S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I)
28 December 1994
Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
established pursuant to
security council resolution 780 (1992)
Annex V
The Prijedor report
Prepared by:
Hanne Sophie Greve
Member and Rapporteur on the Prijedor Project,
Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)
Contributor, Part One:
Mr. Morten Bergsmo, Assistant to the Commission
The statements were collected and presented by Commissioner Hanne Sophie Greve and Assistant to the Commission Morten Bergsmo.
For security reasons, the information gathered from victims and witnesses is kept confidential. These statements are contained in four separate volumes (a total of 911 pages) and are provided exclusively to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY).
Opstina Prijedor is a district located in north-western Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) in an area which is part of Bosnian Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most (to the south), the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east). Except for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations before the armed conflicts started in BiH.
According to the 1991 census, Opstina Prijedor had a total population of 112,470 people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent «Yugoslavs» and 2.2 per cent others (Ukrainians, Russians and Italians). In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately 120,000 people, augmented, inter alia, by an influx of people who had fled the destruction of their villages in areas to the west of Opstina Prijedor.
Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count of June 1993, as published in Serbian-controlled media, gives the following overall picture:
1991 1993 Reduction New arrivals Serbs 47,745 53,637 --- 5,892 Muslims 49,454 6,124 43,330 --- Croats 6,300 3,169 3,131 --- Others 8,971 2,621 6,350 ---Thus, the total number of killed and deported persons as of June 1993 is 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people missing). Since then, the number of non-Serbs in the district has continued to decrease. The extreme persecution to which non- Serbs are subjected and their almost total lack of protection in the district is illustrated by the fact that the ICRC and the UNHCR asked permission from the Serbs, ultimo March 1994, to evacuate all remaining non-Serbs from Opstina Prijedor.
According to Kozarski Vjesnik, a Serbian-controlled newspaper in Opstina Prijedor:
«The man [Simo Drljaca], who the Serbian Democratic Party of the Opstina Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police after half a year of illegal work, had done his job so well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the takeover of power [by the Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The assembly of the Srpske Opstine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him Chief of the public security station [i.e. in charge of the secret police]. He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence his new function in Bijelina on Monday.» *1
More than six months prior to the power change in 1992, the Serbs started to build up their own administration parallel to the legitimate authorities in Opstina Prijedor, what they called the Serbian Opstina Prijedor. This included, inter alia, a pure Serbian police force with secret service functions. The legitimate authorities in Opstina Prijedor had been lawfully elected and the Prijedor Assembly reflected the ethnic composition of the district.
In early 1992, a very small Serbian paramilitary group took control of the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain in Opstina Prijedor. As a consequence, the population in the district could not receive television programmes from Sarajevo or Zagreb any longer, only from Belgrade and later Banja Luka. The television programmes from Belgrade insinuated that non-Serbs wanted war and threatened the Serbs.
Prior to the power change on 30 April 1992, Serbs secretly armed other Serbs in the district. Many soldiers from the JNA withdrew from Croatia to north-western BiH in early 1992. Instead of demobilizing those who returned to Opstina Prijedor, the legitimate authorities were pressured to accept redeploying them to control all inroads to and exits from the district together with police and the TO. The pressure applied was an ultimatum. The legitimate authorities were invited for a guided sightseeing tour of two Croatian villages just north of Bosanska Gradiska which had been destroyed and left uninhabited. The message was that if the ultimatum was not met, the fate of Prijedor would be the same as that of these villages. The ultimatum was accepted.
An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opstina Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel and the telephone system was no longer fully operational. A curfew was introduced in Prijedor town - the main town in the district - and travel permits were required in many areas even to move among local villages. Bus services were closed down.
In the wake of the power change, most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as police, public officials or even manual workers. In all key functions such as police and local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs.
Already before 30 April 1992, Serbs had started to visit the non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demand that they give their weapons up. This process was intensified after the takeover, and combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana or TOs) were instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms.
Also, the local media, Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, joined in the anti non-Serb propaganda. The media slandered former non-Serbian leaders by criticizing everything from their alleged lack of efficiency to their private lives. In addition, the media claimed that many dangerous - in particular Muslim - extremists were in the area, preparing genocide against the Serbs.
Following an incident in which less than a handful Serbian soldiers were shot dead under unclear circumstances, the village of Hambarine was given an ultimatum to hand over a policeman who lived nearby where the shooting had occurred. As it was not met, Hambarine was subjected to several hours of artillery bombardment on 23 May 1992. The shells were fired from the aerodrome Urije just outside Prijedor town. When the bombardment stopped, the village was stormed by infantry, including paramilitary units, which sought out the inhabitants in every home. Hambarine had a population of 2,499 in 1991.
On 24 May 1992, a large-scale attack on the entire Kozarac area east of Prijedor town, under the Kozara Mountain, was carried out with intensive bombardment from all directions by artillery, tanks, and small firearms. The bombardment lasted for more than 24 hours, before infantry and paramilitary groups stormed Kozarac and nearby villages and searched for people in every building. The affected area had a total population of almost 27,000 non-Serbian people.
On 30 May 1992, a group of probably less than 150 armed non-Serbs had made their way to the Old Town in Prijedor to regain control over the town. They were defeated, and the Old Town was razed. In the central parts of Prijedor town, all non- Serbs were forced to leave their houses as Serbian military, paramilitary, police and civilians advanced street by street with tanks and lighter arms. The non-Serbs had been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their homes to signal surrender.
Starting on 20 July 1992, a large area of predominantly non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner to the Kozarac area. However, it was predominantly infantry and paramilitary groups that carried out the destruction. At the time of the attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages west of Opstina Prijedor had been destroyed.
Today, the former homes of almost 47,000 people in the Kozarac and Hambarine/Ljubija areas are empty and destroyed. Some were hit by artillery shells, while others were set ablaze in the initial attack. All the homes were pillaged and a large number blown up, one at a time from inside, destroying especially the inside and the roofs. Most of the artillery used during these attacks had been moved into position some time before the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992.
As non-Serbs were attacked in the villages and Prijedor town, hundreds, possibly thousands, were killed in their home areas, frequently after maltreatment. The survivors who temporarily managed to flee or hide were divided. Females, boys under the age of sixteen (sometimes the age limit may have been lower) and elderly men (older than 60 or 65) made up one group, while the other men comprised the second group.
The second group - the men - were taken to hastily opened concentration camps in a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm, next to Prijedor town and on the premises of the iron ore mine and processing plant at Omarska. Massacres, torture, and appalling living conditions quickly depleted the number of detainees.
