U.S. Department of State

Indonesia Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 1998: Part II

Part I

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Citizens have not had the ability to change their government through democratic means. President Soeharto never faced an electoral challenge. The 1,000-member People's Consultative Assembly that reelected him unanimously to a seventh term as President on March 11 is constitutionally the highest authority of the State. It has met every 5 years to elect the president and vice president and to set the broad outlines of state policy. President Soeharto and his Government effectively controlled the MPR. Soeharto resigned from office on May 21 under pressure from student activists and the parliamentary leadership. B.J. Habibie--his handpicked Vice President, long serving Science and Technology Minister, and intimate adviser--replaced him, and nearly two-thirds of the Soeharto Cabinet was carried over into the new Government. Since Soeharto resigned in May, many Soeharto loyalists in the MPR were replaced before the November special session by members with ties to President Habibie and the new leadership of Golkar. Five hundred members of the MPR come from the Parliament (DPR), 425 of whose members were elected in the May 1997 general election (up from 400 elected members in 1992). Another 500 members of the MPR are representatives, regional representatives, and representatives of societal groups. The Soeharto government reportedly had great influence over the selection of the majority of these additional 500 delegates. The remaining 75 members are military appointees to the DPR.

President Habibie pledged to hold a general election for parliament in the spring of 1999, to be followed by an MPR session to elect a president and vice president at the end of 1999. The Government and the Parliament agreed that the date of the election for parliament would be June 7, 1999, and that the selection of a new president and vice president by the MPR would take place in November 1999. There has been public pressure to move forward the date for the selection of the president and vice president. The Habibie Government drafted new legislation setting out regulations governing the election, political parties, and the organization of the DPR and MPR and sent it to the DPR in September. At year's end, the Parliament still was deliberating these three bills.

Under a doctrine known as dual function, the military assumes a significant sociopolitical as well as a security role. Members of the military are allotted 75 unelected seats in the DPR, in partial compensation for not being permitted to vote. The military occupies numerous key positions in the administration and holds an unelected 20 percent of the seats in provincial and district parliaments. The other 85 percent of national and 80 percent of regional parliamentary seats are filled through elections held every 5 years. All adult citizens, except active duty members of the armed forces, convicted criminals serving prison sentences, and some 36,000 former members of the PKI, are eligible to vote. In past elections voters chose by secret ballot between the three government-approved political organizations, which fielded candidate lists in each electoral district. Those lists were screened by BAKORSTANAS, which determines whether candidates were involved in the abortive 1965 coup or pose other broadly defined security risks. Critics charge that this screening is unconstitutional, since there is no way to appeal the results, and note that it can be used to eliminate critics of the Government from Parliament. Strict rules established the length of political campaigns, access to electronic media, schedules for public appearances, and the political symbols that could be used.

The Government has permitted formally only three political organizations to exist and contest elections. Following Soeharto's resignation, President Habibie did not stop new parties from forming. However, his Government did not recognize them pending the passage of a new law on political parties, which was still before Parliament at year's end. The largest and most important of the recognized parties has been GOLKAR, a government-controlled organization of diverse functional groups. During his tenure, President Soeharto strongly influenced the selection of the leaders of GOLKAR, of which he was the senior leader. GOLKAR has eliminated the Board of Patrons through which Soeharto previously had exerted control over the party. With the assistance of the armed forces, President Habibie backed the successful candidacy of the new GOLKAR General Chairman, who is also the State Minister/State Secretary, one of the most powerful positions in the Cabinet.

GOLKAR traditionally has maintained close institutional links with the armed forces. Following Soeharto's resignation, the armed forces stated publicly that they would no longer be involved directly in the affairs of GOLKAR or back the ruling party in future elections. Despite this statement, the armed forces played a prominent role in the victory of President Habibie's candidate for GOLKAR Chairman in July over a former minister of defense. In December Armed Forces Commander Wiranto publicly announced that the armed forces intended to remain neutral during the election. GOLKAR also has close institutional links with KORPRI, the association to which all civil servants automatically belong. In practice, civil servants have been compelled to support GOLKAR, even though they were able to join any of the political parties with official permission. Former members of the PKI and some other banned parties may not run for office or be active politically.

The other two small, legal, political organizations, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), were not considered opposition parties, and, along with GOLKAR, are required by law to embrace the state ideology of Pancasila. The PPP, however, became more independent during the year adopting Islam as its organizing principle and opposing GOLKAR proposals in the DPR. These smaller parties have not been permitted to maintain party offices below the district level, placing them at a disadvantage to the government-supported GOLKAR. Government authorities closely scrutinize and often guide the activities of the three political organizations. Party leaders may recall members of the DPR and the provincial assemblies from office.

During Soeharto's new order, the DPR was limited to considering bills presented to it by government departments and agencies but did not draft laws on its own, although it had the constitutional authority to do so. The DPR made technical, and occasionally substantive alteration to bills that it reviewed, including changes that reflected the interests of outside groups. In the immediate post-Soeharto era, the DPR appeared to have a much stronger role in the consideration of legislation. For example, it was considering making significant changes to the Government's draft of three political bills. In September and October, objections from the public and from within the DPR helped convince the Government to withdraw and resubmit with revisions legislation related to demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). The DPR also initiated an antimonopoly bill.

While the DPR has been subordinate to the executive branch, its leadership played a major role in requesting the resignation of President Soeharto in May. It also has been active in scrutinizing government policy and in exercising oversight of government budgetary expenditures and program implementation through hearings at which members of the Cabinet, military commanders, and other high officials are asked to testify. The DPR also has become increasingly a focal point of appeals and petitions from students, workers, displaced farmers, and others charging human rights abuses and airing other grievances, and the DPR complex (which is also where the MPR meets) was the site of large antigovernment demonstrations in May, November, and December, as well as other times during the year.

While there are no legal restrictions on the role of women in politics, they are underrepresented in government. The May 1997 parliamentary election represented a step backwards for women in terms of representation in Parliament, with their percentage falling from 12 percent to 9 percent of seats. In the Cabinet, 2 of 36 ministers are women.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Although still subjected to monitoring by and interference from the authorities, domestic human rights organizations were extremely active in pressing the Government to improve its human rights performance. They pushed for government investigation of human rights abuses, including the kidnaping of activists by security forces, acted as defense counsel in political trials, advocated the release of political prisoners, sought to offer assistance to the victims of human rights atrocities, and urged improvements in government policies and legislation. Numerous respected NGO representatives became members of a government-established commission investigating the May riots and rapes.

The Government generally considers outside investigations or foreign-based criticism of alleged human rights violations to be interference in its internal affairs. It emphasizes its belief that the linkage of foreign assistance, or other sanctions, to its human rights observance constitutes interference in its internal affairs and is therefore unacceptable.

