Source: United Nations War Crimes Commission. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. Volume VIII, 1949

CASE No. 47




Part II

Part I  Part II  Part III  Part IV  Part V  Part VI

The Evidence Before the Tribunal

von Geitner



von Leyser




The Judgment of the Tribunal

The General Nature and Sources of International Law
The Plea of Superior Orders


(iii) Foertsch

The whole period of Foertsch’s stay in the Southeast was in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the Army Group commanding the territory.  

The Chief of Staff was in charge of the various departments of the staff and was the first advisor of the Commander-in-Chief. It was his duty to provide all basic information for decisions by the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible for the channelling of all reports and orders. He had no troop command authority. Neither did he have any control over the legal department which was directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief.  As Chief of Staff he was authorised to sign orders on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief when they did not contain any fundamental decision and did not require the exercise of judgment by the subordinate to whom they were directed.

Furthermore, the accused was on leave at the time of the issuing of List’s order of 5th September, 1941, the distribution of the Keitel Order of 16th September, 1941, and the appointment of Lieutenant-General Boehme as Commander of Military Operations in Serbia.

It was the testimony of Foertsch that the Keitel Order of 16th September, 1941, fixing reprisal ratios from 50 up to 100 to 1, was the basic order under which reprisal measures were carried out in the Southeast. On the other hand the evidence showed many reprisal measures to have been executed prior to the Keitel order, on the reports of which appeared the signature or initials of Foertsch. For all practical purposes, the accused had the same information as the defendants List and Kuntze during their tenures as Wehrmacht Commanders Southeast. He knew of all the incidents described earlier in the outline of evidence dealing with the defendants List and Kuntze. The defendant Foertsch did not, however, participate in any of them. He gave no orders and had no power to do so had he so desired.  

He did distribute some of the orders of the OKW, the OKH and of his commanding generals, including Fieldmarshal Keitel’s order of 28th September, 1941, wherein it was ordered that hostages of different political persuasions such as Nationalists, Democrats and Communists be kept available for reprisal purposes and shot in case of attack, and General Kuntze’s order of 19th March, 1942, wherein it was ordered that more severe reprisals be taken in accordance with a definite ratio “ for instance, 1 German dead-100 Serbs, 1 German wounded-50 Serbs.”

The Commando Order of 18th October, 1942, was distributed by Army Group E commanded by General Alexander Loehr and of which Foertsch was then Chief of Staff. Foertsch stated that he considered this order unlawful in that it called for the commission of offences and crimes under International Law but that he assumed that the issuing of the order was an


answer to similar actions by the enemy in contravention of International Law. It was not shown that the defendant knew that this order was in fact carried out in the territory in which he served. (Footnote 1: According to the Tribunal’s judgment, “ By this order, issued by Hitler in person, all sabotage troops generally referred to as commandos, were to be shot immediately upon capture.” A text of the Order is reproduced in Vol. I of these Reports, pp. 32-3. )  

(iv) von Geitner

During the entire period of his service in the Balkans, the defendant von Geitner served only as a chief of staff to the Commanding General in Serbia or to the Military Commander in Serbia and Military Commander in Southeast. His duties generally concerned operations, supplies, training and organization of troops.

The evidence showed that von Geitner initialed or signed orders issued by his commanding general for the shooting of hostages and reprisal prisoners.(Footnote 2: These orders were deemed by the Tribunal to be “ unlawful when viewed in the light of the applicable international law.") Applications for permission to take reprisal action were referred by the commanding general to a special legal officer who worked on them and submitted the result to the commander. The commander then made the decision and delivered a text to the defendant von Geitner for preparation and approval as to form. The order then was sent on its way through regular channels by von Geitner. No doubt existed that such an order was that of the military commander and that the defendant von Geitner lacked the authority to issue such an order on his own initiative.  The accused claimed that the approval of the form of such orders was the full extent of his participation in the issuing and distributing of reprisal orders.  

(v ) Rendulic

The defendant Rendulic became Commander-in-Chief of the Second Panzer Army on 26th August, 1943, and remained in the position until June 1944. In July 1944 he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Twentieth Mountain Army, a position which he held until January 1945.  In December 1944 he became the Armed Forces Commander North in addition to that of Commander-in-Chief of the Twentieth Mountain Army.  In January 1945 he became Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North, a position which he held until March 1945.

