on autonomy as a final solution, and the Portuguese/East Timorese resistance demand for an eventual vote on self-determination. In East Timor itself, there were increasing expressions of popular opposition to the Government, and proreferendum forces began to operate more openly. A surge of support for independence following Soeharto's resignation caused tensions to rise sharply and precipitated the temporary departure of several thousand non-East Timorese government officials and others, reportedly concerned about their security. Serious human rights abuses continued despite a relatively low level of insurgent activity. Extrajudicial killings rose sharply, with confirmed reports of 37 killings in the first 8 months of the year. Credible sources attributed the great majority of these incidents to the military; in the final months of the year, military and police personnel, along with civilians seen as collaborators were the victims of a series of attacks and killings. Insurgents were accused in these cases, although it is unclear who is responsible. Military crackdowns that followed were accompanied by serious human rights abuses. As in past years, disappearances, torture, and excessive use of force on the part of the authorities continued. Following the May events, there was a more open atmosphere in East Timor, with increased tolerance for freedoms of assembly, expression, and the press. A June visit by a troika of European ambassadors, and a December visit by U.N. Special Envoy Jamsheed Marker, were greeted with large proreferendum demonstrations. The Habibie Government released 56 East Timorese political prisoners, but resistance leader Xanana Gusmao remained in prison despite international calls that he be freed. No progress was made in accounting for persons missing following the 1991 Dili incident, or of others who disappeared in recent years. While the military carried out a highly publicized withdrawal of some 1,000 troops, there did not appear to be an overall reduction in the unjustifiably high number of troops in East Timor, and some evidence pointed to an increase. The Government granted increased access to the area to foreign journalists but continued to ban travel by foreign human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) except for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In July a respected East Timorese was appointed director of the previously dormant East Timor branch of the National Commission on Human Rights, which had opened in 1996. While in most cases those responsible for extrajudicial killings went unpunished, the military authorities prosecuted a soldier who had killed a civilian.

In Irian Jaya, resentment among indigenous groups against the Government led to angry demonstrations for independence in five cities between July 1 and July 7. Security forces responded harshly, killing one person in Jayapura, one in Sorong, and a still undetermined number in Biak. Demonstrators beat a plainclothes policeman to death in Jayapura, and injured security personnel in other cities. The Parliament, the National Human Rights Commission, the Council of Churches, and a consortium of NGO's all conducted investigations of human rights violations in Irian Jaya. An investigation by a group of Irianese churches and the National Human Rights Commission confirmed earlier reports of 11 extrajudicial killings by security forces in the central highlands of Irian Jaya and is continuing its investigation into reports that security forces killed another 43 persons in 1997. On October 1, the Government announced a less stringent security status for Irian Jaya.

Serious human rights abuses in Aceh continued through May. However, tensions remained high for the rest of the year despite the reduction in abuses and resulted in several clashes between Acehnese and military personnel, seven of whom were killed following their abduction in December.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Historically, politically related extrajudicial killings have occurred most frequently in areas where separatist movements were active, such as East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, and security forces continued to employ harsh measures against separatist movements in these areas. In addition to killings committed in these three officially designated "troubled areas," security forces killed unarmed student demonstrators, and there were also numerous instances of reported extrajudicial killings by security forces in cases involving alleged common criminal activity.

Security forces beat four bystanders while breaking up a large student demonstration in Yogyarkarta on May 9. One of the victims died from the beating. Security forces shot and killed four unarmed students who were participating in a large, peaceful demonstration at Jakarta's Trisakti University on May 12. Security forces and students there engaged in a brief confrontation, which was resolved through negotiation. However, when the students began returning to campus, four were shot and killed. Anger over the killings helped cause the rioting that took place in Jakarta May 13-14. On November 13, security forces fired on and beat student and nonstudent demonstrators at Atma Jaya University. At least nine demonstrators were killed, and one member of the security forces was killed when beaten by demonstrators (see Section 1.c.). Four progovernment demonstrators were also killed in a separate incident on November 13, when they were beaten to death by civilians.

The Human Rights Commission established a team at the end of November to investigate the November 13 incident. The armed forces earlier had announced on November 22 that they would take legal action against some personnel who had been involved in beating journalists on November 12 and in shooting demonstrators on November 13, when nine (mostly student) demonstrators died. Over 100 Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) and Jakarta Area Command (KODAM JAYA) soldiers were disciplined after the incident, mostly for discharging their weapons (with rubber bullets) without permission and use of excessive force against demonstrators. Based on the severity of the violation, soldiers were given one of three levels of punishment: 21-days' detention, 10-days' detention, or extra duty/confinement to barracks. No further legal action was taken, and no one was held accountable for the deaths of the demonstrators.

Credible sources confirmed some 37 extrajudicial killings in East Timor in the first 8 months of the year. In a case under investigation by the National Human Rights Commission, military personnel killed four East Timorese civilians in January in the Bobonaro area. Special forces troops killed a herdsman near Venilale in February. In April an East Timorese woman and her two children were killed when military forces assaulted her house in Baucau. In another attack on a house in Baucau, two East Timorese men were killed in May. Also in May, military personnel reportedly killed Costodio da Silva Nunes when he ran from them near Liquica. In June Herman das Doares Soares was shot in the back by military forces near Manatuto while gathering wood and died on his way to the hospital. One soldier was found guilty of murder in the incident and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Also in June, a stray bullet apparently killed Manuel Marques Soares when security forces fired at a crowd of protestors in Manatuto. In late June, security forces killed Orlando Marcelino da Costa when they fired into a crowd demonstrating during the visit of the European troika ambassadors to Baucau. In August security forces fatally shot a civilian in Bobonaro, East Timor, in what the local office of the National Human Rights Commission called a retaliation killing following an earlier altercation. In a November military operation in the Alas area, security forces killed at leas six persons.

In Irian Jaya, a group of Irianese churches issued a report in May that charged the military with responsibility for the extrajudicial killing of 11 persons in the south central highlands of Irian Jaya during a military operation aimed at capturing separatists who kidnaped and later killed 2 members of a group of researchers in January 1996. The National Human Rights Commission subsequently confirmed the killings and is continuing an investigation into 43 other deaths that the church commission said were caused by the military. The Council of Churches is continuing an investigation into the reported shooting deaths of an undetermined number of persons after security forces forcefully broke up a large demonstration in favor of independence for Irian Jaya in Biak on July 6.

In Aceh there were credible reports of mass graves and killings carried out by security forces in the past and into 1998. The National Human Rights Commission and a parliamentary delegation carried out investigations of mass graves, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, rape, and torture that took place in Aceh during 1989-91 and 1997-98. The National Human Rights Commission visited Aceh in August and issued a preliminary report that estimated that there were hundreds of instances of killings, disappearances, and torture. Following the Commission's report, the provincial government authorized a series of fact-finding teams composed of community workers, NGO staff, journalists, retired military personnel, and others to conduct more thorough investigations into human rights abuses in the three hardest hit districts in the province. In December the governor of Aceh announced the teams' findings: In three provincial districts, between 1989 and mid-1998, 1,021 Acehnese were killed, 864 disappeared and remain missing, 357 were disabled, 1,376 women were widowed, 4,521 children were "orphaned" (lost at least 1 parent), and 681 houses were burned. There are also credible allegations that hundreds of Acehnese women were raped during the 9-year military operation. Reports of disappearances and other serious human rights abuses continued until May. Between 24 and 34 Acehnese reportedly were abducted in the period from December 1997 to May and remain unaccounted for. The armed forces commander visited Aceh in August and apologized for "excesses" committed by the military in the province; he promised to withdraw all combat units not normally based there, a promise that was subsequently carried out. However, troop levels were increased sharply again in December in response to rising tensions and clashes between civilians and the military. Tensions between the military and the local population in the province remain high, as reflected by rioting in Lhoksumawe in late August and early September. During the Lhoksumawe rioting, one local resident was killed and eight others were injured by gunfire in confrontations with security forces. Through the end of the year sporadic civil disturbances and instances of violence occurred in the districts of North Aceh, East Aceh, and Pidie and two more persons were kidnaped and possibly killed.