ICRC access to political prisoners in East Timor improved over the course of the year, with the ICRC generally allowed access to prisoners that it could identify as being detained. Earlier in the year it had been denied access to some detainees. Generally, ICRC prisoner access in East Timor in some cases was limited with regard to the confidentiality of communication with those detained. ICRC requests for access to political prisoners elsewhere continued to meet with mixed success. In December ICRC was allowed to visit areas of northern Irian Jaya where a number of persons were reported either missing or in custody following political demonstrations in early July. An ICRC program of food and medical assistance in the south central highland area of Irian Jaya continued until July, but it was not extended despite ICRC offers to continue it. The ICRC was allowed to visit prisoners and others detained by security forces in Aceh beginning in May after having had to cease operations in Aceh since March 1997. However, the Government objected to the ICRC's opening of an office in Aceh, where it is working with families of those killed or missing due to security force activities against separatists. It ultimately was allowed to operate an office in conjunction with the Indonesian Red Cross. Cooperation by civilian and military officials in Aceh and at the central government level, generally was good. Elsewhere, the ICRC was able to visit prisoners convicted of involvement in the violence of 1965-66, convicted Muslim extremists, and East Timorese, as well as other political prisoners outside of East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. The ICRC was not able to play a significant role in the matter of the kidnaping, extrajudicial detention, and torture of political activists by security forces, although it made known to the Government its willingness to be of humanitarian assistance in these matters.

The Government-appointed National Human Rights Commission, in its fifth year of operation, continued to be active in examining reported human rights violations and continued to show independence. Lacking enforcement powers, the Commission attempts to work within the system, sending teams where necessary to inquire into possible human rights problems. It employs persuasion, publicity, and moral authority to highlight abuses, to make recommendations for legal and regulatory changes, and to encourage corrective action. The Government appointed the Commission's original chairmen, who then appointed the other 24 original commission members. The Commission selected a new chairman and six replacement members in December.

Throughout the year, the Commission consistently became involved in the most difficult human rights issues, including the disappearance of activists, the Trisakti shootings, the May riots and rapes, reports of mass graves in Aceh, violent action against protestors in Irian Jaya, the situation in East Timor, and a spate of killings in Banyuwangi, East Java. The Commission was able to issue highly credible public reports or press statements that carried significant weight in informing public opinion.

The Government ignored some Commission findings or, in some instances, moved lethargically in reaction to them. The Commission issued a report that clearly stated that rapes of ethnic Chinese women occurred during the May riots and called for the establishment of a national investigative commission. President Habibie publicly acknowledged the rapes, and the Government in July set up an investigation commission. However, in August high-level military officials began questioning publicly whether any rapes had taken place. In 1995 the Commission identified six cases of ABRI abuse of indigenous people in Irian Jaya, involving a number of deaths and rapes; only one extrajudicial killing was ever brought to trial, and the Commission requested follow-up action in 1997. The Government made no further response to the Commission's October 1996 report on the July 27 incident.

The Commission opened an East Timor branch in 1996, which was widely regarded as a positive step in the effort to address and resolve human rights abuses there. However, the office limited itself to dealing only with nonpolitical cases and was located next to the local military headquarters. It therefore had little impact with regard to the more serious human rights problems in East Timor. However, in July a respected East Timorese was appointed director of the office.

The MPR passed a decree on human rights at its November special session, which called on government institutions and officials to respect human rights and for the ratification of international human rights agreements (not in violation of the state ideology Pancasila or the Constitution). It also mandated that a human rights commission be established by law (the current Commission is established by presidential decree only). Such legislation is in preparation within the Government, and Commission members have discussed publicly the goal of strengthening the Commission's investigatory authority (e.g., the authority to summon witnesses).

Parliamentary delegations visited Aceh and Irian Jaya to investigate reports of human rights abuse. In August the Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) regarding "cooperation in the development and implementation of comprehensive programs for the promotion and protection of human rights in Indonesia," which is understood to include the assignment of a UNHCHR program officer to Jakarta, who would have access to East Timor and all other parts of Indonesia. The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women visited Indonesia during the year.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution does not explicitly forbid discrimination based on gender, race, disability, language, or social status. However, it stipulates equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalized. The 1993 Guidelines of State Policy (legal statutes adopted by the MPR) explicitly states that women have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, guidelines from 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993, also state that women's participation in the development process must not conflict with their role in improving family welfare and the education of the younger generation. Marriage law dictates that the man is the head of the family. The Constitution grants citizens the right to practice their individual religion and beliefs; however, the Government only recognizes five religions and imposes some restrictions on other religious activity.

Women

Violence against women remains poorly documented. However, the Government has acknowledged the problem of domestic violence in society, which has been aggravated by social changes brought about by rapid urbanization. Rape by a husband of a wife is not considered a crime under the law. Although women's groups are trying to change the law, they have not made significant progress.

Cultural norms dictate that problems between husband and wife are private matters, and violence against women in the home rarely is reported. While police could bring assault charges against a husband for beating his wife, due to social attitudes they are unlikely to do so. Nonetheless, according to reliable sources, the police have become somewhat more responsive to domestic violence complaints.

Rape is a punishable offense. Men have been arrested and sentenced for rape and attempted rape although reliable statistics are unavailable. The maximum prison sentence for rape is 12 years, but observers say that sentences are usually much shorter. Mob violence against accused rapists frequently is reported. Women's rights activists believe that rape is seriously underreported due to the social stigma attached to the victim. Some legal experts report that unless a woman goes immediately to the hospital for an examination that produces physical evidence of rape, she can not bring charges. A witness also is required in order to bring charges, and only in rare cases is there a witness, according to legal experts. Some women reportedly fail to report rape to police because the police do not take their allegations seriously.

Women's advocates believe that domestic abuse increased during the year as an indirect result of the economic crisis. Like rape, domestic violence is believed to be seriously underreported. In December a women's rights NGO estimated that only 15 percent of domestic violence incidents are reported. The Government provides some counseling for abused women, and several private organizations exist to assist women. Many of these organizations focus on reuniting the family rather than on providing protection to the women involved. Many women rely on the extended family system for assistance in cases of domestic violence. In June the Government, in consultation with women's NGO's, established a National Commission on Violence against Women. The Commission's mandate is to improve and coordinate government and NGO efforts to combat violence against women and to provide assistance to victims. There are only a few women's crisis centers including a drop-in center founded in Jakarta by the government-sponsored National Women's Organization (KOWANI) in 1996 and a crisis center for women in Yogyarkarta run by an NGO. A new crisis center for women, Women's Partner, which opened in 1997, runs a 24-hour hot line and a temporary shelter for abused women. Training of counselors for another Jakarta crisis center, called Speak, is under way.

Serious charges emerged in the early summer that 168 ethnic Chinese women and girls were targeted systematically for rape and sexual abuse during the civil disturbances of May 12-14. The allegations were given credence by the National Human Rights Commission, a government-sponsored body, which issued a preliminary report in July charging that rape of ethnic Chinese women and girls was carried out in an organized and coordinated manner over a 3-day period in Jakarta and several other major cities. The allegations have been challenged by police and military officials. In November the government-appointed fact-finding team, which included official and NGO representatives, issued its report, verifying 85 reports of violence against women during the riots, including 66 rapes. The team stated that the number of incidents probably was higher but that intimidation against witnesses and victims, as well as the reluctance of some victims to report the attacks, had prevented the team from documenting more attacks.

Harassment is not a crime under the law, only indecent behavior. However, sexual harassment charges can damage a civil service career. The law reportedly covers physical abuse only, and requires two witnesses. Female job applicants and workers have complained of being victimized sexually by foremen and factory owners.

There are credible reports of trafficking in women and of temporary "contract marriages" with foreigners in certain areas, such as Kalimantan and Sumatra, though the extent of this practice is unclear. These marriages are not considered legal, and the children born from them are considered born out of wedlock. Prostitution is widespread. Official statistics from 1994 report that there were 70,684 prostitutes in Indonesia, 9,000 of whom were in Jakarta. A local NGO estimates that there are at least 650,000 prostitutes in the country, including 150,000 who are registered as prostitutes. Many believe the figure to be much higher as women who lost their jobs as a result of the economic crisis seek other ways to earn money for their families. By comparison, there were 72,000 registered prostitutes in 1995.