At the time he assumed command of the Second Panzer Army, the head-quarters of the army was in Croatia and its principal task was the guarding of the coast against enemy attacks and the suppression of band warfare in the occupied area. The Italians also had several army corps stationed in the immediately adjacent territory. The danger of the collapse of the Italian government and the possibility that the Italians might thereafter fight on the side of the Allies was a constant threat at the time of his assumption of the command of the Second Panzer Army.

The Hitler order of 16th September, 1941, providing for the killing of 100 reprisal prisoners for each German soldier shot, had been distributed to the troops in the Southeast and, in many. instances, carried out before


the defendant Rendulic assumed command of the Second Panzer Army.  The accused did not attempt to suppress illegal reprisal actions, but instead on 15th September, 1943, he issued an order which in part stated : " Attacks on German members of the Wehrmacht and damages to war-important installations are to be answered in every case by the shooting or hanging of hostages and the destruction of surrounding villages, which later is to take place-if possible-after the arrest of the male population which is capable of bearing arms. Only then will the population inform the German authorities if bandits collect so as to avoid reprisal measures.

“ Unless in individual cases different orders are issued the rule for reprisal measures is : 1 German killed, 50 hostages ; 1 German wounded, 25 hostages shot or hanged. Kidnapping of a German will be considered equal to killing a German if the kidnapped person does not return within a definite period. According to the severity of the attack a hundred hostages will be hanged or shot for each attack against war-essential installations. These reprisal measures are to be executed if the culprit is not caught within 40 hours.”

The reports of the corps commanders subordinate to the defendant revealed that many acts of reprisals were taken in fact against the population by the 173rd and 187th Reserve Divisions for attacks upon troops and military installations. The defendant made no attempt to secure additional details of the killings or to apprehend the guilty. Public proclamations upon the taking of hostages were not made. Previous notice was not given the public that reprisals by shooting would be taken if unlawful acts were repeated. Court-martial proceedings were not held. Hostages, reprisal prisoners and partisans were killed without any semblance of a judicial hearing. There was no requirement that hostages or reprisal prisoners killed should be connected with the offence committed, either passively, or actively, or by proximity.

The accused’s order of 15th September, 1943, was as he maintained, consistent with the orders of Hitler and Keitel and the record did not indicate that he ever issued an order directing the killing of a specific number of hostages or reprisal prisoners as retaliation for any particular offence.  The issuance of such orders was delegated to divisional commanders, whose activities were known to him through reports. He acquiesced in them and took no steps to shape the hostage and reprisal practices in conformity with the usages and practices of war.

The evidence further showed that on 3rd September, 1943, Italy surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The surrender was announced publicly on 8th September, 1943. The defendant testified that this event was anticipated by him as well as the possibility that Italy would become an enemy of the Germans. His testimony was to the effect that the German Army, in performing its task of guarding the coast to prevent an Allied landing, could not tolerate the presence of hostile Italians in these coastal areas.  Holding these definite views of the necessities of the situation, the defendant set about removing the Italians from the coastal areas by making them prisoners of war. He forced General D’Almazzo, Commander of the Italian IXth Army, to sign an armistice with him ; the former had no orders to do this. The accused then received Führer Orders directing that the


officers of all Italian units who had co-operated with insurgents or permitted their arms to fall into the hands of insurgents, were to be shot and that the officers of resisting units who continued their resistance after receipt of a short ultimatum, were also to be shot. The record disclosed that the defendant Rendulic was insistent that his corps commanders carry out these orders “ without any scruples.” Several Italian officers were subsequently shot ; for instance, certain officers of the Bergamo Division of the IXth Army, which had resisted the Germans at Split, were executed after summary court-martial proceedings.

The defendant was also shown to have passed on to troops subordinate to him the Führer Order of 6th June, 1941, providing that all Commissars captured must be shot, when he was in command of the 52nd Infantry Division on the Russian Front. He admitted that the legality and correctness of this order was discussed in army circles and that it was generally considered illegal. He testified that he considered the order as a reprisal measure, the purpose of which was unknown to him. (Footnote l: See p.46, note 2)

There was evidence that, during the retreat of the German troops under Rendulic from Finnmark, much physical destruction was carried out on the latter’s orders in an attempt to extricate the former from a strategically perilous situation arising out of the withdrawal from the war of Finland.