In an interview of Simo Drljaca (Chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor), he stated that:
«In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm', and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjaca', on the basis of solid documentation of active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republica Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjaca.» *2
As the «informative talks» or interrogations basically took place in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, it can be concluded that more than 6,000 adult males were taken to these concentration camps in the short period they existed (from the end of May to the beginning of August 1992). Since only 1,503 were moved on to Manjaca camp according to Mr. Drljaca, a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje camp, and almost none released, it may be assumed that the death toll was extremely high, even by Serbian accounts. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. On at least one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of newly captured people being arbitrarily executed en masse. Some 37 women were detained in Omarska, whilst no women were kept over time in Keraterm.
The women's groups (almost all the females, the boys under the age of sixteen and the elderly men) were normally taken to the Trnopolje camp. Here the regime was far better than in Omarska and Keraterm; none the less harassment and malnutrition was a problem for all the inmates. Rapes, beatings and other kinds of torture and even killings were not rare. Some of these detained women were released after a few days as there was a lack of space in the Trnopolje camp as well.
On their way to the concentration camps, some captives were detained for shorter periods at improvised detention facilities such as sports halls in schools and stadiums (notably in the Prijedor suburb of Tukovi, and in Ljubija).
As soon as the Serbs had captured the first groups of non- Serbs, the large-scale deportations of the women's group started. Some were deported straight from the improvised detention facilities, the majority from the Trnopolje camp. The majority of deportees were cramped into buses or onto military trucks and sent towards Travnik. These deportees had to walk almost 30 kilometres from where the trucks and buses dumped them in a desolate area on the outskirts of the Vlasic Mountain, to reach non-Serbian-held areas in central BiH. A few were deported the safer way to Bosanska Gradiska. Sizable numbers were taken by rail - many in cattle wagons - to Travnik, some were let off the trains in Doboj from where they were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla. Some individuals perished during the transport due to the mid-summer heat and next to suffocating conditions both in cattle wagons and on closed military trucks where the deportees were also deprived of food and water.
The Serbs took power in Opstina Prijedor on 30 April 1992, after more than six months of careful planning. After this, the non-Serbs had their homes and communities destroyed, their families split, and their employment denied. The majority of the non-Serbs were soon captured, thousands incarcerated in concentration camps, and even larger numbers deported. This all happened after the Serbs had sealed off most exits from the area. The non-Serbs presented no real threat to the Serbs under these circumstances, the district of Prijedor being surrounded at the time by areas controlled and dominated by the Serbs (the non-Serb majority population in the Sanski Most district was purged simultaneously as in Prijedor).
Despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat, the main objective of the concentration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm, seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership. Political leaders, officials from the courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, key business people and artists - the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities - were removed, apparently with the intention that the removal be permanent. Similarly, law- enforcement and military personnel were targeted for destruction. These people also constituted a significant element of the non- Serbian group in that its depletion rendered the group at large defenceless against abuses of any kind. Other important traces of Muslim and Croatian culture and religion - mosques and Catholic churches included - were destroyed.
From the time when the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, non-Serbs in reality became outlaws. At times, non- Serbs were instructed to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Non-Serbs were subjected to crimes without the new Serbian leaders attempting to redress the problem. For example, rape became a serious problem for many women who were left alone as their husbands had been detained. The impression was allowed to spread among Serbs that they would be exonerated if they made life difficult for non-Serbs so that the latter would ask permission to leave the district. According to new Serbian regulations, those leaving the district had to sign over their property rights to Serbs and accept never to return, being told that their names simultaneously would be deleted from the census.
When the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, they immediately declared the existence of a Crisis Committee of the Serbian district of Prijedor (Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor). Some of the members of this crisis committee were the military commanders Colonel Vladimir Arsic and Major Radmilo Zeljaja, and other district leaders, such as Major Slobodan Kuruzovic; the Chief of Police, Simo Drljaca; Mayor Milomir Stakic; the President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor, Mico Kovacevic; the President of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) in Prijedor, Simo Miskovic; and the President of the Red Cross in Prijedor, Srdjo Srdic.
The military destruction of the non-Serbian habitations in Opstina Prijedor took place when the area was under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsic and Major Radmilo Zeljaja in close cooperation with military superiors, at least in the regional capital Banja Luka. Units stationed outside of Opstina Prijedor assisted in the military destruction, as did paramilitary units whose attacks were timed to fit with the artillery attacks and the manoeuvres of the regular army units.
In the above-mentioned interview, Simo Drljaca stated that:
«[T]hey [the police force (including the secret services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior.
...
... the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups.» *3
The secret police and the military police provided the concentration camps with interrogators and guards. For some of the most gruesome torture and killings of detainees, the assistance of paramilitary units and some locals was also called upon. The joint police and military intervention units were used to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership. The latter units killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manjaca camp and arranged mass-killings of «deported» prisoners in the Vlasic Mountain area.
The other members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor ran the community in which all these violations occurred. They participated in the administrative decision- making. The gains of the systematic looting of non-Serbian property were shared by many Serbs on different levels.
The Commission of Experts possesses the names of hundreds of alleged perpetrators at different levels and in a variety of capacities.
It is unquestionable that the events in Opstina Prijedor
since 30 April 1992 qualifies as crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due
process of law that these events constitute genocide.
«Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.»
-William Shakespeare, Hamlet
The Commission of Experts has been mandated to examine and analyze information gathered and to pursue actively its investigations with regard to, in particular, the practice of «ethnic cleansing».
This initial analysis of the context of the events in Opstina Prijedor is based on almost 400 statements by surviving victims of and witnesses to these events currently living in different countries, local Serbian media reports of the events and research into the context of the events. The statements from almost 400 victims and witnesses are contained in four separate confidential volumes.
The hundreds of informants presented descriptions of different parts of the events and also various versions of the events - differences appear, however, only as far as details are concerned. When it comes to the overall and general picture, the witnesses speak as if with one voice - as the case often is with the expression of the collective memory of a population having shared in a major painful event. More often than not, available Serbian media reports and statements made by Serbian leaders to foreign visitors to the area - official delegations among them - support the general overall information obtained from the victims and witnesses.
When mapping experts map out alien territory, the obligatory reservation on each map reads, «Compiled in 19.. from best available source material». A similar reservation is necessary concerning the accuracy of this analysis. The analysis is, save for the reproduction of generally available facts, based on allegations. As always in criminal cases, the judgement is for the court to make under due process of law.