International human rights organizations reported that three Acehnese refugees deported by Malaysia and suspected of separatist activity by the Indonesian Government were tortured as they were being transported back to Indonesia by Indonesian authorities. According to the reports, the three were chained to inner tubes and dragged across the Strait of Malacca behind the Indonesian vessel that was transporting them. One of the three reportedly died.

The police often employed deadly force in apprehending suspects or coping with alleged criminals, many of whom were unarmed. In response to protests that the methods used were unjustifiably harsh and amounted to execution without trial, police generally claimed that the suspects were fleeing, resisting arrest, or threatening the police. Complete statistics about the number of these cases have not been released. A police spokesman in Jakarta told the press that police had shot a suspected drug dealer in February when he resisted arrest by pulling a knife and ignoring warning shots. According to a press report, the victim died from a shot to the head.

In the past, higher authorities rarely punished the military or police for using excessive force. The armed forces' investigation into the Trisakti shootings implicated 18 police officers, 2 of whom had been court-martialed as of September. Lawyers for the defendants charged that their clients were wrongly accused. The prosecution had indicated that the police fired rubber bullets, but the defense and others contended that the students had been killed by live ammunition. The National Human Rights Commission in a May 27 statement indicated that it was not able to meet with a number of witnesses to the shootings because they had been "threatened by an unidentified person." It also reported that it had obtained evidence that the police had not used live ammunition. Other evidence appeared to implicate military units in the shootings. On August 12, the two police officers who were court-martialed in the case were convicted by a military tribunal of disobeying or exceeding orders by ordering their subordinates to shoot into the crowd of demonstrating students. The two were sentenced to imprisonment, one for 10 months and the other for 4 months. Trials in the cases of the other 16 defendants had not yet begun as of year's end. The government-established joint fact-finding team on the May riots and rapes in its November 3 report urged authorities to speed up the judicial process related to the Trisakti case, and called for further investigations in order to reveal the full story surrounding this incident. It also concluded that the Trisakti shootings triggered the May 13-15 rioting.

There were no developments in the five cases of alleged human rights violations in Irian Jaya involving the death of Irianese civilians, which were cited in a 1995 report by the National Human Rights Commission.

Police resumed the investigation of the 1993 murder of labor activist Marsinah, questioning old and new witnesses, after NGO's and labor groups called for a fresh effort to solve the case. In September 1997, police had announced a "temporary suspension" in the investigation.

Vigilantes apparently killed three suspected informants in Aceh in late October and early November. In late December, seven off-duty soldiers were killed by a mob in a village in East Aceh, prompting dozens of arrests by security forces and the deployment of at least 700 troops from outside the province.

In East Timor during the first half of the year, at least six security personnel and East Timorese civilians accused of collaborating with the Government were killed. During the final months of the year, there was also a pattern of attacks and killings directed against military and police personnel and civilians seen as collaborators. Insurgents were accused in these cases although it was often unclear who was responsible. Personal grudges or other motives, rather than political grounds, may have been the cause of the killings in some cases. In November residents of Alas, possibly accompanied by guerrillas, attacked a local military post and killed three soldiers.

In several areas, especially East Java, suspected practitioners of black magic as well as some religious leaders associated with a moderate Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, were killed by unidentified persons or mobs. There were close to 200 such attacks during the year. Associates of the victims criticized the lack of police or military response and said that the attacks were politically motivated. Few of the perpetrators were caught; in some cases, angry mobs killed suspects detained by the police.

b. Disappearance

Reports of disappearances continued until May. Security forces admitted to involvement in the abduction and disappearances of nine student and human rights activists, who were subsequently released. Several of these credibly reported that they were tortured while in custody and that other abducted activists, who remain missing, were held in the same facility. According to credible local human rights monitors, the confirmed disappearances occurred in three phases: Near the time of the May 1997 election, in the 2 months prior to the March People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session, and in the period just before Soeharto's May 21 resignation. By May, nine of those kidnaped in the second phase were released from captivity and had "reappeared." They were Pius Lustrilanang, Desmon Mahesa, Haryanto Taslam, Faisol Reza, Rahardjo Waluyo Djati, Nezal Patria, Mugianto, Aan Rusdianto, and Andi Arief. Several spoke out publicly about their experiences. None of those abducted in the first and third phases had reappeared as of December.

Pius Lustrilanang, chairman of the People's Alliance for Democracy (ALDERA), testified before the National Commission on Human Rights on April 27 about his ordeal. According to his statement, on February 4 while waiting for public transportation he was kidnaped in Jakarta by an armed man who shoved him into a car. He was handcuffed and blindfolded, and taken to an unidentified place where he was questioned and tortured (see Section 1.c.). He was held with other kidnaped activists in a facility with six cells. Prior to his April 2 release, he was threatened with death if he spoke of his experience. He never saw the kidnapers during his 2 months of captivity. Desmon Mahesa, the chairman of a local legal aide group, LBH Nusantara, and a member of ALDERA, on May 12 gave a public statement about his experience. He reported that on February 3 he was on his way to a meeting and was approached by two men armed with pistols who beat him. He was pulled into a car and a bag was put over his head. He was taken to a room where he was interrogated and tortured (see Section 1.c.). He was held in the same facility as Pius Lustrilanang. Mahesa was released on April 3 at the Jakarta airport. Rahardjo Waluyo Djati, from the National Committee for Democratic Struggle publicly spoke on June 4 about his March 12 abduction. He was taken to an unidentified location where he was interrogated and, for the first 3 days, tortured (see Section 1.c.). The kidnapers transferred him to the police on April 17. Faizal Reza spoke publicly on June 26 about his experience. He said that while waiting for public transportation he was abducted and thrown into a car and blindfolded. He was taken to a large building in Jakarta and tortured (see Section 1.c.). Andi Arief, the head of the student wing of the People's Democratic Party (PRD), on July 21 publicly spoke about his March 28 kidnaping from Lampung, South Sumatra and subsequent interrogation. He said that he had been held captive for almost 3 weeks in Jakarta along with other political activists, and then he was turned over to the police who held him until he was released on July 15.

Four more of the persons who disappeared also resurfaced, including Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) official Haryanto Taslam and students Nezar Patria, Mugianto, and Aan Rusdianto.

Local human rights monitors listed 12 missing persons as of year's end, and there are fears that some or all may have been killed by their abductors. A member of the National Human Rights Commission at the end of August called on the armed forces to explain to the public the status of the missing and to find them, alive or dead.