(vi) Dehner

The defendant Dehner was assigned as the commander of the LXIXth Reserve Corps in the last days of August 1943. He held this command until 15th March, 1944. The corps was stationed in Northern Croatia and occupied about one-third of that country. The chief task of this corps was to suppress the guerrilla bands operating in the territory and particularly to guard the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad and the communication lines in the assigned area.

The 173rd and 187th Reserve Divisions, which have been mentioned above in the section setting out the evidence relating to the defendant Rendulic, were directly subordinated to Dehner. (Footnote 2: See p.44) Numerous other and similar offences were committed by troops under his command and the defendant appeared to have made no effort to require reports showing that hostages and reprisal prisoners were shot in accordance with International Law. The defendant attempted to excuse his indifference to these killings by saying that they were the responsibility of the division commanders.  Dehner had knowledge of the offences; on the other hand, there was evidence of attempts on his part to correct certain irregularities connected with the taking of reprisals ; for example in an order of 19th December, 1943, his corps headquarters stated : “ Measures of the  unit have repeatedly frustrated propaganda for the enemy as planned by the unit leadership. It must not happen that bandits who arrive at the unit with leaflets asking them to desert and which should be valid as passes, are shot out of hand. This makes any propaganda effort in this direction nonsensical. . . .”  


(vii) von Leyser

The defendant von Leyser was appointed to command the XXIst Mountain Corps on 1st August, 1944, and continued in the position until April 1945.  Immediately previous thereto he had been in command of the XVth Mountain Corps, a position which he had held since 1st November, 1943. Other former assignments were his command of the 269th Infantry Division In Russia in 1941 and his command of the XXVIth Corps in Russia in 1942.

There was evidence that innocent members of the civilian populations were killed in reprisal for attacks on troops and acts of sabotage committed by unknown persons by troops subordinate to the defendant von Leyser, who admitted that he knew of many such killings. He denied that he ever issued an order to carry out any specific reprisal measure, and contended that this was the responsibility of divisional commanders in conjunction with Croatian government authorities. The record disclosed, however, that on 10th August, 1944, the defendant issued an order containing the following :“ In case of repeated attacks in a certain road sector, Communist hostages are to be taken from the villages of the immediate vicinity, who are to be sentenced in case of new attacks. A connection between these Communists and the bandits may be assumed to exist in every case." (Footnote 1: Of this order the Tribunal said : “ This order is, of course, not lawful. Reprisals taken against a certain race, class or group irrespective of the circumstances of each case, sounds more like vengeance than an attempt to deter further criminal acts by the population. An assumption of guilt on the part of a particular race, class or group of people in all cases also contravenes established rules. This is a matter which a judicial proceeding should determine from available evidence.”)

Shortly after taking command of the XVth Corps, the defendant formulated a plan for the evacuation of the male population between the ages of 15 and 55 from the area between Una and Korana. This territory was supposed to contain about 7,000 to 8,000 men who were partly equipped with arms procured from the Italians. The area had been under the temporary control of the bands to such an extent that the Croat government had complained of its inability to conscript men for military-service from the area: It was planned to crush the bands and evacuate the men and turn them over to the Croatian government for use as soldiers and compulsory labour. The operation was designated as Operation “ Panther ” and was so referred to in the German Army reports. On 6th December, 1943, the Second Panzer Army approved Operation “ Panther.” The operation was carried out but only 96 men fit for military service were captured. The defendant attempted to justify his action by asserting that the primary purpose of the Operation “ Panther ” was the suppression of the bands, that the operation was purely a tactical one so far as he was concerned and that the disposition of the captured population fit for military service was for the decision of the Croatian government and not his concern.  