An opstina is an administrative unit in the former Yugoslavia. The neutral translation is a district.
Opstina Prijedor is located in north-western BiH in an area which is part of Bosanska (i.e. Bosnian) Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most to the south, the BiH- Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional «capital» of Banja Luka to the east. Save for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations prior to the disintegration of and violence in the former Yugoslavia.
More important in the context of the events from 1992 onward, Opstina Prijedor as part of north-western BiH is clearly located inside any corridor that Serbs could want to clear between Serbia proper and the Serbian-occupied Croatian Krajina. One obstacle to such a corridor is that when crossing the Drina River (the frontier between Serbia proper and BiH) and moving westward through BiH towards the Croatian Krajina region, the population - before the violence started in 1992 - was multi- ethnic and the Serbs were not even a majority in many of these areas. Any Serbian demands for territory for a corridor was thus unlikely to gain political support in BiH. In 1993, Serbian military leaders in Banja Luka acknowledged the need for the conquest of a corridor as mentioned. It was a prerequisite for the «bringing in of humanitarian assistance».
The district Prijedor has one main town, which is also named Prijedor, two smaller towns called Ljubija and Kozarac, and numerous villages and hamlets. The Sana River flows through the district (which has a shape that resembles an irregular vertical rectangle) from the west towards the centre, and then bending to the south. Prijedor Grad (i.e. town) is located in the valley of the river, where the Sana River bends to the south. There is a large artificial lake for fishfarming to the south-east of Prijedor town. The district is mountainous especially in the northern and western areas, with the Kozara Mountain in the north and parts of the Majdanska Mountain in the south-west. The mountains are forested.
Opstina Prijedor, according to the 1991 census, had a total population of 112,470 people of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent «Yugoslavs», and 2.2 per cent others (Ukrainians, Russians, and Italians). «Serb» is considered synonymous to Orthodox, and «Croat» is considered synonymous to Catholic. «Yugoslavs» were people of mixed ethnic/religious parentage, and people who for conscientious and/or political reasons did not want to declare themselves by ethnic/religious groups. Muslims probably counted for the majority of the «Yugoslavs».
Many people have stated that it never occurred to them that serious difficulties between the ethnic groups - not to say war - ever could happen in the area. None have said the opposite.
In early April 1992, the total population may have been
approximately 120,000 people due to an influx of refugees from
Opstina Bosanski Novi (see Chapter
Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a
population count of June 1993 as published by the Serbs, give the
following overall picture:
In general, it is claimed that the population of BiH,
heterogeneous as far as religions are concerned, had developed a
unique and cohesive regional identity and culture. The people of
BiH for centuries coexisted in a pluralistic society. One
illustration of this is their proverb, «Sto sela, sto obicaja»
(i.e. «One hundred villages, one hundred habits»). According to
the 1991 census, more than one-fourth of the entire population in
BiH had mixed ethnic/religious parentage. To many there were no
marked differences between the ethnic/religious groups, save that
Muslims could usually be recognized by their names.
Traditionally, both Croats and Serbs have claimed that the
Muslims in BiH were actually Croats and Serbs respectively, of
the Islamic faith. The Muslims have preferred to call themselves
Bosniaks, a name with an ethnic rather than religious
connotation.
Prior to the 1960s, the Muslims were ethnically undeclared
in population counts, or they opted for the denomination
«Yugoslav». In the 1961 census, they were for the first time
allowed to register as «Muslims in the ethnic sense». In the
1971 census, Muslims were included as a distinct and equal
nationality in all of the former Yugoslavia. Many people from
BiH considered this move by Tito, in his old age, to be a trap.
Why not let the people in BiH call themselves Bosnians as they
wanted to, regardless of whether they were Muslims, Catholics or
Orthodox? This way the people were forced into different groups,
which created partially artificial linkage between Bosnian Serbs
and Serbs elsewhere and Bosnian Croats and Croats elsewhere,
rather than emphasizing the existing ties internally in BiH.
In retrospect, many of the refugees and deportees speak
about what happened in Opstina Prijedor and elsewhere in BiH as
an effort by those opposed to its pluralistic culture to dismiss
the Bosnian soul (istjerati bosanski duh).
In 1574, Sultan Selim II issued a decree awarding tax
privileges to Gypsy miners (inter alia, to Gypsies working in an
iron ore mine near Banja Luka, possibly the mine - which is said
to be very old - in Ljubija in Opstina Prijedor, see Chapter
II.D. infra). This is considered as the first recorded specific
reference to Gypsies in BiH. The Gypsies had more or less the
same rights as their Muslim or Christian brethren respectively.
The majority of Gypsies in BiH were Muslim. During World War II,
the Gypsies were targeted both by the Ustase and the Cetniks, and
numbers of survivors took refuge in north-western BiH.
Opstina Prijedor is subdivided in the following naselje
(i.e. towns and villages):
Opstina Prijedor had a remarkably high percentage of
Partisans (from all the different ethnic groups) during World War
II. The district was the first to be a liberated Partisan area
in 1942. It was recaptured by German, Ustasa, and to a lesser
extent Cetnik forces, with many people killed not the least - but
not only - Serbs. Both the World War II heros Esad Midzic
(Muslim) and Mladen Stojanovic (Serb) were locals. They even had
a song about the Cetniks killing the latter. Kozarac has a war
monument which reportedly surpasses any other war monument in the
former Yugoslavia.
The district at large was anti-German during World War II.
It is said that the word Cetnik is a traditional term for
the much-heroicized bandit fighters of earlier Serbian history.
There were Serbian veterans from World War I who called
themselves Cetniks. Many other Serbian groupings also made claim
to the Cetnik name during World War II. The main Cetnik movement
during World War II was that formed by the royalist, Yugoslav
Army colonel, General Draza Mihailovic. With reference to the
latter group of Cetniks, Noel Malcolm writes:
The name Cetnik awakens different emotions and allows for
different interpretations. For some people, it is a genuinely
patriotic and decent concept also in terms of fundamental respect
for human beings as such. For others, and possibly most people
due to the main events during World War II, it is as ominous and
horrifying as Fascist and Nazi - associated with destruction and
death for any and all envisaged enemies. The Cetnik concept
reinvigorated and incarnated by the Serbs in the 1990s in BiH has
gathered followers among Serbs of different interpretational
creeds, but in practical terms the re-awakened Cetniks have taken
up only the most gruesome of the Cetnik traditions - linking the
name once again to barbarious behaviour. Among non-Serbs in BiH,
the word Cetnik is used in the vernacular as a generic term for
evil.