In September more than a hundred women from Java, including some minors, reported that they and other women had been held against their will on an island in Riau province, Sumatra, and forced to work as prostitutes. The women claimed that they had been recruited with the understanding that they would be employed as waitresses in resorts on the island. They were prevented from leaving after discovering that they were recruited to be sex workers. The International Labor Organization's report on the sex industry in Southeast Asia, released in August, estimated that Indonesia's sex sector accounted for from 0.8 to 2.4 percent of GDP.

Female domestic servants are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. In April Jakarta police raided a building where more than 900 women had been held against their will for up to 4 months by a recruitment agency preparing to send them to the Middle East to work as domestic servants. Again in October, hundreds of women were freed in Jakarta after being held against their will for 2 to 8 months by an agency that had promised to place them abroad as domestic servants.

According to the Constitution, women are equal to and have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities as men. However, in practice women face some legal discrimination. Marriage law dictates that the man is the head of the family. Marriage law for Muslims, based on Islamic law, allows men to have up to four wives if the husband can provide equally for each of his wives. Permission of the first wife is required, but reportedly most women cannot refuse. Civil servants who wish to marry a second woman also must have permission from their supervisors. Cabinet officials and military personnel customarily have been forbidden to have second wives. In divorce cases women often bear a heavier evidentiary burden than men, especially in the Islamic-based family court system. Divorced women rarely receive alimony, and there is no enforcement of alimony payment.

The 1958 Citizenship Law states that children's citizenship is based only on the citizenship of the father. Children of citizen mothers and foreign fathers are considered foreigners and need visas to remain in the country until the age of 18, when they can apply for citizenship. They are prohibited from attending Indonesian schools and have to attend international schools, which are expensive.

Foreign women married to citizens also face difficulties. Their children are citizens and thus are not allowed to attend international schools in Indonesia. These women usually are taxed as the foreign head of household, but they do not have property, business, or inheritance rights. There has been much discussion about problems with the citizenship law, and NGO's and the Government appear to agree that the law needs to be revised. However, by year's end the Government still had not taken any action to remedy these problems.

Although some women enjoy a high degree of economic and social freedom and occupy important positions in both the public and private sectors, the majority do not enjoy such social and economic freedoms and are represented disproportionately at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. The 1995 national profile of women's positions and roles showed that 37.4 percent of civil servants were women, but only 5.5 percent were in positions of authority.

Female workers in manufacturing generally receive lower wages then men. Many female factory workers are hired as day laborers instead of as full-time permanent employees, and companies are not required to provide benefits, such as maternity leave, to day laborers. Women's rights activists report that there is a growing trend in manufacturing to hire women to do work in their homes for less than the minimum wage. Unemployment rates for women are approximately 50 percent higher than for men. Women often are not given the extra benefits and salary that are their due when they are the head of household, and in some cases do not receive employment benefits for their husband and children, such as medical insurance and income tax deductions. Income disparity between men and women diminishes significantly with greater educational achievement.

Despite laws that provide women with a 3-month maternity leave, the Government has acknowledged that pregnant women often are dismissed or are replaced while on leave. Some companies require that women sign statements that they do not intend to become pregnant. The Employment Law mandates 2 days of menstrual leave per month for women, although this leave is not allowed in all cases. Many groups criticized the 1997 Manpower Law for not addressing sexual harassment and violence against women in the workplace and for providing inadequate protection in areas of employment where women regularly have suffered abuse, such as overseas employment and household service. The Government has postponed implementation of the new Manpower Law for 2 years to allow time for its revision.

Women disproportionately experience illiteracy, poor health, and inadequate nutrition. The Government is making efforts to reduce the high maternal mortality rate, which is 425 per 100,000 live births, according to official figures, and up to 650, according to estimates from other sources. According to U.N. data, two-thirds of women are anemic, and 24 percent of women of reproductive age suffer from chronic energy deficiency. Women's educational indicators have improved in the last decade. The number of girls graduating from high school tripled from 1980 to 1990.

Women's advocacy groups became more assertive during the year. In February three women's advocates from the group Voices of Concerned Mothers were detained after they led a protest against the rising price of milk. The three were convicted in a highly publicized trial of staging a parade without a permit and were fined. Numerous conferences and rallies concerned with women's issues were held throughout the year. Most were sponsored by NGO's, but some were organized by academic institutions and government ministries. In December the first National Women's Congress brought together more than 500 women from a broad range of economic and sociopolitical perspectives. The Congress concluded with calls for a greater role for women in government, an end to the military's "dual function" in defense and politics, and a referendum in East Timor about the territory's future political status.

Children

The Government has expressed a commitment to children's rights and welfare but a lack of resources prevents it from translating this commitment into practice. The Government allocates only 2.2 percent of gross national product to education. Spending on education declined significantly in real terms during the year, due to economic contraction. A 1979 law on children's welfare defines the responsibility of the State and parents to nurture and protect children. However, the law's provisions on protection of children have yet to go into effect; implementing regulations have never been promulgated. The Government has made particular efforts to improve primary education and maternity services.

Low cost medical care is available, although access and availability are sometimes sporadic, especially in rural areas. Moreover, government spending on health care dropped in real terms due to the economic contraction. According to U.N. data, 34 percent of children under 5 years of age suffer from protein-energy malnutrition, and 35 percent suffer from iron deficiency. In October the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) warned of a "lost generation" of Indonesian youth as a result of the economic crisis which started in mid-1997. UNICEF estimated that 50 percent of children below the age of 2 were undernourished, threatening the development of brain function. Provincial authorities in Central Java noted a sharp increase in infant mortality attributed to poor nutrition among mothers. NGO research in a district of Central Java documented an increase in underweight infants from 8 percent in 1996 to 14 percent in 1998. In Jakarta city health officials also noted a sharp increase in reports of child malnutrition.

A 1994 law raised compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, but the law has not been implemented fully due to inadequate school facilities and the lack of family financial resources to support children to stay in school. Official and unofficial fees for public education, including payments for registration, books, meals, transport, and uniforms have become prohibitively high for many families. Although primary education is in principle universal, the UNICEF estimates that more than 1 million children drop out of primary school every year due mainly to the costs associated with education and the need for the children to supplement family income. A credible NGO estimated that millions of children dropped out of primary school in 1998 because their families could no longer afford school fees and related expenses due to the economic crisis.

Although statistics are not yet available, children's advocates and labor analysts agree that the number of working children has increased significantly due to the economic crisis which continued to affect the country. According to recent government statistics, 8 percent of all children between the ages of 10 and 14 work. Half go to school and also work, and half work exclusively. Unofficial estimates of working children are higher. A prominent NGO estimated that more than 10 percent of children worked more than 4 hours per day.

According to the Ministry of Social Affairs, 20,000 street children lived in Jakarta in 1997. NGO's report that the number in Jakarta may have increased by more than 60 percent as a result of the economic crisis. The number of street children also grew in other cities. Street children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch cars, and otherwise attempt to earn money. Many children work under hazardous conditions as scavengers and garbage pickers and on fishing platforms and fishing boats. According to credible sources, there are several thousand children working in hazardous conditions on fishing platforms off the east coast of north Sumatra (see Section 6.c.). Many thousands work in factories and fields (see Section 6.d.).