The evidence also showed that the 269th Infantry Division, commanded by the defendant von Leyser in Russia, killed Commissars pursuant to the Commissar Order.(Footnote 2: The Tribunal said : “ This was a criminal order and all killings committed pursuant to it were likewise criminal. We find the defendant guilty on this charge.” The charge referred to was said to be one of “ issuing the Commissar order of 6th June, 194l,.and causing the same to be carried out while he was in command of the 269th Infantry Division in Russia in 1941.” It would appear from an examination of the Indictment, and of the Tribunal’s summary thereof, that allegations regarding offences committed in Russia would, technically, fall outside its terms.)


(viii) Felmy

The defendant Felmy was appointed Commander Southern Greece at about the middle of June 1941, and continued in the position until August 1942. During this period he had three battalions of security and police troops subordinate to him. On 10th May, 1943 the defendant became commander of the LXVIIIth Corps and continued in that position until the corps withdrew from Greece, an operation which was completed on 22nd October, 1944. In addition thereto on 9th September, 1943, he assumed command of Army Group Southern Greece. He had subordinate to him the 1st Panzer Division, 117th Rifle Division, and a number of fortress battalions. Until the collapse of Italy, two Italian divisions were subordinate to him. The defendant admitted having ordered reprisal measures but denied that they were unlawful. Many other reprisal actions on the part of his troops were brought to his notice in reports made to him.

The evidence showed that the accused received and passed on an order of General Loehr, Commander-in-Chief Southeast, dated 10th August, 1943, which stated in part : “ In territories infested by the bandits, in which surprise attacks have been carried out, the arrest of hostages from all strata of the population remains a successful means of intimidation. Furthermore, it may be necessary, to seize the entire male population, in so far as it does not have to be shot or hung on account of participation in or support of the bandits, and in so far as it is incapable of work, and bring it to the prisoner collecting points for further transport into the Reich. Surprise attacks on German soldiers, damage to German property must be retaliated in every case with shooting or hanging of hostages, destruction of the surrounding localities, etc. Only then will the population announce to the German offices the collections of the bandits, in order to remain protected from reprisal measures.” The defendant also received and passed on the order regarding reprisal measures issued by General Loehr, deputising for Field Marshal von Weichs as Commander-in-Chief Southeast, under date of 22nd December, 1943, an order which has been previously quoted in this opinion. It says in part : “ Reprisal quotas are not fixed. The orders previously decreed concerning them are to be rescinded. The extent of the reprisal measures is to be established in advance in each individual case. . . .  The procedure, of carrying out reprisal measures after a surprise attack or an act of sabotage at random on persons and dwellings, in the vicinity, close to the scene of the deed, shakes the confidence in the justice of the occupying power and also drives the loyal part of the population into the woods.  This form of execution of reprisal measures is accordingly forbidden, If, I however, the investigation on the spot reveals concealed collaboration or a conscientiously passive attitude of certain persons concerning the perpetrators then these persons above all are to be shot as bandit helpers and their dwellings destroyed. . . .  Such persons are co-responsible first of all who recognise Communism.”

The evidence showed many separate reprisal actions by troops subordinate to this defendant. In many instances there was no connection between the inhabitants shot and the offence committed. Reprisals were taken against special groups, such as “ Communists ” and “ bandit suspects ”


without any relationship to the offence being established. Reprisal prisoners were taken from hostage camps generally and at points distant from the place where the offences occurred. It was also shown that in many reprisal actions destruction of property accompanied the mass shootings. 

(ix) Lanz

The defendant Lanz was appointed to command the XXIInd Mountain Corps on 25th August, 1943, and actually assumed the position on 9th September, 1943.

On 3rd October, 1943, the defendant issued an order reading in part as follows : “ On account of the repeated cable sabotage in the area of Arta, 10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Arta, 10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) from Filipias, are to be arrested and kept as hostages. The population is to be notified that for every further cable sabotage 10 of these 40 hostages will be shot to death.”

The defendant denied that any of these hostages were shot and there was no evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, there was proof of many reprisal actions, of the same general type as those already described, having been committed by troops under the accused’s command and with his knowledge and acquiescence.

There was also evidence that a number of Italian officers, whose troops had resisted German requests to surrender with their arms, were shot on the orders of Lanz. It was shown, however, that Lanz acted under orders from Hitler and that, by resisting a previous order, he reduced the number of persons whom he was required to have executed.