Six of the persons still missing are believed to have disappeared in Jakarta in 1997 near the time of the general election. They are: M. Yusuf, Yani Avri, Sonny, Noval Alkatiri, Deddy Hamdum, and Ismail. Two of the six disappeared during the period prior to the March MPR session, but--unlike the nine other persons who disappeared during that period and who were released÷-they have not reappeared. They are: Suyat, who disappeared in Solo, and Herman Hendrawan, who disappeared in Jakarta. Four persons disappeared after the MPR session, most on May 14 in Jakarta. They are: Bimo Petrus, Ucok Munandar Siahaan, Hendra Hambalie, and Yadin Muhididn. An activist and street singer living in Solo was reported missing in May. He was found dead in East Java on May 23. There were suspicions that he had been killed because of his political activities, like some other kidnap victims, he was a member of the PRD.

The National Human Rights Commission issued a statement on April 30, which reported that a "well organized group" had carried out the disappearances of the student and NGO activists, and concluded that there were strong indications that "elements" of the security forces were involved. Prior to that, Defense Minister/Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto had said that there was no order for armed forces personnel to kidnap persons and that the armed forces would help find those who were missing. On June 29, Wiranto revealed that the armed forces had identified several of their personnel who were "allegedly involved" in the kidnaping of activists and who "exceeded their authority." He added that the armed forces were working with the National Human Rights Commission and a local NGO in their investigation. On July 3, the armed forces revealed that their internal investigation had concluded that special forces personnel were involved in the disappearances but claimed that this resulted from "procedural errors" and excesses in violation of the law. Twenty soldiers had been questioned. On July 14, the military police announced that several special forces officers had been detained. The military police chief said that special forces members were involved in the kidnapings of eight activists who had already been released, plus one more (Andi Arief) who would soon be released. On August 3, Wiranto announced that an officers' honor council had been formed to question senior officers about the kidnaping and torture of activists. It would question Lieutenant General Prabowo, Major General Muchdi Purwopranjono, and Colonel Chairawan (former commander of "Group 4" within the special forces).

Despite admitting his involvement in the abduction of the nine activists who reappeared, General Prabowo was discharged honorably from the military, and as of year's end no legal action had been taken against him. Prabowo took no responsibility for the remaining activists who were still missing. The government-established joint fact-finding team, in its November 3 report on the May riots and rapes, urged that Lt. General Prabowo and all those involved in the abductions be brought before a military tribunal. It also stated that the judicial proceedings surrounding the disappearance cases should be speeded up. The other two officers investigated by the honor council were removed from active service. After being detained in July, 11 officers (none higher than major) and noncommissioned officers from the special forces went on trial on December 23 for their alleged involvement in the abductions of the nine student and NGO activists who already had been released. The torture that the detainees reported was not addressed in the trial, and it was asserted that these military personnel had acted on their own initiative without orders from above. Moreover, the trial has not addressed the possible killing of one abductee and the fact that at least 12 others still are missing.

There were numerous reports of disappearances in East Timor. In most, but not all, cases the missing persons turned out to have been detained without notification to their families. Credible sources reported that two persons taken into military custody in November in the Alas area subsequently disappeared.

The Indonesian Council of Churches' investigation of the security forces' forceful breakup of a July demonstration in Biak, Irian Jaya, revealed the existence of 51 "mysterious" bodies. Some of the bodies showed signs of having drifted from the site of a tidal wave in Papua New Guinea, but others were clearly Irianese. A related investigation by a consortium of Irianese churches and NGO's listed 11 persons as missing following the incident.

The National Human Rights Commission continued to list 16 persons missing from the government-backed violent takeover of PDI headquarters on July 27, 1996. On August 12, it issued a statement that noted that the Commission's October 1996 recommendations regarding the July 27 incident had not received a full response from the Government.

Also in August, the National Human Rights Commission issued a preliminary report that found that 163 persons had disappeared in Aceh during 1989-91 and 1997-98. In October the fact finding team (see Section 1.a.) reported that there had been 475 disappearances in North Aceh between 1989 and 1998.

There were no significant efforts by the Government to account for the missing and dead from the November 12, 1991, military shooting of civilians in Dili. No additional cases were resolved during the year. Knowledgeable observers continued to believe that most of the persons missing are dead and that members of the armed forces know where their bodies are located.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a confession. In practice, however, legal protections are both inadequate and widely ignored, and security forces continued to employ torture and other forms of mistreatment, particularly in regions where there were active security concerns, such as Irian Jaya and East Timor. Police often resort to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.

The Parliament in July approved a bill ratifying the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

Several of the student and human rights activists kidnaped by the security forces (see Section 1.b.) testified publicly that they had been tortured during interrogation. The military court that convened in December to try 11 special forces personnel for the kidnappings did not take up charges of torture. General Prabowo, the son-in-law of former President Soeharto, who was in charge of the elite special forces at the time, admitted to a military honor board that he was responsible for these and several other abductions (see Section 1.b.).

Pius Lustrilanang testified publicly before the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights on April 27 that his captors used electric wires attached to his feet to shock him as they asked him questions about the activities of various opposition figures. They also submerged his head in water so that he could not breathe and kicked and hit him. The torture and interrogation continued for the first 3 days of his captivity but not afterward. Desmon Mahesa said publicly on May 12, that on the first day of his captivity he had been tortured while asked questions about his political activities. His captors covered his eyes and handcuffed him to a chair. They applied electric shocks to his feet and head, and beat and kicked him. They forced him to immerse his head in water so that he could not breathe. Rahardjo Waluyo Djati on June 4 publicly recounted how he, too, had been beaten and subjected to electric shocks during his captivity. His kidnapers also made him lie on a block of ice. Faizol Reza testified on June 26 that during his captivity he had been subjected to a variety of abuse and torture, including beatings, the application of electricity to various parts of his body, burning by cigarettes, and sleep deprivation. He was asked questions mainly about his role in the People's Democratic Party (PRD).

A credible local human rights monitor reported that five people from Garut, West Java claimed to have been tortured in February when they were being held without a warrant by local military forces. They said that they had been stripped, slapped, kicked, choked, pistol whipped, immersed in water, abused verbally, forced to swallow bullets, and had their hair pulled.

Twelve students questioned in May regarding the death of a police officer in Bogor were beaten by security forces and not permitted legal counsel during their questioning, according to local human rights monitors. Three of the students were accused in the death of the police officer, who allegedly was killed by a stone when he tried to intervene to help a colleague who was under attack by students. A forensic expert later publicly stated that the police officer had died of a heart attack rather than a blow to the head implying that the officer had not been attacked by students.

In August a preliminary report by the National Human Rights Commission (see Section 1.a.) found that 368 persons had been tortured in Aceh during 1989-91 and 1997-98. In October a fact-finding team reported 1,010 incidents of torture in North Aceh between 1989 and 1998 (see Section 1.a.).

In East Timor, military units and civilian paramilitary forces regularly detain civilians for interrogation; most are held in extralegal military detention centers, often with no notification of relatives, mistreated for several days, and then released. Family members and human rights monitoring organizations often encounter difficulties in identifying and visiting detainees held in these military facilities. Many credible sources agreed that persons detained by the police in East Timor are beaten routinely while in the process of being detained. Following the fall of the Soeharto government in May, there were indications that security forces in East Timor were being more careful in their handling of detainees, and local human rights monitoring organizations reported that complaints of serious abuses had decreased. However, in November and December security forces' abuse of the civilian population during operations in the Alas and Bobonaro areas following attacks on security personnel in those locales was widespread.