Street children and child laborers in some cities have become organized and interested in protecting their rights. At least 30 NGO's work with street children. NGO's have criticized the Government for making insufficient and inadequate efforts to help street children and working children. The Government is working in cooperation with the U. N. Development Program, UNICEF, the ILO, and with NGO's to create programs for street children and child laborers. One project incorporates many ideas generated by the NGO community, including establishing "open houses" in targeted areas that provide vocational training and basic education to street children. Efforts have been initiated to start open houses for street children in seven provinces.

Another approach to the street children problem utilizes the National Program for Discipline and Clean Cities Decree. Under this program, street children are removed physically from cities by bus. Usually, they are taken outside the city and left there. Sometimes they are taken to "holding houses" where they are first interrogated and later released. NGO's criticize this practice as ineffective and inhuman.

Child prostitution and other sexual abuses occur, but firm data are lacking. While there are laws designed to protect children from indecent activities, prostitution, and incest, the Government has made no special enforcement efforts in these areas. A credible NGO asserts that it has seen a pattern of increased child prostitution resulting from the economic crisis during 1997 and 1998. Although reliable nationwide statistics remain elusive, NGO findings indicate a growth trend in child prostitution and sexual exploitation. A credible NGO reported instances of families in rural areas of Java and Sumatra being forced by economic circumstances to "sell" their daughters to local men. Another report indicating an increase in child prostitution counted 1,500 underage prostitutes working in just one province in Sumatra.

A separate criminal justice system for juveniles does not exist. Police officials admit that juveniles often are imprisoned with adult offenders. Ordinary courts handle juvenile crime. A Juvenile Justice Law was passed by Parliament in December 1996 and was signed by President Soeharto in 1997. It defines juveniles as children between the ages of 8 and 18 and establishes a special court system and criminal code for them.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is practiced in some parts of Indonesia. The method varies depending on ethnic, cultural and religious tradition. However, the most prevalent practice is a ceremonial one that involves the pricking, scraping, or touching of the clitoris of a baby or young girl, often with the purpose of drawing several drops of blood. Sometimes, a plant root is used symbolically, and the girl is not touched. A more serious form of FGM involves the removal of the tip of the clitoris. This practice appears to be declining, and there is disagreement about how widely practiced it is. It reportedly still is practiced in Madura, South Sulawesi, and other areas. Since FGM is not regulated, and religious leaders have taken no formal position, the method used is often left up to the local traditional practitioner. FGM usually takes place within the first year after birth, often on the 40th day, though it is done in some areas up to the age of 10. It is performed either at a hospital or, especially in rural areas, by the local traditional practitioner. There are no statistics available on FGM.

People With Disabilities

According to U.N. estimates, there are 10 million disabled persons in the country, while the Ministry of Social Affairs estimates that 3 percent of the population, or 6 million persons, are disabled. However, there are no precise statistics. Families often hide their disabled family members to avoid social stigma or embarrassment. The disabled face considerable discrimination in employment, although some factories have made special efforts to hire disabled workers. Several provinces have established "rehabilitation centers" for the disabled. Disabled persons reportedly are taken off the streets by the authorities and brought to these centers for job training. Many disabled citizens beg for a living.

NGO's are the primary providers of education for the disabled. There are 1,084 schools for the disabled; 680 are private, and 404 are government schools. Of the government schools 165 are "integrated," serving both regular and special education students. In Jakarta there are 98 schools for the disabled, 2 of which are government-run, and 96 of which are private. The Government also runs three national schools for the visually, hearing, and mentally disabled. These schools accept children from throughout the country.

A disability law was passed in 1997. Implementing regulations have not been issued, so the impact of the law remains unclear. The law strives to provide access to education, employment, and assistance for the disabled. It requires companies that employ over 100 persons to give 1 percent of their jobs to the disabled. The law mandates accessibility for the disabled to public facilities. However, virtually no buildings or public transportation have been designed with such accessibility in mind.

The Constitution requires that the Government provide care for orphans and the disabled, but it does not specify how the term "care" should be defined, and the provision of education to all mentally and physically disabled children has never been inferred. Regulations specify that the Government establish and regulate a national curriculum for special education by stipulating that the "community" should provide special education services to its children.

Indigenous People

The Government considers the term "indigenous people" to be a misnomer, because it considers all Indonesians except ethnic Chinese to be indigenous. Nonetheless, it publicly recognizes the existence of several "isolated communities," and that they have a right to participate fully in political and social life. The Government estimates that the number of persons in isolated communities is 1.5 million. This includes, but is not limited to, groups such as the Dayak population in Kalimantan who live in remote forest areas, indigenous communities throughout Irian Jaya, and economically disadvantaged families living as sea nomads on boats near Riau in east Sumatra and near Ujung Pandang in southern Sulawesi. Critics maintain that the Government's approach is basically paternalistic and designed more to integrate indigenous people into society than to protect their traditional way of life. Human rights monitors criticize the Government's transmigration program for violating the rights of indigenous people (see Section 1.f.).

Sixty percent of the population of over 200 million live in Java, which represents only 7 percent of the country's territory. The government-sponsored transmigration program seeks to resettle people from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas outside Java. The majority of migrants are spontaneous migrants who are not part of the official program. The current 5-year development plan calls for 600,000 families to be resettled, with 80,000 planned for the 1997-98 fiscal year.

Critics of transmigration claim that it often threatens indigenous cultures and sparks social envy. Some critics claim that it has been used as a political tool to inject nonindigenous persons into certain areas to "Indonesianize" these areas, in part to preclude secessionist movements. A senior government official has confirmed this. In some areas, such as in certain parts of Kalimantan, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, relations between transmigrants and indigenous people are hostile. NGO's also report tensions between transmigrated Javanese and indigenous populations in the Mentawai Islands off the west coast of Sumatra. Indigenous groups often complain that they receive less government support and funding than transmigrants, and transmigrants complain that in some cases they are moved to areas with inadequate infrastructure to support them and less than desirable land. Transmigrants also may be settled on land of disputed ownership.

Tensions are particularly acute in West Kalimantan between the indigenous Dayak people and settlers from Madura, an island off the eastern coast of Java. The past 30 years have been marked by periodic violent confrontations between the two communities, growing partly out of the Dayaks' perception that they were being marginalized in their native lands. The Madurese community in West Kalimantan grew around an earlier core of transmigrants, although the majority of Madurese in the area are spontaneous immigrants.

The Government's emphasis on relatively rapid growth and development strategies, burgeoning urbanization, and aggressive government-backed commercial exploitation of natural resources results in continued tension over land tenure issues. That tension often is expressed along racial/ethnic lines as developers are frequently ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Land disputes represent the largest category of complaints submitted to the National Human Rights Commission and a significant portion of the cases brought to legal aid foundations and other legal assistance organizations.

According to a law derived from colonial-era practices, all subsurface mineral resources belong to the Government. The Basic Agrarian Law states that land rights cannot be "in conflict with national and state interests," which provides the Government with a broad legal basis for land seizures. When disputes cannot be settled the Government has the authority to define fair compensation for land. There are numerous instances of the use of intimidation, sometimes by the military, and often by hired "thugs," to acquire land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people.