(x) Speidel

The defendant Speidel assumed the position of Military Commander Southern Greece in early October 1942, and remained in the position until September 1943. From September 1943 until May 1944 he occupied the position of Military Commander Greece.

That the Military Commander Greece could control the reprisal and hostage practice through the various sub-area headquarters which were subordinate to him was borne out by the testimony of the defendant himself and charts prepared by him. Nevertheless, there was evidence of numerous separate instances of reprisal killings by troops under his command and with his knowledge, the victims often having no connection with any offences committed against the German armed forces and having lived in other districts, and often no court-martial proceedings having been held.


In addition to summarising the evidence which had been placed before it, the Tribunal in its judgment dealt with a number of legal matters, as follows :


(i) The General Nature and the Sources of International Law (Footnote 1: The reader may find it of interest to compare the Tribunal's remarks on these matters with some observations of the Tribunal which conducted the Justice Trial, which are set out in Vol. VI of this series, pp. 34-8)

It seemed to the Tribunal advisable “ to briefly state the general nature of International Law and the sources from which its principles can be ascertained.” It added, however, that :

“ No attempt will be here made to give an all inclusive definition of International Law, in fact, there is justification for the assertion that it ought not to be circumscribed by strict definition in order that it may have ample room for growth. Any system of law that is obviously subject to growth by the crystallisation of generally prevailing custom and practice into law under the impact of common acceptance or consent, must not be confined within the limits of formal pronouncement or complete unanimity. For our purposes it is sufficient to say that International Law consists of the principles which control or govern relations between nations and their nationals. It is much more important to consider the sources from which these principles may be determined.”

The judgment then continued :

“ The sources of International Law which are usually enumerated are : (1) customs and practices accepted by civilised nations generally, (2) treaties, conventions and other forms of interstate agreements, (3) the decisions of international tribunals, (4) the decisions of national tribunals dealing with international questions, (5) the opinions of qualified text writers, and (6) diplomatic papers. These sources provide a frame upon which a system of International Law can be built but they cannot be deemed a complete legal system in themselves.  Any system of jurisprudence, if it is to be effective, must be given an opportunity to grow and expand to meet changed conditions. The codification of principles is a helpful means of simplification, but it must not be treated as adding rigidity where resiliency is essential.  To place the principles of International Law in a formalistic strait-jacket would ultimately destroy any effectiveness that it has acquired. 

  “ The tendency has been to apply the term ‘ customs and practices accepted by civilised nations generally’, as it is used in International Law, to the laws of war only. But the principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilised nations generally. In determining whether such a fundamental rule of justice is entitled to be declared a principle of International Law, an examination of the municipal laws of states in the family of nations will reveal the answer. If it is found to have been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their municipal law, its declaration as a rule of International Law would seem to be fully justified. There is convincing evidence that this not only is but has been the rule. The rules applied in criminal trials regarding burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and the right of a defendant to appear personally to defend himself, are derived from this source. Can it be doubted that 


such a source of International Law would be applied to an insane defendant ? Obviously he would not be subjected to trial during his incompetency. Clearly, such a holding would be based upon a fundamental principle of criminal law accepted by nations generally.  If the rights of nations and the rights of individuals who become involved in international relations are to be respected and preserved, fundamental rules of justice and right which have become commonly accepted by nations must be applied. But the yardstick to be used must in all cases be a finding that the principle involved is a fundamental rule of justice which has been adopted or accepted by nations generally as such.”

(ii) The Plea of Superior Orders

The Judgment then continued

“ The defendants invoke the defensive plea that the acts charged as crimes were carried out pursuant to orders of superior officers whom they were obliged to obey. This brings into operation the rule just announced. The rule that superior order is not a defence to a criminal act is a rule of fundamental criminal justice that has been adopted by civilized nations extensively. It is not disputed that the municipal law of civilised nations generally sustained the principle at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed. This being true, it properly may be declared as an applicable rule of International Law.  