The modern iron ore mine in Opstina Prijedor was started
in 1916 by the Austrians. Up to World War II, the leaders were
Western-oriented, after the war the orientation shifted towards
Belgrade and the USSR. Up to World War II, the production was
some 300-400 tons a year. In the late 1980s, the production was
three million tons a year: Rudnika (the mine) Ljubija was the
largest and most important mine in the former Yugoslavia and one
of the largest in Europe, and in terms of the quality of the
metals produced, the mine was considered second only to the one
in Kiruna, Sweden.
More than 85 per cent of the directors of the mine were
Serbs, the rest were Muslims. Rudnika Ljubija was divided into
three different main production areas: Ljubija, Tomasica and
Omarska. The latter was the larger where the largest investments
had been made. The mining company was in charge of all the three
areas. The distance between the most distant part of the mines
in Ljubija and Omarska was approximately 30 kilometres. In the
late 1980s, the mine was fully modernized. All the republics in
the former Yugoslavia had invested in the latest upgrading of
Omarska. The mining company, Rudnika Ljubija, had 5,000
employees. Most of the Croatian and Muslim workers in the mine
in the early 1990s have now been killed or deported.
In addition to Rudnika Ljubija, there were smaller plants
and production units in Opstina Prijedor. The second largest
enterprise was Celpak producing cellulose and paper. The paper
mill was located on the outskirts of Prijedor town, to the south.
It had 3,000 employees. There were also many small saw mills
spread around in the forested parts of the district, including in
the Kozarac area.
Several small factories were producing their goods (such
as biscuits, soft-drinks, etc.) mainly for local consumption.
The agricultural production was good, and animal husbandry played
a significant economic role. Citopromet consisted of a flour
mill and a bakery employing some 800 people.
Located in between and linking the nearby towns of Banja
Luka, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, and Bosanska Dubica, Opstina
Prijedor offered employment in the transport section and related
services. A railway crosses through Opstina Prijedor from east
to west. The Kozarac area with the Kozara Mountain and the World
War II memorial attracted tourists.
It was first in the early 1990s that nationalist political
parties had been established. These parties had not existed one
year earlier. There was initially a reasonable relationship
between the Muslim party, called the Party of Democratic Action
(Stranka Demokratske Akcije, the SDA), and the main Serbian
party, named the SDS, in Prijedor. This, however, changed
especially after Vojislav Seselj came to several SDS meetings and
expressed surprise that the Serbs could live in such harmony with
the non-Serbs.
In the local elections in Prijedor in 1990, the SDA won.
Following the local elections, the Prijedor Assembly of a total
of 90 seats had 30 representatives from the SDA, 28
representatives from the SDS, two representatives from the
Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, the
HDZ), and 30 representatives from the other, mainly leftist
parties, including the Political Action Party (Stranka Politicke
Akcije, the SPA), where the Serbs counted for the majority.
Although the Serbs made up only 42.5 per cent of the
population in Opstina Prijedor, they traditionally held almost
all key positions in the Opstina. The legacy from the Communist
era - part and parcel of which had been the distribution of all
leading positions to trusted party members - was not altered
considerably after the first free elections. The Serbs said that
Prijedor had been Serbian, and would remain Serbian. Thus, the
Serbs tended to block proposals made by Muslims or Croats in the
Assembly in Prijedor. The Serbs more or less tried to obstruct
the work of the Assembly as such. To avoid conflict, the others
more often than not let the Serbs have it their way. Thus, the
Muslims also refrained from asking to take over a number of
leading positions to which the election victory actually entitled
them.
The Muslims were 44 per cent of the population, but held
only a limited number of leading positions. It is claimed that
from a total of 200 plants, only three were Muslim and two
Catholic (i.e. Croatian). The Serbs were not underprivileged.
Conversely, the Serbs held almost 90 per cent of the key
positions.
In Prijedor, Marko Pavic was alfa et omega in the SDS; he
had previously been mayor of the town. He studied law at the
University of Zagreb. He worked for the police and the «Federal
Security Service» (the Secret Service of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) which had close ties to the JNA
(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, i.e. the Yugoslav People's Army).
Marko Pavic established the Reformist Forces Party (a reformed
Communist party) in Prijedor before he joined the SDS. At the
time when the Serbs took power in Opstina Prijedor, he was
director of the post, telephone and telegraph in the district.
Allegedly, he played a pivotal role in the power change.
Reportedly, Serbian de facto control of the post was used to
facilitate financial transactions needed in this period.
Apparently, the post office under the leadership of Marko Pavic
was used, among other things, to channel and launder money during
the advent of the Serbian takeover, and in the time following the
power change.
Key Serbian people in commercial and service activities in
Opstina Prijedor were:
Radio Prijedor and the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik were
directed by three Serbs (whose names are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). Twice a week they
were driven in a Mercedes with drivers in JNA uniforms with the
Yugoslav flag, without the Red Star, on their hats and jackets,
to the main front in Croatia at Pakrac.
Telford Taylor stated the following prior to the Nuremberg
trials:
The question of responsibility for causing the war/wars in
the former Yugoslavia is not addressed by the United Nations
Commission of Experts. It may, however, be useful for the
general understanding of the context of the events in Opstina
Prijedor to include a brief presentation of some relevant
information concerning the political and military background to
the catastrophe.
According to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), dated 1974, Basic Principle I:
Article 1 of the Constitution continues:
In March 1989, the Serbian Assembly passed constitutional
amendments which abolished the political autonomy of Vojvodina
and Kosovo.
On 9 January 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY decided to
arm paramilitary groups (primarily to counterbalance the Croatian
national defence). Only about one month later, President
Slobodan Milosevic reportedly delivered a speech on television
stating that, inter alia:
The Muslims and Croats wanted cooperation between and
coexistence among the different ethnic groups in BiH. A number
of Serbs dreamt of establishing Greater Serbia - a 600-year old
dream. The once huge Serbian empire broke up soon after the
death in 1355 of its creator, Stephen Dusan - King of Serbia.
Nationalism in Serbia reached a new height in 1989, 600 years
after the battle at Kosovo Polje (i.e. the field of Kosovo).
President Milosevic went there to commemorate the 600th
anniversary and then told the people what he wanted to achieve.