In February security forces in Aceh detained a 7-month-old baby, Muhammad Ardiansyah, of Morong village, along with his mother Ainsyah. Ainsyah alleged that her captors suspended her baby by his legs and left him in the sun for several hours in order to force her to reveal the whereabouts of her husband, who they suspected of separatist activity. Ainsyah and her child later were released. In March Acehinese separatist Ishaq Dawood was handed over to Indonesian authorities in Malaysia and according to an international human rights organization was one of three accused separatists who were chained to inner tubes and dragged across the Strait of Malacca (see Section 1.a.).

There were instances where security forces responded with brutality to peaceful demonstrations, although they more frequently excercised restraint in the post-Soeharto era. On August 25, a group of 750 workers from a textile factory in Central Java, consisting mostly of young women, tried to march from a local human rights organization in Jakarta where the workers were holding a free speech forum to the local office of the ILO. When security forces attempted to push them off the street, a shoving match ensued, and security forces beat the demonstrators with rattan canes and kicked them until they retreated. As many as 19 demonstrators were injured. On June 12, approximately 400 security force personnel violently broke up a peaceful demonstration by East Timorese protesters at the Foreign Ministry in Jakarta. Upon being confronted and blocked by security forces, many demonstrators tried to break though the line of security forces and were beaten with batons and kicked. Some of the 180 persons arrested following the July 6 shooting of demonstrators in Biak reportedly were beaten in detention. Some shot in the course of the arrest were not afforded medical attention for many hours. On September 11, in Jakarta, security forces beat with rattan canes numerous Irianese among a group of approximately 40 demonstrators attempting to demonstrate near the Ministry of Defense and Security.

Although authorities allowed hundreds of student demonstrations to take place on campus between January and May, in numerous cases security forces violently stopped students from attempting to move their protests off campus. One example occurred in Central Java on May 8, when thousands of students and local residents gathered at a local university to participate in a demonstration calling for lower prices, political and economic reform, and Soeharto's resignation. When they tried to march off campus, security forces drove them back using rattan canes. When the demonstrators responded by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, the police used tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. Negotiations failed to halt the protest and police again attacked demonstrators with rattan canes, severely injuring hundreds.

On March 19, 400 to 500 security force personnel blocked the entry gate at Lampung University, preventing a student demonstration of 2,000 to 3,000 participants from moving to another campus, according to a local human rights monitor. Either students or provocateurs threw rocks at the security forces, and the security forces responded by throwing rocks back. Security forces entered the campus, fired warning shots and tear gas, and dragged students into the street and beat them. Many students and several police were injured. On April 8, 1,000 to 2,000 students at Surabaya's Airlangga University were pushed back when they tried to leave campus by security forces using water cannon. Students responded by throwing stones at the security forces, and, when it appeared that security forces would attempt to enter the campus, the students laid down in front of advancing water cannon. Seventeen students reportedly were injured in the clash.

Student demonstrations intensified again in the months leading up to the mid-November special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Unlike the pre-May period, most demonstrations occurred off-campus. Security forces permitted a great many of the street demonstrations to occur and in many cases did not resort to violence. However, there were numerous cases where security forces violently dispersed demonstrations, and several resulted in fatalities to students and a few security forces personnel (see Section 1.a.). For example, on September 8, security forces broke up a student demonstration at the Parliament. They injured several students, including two who reportedly were stabbed with combat knives. This incident appears not to have been investigated, and no one has been held accountable. On September 14, a group of students attempted to stage a demonstration in front of the Defense Ministry, but they were beaten by security forces as they attempted to get out of their buses and were forced to retreat.

The period surrounding the November MPR session was especially violent. It was complicated by the decision of government and military authorities to organize thousands of civilians, many of them armed with sharpened bamboo sticks and other crude, but dangerous weapons, to assist in providing security for the MPR session. On November 10, the opening day of the MPR, thousands of student demonstrators and hundreds of progovernment counterdemonstrators took to Jakarta's streets. Although a tense standoff ensued, violence was limited mostly to stone throwing.

On November 11, demonstrators and security forces cooperated through much of the day to avoid violence and confrontation. However, during a standoff that ensued after students were stopped by security forces as they attempted to march to the parliament building where the MPR was taking place, one student's car went out of control and careened into security personnel, injuring nine security officers. Security forces reportedly assaulted three journalists on the scene as well as two female students.

On November 12, the situation became more violent when security forces used water canon, tear gas, and batons to disperse a crowd that had gathered outside the Parliament to protest against the MPR. During a separate altercation also on November 12, security forces fired upon students who were trying to break through security lines and reach the Parliament.

On November 13, the violence peaked when over a 10-hour period security forces fired on and beat students who were part of a demonstration at Atma Jaya University, whose campus is located less than 2 miles from the parliament building where the MPR was being held. At least nine demonstrators, mostly students, died of gunshot wounds and severe beatings. One member of the security forces died as a result of a beating by demonstrators and several other security force members were injured and were hospitalized. Hundreds of student and nonstudent demonstrators were hospitalized, many with gunshot wounds, presumably caused by rubber bullets. Live ammunition accounted for the injuries of most of those demonstrators who were killed. Four journalists also were injured including one who was shot. A member of the security forces approached this journalist and shot him at very close range with rubber bullets, wounding him in the kidney area (see Section 1.a.). In a separate incident on November 13, four progovernment demonstrators were also killed when they were beaten to death by civilians.

Following the November MPR session, students continued to demonstrate, but mostly in smaller groups. Several demonstrations ended violently. On December 19, security forces injured up to 17 student protestors after they refused to stop a demonstration near President Habibie's residence. A police official referred to the recently passed law on demonstrations that requires 3-days advance notice of a demonstration (see Section 2.b.). The official was quoted as saying that "we had the right to disperse them." Thirty-three demonstrators were detained. Another clash between students and security force occurred on December 17 near the Parliament. Students had reacted with violence when ordered to disperse by the security forces, and the security forces responded in kind. Up to 80 students and 14 members of the security forces reportedly were injured."

In May violent unrest erupted in Jakarta and other cities. It included massive looting and burning, especially of commercial areas, and the ethnic Chinese community was a particular target of the violence. The National Human Rights Commission issued a statement on June 2, in which it concluded that the security apparatus did not take action to stop the unrest from spreading and failed to take sufficient preventive action to stop it from beginning. According to government sources, 499 people died during the unrest, many of them purportedly looters who became trapped in stores that were being burned. However, the National Human Rights Commission, stated in its June 2 statement that it had received a report listing 1,188 deaths and 101 persons injured.

Local human rights monitors charged that between May and early July, 168 women were the victims of rape or sexual abuse, 152 from Jakarta and 16 in Solo, Medan, Palembang, and Surabaya. In a July 8 statement, the National Human Rights Commission found that during the rioting that took place May 12-14 and afterward in Jakarta and other cities it had been "unequivocally ascertained" that "widespread and repeated rape of a particularly inhumane nature occurred, perpetrated by brutal gangs successively in Jakarta and other cities." It was carried out in a "systematic manner" and focused on ethnic Chinese women and girls. The Commission noted in particular that some rapes occurred in front of the families of victims. The Commission found that there was a uniform "modus operandi" in the way that the rapes were carried out. It stated that the security vacuum during the initial days of the unrest indicated the neglect of state responsibility, which could have permitted the sexual violence to occur.

Two months after the May unrest, the Government established a joint fact-finding team to investigate the May riots and rapes. It was made up of representatives of the military, the National Human Rights Commission, other government agencies, and NGOs, and the vice chairman of the National Human Rights Commission was elected as its chairman. It was given 3¸ months to complete its work. However, after its establishment, military and police officials began questioning publicly whether rapes had taken place or whether the reports had been exaggerated, and threatened prosecution of anyone who made exaggerated claims. Team members complained that these threats impeded their investigation by intimidating witnesses and victims.