Such intimidation has been used in Jakarta, other parts of Java, North Sumatra, Aceh, and other areas. Compensation paid for the land is often minimal or even nonexistent. According to credible sources in West Sumatra, large tracts of land in the province have been confiscated over the past several years by commercial plantation developers who paid bribes to the local governor. In some cases, NGO's report, farmers growing rice and other crops were evicted from the land they were planting without compensation to make way for new palm oil plantations staffed by Javanese transmigrants. A local NGO alleged that, when its staff members visited the area in the summer to investigate land dispute claims made by local communities, "thugs" hired by local officials intimidated them.

NGO's assert that violations of the rights of indigenous people are frequent in mining and logging areas and state that violations stem from the State's denial of ownership by indigenous people of ancestral land, erosian of indigenous groups' traditional social structure, and forced takeover of land. These problems are most prevalent in Irian Jaya and Kalimantan.

In 1998 an internationally recognized environmentalist, Loir Botor Dingit, who is also a paramount chief of the Dayak tribe of East Kalimantan, was brought to trial; the Government charged him with forgery and perjury. The charges stem from the tribe's opposition to logging operations being conducted on land claimed by the tribe. The operations were being conducted by a company owned by a former minister and close associate of Soeharto. The defendant alleged that he had been threatened repeatedly and harassed by security forces for his opposition to the logging (see Section 1.e.). The charges against Dingit were dropped in November.

In Central Kalimantan, NGO's report that local residents have suffered as a result of a project to turn 1 million hectares of peat land into agricultural land for rice cultivation. The site is designated as a major transmigration area. According to credible sources, 100,000 indigenous people are affected by the project. Forced to cease their traditional farming and forest-based livelihoods, many indigenous people living in the area have become poorly paid laborers on the project.

There were credible reports that bonded labor has become a problem for some Dayaks in East Kalimantan. According to the ILO, on at least one project, a logging company established a company store in a remote area, where workers had to purchase necessities at inflated prices. Since the workers could not afford the prices, they bought the goods using vouchers representing future wages, thereby, according to the ILO, "turning once independent and relatively well-off farmers into impoverished bonded laborers trapped in an ever-mounting cycle of debt."

Where indigenous people clash with commercial/private sector development projects, the developers almost always win. Decisions regarding development projects, resource-use concessions, and other economic activities generally are carried out without the participation or informed consent of the affected communities. Some NGO's that sought to aid these communities were subjected to verbal attacks, raids, and other forms of intimidation by government security forces.

Tensions with indigenous people in Irian Jaya continued. Indigenous Irian Jaya residents complain of racism, religious bias, paternalism, and condescension as constant impediments to better relations with non-Irianese people, including members of the Government, the military, and the non-Irianese business community. A large percentage of the population of Irian Jaya is now made up of migrants, who are economically and politically dominant. A clash between indigenous people and recent migrants over gold mining claims in the area of Nabire led to the stabbing death of three Irianese and nine non-Irianese in August. Most civil servants in local governments in Irian Jaya and other isolated areas continue to come primarily from other parts of Indonesia, rather than from the local indigenous population. There were credible reports of serious human rights abuses by the security forces in Biak following proindependence demonstrations, and new revelations of abuses by security forces pursuing separatists in the central highlands of Irian Jaya (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). There was a proindependence demonstration in Manokwari in early October. When police dispersed the demonstrators, persons in the crowd threw rocks, injuring one policeman and damaging shops and houses. Six persons, including a tribal leader, were arrested in Jayapura in early October on suspicion of planning proindependence demonstrations. They were conditionally released later in the month. Also in October, 19 persons went on trial on sedition charges in connection with the Biak proindependence demonstrations. At year's end, the trial of 10 persons accused in connection with the July 7 proindependence demonstration in Wamena had not yet begun. Twenty-four others are awaiting trial elsewhere in Irian Jaya on similar charges. No members of the security forces have been charged or held accountable for their harsh response to the July demonstrations.

In August the Government announced the withdrawal of 270 troops from the Timika area and 394 troops from the task force operating in the central highlands. On October 1, Armed Forces Commander Wiranto announced that he had decided to withdraw the status of "military operational area" from Irian Jaya. However, the province is still designated a "critical control area."

In September President Habibie agreed to a recommendation from the Indonesian Council of Churches that the Government hold a national dialog on Irian Jaya. Representatives from Irian Jaya and from the Irianese community in Jakarta met with government officials in late October and early November to draft terms of reference for the dialog. By year's end, no date has been set, but Minister of State/State Secretary Akbar Tanjung told the press in mid-December that the Government planned to hold the dialog after the Idul Fitri holiday in January 1999. Some Irianese have expressed disappointment in the Government's approach to the preparations.

A large foreign mining concession area near Timika continued to draw attention and controversy. In March a foreign court dismissed with prejudice a 1996 suit brought by a local indigenous leader. In December a council of indigenous representatives announced that it would continue to press the lawsuit against the company "until such time as a comprehensive, honest, and fair solution has been reached between the parties, on an equal footing." In June a landslide into a lake into which mine tailings are deposited caused the lake to overflow, damaging settlements and crops. An environmental group blamed the company's mining practices, while the company cited unusually heavy rains as the cause of the landslide and flooding. Indigenous residents, including the governor of Irian Jaya, demanded that the central Government return a greater percentage of the mine's revenues to the province. The mine was shut down for 5 days when mine workers went on strike in August. The strike ended when the local military and police commanders held a meeting with workers and company officials. A parliamentary committee that visited Irian Jaya in August recognized that the company's presence should be maintained and secured, and it suggested the company negotiate with the residents regarding demands for the company to increase its participation in the improvement of community welfare. The committee also recommended that the negotiated agreements be set forth in a contract to give them a legal basis and that company funds for development of the mine area be disbursed in a fair, transparent, and organized manner.

Religious Minorities

During the year, there were instances of attacks on churches, temples, and other religious facilities, ranging in nature from minor vandalism to arson. There were also instances of preaching and publications against Christians, which led to concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was under pressure. Christian groups recorded 128 instances of attacks on churches and other Christian facilities during the year, 76 of which occurred following the accession to office of President Habibie in May. The attacks ranged in severity from broken windowpanes to total destruction. The Government has not resolved fully many cases of attacks on religious facilities and churches that occurred during riots and, in other cases, has not investigated at all.

On February 13, serious anti-Christian and antiethnic Chinese violence broke out in west Java. Twenty-eight churches were attacked in several towns east and southeast of Jakarta. Mobs stoned windows, vandalized interiors, and in some cases attempted to burn the churches. Cars and other property belonging to the church and church members also were targeted for vandalism. Incidents such as these reflect religious tensions, as well as in some cases underlying socioeconomic and political tensions between poor Muslims and relatively more affluent ethnic Chinese Christians.

On July 24, a Protestant church was burned in the Depok area of south Jakarta. The church's congregation was Batak, an ethnic group with origins in north Sumatra. Although the church was in close proximity to a police station, the mob spent hours demolishing it to its foundations with sledgehammers. Police have made no progress investigating the incident.

In late November, a brawl in Ketapang, West Jakarta, between Muslim local residents and Christian security guards of a gambling den, who were mainly of Ambonese descent, escalated into a riot in which 14 were killed and 27 local churches and Christian schools were attacked, and in some cases destroyed. The anti-Christian violence in Jakarta prompted retaliatory anti-Muslim violence in Kupang, West Timor, in late November and early December. In Kupang (where Muslims are a minority), Christian mobs burned four mosques and several homes and shops belonging to Muslims. Five other mosques and a number of houses were damaged and dozens were injured. In both the Jakarta and Kupang incidents, interethnic tensions, as well as interreligious tensions, were factors contributing to the violence.

Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of Irian Jaya. In January a mosque was burned down in a small village near Kurima in the central highlands of Irian Jaya. The attack on the mosque apparently was motivated by local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries to win converts in the predominantly Christian province. The incident also reflected local resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of the country. Interreligious tensions remain high in the province.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The Government officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. Ethnic Chinese, at approximately 3 percent of the population by far the largest nonindigenous minority group, historically have played a major role in the economy. In 1998 anti-Chinese sentiment led to serious and widespread attacks on Chinese-owned businesses, especially in the disturbances of May 12-14. Credible charges emerged that attacks on Chinese property during the May rioting were in some cases organized rather than spontaneous in nature, and that attacks on Chinese property were coordinated in Jakarta and in other cities and towns across the country. Charges that members of the security forces were involved in these attacks had not been fully investigated by year's end.

Both the Government and NGO's also are investigating allegations that during the May riots, more than 150 ethnic Chinese women and girls were targeted for rape in Jakarta and other cities, as part of a campaign to spread terror among the ethnic Chinese community (see Section 1.c.). Allegations of the organized destruction of Chinese property and the systematic mass rape of Chinese women are very controversial, and both official and private investigations of these charges found it difficult to produce concrete evidence, particularly first-hand testimony. Despite these difficulties, in November a government-appointed, fact-finding team verified 66 rapes that occurred during the riots, involving primarily ethnic Chinese women and girls, as well as numerous other acts of violence against women.

Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to run businesses in rural Indonesia. Regulations prohibit the operation of Chinese schools, formation of exclusively Chinese cultural groups or trade associations, and public display of Chinese characters, although Chinese characters are seen on some products. The Government permits the publication of a government-owned, Chinese-language daily newspaper, but otherwise legislation bans the import, sale or distribution of Chinese-language material (see Sections 1.f. and 2.a.). However, Chinese-language materials have begun to appear in Chinese neighborhoods in Jakarta and possibly elsewhere. Since 1994 the Government has allowed Chinese-language instruction for employees in the tourism industry, and it has allowed distribution of locally printed Chinese-language tourist brochures, programs, and similar material to Chinese speaking tourists.

Private instruction in Chinese generally is prohibited but takes place to a limited extent. The University of Indonesia offers Chinese language courses. State universities have informal quotas that limit the number of ethnic Chinese students. The law forbids the celebration of the Chinese New Year in temples or public places, but enforcement is limited. Chinese New Year decorations were displayed prominently and sold in public shopping areas in at least a few cities. Senior officials previously have shown reluctance to relax the ban on Chinese-language publications, citing concerns that such an action could promote interracial tensions.

East Timorese and various human rights groups charge that the East Timorese are underrepresented in the civil service in East Timor. The Government has made some efforts to recruit more civil servants in both East Timor and Irian Jaya, and there has been some increase in the number of civil servant trainees for these two provinces, despite a "no growth" policy for the civil service as a whole. East Timorese have expressed concerns that the transmigration program (see Section 1.f.) could lead to fewer employment opportunities and might eventually destroy East Timor's cultural identity. The Government stated that the transmigration program in East Timor focused mostly on resettlement of Timorese, with a much smaller portion of predominantly Christian and Hindu non-Timorese coming in from outside. In the last several years, informal, predominantly Muslim migration to the province has sparked socioeconomic tension in urban areas, provoking even greater concern than the formally sponsored transmigration program. In July in reaction to rumors and possible intimidation, at least several thousand non-East Timorese fled the province; however, most later returned.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Private sector workers are by law free to form worker organizations without prior authorization, and unions may draw up their own constitutions and rules and elect their representatives. In May the Government ratified ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and issued a new regulation on the registration of workers' organizations. The new regulation eliminates numerical and other requirements that were previously a barrier to union registration. It provides for registration of unions at the factory, district, provincial, and national level and allows unions to form federations and confederations. The regulation prohibits unions based on political orientation, religion, gender, or ethnic groups. The regulation requires that workers' organizations already recognized by the Government, i.e., the Federation of All-Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI) and plant-level unions, must reregister within 90 days. Since the new regulation on trade union registration went into effect, at least nine new or previously unrecognized unions have begun organizing themselves to register.

The SPSI, which was formed by the fusion (with strong government encouragement) of existing labor organizations in 1973, is the oldest trade union organization. The head of the SPSI and many members of the executive council are also members of the ruling GOLKAR political organization and its constituent functional groups. In August the SPSI leadership split over the issue of reforming the Federation's structure. Following the split, the Department of Manpower stated that it would no longer intervene in organizational disputes within trade unions or provide guidance to any unions.

Under the Law on Manpower Affairs enacted in October 1997, workers may form unions on the basis of "democratic consultation" with other workers in the same company and may join with other unions to form sectoral and intersectoral federations. The law was scheduled to take effect on October 1, but in October Parliament amended it to postpone implementation until October 1, 2000 to allow time for revision, consultation with concerned groups, and preparation of implementing regulations.

Although, as with other mass organizations, the Government may dissolve a union if it believes that the union is acting against Pancasila, it has never done so, and there are no laws or regulations specifying procedures for union dissolution.

Two labor groups previously considered illegal by the Government, the Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union (SBSI) and the Alliance of Independent Journalists, now operate openly. Since May the AJI, formed in 1994 by journalists disillusioned with the government-sanctioned Association of Indonesian Journalists (PWI), has carried out its activities without hindrance. The SBSI's founder and general chairman, Muchtar Pakpahan, was released after nearly 2 years of detention and cleared of all previous charges and convictions in May. However, the SBSI, created in 1992, continues to encounter harassment. For example, military and police prevented the SBSI from holding a large public rally at the Parliament in June (see Section 2.b.). In July the local military commander canceled a meeting between Pakpahan and employer representatives in Solo, Central Java. Later the same month, local officials broke up an SBSI training session in North Sumatra and assaulted SBSI leaders, and security officials beat and detained SBSI representatives in Tangerang (near Jakarta) who were seeking to register a workplace SBSI unit with the Department of Manpower office. The SBSI claims that companies are continuing to fire SBSI members because of their affiliation with the union or because they sought to organize SBSI units within their factories, a problem other labor organizations and activists have encountered in trying to form unions. In addition, SBSI has complained of difficulty in registering some of its workplace units.

Civil servants must belong to KORPRI, a nonunion association whose Central Development Council is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs. State enterprise employees, defined to include those working in enterprises in which the State has a 5-percent holding or greater, usually are required to join KORPRI, but a small number of state enterprises have SPSI units. Teachers must belong to the Teachers' Association (PGRI). While technically classed as a union, the PGRI continues to function more as a welfare organization and does not appear to have engaged in trade union activities such as collective bargaining. Mandatory KORPRI and PGRI contributions are deducted automatically from teachers' salaries.

The Government announced late in 1995 its intention to relax a regulation requiring police approval for all meetings of five or more people of all organizations outside offices or normal work sites. However, in practice this regulation continues to apply to union meetings. Permission was given routinely to the SPSI, but the SBSI and other labor organizations claim that local civilian and security officials on a number of occasions have discouraged or denied permission to their gatherings even after the union registration process was opened up in May.