Large numbers of Cetniks, possibly from different schools of
thought, participated in the commemoration, sporting their Cetnik
emblems and uniforms. Later, the general policy became
increasingly nationalistic. Various kinds of Cetnik meetings
were held. Suddenly, many people started whispering. The SDS
made public statements to the effect that they wanted peace, but
hardly ever tolerated a meeting in the parliament in BiH to be
properly concluded.
The Orthodox church celebrates Christmas on 6 January.
Even during that religious feast, Serbs went around shouting and
singing an old Cetnik song from World War II, «Od Topole pa do
Ravna Gora svud su straze Denerala Draza» («All the way from
Topolje to Ravna Gora General Draza has his guards»). This was
considered a highly ominous sign by the non-Serbs. Previously,
such Cetnik songs had been banned in public.
When the war in Croatia started in August 1991, it was
followed by general tension between the Serbs on the one side and
Croats and Muslims on the other. Life became more difficult also
in Prijedor. The Muslims and Croats did not want to join the
Serbs in their fighting in Croatia against the Croats.
As the war in Croatia ended, the Serb-controlled JNA
withdrew in part to or through BiH.
In elections held in BiH, on 18 November and 2 December
1990, the parties received votes reflecting the ethnic
composition of the population.
The Republic's Constitution stipulated that decisions of
vital importance to BiH needed consensus of the Muslims, Serbs,
and Croats in the Republic.
In April 1991, Serbian politicians in Banja Luka initiated
the proclamation of the Bosanska Krajina Srpska Autonomna Oblast
(SAO, i.e. Serbian autonomous region). Opstine Banja Luka,
Glamoc, Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica,
Bosanska Gradiska, Srbac, Prnjavor and Celinac all wanted to join
this SAO. Opstine Prijedor and Sanski Most did not join. The
decision to enter the SAO was made by the respective Opstina
assemblies after informal discussions.
On 14 November 1991, the Constitutional Court in BiH
declared the so-called SAOs unconstitutional.
On 9 January 1992, the «Assembly of the Serbian People in
Bosnia and Hercegovina» adopted a «Declaration on the
Proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
Hercegovina». The «Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Hercegovina» described itself as «a legitimate, freely and
democratically elected representative and protector of the
Serbian people», and stated that by adopting the Declaration, it
was «implementing its [the Serbian people's] will expressed in a
plebiscite [see Chapter III.E. infra], and the decision based on
this plebiscite to form the »Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Hercegovina«, or as stated in the Declaration Article I, »on the
basis of the plebiscite held on 9 and 10 November 1991, at which
the Serbian people decided to remain in the joint State of
Yugoslavia«. The members of the Assembly were the Serbian
politicians who had been elected to the Parliament in BiH. The
Declaration was to enter into force on the day of adoption.
According to Article II of the Declaration, the new
Republic would remain within the Yugoslav Federal State as one of
its units. Pending the promulgation of its own legislation, the
new Republic was to apply federal regulations in its territory,
as well as the regulations of the Socialist Republic of BiH as
far as the Assembly did not deem the latter regulations contrary
to the federal Constitution (see Article VIII).
The new Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
Hercegovina was established in the territories «of the Serbian
autonomous areas in the region and of other Serbian ethnic
entities in Bosnia and Hercegovina, including the regions in
which the Serbian people remained in minority due to the genocide
conducted against it in World War Two» (see Article I).
The Serbian point of view is that it was the Muslim and
Croatian majority in BiH which acted in an illegal and
illegitimate manner by requesting international recognition of
BiH as an independent State. In other words, the Serbs claimed
that by remaining within the Yugoslav Federation, they did not
make an unlawful disassociation from the rest of BiH. As far as
the Serbs were concerned, they were still a part of the Yugoslav
Federation even after BiH gained international recognition as an
independent State.
On 15 January 1992, the Serbs in BiH withdrew the
proclamation of an independent republic and wanted thence to
negotiate for a cantonisation based on ethnic division.
On 13 February 1992, a dialogue was started between the
three parties - the SDS (the Serbs), the SDA (the Muslims) and
the HDZ (the Croats) - in BiH concerning the future of the
Republic.
On 28 February 1992, the «Assembly of the Serbian People
in Bosnia and Hercegovina» adopted a «Decision on the
Proclamation of the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Hercegovina» (as proclaimed in January the same year
under the name the «Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Hercegovina»). By a later amendment to the Constitution,
Amendment VI dated 12 August 1992, the name of the Republic was
once again altered from the «Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Hercegovina» (SRBiH) to the «Republic of Srpska».
On 22 February 1992, a meeting was held in Lisbon between
the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats concerning the future of BiH. An
agreement was reached that the Republic should be upheld within
its existing borders with a Swiss-style cantonisation solution
for dividing up the Republic on the basis of ethnic groups.
According to an article by Slobodan Kljakic printed by the
Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia (i.e. Serbia
proper):
On 7 April 1992, an Assembly of the Serbian People in
Bosnia and Hercegovina declared the independence of the SRBiH.
On 15 April 1992, the Presidency of the SRBiH proclaimed
the immediate danger of war and gave an order of mobilization.
On 27 May 1992, deputies from the parliaments of the
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new Yugoslavia.
The new country was named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY); its flag would continue to be the horizontal blue, white
and red bands, but without the red star.
On 30 April 1992, the Republic of BiH was accepted - with
the consent of Belgrade - as a full member of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
The basic version of the Serbian coat of arms is a double-
headed eagle with a shield and four crescent-shaped flints, two
pointing to the east and two to the west. There are two
explanations as to why the Byzantine double-headed eagle has its
two heads. One interpretation is that the two heads symbolize
two powers; the other is that one head looks to the east and the
other head looks to the west. Each crescent-shaped flint looks
much like a C. Today the most powerful example of Serbian
ichnography is said to be the symmetrical cross adorned with four
Cs (the Cyrillic letter S), the two left-hand ones being printed
as mirror images of the right-hand ones. It is referred to as an
acronym for the phrase «Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava» (i.e. «Only
Unity Can Save the Serbs»). The Cs may, however, also be an
acronym for the phrase «Saint Sava is the patron saint of the
Serbs».
On 9 and 10 November 1991, the «Assembly of the Serbian
People in Bosnia and Hercegovina» of which the members of the the
SDS comprised the majority, organized a plebiscite in BiH which
was considered unconstitutional by the Croatian and Muslim
members of the government in BiH. The question posed read:
More than 98 per cent of the participants answered yes.