“ It cannot be questioned that acts done in time of war under the military authority of an enemy, cannot involve any criminal liability on the part of officers or soldiers if the acts are not prohibited by the conventional or customary rules of war. Implicit obedience to orders of superior officers is almost indispensable to every military system.  But this implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done pursuant to a superior’s orders be murder, the production of the order will not make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify the crime. We are of the view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior will be protected. But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are bound to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot escape criminal liability by obeying a command which violates International Law and outrages fundamental concepts of justice. In the German War Trials (1921), the German Supreme Court of Leipzig in The Llandovery Castle case (Footnote 1: See the notes to the Stalag Luft III Trial report, in Vol. XI.) said : ‘ Patzig’s order does not free the accused from guilt. It is true that according to para. 47 of the Military Penal Code, if the execution of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the law as is punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order is alone responsible. According to No. 2, however, the subordinate obeying such an order is liable to 


punishment, if it was known to him that the order of the superior involved the infringement of civil or military law.’

“ It is true that the foregoing rule compels a commander to make a choice between possible punishment by his lawless government for the disobedience of the illegal order of his superior officer, or that of lawful punishment for the crime under the law of nations. To choose the former in the hope that victory will cleanse the act of its criminal characteristics manifests only weakness of character and adds nothing to the defence.

“ We concede the serious consequences of the choice especially by an officer in the army of a dictator. But the rule becomes one of necessity, for otherwise the opposing army would in many cases have no  protection at all against criminal excesses ordered by superiors.  

“ The defence relies heavily upon the writings of Professor L.  Oppenheim to sustain their position. It is true that he advocated this principle throughout his writings. As a co-author of the British Manual of Military Law, he incorporated the principle there. It seems also to have found its way into the United States Rules of Land Warfare (1940). We think Professor Oppenheim espoused a decidedly minority view. It is based upon the following rationale : ‘ The law cannot require an individual to be punished for an act which he was compelled by law to commit.’ The statement completely overlooks the fact that an illegal order is in no sense of the word a valid law which one is obliged to obey. The fact that the British and American armies may have adopted it for the regulations of its own armies as a matter of policy, does not have the effect of enthroning it as a rule of International Law. We point out that army regulations are not a competent source of International Law. They are neither legislative nor judicial pronouncements. They are not competent for any purpose in determining whether a fundamental principle of justice has been accepted by civilised nations generally. It is possible, however, that such regulations, as they bear upon a question of custom and practice in the conduct of war, might have evidentiary value, particularly if the applicable portions had been put into general practice. It will be observed that the determination, whether a custom or practice exists, is a question of fact. Whether a fundamental principle of justice has been accepted, is a question of judicial or legislative declaration. In determining the former, military regulations may play an important role but, in the latter, they do not constitute an authoritative precedent.  

“ Those who hold to the view that superior order is a complete defence to an International Law crime, base it largely on a conflict in the articles of war promulgated by several leading nations. While we are of the opinion that army regulations are not a competent source of International Law, where a fundamental rule of justice is concerned, we submit that the conflict in any event does not sustain the position claimed for it. If, for example, one be charged with an act recognised as criminal under applicable principles of International Law and pleads superior order as a defence thereto, the duty devolves upon the Court to examine the sources of International Law to determine the merits


  of such a plea. If the Court finds that the army regulations of some members of the family of nations provide that superior order is a complete defence and that the army regulations of other nations express a contrary view, the Court would be obliged to hold, assuming for the sake of argument only that such regulations constitute a competent source of International Law, that general acceptation or consent was lacking among the family of nations. Inasmuch as a substantial conflict exists among the nations whether superior order is a defence to a criminal charge, it could only result in a further finding that the basis does not exist for declaring superior order to be a defence to an International Law crime. But, as we have already stated,. army regulations are not a competent source of International Law when a fundamental rule of justice is concerned. This leaves the way clear for the Court to affirmatively declare that superior order is not a defence to an International Law crime if it finds that the principle involved is a fundamental rule of justice and for that reason has found general acceptance.

“ International Law has never approved the defensive plea of superior order as a mandatory bar to the prosecution of war criminals. This defensive plea is not available to the defendants in the present case, although if the circumstances warrant, it may be considered in mitigation of punishment under the express provisions of Control Council Law No. 10.” 

Part I  Part II  Part III  Part IV  Part V  Part VI
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©S D Stein
Faculty of Economics and Social Science