In 1994 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions lodged a formal complaint against Indonesia with the ILO, accusing the Government of denying workers the right to set up unions of their own choosing, harassing independent workers' organizations, and of taking other actions contrary to ILO standards on freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. In early June, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association stated that the release of Muchtar Pakpahan and other SBSI leaders constituted an important and positive step with regard to freedom of association, and it expressed the hope that this would be one of a series of positive measures toward full respect of freedom of association.

While Pancasila principles call for labor-management differences to be settled by consensus, all organized workers except civil servants have the legal right to strike. State enterprise employees and teachers rarely exercise this right, but private sector strikes are frequent. Before a strike can occur legally in the private sector, the law requires intensive mediation by the Department of Manpower and prior notice of the intent to strike. However, no approval is required. In practice, dispute settlement procedures rarely are followed, and formal notice of the intent to strike rarely is given because Department of Manpower procedures are slow and have little credibility with workers. Therefore, sudden strikes tend to result from longstanding grievances, attempts by employers to prevent the formation of union branches, or denial of legally mandated benefits or rights. The Government has stated that it would address strike procedures and industrial dispute resolution in revising the 1997 Law on Manpower Affairs and in new legislation on dispute resolution.

According to Department of Manpower statistics, there were 234 strikes involving 141,495 workers during 1998. However, beginning in 1997 the Government only counted work stoppages in which at least a full day's production was lost as strikes. Shorter work stoppages ("unjuk rasa") are more frequent; but the police counted 496 cases of strikes or other forms of industrial action during the year. The largest strike involved an estimated 30,000 workers from a Surabaya manufacturing company who went on strike in June, and again in November, for increased wages and allowances. One worker died of injuries, reportedly after being struck with a rifle butt during a clash with police. After periodic strikes in July involving several thousand workers at a textile plant in Solo, Central Java, a group of 750 workers demonstrated for several days in front of the Department of Manpower and other offices in Jakarta. Nineteen of the workers were injured in a clash with police when the demonstrators blocked traffic on a busy street in Jakarta. They left Jakarta after the government Labor Dispute Resolution Board ruled that the company should reinstate them. However, the company challenged the ruling in court and refused to rehire the workers. In October police fired rubber bullets and beat demonstrating workers at a factory near Medan, North Sumatra, after workers began throwing stones at the factory and security forces. At least nine workers and two police officers were injured. Several other strikes during the year resulted in damage by workers to factories.

The SPSI maintains international contacts but its only international trade union affiliation as a federation is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Trade Union Council. Some of the SPSI's federated sectoral unions are members of international trade secretariats. The SBSI is affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor and some international trade union secretariats.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Collective bargaining is provided for by law, and the Department of Manpower promotes it within the context of the national ideology, Pancasila. Until 1994 only recognized trade unions--the SPSI and its components--could legally engage in collective bargaining. Since ratifying ILO Convention 87 and issuing a new regulation on union registration in May, the Government has made it possible for new workers' organizations that register with the Government to conclude legally binding agreements with employers.

In companies without unions, the Government discourages workers from utilizing nongovernment outside assistance, e.g., during consultations with employers over company regulations. Instead, the Department of Manpower prefers that workers seek its assistance and believes that its role is to protect workers. There are credible reports that for many companies, consultations are perfunctory at best and usually with management-selected workers; there are also credible reports to the contrary from foreign companies. According to government statistics, approximately 80 percent of the factory-level SPSI units have collective bargaining agreements. The degree to which these agreements are negotiated freely between unions and management without government interference varies. By regulation, negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration. Most negotiations are concluded within the 30-day period. Agreements are for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.

According to NGO's involved in labor issues, in current practice the provisions of collective bargaining agreements rarely go beyond the legal minimum standards established by the Government, and the agreements often merely are presented to worker representatives for signing rather than being negotiated. The SPSI stated in September 1997 that of 23,525 collective bargaining agreements signed between employers and workers, 10,776 of these agreements were only "imitation" agreements because they were concluded in companies where workers were not represented by a union. Although government regulations prohibit employers from discriminating against or harassing employees because of union membership, there are credible reports from union officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including firing, which is not effectively prevented or remedied in practice. Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against contact with union organizers.

Charges of antiunion discrimination are adjudicated by regional and national labor dispute resolution committees, and their decisions can be appealed to the State Administrative Court. In September 1997, the State Administrative Court reversed a national labor dispute resolution board ruling that ordered the Hong Kong Bank to reinstate 166 union members who went on strike, despite government regulations making it illegal to fire workers solely for striking or other union activity. Decisions such as this lead many union members to believe that the dispute resolution committees generally side with employers. As a result, workers frequently present their grievances directly to the National Human Rights Commission, Parliament, and NGO's. Administrative decisions in favor of dismissed workers tend to be monetary awards; workers are rarely reinstated. The law requires that employers obtain the approval of the Labor Dispute Resolution Committee before firing workers, but the law often is ignored in practice.

Commenting on antiunion discrimination and restrictions on the right to organize and bargain collectively, the ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in June expressed the hope that the Government would take the necessary measures in the very near future to bring its legislation, including the 1997 Manpower Law, into conformity with ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively.

In 1996 the Minister of Manpower issued a new regulation permitting unions affiliated with the SPSI to collect union dues directly through the checkoff system, rather than having the Department of Manpower collect dues and transfer them to the SPSI. Implementation of this system remains uneven, but labor observers generally believe that it has given more power to factory-level union units where the checkoff system is practiced. Union officials at SPSI headquarters stated that not all local branches of the unions send a portion of dues collected to regional and central headquarters as provided in the SPSI's bylaws.

The police, as well as the military, continue to be involved in labor matters, although since the mid-1990's there has been a shift from open intervention and demonstrations of force by uniformed troops to less visible measures. Nevertheless, in June army troops guarding a steel plant near Jakarta during a strike fired rubber bullets on striking workers who pelted them with rocks and bottles. Twenty-three workers, as well as 3 soldiers, were injured. On several occasions security personnel interfered with activities of the SBSI (see Section 6.a.). However, the most common form of military involvement in labor matters, according to union and NGO representatives, is a longstanding pattern of collusion between police and military personnel and employers, which usually takes the form of intimidation of workers by security personnel in civilian dress. Employer and union representatives also have complained about the "invisible costs" of corruption, which they and others estimate constitute up to 30 percent of a company's expenses.

Responding to criticism of Indonesian security force intervention in labor matters at the June international labor conference, Minister Idris sent a letter to Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Feisal Tanjung requesting that government agencies allow labor disputes to be settled in accordance with the law by the Department of Manpower. The Coordinating Minister subsequently sent a letter to the Minister of Defense and Security and other government departments requesting that they give attention to Idris' request and implement a policy of permitting industrial disputes to be resolved between workers and employers on the basis of internationally recognized principles. A 1990 decree giving the BAKORSTANAS authority to intervene in strikes in the interest of political and social stability remains in effect.