The number of people who went to the polls corresponded with
about 85 per cent of the approximately 800,000 Serbs who were
eligible to vote. In the plebiscite, the Serbs had blue ballot
papers, while the non-Serbs had yellow. According to the Serbs,
the different colours were to distinguish between the different
ethnic groups as the non-Serbs were given a ballot paper where
the question was slightly different from the question to the
Serbs, to reflect that these voters were non-Serbs. The non-
Serbs perceived the difference as an example of discrimination
against them, and even more so as the names of everyone voting
were marked in the census.
Due to arguably different standing under international
law, the Serbs decided to use a plebiscite form in
contradistinction to a referendum.
When the Serbs were preparing their plebiscite (in
November 1991), they went from house to house and counted the
electorate. The non-Serbs charge that the Serbs included also
those under-age down to children, Serbs from Serbia, and Serbs
living abroad. (Among those active in the process were allegedly
Dusan, alias Dule, Tadic from Kozarac - see Chapter VII.B. infra
- and at least one of his immediate family members.) It was
allegedly a strong Serbian pressure for all Serbs to vote.
The European Community (EC) required a referendum in BiH
as a pre-condition for recognition of BiH as an independent
State. In the referendum, the people would be asked if they were
in favour of a unified and sovereign BiH.
On 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum was held in
BiH concerning the independence of the Republic. Participating
were 63.4 per cent of the electorate, and of those more than 99
per cent voted in favour of independence. The election committee
was the same as for the 1990 general elections.
Radovan Karadzic ordered all Serbs (approximately 32 per
cent of the population in BiH) to boycott the referendum. As
Serbs allegedly were threatened by fellow Serbs that they might
even lose their jobs if they participated in the referendum;
some, it is said, avoided the problem by arranging sick leaves.
Most Serbs, thus, did not participate in the referendum, and it
was commented on by their own people if they did. A member of
the election committee in Opstina Prijedor later commented that
she had a feeling that her Serbian colleagues knew already what
was going to happen.
Radovan Karadzic later used the lack of Serbian
participation in the referendum to dismiss it as unconstitutional
although there was an overwhelming independence vote by the
Croats and the Muslims (and other smaller groups). In this
context, it ought to be remembered that the Serbs unilaterally
had changed the status of the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo
and Vojvodina respectively bringing them directly under Serbian
control without paying adequate attention to the will of the
people in those provinces and the formal procedures for such
changes as enacted in the Constitution of the SFRY. This
happened way before any of the republics opted for independence.
After the referendum, the Muslims and Croats in BiH
favoured the withdrawal of the JNA, whereas the Serbs were
against it.
In March 1992, the legal BiH authorities were still in
power also de facto. The chairman of the election committee in
Opstina Prijedor for the legal referendum in BiH was later killed
in Logor (i.e. the camp) Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. infra).
His name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons. His name was called out three times in Logor Omarska.
The first time he was beaten and maltreated so that his body had
turned black when he was returned to the room where he was
detained. Returning the second time he could hardly move at all.
The third time his name was called out, he did not return. All
the other members of the election committee were also detained in
Logor Omarska. Their names are not disclosed for confidentiality
or prosecutorial reasons. One, a man, was half blind, but he
was a judge held in high esteem and chairman of the court. He
was also killed in Logor Omarska. The three others are women who
survived the horrors of Logor Omarska.
From the early 1980s until the disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia started, there had been a limited military
presence in Opstina Prijedor.
There were primarily a few soldiers guarding a small air
field, called Urije, where there was a military cache. The Urije
aerodrome was used for sports planes and located close to
Prijedor town. The main military barracks were also located in
the Urije area, near the aerodrome. In addition to a partisan
brigade, the JNA had a motorized brigade in Prijedor. The JNA
was officially considered as a Yugoslav entity, but in reality it
was fully Serb-controlled, that is a full-fledged Serbian army.
The TO was an integrated part of the SFRY military system.
The TOs were locally recruited to serve in their home areas.
They received some basic military instruction and served in the
TO when called upon. Save for a state of emergency, they
retained their civil functions when enrolled in the TO.
Only four per cent of the Muslims in Prijedor had been
licensed to have weapons. Many Muslims and Croats had had their
applications for a license to carry arms turned down without any
reason given. This was in contradistinction to Serbs, who
normally would be granted permission to have weapons if they
asked.
As early as 1991, the Serbs organized an alternative and
pure Serbian administration in Opstina Prijedor, or rather in
what they called the Srpske (i.e. the Serbian ) Opstine Prijedor.
People in Opstina Prijedor were aware of this, but they did not
take it seriously. The Serbian Assembly first met in a community
building close to Urije, and later the meetings were moved to a
building in Cirkin Polje. The members of the Serbian Assembly in
Prijedor were under guidance from a central administration in
Banja Luka. The Serbian Mayor was Dr. Milomir Stakic from the
SDS who functioned as Deputy Mayor within the elected authorities
of Opstina Prijedor
Possibly in February 1992, so-called «Crisis Committees»
(Krizni Stab) were established by the Serbs. There was a central
«Crisis Committee» in Prijedor town, and other additional
committees in different parts of the town, and in other towns and
villages. In the beginning, the headquarters of the central
«Crisis Committee» was in Urije, but later it was moved to Cirkin
Polje. There are indications that in February 1992, the most
important members of the central «Crisis Committee» were:
Probably in the summer of 1991, a heavy armour brigade
(with tanks) - the Pancevo Brigade (or parts of this brigade)
from Serbia - came to Prijedor where it was well-received by the
Serbs. The pretext for its arrival was the war in Croatia, but
the Pancevo Brigade did not primarily become involved in the that
war. It established itself at the aerodrome Urije. In general,
the JNA was still held in high esteem by the people at large.
During the war in Croatia, numerous tanks from Banja Luka passed
through Prijedor on their way to Kostajnica, Petrinja and
Karlovac. Some units were allocated to Prijedor.
In 1992, an artillery unit of the JNA, which had
participated in the war in Croatia, took up a strategic position
in Benkovac on the Kozara Mountain. The Serbs also brought
artillery into other areas which would be strategic positions if
one would consider attacking Kozarac (see Chapter VII.B. infra).
Canons and a big number of tracked vehicles were brought
to Prijedor by railway in the first months of 1992.
Some time before the Serbs took power, some 200 Serbian
soldiers came from outside to stay in Hotel Prijedor in Prijedor
town. They were a special forces unit, more disciplined than
other soldiers. They were well-behaved and did not associate
with others. By mid-May 1992, it is claimed that it was
Arkanovci (Arkan's paramilitary men, see Chapter V.C. infra) who
stayed in Hotel Prijedor.