On November 3, the joint fact-finding team issued its report on the May riots and rapes. The report concluded that there had been 52 rapes, 14 rapes accompanied by other violence, 10 instances of sexual attacks, and 4 instances of sexual harassment in Jakarta, Medan, and Surabaya in connection with the May riots. The majority of the victims were Sino-Indonesian women. It also concluded that sexual violence had occurred before and after the May riots and that the May 13-15 riots were a culmination of a series of violent events, such as the Trisakti shootings and the disappearances. Moreover, according to the team's report, while some of the rioting was local, sporadic, limited, and spontaneous, it was "assumed" that other riots were created as part of an "elite political struggle." Many different parties reportedly were involved, including local hoodlums, mass organizations, and elements of the armed forces. The team criticized the armed forces for failing to take preventive action or steps to stop the riots once they began. The team also found that it was not yet clear whether the sexual violence was premeditated or an excess of the rioting, but it charged that the riots were part of an effort to create an emergency situation that would allow authorities to assume extraconstitutional powers and that the highest level of decisionmakers had been involved in planning the violence. It called on the Government to conduct further investigation into the root causes of the riots and to investigate a meeting at KOSTRAD headquarters on May 14 that involved Lt. General Prabowo and other parties. Following a meeting between President Habibie and government representatives of the joint fact-finding team in late December, the Government accepted the findings on the numbers of rapes but by year's end had left many of the other issues raised in the report unanswered.

The Government continued to maintain an unjustifiably high military presence in East Timor, totaling more than 16,000 personnel. In July the Government made a highly publicized withdrawal of some 1,000 troops from East Timor, but there did not appear to be an overall reduction in troop levels; some unconfirmed but credible information indicated that troop levels actually significantly higher than the Government had stated. The Government, as it does elsewhere, also relied on bands of youths, organized and directed by the military, to intimidate and harass its opponents. Civilian paramilitary groups frequently were involved in human rights abuses. Human rights monitoring organizations reported that several East Timorese women were raped by Indonesian security or civilian personnel during the year. Cases of East Timorese women allegedly raped by soldiers in previous years remained unresolved.

Prison conditions are harsh with violence among prisoners and mistreatment and extortion of inmates by guards common. The incidence of mistreatment drops sharply once a prisoner is transferred from police or military intelligence (BIA) custody into the civilian prison system or into the custody of the Attorney General. Credible sources report that criminal prisoners in some facilities are beaten routinely and systematically as punishment for infractions of prison discipline and to extract information about developments within the prison. Punishments include use of electric shock batons and stapling of the ears, nose, and lips. Political prisoners sometimes were mixed with the general prison population. Political prisoners in the Cipinang, Salemba, and other prisons tend to be segregated from the criminal population and generally receive more humane treatment. In East Timor, some 83 prisoners in Dili reportedly suffered severe food poisoning in June and dozens were hospitalized.

Special arrangements for foreign dignitaries to visit some prominent political prisoners sometimes were made, including allowing a foreign parliamentarian to enter Cipinang prison in Jakarta and visit all political prisoners there. Imprisoned East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao received a large number of high-level foreign visitors and held frequent meetings with the press. Human rights monitors also have visited some nonpolitical prisoners, although this appears to be permitted on a case-by-case basis.

The ability of the ICRC to visit prisoners varied over the course of the year (see Section 4).

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Criminal Procedures Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms and authorities routinely violate it. The code specifies that prisoners have the right to notify their families and that warrants must be produced during an arrest except under specified conditions, such as when a suspect is caught in the act of committing a crime. The law also requires that families of detainees be notified promptly. The law authorizes investigators to issue warrants to assist in their investigations or if sufficient evidence exists that a crime has been committed. However, authorities sometimes made arrests without warrants.

The law presumes defendants innocent and permits bail. They or their families also may challenge the legality of their arrest and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if wrongfully detained. However, it is virtually impossible for detainees to invoke this procedure, or to receive compensation after being released without charge. In both military and civilian courts, appeals based on claims of improper arrest and detention rarely, if ever, are accepted. The Criminal Procedures Code also contains specific limits on periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must approve extensions, usually after 60 days. In addition, suspects charged under the 1963 Antisubversion Law are subject to special procedures outside the code. These give the Attorney General the authority to hold a suspect for up to 1 year before trial. He may renew this 1-year period without limit.

The authorities routinely approve extensions of periods of detention. In areas where active guerrilla movements exist, such as East Timor and Irian Jaya, there are many instances of persons being detained without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. This is also true in Aceh. Bail rarely is granted, especially in political cases. The authorities frequently prevent access to defense counsel while suspects are being investigated and make it difficult or impossible for detainees to get legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. Special laws on corruption, economic crimes, and narcotics do not come under the Criminal Code's protections.

The Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (BAKORSTANAS) operates outside the legal code and has wide discretion to detain and interrogate persons thought to threaten national security. In November the Government formed a new, separate "Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law" headed by the President but run by the Armed Forces Commander. Made up of members of the Cabinet, security and intelligence officials as well as the heads of five religious councils, its stated mission was to control and coordinate efforts to resolve crises threatening national stability. It is reported to be advisory in nature, rather than operational.

Security forces broke up numerous demonstrations and meetings and detained participants (see Sections 1.a., 1.c. and 2.b.).

There are no reliable data on the number of arbitrary arrests or detentions without trial, particularly in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and Aceh. In East Timor, arbitrary detentions were a continuing problem.

The Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution stipulates the independence of the judiciary, but in practice the judiciary is subordinated to the executive and the military. Judges are civil servants employed by the executive branch, which controls their assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encourage widespread corruption. Judges are subject to considerable pressure from governmental authorities, which often determines the outcome of a case.

A quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and administrative courts exists below the Supreme Court. The right of appeal from district court to high court to Supreme Court exists in all four systems. The Supreme Court does not consider factual aspects of a case, only the lower courts' application of law. The Supreme Court theoretically stands coequal with the executive and legislative branches, but it does not have the right of judicial review over laws passed by Parliament.

A panel of judges conducts trials at the district court level, poses questions, hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence, and assesses punishment. Initial judgments rarely are reversed in the appeals process, although sentences can be increased or reduced. Both the defense and the prosecution may appeal.

Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and to produce witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to court. In such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. However, the Criminal Procedures Code does not provide for witnesses' immunity or for defense power of subpoena. As a result, witnesses generally are unwilling to testify against the authorities. The courts commonly allow forced confessions and limit the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants do not have the right to remain silent and can be compelled to testify against themselves.

The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an attorney from the moment of their arrest, but not during the prearrest investigation period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right to be assisted by lawyers even though information developed in the course of rendering testimony subsequently can become the basis of an investigation of the witness. The law requires that a lawyer be appointed in capital cases and those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, a lawyer must be appointed if the defendant desires an attorney and is indigent. In theory, destitute defendants may obtain private legal help, such as that provided by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. In practice, however, defendants often are persuaded not to hire an attorney, or access to an attorney of their choice is impeded.

In many cases procedural protections, including those against coerced confessions, particularly those coerced by the police and the BIA, are inadequate to ensure a fair trial. Corruption is a common feature of the legal system and the payment of bribes can influence prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases.