Labor law applies in export processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country, although nongovernmental observers believe that in practice enforcement of laws in EPZ's is weaker.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law forbids forced labor, and the Government generally enforces it. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but does not always enforce this effectively. There are credible reports that several thousand children are forced to work on fishing platforms off the east coast of North Sumatra in conditions of bonded labor. Most are recruited from farming communities, and once they arrive at the work site, miles offshore, they are held as virtual prisoners and are not permitted to leave for at least 3 months and until a replacement worker can be found. Children receive average monthly wages of $17 to $32, well below the regional minimum wage. They live in isolation on the sea, work 12 to 20 hours per day in often dangerous conditions, and sleep in the workspace with no access to sanitary facilities. There are reports of physical, verbal, or sexual abuse of the children. In November 1997, the Department of Manpower issued a circular letter having the force of law which prohibits the hiring of persons under the age of 14 on fishing platforms. In July Minister Idris told a parliamentary committee that the Government wanted to end child labor on the fishing platforms and to find alternatives for children employed there. In December Minister Idris signed a statement of intent, witnessed by President Habibie and the ILO director in Jakarta, committing the Government to ratify the ILO convention prohibiting forced labor by no later than June 1999.

In East Kalimantan a logging company reportedly has trapped Dayak laborers in a cycle of debt and turned them into bonded laborers (see Section 5).

There were reports in 1997 that the military forced villagers to perform uncompensated labor in Irian Jaya; the military denied such reports (see Section 2.d.).

d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment

Child labor exists in both urban and rural areas, and in both the formal and informal sectors. A survey conducted in 1996 by the Indonesian Child Welfare Association, found that 1.92 million children between the ages of 10 and 14 worked at least 4 hours a day. The Association believes that this figure represents about 8.5 percent of children. However, the total number of working children is probably significantly higher because documents verifying age are falsified easily and because children under age 10 were not included in the survey. This number is believed to have risen still further due to the 1998 economic crisis. Although statistics are not yet available, it is widely agreed that about 2 million children worked at least 4 hours a day in 1998.

Indonesia was one of the first countries to be selected for participation in the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), and it signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO in 1992 to guide collaboration under this program. The Government and the ILO signed another memorandum of understanding on child labor in March 1997, committing them to "promote conditions to enable the Government to protect working children and progressively prohibit, restrict and regulate child labor with a view to its ultimate elimination." In December Minister Idris signed a statement of intent, witnessed by President Habibie and the ILO director in Jakarta, committing the Government to ratify the ILO convention on minimum working age no later than June 1999. Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor inspectors on child labor matters under the IPEC program, enforcement remains lax.

The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of Manpower issued a regulation on "Protection of Children Forced To Work." This regulation legalizes the employment of children under the age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families. It requires parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work, limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the number of children working under its provisions. It does not set a minimum age for children in this category, effectively superseding the colonial-era government ordinance of 1925 on "Measures Limiting Child Labor and Nightwork of Women," which is still the current law governing child labor and sets a minimum age of 12 for employment. The 1987 regulation is not enforced. No employers have been taken to court for violating its restrictions on the nature of employment for children, and no reports are collected from establishments that employ children.

Act No. 1 of 1951 was intended to bring into force certain labor measures, including provisions on child labor that would replace those of the 1925 legislation. However, implementing regulations for the child labor provisions have never been issued. Thus the child labor provisions in the 1951 Act have no validity. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).

The 1997 Manpower Law prohibits employers from hiring children under the age of 15, except that employers may hire children who are forced for economic reasons to work. The new law, which is scheduled to go into effect in 1999, places restrictions similar to those in the 1987 regulation on employers that hire children. It also states that adolescents (ages 15 to 17) cannot work during certain hours of the night, below ground, in mines, or in jobs that would have an adverse effect on morality, such as in entertainment facilities.

According to government labor force data, most working children work in the agricultural sector, although the number of working children in urban areas has risen significantly with urbanization. A prominent NGO estimated in 1998 that 1.92 million children worked more than 4 hours per day. Of this number, 1.67 million worked in rural areas and 249,000 worked in urban areas. According to the NGO's estimates, boy workers outnumbered girl workers in the rural areas: 1.01 million boys worked and 662,000 girls worked. By contrast, girls outnumbered boys in the urban areas: 119,402 boys worked and 130,000 girls worked.

More child laborers work in the informal sector than the formal sector. Where children work in the formal sector, such work tends to occur on the border line between the informal and formal economies, such as alongside their parents in home enterprises and on plantations, and in family-owned shops and small factories, particularly those that are satellites of large industries. There are children working in large factories, although the number is unknown, especially since documents verifying age are falsified easily. In the informal sector, children sell newspapers, shine shoes, help to park or watch cars, and otherwise earn money. Many children work in hazardous conditions as scavengers and garbage pickers, and on fishing platforms and fishing boats. One prominent NGO estimated that in 1998, there were 3,200 children working on offshore fishing platforms, often under adverse conditions. Other estimates are higher (see Section 6.c.). Many domestic workers are female children under the age of 15. Although accurate figures are unavailable, estimates put the number of child domestic workers at up to 1.5 million. Observers agree that this number increased in 1998 as a result of the economic crisis. A survey done in 1995 revealed that these children work long hours, receive low pay, generally are unaware of their rights, and often are far from their families.

A 1994 law raised compulsory education from 6 to 9 years, but the law has not been implemented fully due to inadequate school facilities and lack of family financial resources to support children staying in school. One prominent NGO reported that 8 million children had dropped out of primary school after the economic crisis began in 1997. Some employers hire children because they are easier than adults to manage and tend not to organize or make demands on employers. Children working in factories usually work the same number of hours as adults. Children work in the rattan and wood furniture industries, the garment industry, the footwear industry, food processing, and toy making, among others.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no national minimum wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the supervision of the National Wage Council establish minimum wages for regions and basic needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and shelter. The Government increased the average minimum wage 70 percent (when adjusted for inflation) between 1992 and 1997. However, the high inflation rate in 1998 has depressed sharply the purchasing power of the minimum wage. After the latest minimum wage increases in August, which averaged 15 percent nationwide, the average minimum wage was equal to 76 percent of the government-determined "minimum living need," down from 95 percent in 1997. In Jakarta the monthly minimum wage is about $17 (Rp 198,500). There are no reliable statistics on the number of employers paying at least the minimum wage. Independent observers' estimates range between 30 and 60 percent. Enforcement of minimum wage and other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions are light, although the new Manpower Law, which took effect in October after revisions were made, increased penalties for not paying the minimum wage from about $8 (Rp 100,000) to $17,000 (Rp 200,000,000). According to government figures, 57 companies applied for relief from the minimum wage increases on the ground that they would otherwise close. The Department of Manpower granted 43 of the applications and denied the other 14 requests.

Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and transportation. The law establishes 7- or 8-hour workdays and a 40-hour workweek, with one 30-minute rest period for each 4 hours of work.

The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate is 1¸ times the normal hourly rate for the first hour, and 2 times the hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower and with the agreement of the employee. Workers in industries that produce retail goods for export frequently work overtime to fulfill contract quotas. Observance of laws regulating benefits and labor standards varies from sector to sector and by region. Employer violations of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and employee protests. The Ministry of Manpower continues publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.

Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of industrial health and safety. In January 1997, the Government announced a new occupational safety and health management system under which companies with more than 100 employees could obtain public recognition of their compliance with safety and health standards by submitting to a safety audit procedure. In the largely Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered companies outside the oil sector, the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies greatly. The enforcement of health and safety standards is hampered severely by the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors, as well as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do, but the law is not effectively enforced. As a result, workers who remove themselves from hazardous working conditions may risk loss of employment.

[end of document]

Part I