The discipline of the soldiers staying in Hotel Prijedor
stood in stark contrast to the general impression of other
soldiers in the area at the time who were often drunk and ill-
behaved, especially the soldiers returning from the war in
Croatia. It was common that soldiers on their way to the front
at Lipik/Pakrac in Croatia were troublesome and even fired their
weapons randomly. During the war in Croatia, Serbian soldiers
also used the Prijedor area for rest and recuperation, much to
the dislike of the local inhabitants.
Due initially to the war in Croatia, there were many
military men in Opstina Prijedor and especially in the regional
centre in Banja Luka, but also in the other neighbouring
districts. This augmented military presence proved useful for
the Serbs when they took power on 30 April 1992.
In mid-April 1992, the Serbs arranged for roadblocks to be
erected on all main roads to and from Opstina Prijedor (see
Chapter IV.G. infra). It started to become more difficult to
travel even earlier, due in part to the war in Croatia and the
related massive movements of troops and military equipment.
Belgrade Radio, on 14 April 1992, broadcasted that within
troubled multi-ethnic BiH, «movement is strangled by Serbian
roadblocks».
On 28 April 1992, there was a regular programme on Radio
Prijedor with guests in the studio. The guests were Simo
Miskovic (from the SDS), Mirza Mujadzic (from the SDA, see
Chapters VI.A. and VII.D. infra) and Drasko Velaula (from the
leftist party, the SPA). The question to be debated was the
influence of the general situation in BiH on life in Prijedor.
By then Opstina Prijedor had started to experience a virtual
blockade of communication with Sarajevo. The programme was
prolonged by one hour. It was closed by an assurance given by
Simo Miskovic and Mirza Mujadzic that people could sleep well -
«This is Opstina Prijedor with its Kozara brotherhood, we shall
continue to live peacefully as we always have!»
There never were United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs)
stationed in Opstina Prijedor. On 28 April 1992, the UNMOs in
nearby Banja Luka were withdrawn due to the dangers inherent in
their continued presence.
The television relay station is situated near Lisina,
where the peak of the mountain is 978 metres above sea level, and
called Mali Vis.
The Serbs took control of the relay station/television
transmitter on the Kozara Mountain possibly some time between 21
and 28 March 1992 (possibly earlier, see the next paragraph
infra). At this time, the studio in Banja Luka was also under
the firm control of Serbs. The transmitter on the Kozara
Mountain was taken over by paramilitary Cetnik units from
Lamovita, Bistrica, and Omarska, allegedly supported by special
Units of the JNA in Banja Luka. They disarmed the local guards
and forced the personnel to change the programmes together with
some Serbian technicians. The paramilitary units mentioned were
not the so-called «Wolves» from Prnjavor.
The «Wolves» from Prnjavor or rather Vukovi sa Vucjaka
(i.e. the «Wolves from Vucjaka») took their name from the Vucjaka
Mountain near Prnjavor. Apparently, this group was also at one
time involved in taking control of the television transmitter on
the Kozara Mountain - maybe at an earlier time. These
paramilitary fighters were dressed in camouflage uniforms having
a badge with a wolf on their upper arms. Following subsequent
protests the JNA said that it was unable to control the «Wolves»,
although close by the television transmitter there was a JNA unit
stationed. The police in Prijedor warned a group from a local
peace movement not to approach the «Wolves» or the television
transmitter as «something unfortunate might happen».
As a consequence, the people of Opstina Prijedor could no
longer receive any television programmes from Sarajevo (only from
Belgrade and Pale, and later also from Banja Luka). As with all
other controlled transmitters, the one on the Kozara Mountain was
now operational only for transmissions from Serbian-controlled
television stations - neither Sarajevo nor Zagreb. The local
Serbian military said that they would take action to retake
control of the transmitter, but no efforts were made.
Like in the preparation for other wars, the programmes
transmitted became more and more militant. Much propaganda was
also broadcast. It was repeatedly broadcast that one ought to be
terribly afraid of Muslims, Albanians, Croats and Slovenians -
only Serbs and Montenegrins were not dangerous. The Serbs and
the Montenegrins were the defenders of Yugoslavia. Non-Serbs
will insist that the latter was not true, most people favoured
Yugoslavia as such - but leading Serbs were striving for Greater
Serbia.
When the Serbs took over control of the transmitter on the
Kozara Mountain, they already had full control over the main
relay station for the whole of BiH on the Vlasic Mountain.
The Muslims who made up the majority of the political
leaders were blamed for everything that came with economic
crisis, especially unemployment and inflation. In addition, they
were branded as extremists, meaning Muslim fundamentalists or
rather violent fanatics. The Croats were discredited as Ustase
wanting revenge over Serbs for what had happened in the war in
Croatia with Serbs taking power in Knin and Vukovar and other
areas. Non-Serbs were portrayed as savages to be feared at the
same time as they were used as scapegoats.
Anxiety was building up in the police force for some
months prior to the change of power on 30 April 1992. The Serbs
were talking about dividing the police stations. The Serbs did
not come regularly to work as they had to attend meetings most of
the time. There was a lot of secrecy.
In this period, the Serbs were actually secretly setting
up nine new police stations. At the time, there were only four
police stations in Opstina Prijedor: in Prijedor town, in the
towns of Ljubija and Kozarac, and in Omarska village.
Austrian Television reported on 1 April 1992 that Serbs
left the police force in BiH to form their own purely Serbian
police force. This parallelled the actions of Serbian police in
Croatia at the outset of the crisis in that Republic.
According to an interview which journalist Sinisa
Vujakovic had with Simo Drljaca (chief of the Serbian secret
police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine
Prijedor, see Chapter V.B. infra) printed in the Serbian-
controlled Kozarski Vjesnik:
The Serbian army, in close cooperation with the SDS,
distributed weapons to the Serbian population in Prijedor town
and other towns and villages in the Opstina. Often these
deliveries took place openly in broad daylight. The distribution
was mainly organized by trucks and seemed aimed at arming every
Serbian male between the ages of 15 and 70. Many Serbian women
and old men were provided with arms. Serbian policemen were also
moving around especially at night handing out weapons to fellow
Serbs.
Weapons and military equipment were even flown in by
military helicopters to Serbian military officers. It is said
that by the end, almost no Serbian house was without an automatic
gun. Many Serbs may also have received grenades.
The pretext for the arms deliveries and the rearmament was
that this was necessary for the defence against «the enemies of
the people» - the Muslim extremists and the Ustase.