There were few signs of judicial independence. The court continued to be used to take action against, or deny legal remedy to, political activists and government critics. By the beginning of May, the Government tried, convicted, and sentenced to time served most of the 122 members of the "Red and White Front" who were arrested in February for holding a peaceful march. It also initiated legal action against three members of "The Voice of Concerned Mothers." However, the Government dropped charges against these three during President Habibie's first week in office. Ratna Surampaet and four other persons who had been arrested while holding a peaceful demonstration on March 10 were tried, convicted, and sentenced to time served (see Section 2.b.). The Government released Muchtar Pakpahan and Sri Bintang Pamungkas from prison in May and subsequently ceased legal action against them. However, the Supreme Court proved incapable of providing redress for Megawati Soekarnoputri; it ruled that the Government's transparent manipulation of the PDI leadership structure in 1996 was an internal party matter. Therefore, Megawati could not bring suit against government officials, only the government-installed PDI leadership. The trial of Loir Botor Dingit, a prominent defender of Dayak land rights in East Kalimantan concluded in November, when charges against him were dismissed. The trial involved Dingit's attempt to gain compensation for the alleged destruction of Dayak crops and sacred sites in a 1993 logging operation by a timber corporation. Dingit was charged with forgery and perjury due to his alleged listing of some deceased individuals as those who had lost land. The charge ignored traditional law, which records land ownership in the name of the deceased. The trial session required 30 hours of travel from Dingit's remote home, disrupting his activities in defense of traditional land rights.

The Antisubversion Law carries a maximum penalty of death (although this has not been invoked in recent years), and the law makes it a crime to engage in acts that could distort, undermine, or deviate from the state ideology or broad outlines of state policy, or that could disseminate feelings of hostility or arouse hostility, disturbances, or anxiety among the population. The excessively vague language of this law makes it possible to prosecute persons merely for peaceful expression of views contrary to those of the Government. Many prisoners are serving sentences for subversion, including alleged members of the banned Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Muslim militants, and those convicted of subversion in Irian Jaya, Aceh, and East Timor. Other persons are serving sentences under the Hate-Sowing or Sedition laws. Some of these persons advocated or employed violence, but others are political prisoners who were convicted for attempting to exercise such universally recognized human rights as freedom of speech or association, or who were convicted in unfair trials. The MPR passed a decree at its November special session that included a provision calling for the revocation of the Antisubversion Law and its replacement with a law on national security. The Minister of Justice said publicly that the Government would submit legislation in 1999 to revoke the Antisubversion Law.

Since assuming office, President Habibie has released political prisoners, although he has taken a gradual approach, and many of the most high-profile political prisoners remain in jail. Prisoners and others claim that Habibie is using prisoner releases at selected moments to curry favor with foreign governments, thus treating the prisoners as if they were hostages. Independent labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan, former Member of Parliament Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Nuku Suleiman (chairman of the NGO PIJAR), and Andi Syahputra, a member of the Independent Association of Journalists (AJI) were released in May. In June seven political prisoners in East Timor were released, in addition to activist Coky Aritonang and eight East Timorese detainees. In July the Government released prisoners belonging to or affiliated with the PRD, 36 members of a paramilitary group who had been arrested in East Java in 1997, 2 persons who had been convicted for subversion in the Tasikmalaya unrest that occurred in 1996, and 2 members of AJI who were already on probation. It also stopped legal action against Aberson Marle Sihalolo, a former Member of Parliament from the PDI, and Rachmad Buchori, the private secretary to a writer whose books have been banned. In August in conjunction with Indonesian Independence Day (August 17), the Government freed 27 more political prisoners, including 3 who were alleged to have had ties to the PKI, alleged separatists from East Timor (6), Aceh (9), and Irian Jaya (3), as well as 6 from Lampung who had been involved in a clash with government forces. Some of these releases came as the result of accumulated sentence remissions. The Government also set aside the convictions of four dissidents. On December 31, the Government freed 43 more political prisoners and rehabilitated the citizenship and job status of 26 others who previously had been released. The 43 included prisoners from East Timor, Lampung, and Aceh.

f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption. However, security agencies regularly made forced or surreptitious entries. Security forces also engaged in surveillance of persons and residences and selective monitoring of local and international telephone calls without legal restraint.

Government security officials monitor the movements and activities of former members of the PKI and its front organizations, especially persons the Government believes were involved in the abortive 1965 coup. These persons and their relatives sometimes are subjected to surveillance, required check-ins, periodic indoctrination, and restrictions on travel outside their city of residence. They also are required to have official permission to change their place of residence. The requirement that "E.T." ("Ex-Tapol" or political prisoner) be stamped on the identification cards of these prisoners was ended officially in 1995, although in practice it continued in use in many cases. At least some individuals who had E.T. stamped on their identity cards were able to have the stamp removed. This stamp has been one of the methods the Government has used to monitor the activities of these people, allowing the Government and prospective employers to identify alleged former PKI members, thereby subjecting them to official and unofficial discrimination. Even when the stamp has been removed, these former political prisoners continue to face discrimination and restrictions on employment.

The Government's transmigration program moves large numbers of people from overpopulated areas to more isolated and less developed ones. It also is used to resettle local populations within East Timor and Irian Jaya. However, plans to revive the program, after several years during which the Government reduced its support for it, fell victim to the economic crisis. The Minister of Transmigration, during the brief seventh Soeharto Government, said publicly that the Ministry of Transmigration would focus its efforts in 1998 on improving conditions at existing transmigration sites rather than on developing new ones. The Minister also said that the Government would try to settle numerous disputes between transmigrants and local residents at scores of resettlement sites where there was disagreement between transmigrants and local landholders over land rights and other issues. Human rights monitors state that the program violates the rights of indigenous people and dupes some transmigrants into leaving their home villages without any means of return. Human rights activists also have claimed that a number of those resettled are persons who have been forced off lands that are coveted by developers who have collusive arrangements with the Government and/or security forces. Conditions at some sites are life threatening with inadequate measures to protect the transmigrant population against diseases endemic to the sites. Transmigrants and migrants outside the government transmigration program received indirect government support in the form of developmental assistance programs and contracts with the armed forces (ABRI) or local government officials. This practice, particularly in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and parts of Kalimantan, led to resentment among indigenous populations, whose members believed that their rights were infringed upon and that they were being discriminated against by virtue of the disbursement of development funds to those who were in some cases their newly arrived economic rivals (see Section 5).

The Government prohibits the import of Chinese-language publications (see Sections 2.a. and 5).

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Although the 1945 Constitution and the 1982 Press Law provide for freedom of the press, the Government maintained some serious restrictions and monitoring continued; however the Government did markedly increase its respect for this right, especially in the latter part of the year. Freedom of speech improved significantly, as sensitive issues were discussed and dissenting opinions were expressed at public demonstrations, seminars, and in statements to the press.

The Government in June revoked the 1984 decree allowing the Minister of Information to cancel press publication licenses. The Government had used this decree to control the press in practice. The Government also simplified the licensing procedure for starting a publication. However, the Government issued a new decree in which it retained the right to suspend publishing licenses for an unspecified period of time, provoking objections from the Association of Indonesian Journalists (PWI) and the Association of Indonesian Publishers (SPS). Other means of control include regulation of the amount of advertising permitted and of the number of pages allowed in newspapers.

In the first 5 months of the year, public criticism of the Government intensified, and the press carried it more openly. However, the Government still made attempts to rein in the media; in March the Government announced that it would take the magazine Detektif dan Romantika to court because of a cover depicting then-President Soeharto as the king of spades. The magazine's editor already had been forced to apologize to the Government. In May then-President Soeharto publicly condemned the print and electronic media for waging a "psychological war" on Indonesia in the way that it was portraying the Indonesian economy. Some journalists covering student demonstrations in May reportedly were subjected to intimidation by authorities. Two foreign journalists who were filming a May 6 clash between students and security authorities in Jakarta reportedly were stoned and fired upon by police but escaped uninjured. A foreign journalist who was filming security forces firing into a crowd in Medan was seized and threatened with a pistol.

Following Soeharto's resignation, press freedom improved significantly, and there were few signs of the self-censorship that had pervaded reporting in the past, even on subjects known to be sensitive to the Government. Although the English-language press was more forward in the move toward openness, the Indonesian-language press was not far behind. Attempts by authorities to direct local journalists and editors on what they should print apparently have diminished significantly.

President Habibie's public discussion in July of the need for journalists to obtain licenses, in order to insure that they were qualified professionally, raised concerns that the Government might try to rein in the new found press freedom. However, no action was taken to implement this proposal.

The electronic media also became more open, although it remained more cautious in its coverage of the Government than the print media. Well before Soeharto stepped down, television news reports became more substantive. For example, the private television stations began broadcasting film footage of student demonstrations in the weeks before Soeharto resigned. Live television coverage of the May 13 funerals of students shot at Trisakti University, and coverage afterward, of the trial of two of the security force personnel accused of the shootings helped focus public attention on this issue. The Government operates a nationwide television network with 12 regional stations. Private commercial television companies, most with ownership by, or management ties to, the former president's family, continued to expand. All are required to broadcast government-produced news, but they all also produce news and public affairs programming independently. Journalists at a private television station publicly charged that the Government was using an outstanding debt held by the station as an opportunity to take over the station and control its new programming policy and to remove the news director who was a government critic. The Government rejected this argument. By year's end, the station remained in private hands, with the management unchanged.

Over 600 private radio-broadcasting companies exist in addition to the Government's national radio network. They all were required to belong to the government-sponsored Association of Private Radio Stations to receive a broadcasting license. The government radio station produces the program "National News." The new regulations issued by the Government in June reduced the number of these government broadcasts that a private station must run per day from 14 to 4. These broadcasts are relayed throughout the country by private stations and 53 regional affiliates of the government network. The new regulations allow private stations to produce their own news programs and many are doing so. Moreover, "talk radio" call-in programs regularly address political and socioeconomic issues.

Foreign television and radio broadcasts were readily accessible. Satellite dishes have proliferated throughout the country, and there was access to the Internet. The Government made no effort to restrict access to this programming and has proclaimed an "open skies" policy. Foreign periodicals are widely available, and the Government announced in July that the International Herald Tribune and the Asian Wall Street Journal would be permitted to print in Indonesia. Both subsequently began publication during the year. The authorities have delayed distribution of publications by a day or more, although this is rare. The Government restricts the import of Chinese-language publications (see Sections 1.f. and 5).

The Government regulates access to Indonesia, particularly to certain areas of the country, by visiting and resident foreign correspondents. It occasionally reminds the latter of its prerogative to deny requests for visa extensions. Special permission is necessary for foreign journalists to travel to East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya; the Government now grants increased access to East Timor to foreign journalists. The local press in Aceh is tightly controlled. A foreign journalist was ordered to leave the country in March because the journalist allegedly brought other journalists into a session of the MPR without permission. In November Canadian journalist John Stackhouse was deported shortly after his arrival in the country, reportedly because of articles he had written about East Timor in 1997.

The Government requires a permit for the importation of foreign publications and videotapes, which must be reviewed by government censors. There is a significant amount of materials that bypasses customs and censorship procedures.

Most books by the prominent novelist and former political prisoner Pramoedya Ananta Toer are banned, though some were in circulation. In May the Government banned a book by Soebadio Sastrosatomo for allegedly discrediting then-President Soeharto.

Following the November 13 shooting of students, authorities questioned numerous government critics in connection with possible charges of treason; most had signed a statement on November 12 calling for cancellation of the special session of the MPR and the creation of an interim government in advance of new elections.

While the law provides for academic freedom, constraints exist on the activities of scholars. There was an increase in political activity and discussions at universities during the year.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right. The Government promulgated regulations in 1995 that eliminated the permit requirements for some types of public meetings. A requirement to notify the police remained for most others, and in practice numerous public meetings continued to be prevented or broken up.

In East Timor, several large demonstrations and free speech forums were held without government interference. East Timor related demonstrations and unprecedented public discussions also took place in Jakarta. Most were peaceful, but in June a demonstration by East Timorese students at the Department of Foreign Affairs was dispersed with excessive force by security forces (see Section 1.c.).

In the period prior to the March reselection of President Soeharto, security forces intervened to stop many meetings and peaceful demonstrations of dissidents and reform advocates. In February Jakarta police warned that political protests would not be tolerated and that political demonstrators would be charged under an emergency decree from 1963 related to illegal political activity. Those arrested would face a maximum sentence of 5 years in prison. The national police also warned the public that no political activities involving large numbers of people should be held between February 22 and March 18, a week before and after the March 1-11 general session of the MPR. In addition, although thousands of students were allowed to stage daily political demonstrations in the months prior to the MPR and afterward, their activities in large part were restricted to campuses. Military and government officials warned students that they should confine their demonstrations to their campuses and explicitly instructed students not to take their protests off campus. The Education Minister later tried to ban demonstrations on campus, though his move was in practice ignored by rectors charged with enforcing the order.

In February security authorities arrested approximately 150 members of the Red and White Front who were conducting a peaceful march in Jakarta. Subsequently, 122 persons were held and charged in accordance with the 1963 emergency decree relating to illegal political activity and sections of the Criminal Code related to refusal to move from a public place. They filed suit against the police, and the opening session of their trial was postponed when the police failed to release them from detention so that they could attend the hearing. Security authorities detained a delegation from the Indonesian Committee for the Global March against Child Labor following the delegation's meeting with the Department of Manpower. Fourteen of the activists were held overnight and then released.

Security forces arrested three of about a dozen members of The Voice of Concerned Mothers who staged a protest in the center of Jakarta against rising prices, especially of milk. The three persons arrested were Karlina Leksono, Indonesia's first female astronomer, Gadi Arivia, a university lecturer, and Wilasih Noviana. The police stated that the demonstration had been stopped because it was unauthorized and the three were charged under an article of the Criminal Code, which bans demonstrations without a permit. The three were released the following day but faced trial on March 4. On March 9, the court levied a small fine on the three.

In March security forces broke up a peaceful, public meeting of activists in a north Jakarta park. Nine persons were arrested without a warrant, including actress Ratna Sarumpaet, Ging Ginanjar, Adi Hermawan, Alexius S. Fathom Saulina, Bonar Tiro Naispospos, Aspar Paturisi, Wira Kusuma, and Joel Thaer. On March 10, Sarumpaet and four others were sentenced to time served, 2 months and 10 days each, for ignoring a police order to halt a meeting and were released. Also in March security forces broke up a small peaceful demonstration held by activists calling for the release of labor leader Muchtar Pakpahan and protesting against high prices. Four persons were arrested for conducting an unauthorized demonstration. Others were arrested from the group the night prior to the demonstration. Four members of the group were put on trial, but they were released following President Habibie's assumption of office in May.

Security authorities allowed students to carry out huge demonstrations at the Parliament complex beginning on May 18. The protests numbered up to 30,000 participants at their peak and helped lead to the resignation of President Soeharto on May 21. The military forced the students out of the Parliament early on the morning of May 23 without violence.

The authorities did not stop many demonstrations on a variety of issues that took place on a daily basis in the weeks following Soeharto's resignation. However, it took a strong position, against some demonstrations and gatherings. A large contingent of security forces physically prevented a large-scale procession to the Parliament by the independent Indonesian Prosperity Trade union (SBSI) in late June. The Government refused to allow Megawati Soekarnoputri to hold a large public gathering at Senayan sports stadium in Jakarta to commemorate the second anniversary of the July 27 incident, a government-assisted forcible takeover of PDI headquarters. However, she was able to hold a peaceful event at her home, which was attended by many thousands of persons. Demonstrations by students and nonstudents intensified in the weeks before the November 10-13 special session of the MPR. A majority were permitted to take place by authorities and occurred without incident. However, several ended violently, especially on November 13 when security forces fired on and killed demonstrators (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Following the MPR, demonstrations continued, although most were consisted of smaller groups.

In addition, the Government issued a controversial decree at the end of July that required a police permit for demonstrations by more than 50 persons, prohibited demonstrations in front of the presidential palace, military facilities, places of worship, hospitals, public transport centers, and other important public areas. After a great deal of protest, the Government rescinded the decree on August 13, deciding instead to submit it in substance to the Parliament for passage into law. On September 11, using emergency rules to allow it to be passed more quickly as a government regulation rather than a bill, the Government introduced the measure to the Parliament. Opposition both inside and outside the Parliament grew, and the Government was forced to withdraw the proposed regulation on September 29 and to submit it again as a proposed law with several key areas revised to meet popular demands. The DPR passed the bill on October 22. In its final form, the law on freedom of expression dropped the requirement for a permit to hold a demonstration. It required instead that demonstrators notify the police 3 days in advance and appoint someone accountable for every 100 demonstrators. It also dropped a controversial clause that would have required the media to obtain a police permit to cover demonstrations. The restriction on demonstrations near specific sites was retained. This new law was enforced unevenly. Numerous student demonstrations continued to be held in Jakarta and around the country after the law was enacted. However, in some cases authorities invoked the new law. For example, on December 16 over 50 student demonstrators were detained briefly for allegedly holding a protest without giving 3 days' advance notification. A prominent economist was called in by the police on November 30 and questioned about November 14 student demonstrations at the Parliament. A police official was quoted in the press as saying that the gathering had been illegal under the new law because the participants had not notified the authorities 3 days in advance.

The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the Government places significant controls on the exercise of this right. The 1985 Social Organizations Law (ORMAS) requires the adherence of all organizations, including recognized religions and associations, to the official ideology of Pancasila. This provision, which limits political activity, is widely understood as designed to inhibit activities of groups seeking to engage in democratic political competition, make Indonesia an Islamic state, revive communism, or return the country to a situation of partisan ideological division. It empowers the Government to disband any organization that it believes to be acting against Pancasila and requires prior government approval for any organization's acceptance of funds from foreign donors. A court on August 10 declared the 1997 Home Affairs Ministry decree banning the PRD illegal.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for religious freedom for members of five accepted religions and belief in one supreme god. The Government recognizes Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hinduism and permits the practice of the mystical, traditional beliefs of "Aliran Kepercayaan." Although the population is over 85 percent Muslim, the practice and teachings of the other recognized religions generally are respected, and the Government actively promotes mutual tolerance and harmony among them. However, some restrictions on certain types of religious activity, including unrecognized religions, exist.

Because the first tenet of Pancasila is belief in one Supreme God, atheism is forbidden. Although individuals are not compelled to practice any particular faith, all citizens must choose one of the five officially recognized religions. As this choice must be noted on official documents, such as the identification card, failure to identify a religion can make it impossible to obtain such documents. The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all religious and secular organizations. The Government strongly opposes Muslim groups that advocate establishing an Islamic state or acknowledging only Islamic law. The Government banned some religions, including Jehovah's Witnesses, Baha'i, Confucianism, and in some provinces the messianic Islamic sect Darul Arqam. The Government closely monitors Islamic sects considered in danger of deviating from orthodox tenets, and in the past on occasion it has dissolved such groups.

High-level officials continued to make public statements and emphasize by example the importance of respect for religious diversity. However, lower level officials frequently were alleged to be reluctant to facilitate and protect the rights of religious minorities. Minority houses of worship particularly have been targeted for damage or destruction during riots (see Section 5). Attacks against minority houses of worship and the lack of an effective government response to punish perpetrators and prevent further attacks led to allegations of official complicity in some of the incidents.

A 1969 regulation dictates that before a house of worship can be built, agreement must be obtained from local residents living near the site, and a license must be obtained from the regional office of the Ministry of Religion. Some Christians claim that this regulation is being used to discriminate against them and to prevent them from building churches. Despite the problems, the building of churches continues.

The law allows conversion between faiths, and such conversions occur. Independent observers note that interfaith marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims have become increasingly difficult. Persons from religions outside the five accepted religions have difficulty having their marriages recognized officially.

The Government views proselytizing by recognized religions in areas heavily dominated by another recognized religion as potentially disruptive and discourages it. Foreign missionary activities are relatively unimpeded, although in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and occasionally elsewhere missionaries have experienced difficulties and delays in renewing residence permits, and visas allowing the entrance of new foreign clergy are difficult to obtain. Laws and decrees from the 1970's limit the number of years that foreign missionaries can spend in Indonesia, with some extensions granted in remote areas like Irian Jaya. Foreign missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of the ORMAS law. Citizens practicing the recognized religions maintain active links with coreligionists inside and outside the country and travel abroad for religious gatherings.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Although in 1993 the Government drastically reduced the number of persons barred either from entering or departing the country from a publicly announced figure of 8,897 "blacklisted" persons to a few hundred, such restrictions still exist. The Government also restricts movement by citizens and foreigners to and within parts of the country. In addition, it requires permits to seek work in a new location in certain areas, primarily to control further population movement to crowded cities. Special permits are required to visit certain parts of Irian Jaya. Although former political prisoners associated with the abortive 1965 coup are no longer officially required to carry the stamp E.T. on their identity cards, in many cases the stamps have not been eliminated in practice (see Section 1.f.). Among other restrictions, some former prisoners are still required to obtain permission if they want to move. Authorities reportedly imposed a 1-year travel ban on four individuals who were being investigated for treason in connection with the November 13 incident (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). Most had signed a statement on November 12 calling for the cancellation of the MPR and an interim government in advance of elections, and one allegedly had been present at student demonstrations and addressed protestors.

In past years, the Government offered first asylum to over 125,000 Indochinese boat people. The Galang Island camp was closed in 1996 as the last remaining asylum seekers were repatriated. However, some 14 persons remain who are awaiting a resettlement opportunity in another country. The Government has not formulated a policy regarding asylum seekers, but in practice it has respected the principle of not returning asylum seekers to the country from which they had fled. While the law lacks provisions for dealing with refugees/asylees in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, which maintains a regional office in Jakarta. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution, but during the year there was a substantial increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers placed in detention pending deportation.

Part II

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Document compiled by Dr S D Stein
Last update 09/09/99
Stuart.Stein@uwe.ac.uk
©S D Stein
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