The Serbs were provided with new automatic weaponry.
Serbs who had been armed in this manner started to establish
checkpoints in the villages.
Ample distributions of ammunition were also made, and even
larger quantities of ammunition were stored locally.
Approximately five kilometres from Malo Palanciste on the road to
Knezica, there is an ammunition cache. A Serbian teacher (now
director of the school), whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, who used to sign out
ammunition for the heavy artillery there, boasted that there was
enough heavy ammunition stored that it would suffice for one year
if 1,000 rounds were fired each day.
In this period, some Serbs went around firing shots at
random. Other people often tried to stop them. Sometimes these
Serbs inflicted wounds on themselves, but once a woman and two
children were injured. Some of the local Serbs returning from
the war in Croatia were quite excited and very easily provoked -
there were more and more Serbs in this category.
Many non-Serbs, who saw truck-loads of weapons being
distributed in their home areas to Serbs, were so frightened that
they did not dare to believe what they saw. In general, Muslims
and Croats became scared. At the same time, Serbs had their
informants among the Muslims and Croats who spread the word that
Serbs had weapons for sale. One Serb (whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), later
ill-reputed and then belonging to a so-called intervention unit
(see Chapters IX.C., XII.C. and XII.D. infra), and other Serbs,
who later came to play important destructive roles when the Serbs
had taken power, were involved in selling rather faulty weapons
to non-Serbs. The sellers simultaneously registered the buyers
for illegally being in possession of firearms. The people
wanted, it seems, to buy these weapons as they were frightened
and wanted to have something for self-defence. The number of
such weapons around remained none the less limited.
When the later Serbian chief of police, Simo Drljaca,
briefed visitors on the background of the events in Opstina
Prijedor, he insisted that the Muslims and Croats had been
preparing for war for more than 22 years, and that the Serbs had
«documents showing that 3,491 men who could fight from Kozarac,
had accepted weapons». Simo Drljaca would obviously not quote a
deflated figure; there are, however, reasons for believing that
his figure is highly inflated. Considering the later attack on
the Kozarac area and the interrogations conducted in the main
concentration camps where the possession of arms seems to have
been a main theme of accusations against camp inmates (see
Chapters VII.B., VIII.A. and VIII.B. infra), it may be questioned
whether the sale of rather faulty weapons to perceived enemies by
key people in the Serbian military ranks was designed to give the
Serbs a pretext.
Radio Prijedor was, prior to 30 April 1992, constantly
broadcasting that people ought to hand over their weapons to the
authorities. The TO and the police kept their weapons. People
who had no license to own weapons hid them if they had any.
Muslims and Croats who had legal authorization to have weapons
(normally for hunting) were visited by Serbs and threatened to
hand over the weapons which they legally possessed. It is
noteworthy that the non-Serbs, who «illegally» bought weapons
from and were registered by the above-mentioned ill-reputed Serb
and others associated with or members of the Serbian military,
were not similarly visited. People on these sales lists were,
however, among the first to be liquidated in the later Serbian
military attacks whether or not they had kept their arms and
whether or not they had taken any recourse to arms.
Not only the Serbs, but also the Muslims, had established
their own checkpoints. At least in one of the Muslim villages on
the left bank of the Sana River, this happened when a Serbian
representative from the police came to the village and advised it
to establish such checkpoints in order to protect the village.
The Serbs even gave the Muslims some weapons to be used for this
purpose. These weapons were, however, of a very bad quality. On
duty at these checkpoints, there were normally two or three young
males with very limited, if any, experience.
A meeting in the local National Defence Council in
Prijedor in mid-April 1992 demanded that the soldiers returning
from the war in Croatia be demobilized. The Council had
politically appointed members, but was chaired by Colonel
Vladimir Arsic, the military commander of the area. He allegedly
gave the politicians an ultimatum not to demobilize the soldiers
but to have them redeployed outside of Prijedor town, together
with police and TOs (which were to be mobilized and armed), to
control all roads to Prijedor - from Banja Luka, Sanski Most,
Bosanski Novi and Bosanska Dubica. This would become a
stranglehold on both the district and the town of Prijedor. The
army wanted to control all movement there.
Major Slobodan Kuruzovic (who had returned from the war in
Croatia, see Chapter V.B. infra) then invited those opposed to
redeployment to come for a guided tour to Novi Varos and another
Croatian village in Western Slavonia flattened and depopulated in
the war, to see allegedly the fate that would befall Prijedor if
the politicians rejected redeployment and mobilization of the TO.
Some of them went with Kuruzovic. The ultimatum was met.
Radio Prijedor took active part in the propaganda to
mobilize and rearm the TO. Some time earlier it had been decided
that the weapons belonging to the TOs had to be stored in the
military barracks in Prijedor town. Now the TOs were again
provided with weapons. Many non-Serbian TOs seem to have been
provided with old weapons, especially rifles. At the time, it is
claimed that the weapons available for the TO in the entire
Kozarac area were five machine guns. Moreover, the staff members
had Dobosk (Russian rifles) with 72 bullets in the cartridge,
calibre 762. The rest had old M 48 rifles (made in Serbia) and
some hand carried grenade launchers, but no grenades. More or
less, all of the weapons were substandard.
From this time, it was indicated that the TOs were to move
into the army barracks and be controlled by the army. Then, the
Serbs changed their mind and wanted the TOs to hand over their
weapons and demobilize.
On 29 April 1992, Radio Sarajevo stated that a feigned
telefax was circulated. The fake fax pretended to be
instructions sent from the Minister of Defence in BiH to the TO,
inter alia, in Banja Luka and Prijedor, to attack the JNA. The
Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo immediately denounced the fax as
fraud, charging that the fax showed on Television Belgrade was
fake and not rubber-stamped with the seal of the Ministry of
Defence in Sarajevo. It also insisted that no such instructions
to attack existed or ever had existed. Television Banja Luka was
persistent that the telefax and the instructions were authentic.
The telefax which later was circulated by Serbian leaders
to prove their claim that the fax and the instructions were
genuine, had the following layout and wording (the original is in
the Bosnian language):
There is no evidence to sustain a claim that a telefax
like the above- quoted ever was produced by the legitimate
authorities of BiH. Conversely, they had every reason to
facilitate the departure of the JNA as soon as possible. For the
legitimate authorities in BiH to have declared war against the
JNA at the time, would have been suicidal. Moreover, if the
leadership in BiH would have wanted to confront the JNA by force,
there is every reason to believe that they would have taken
certain carefully planned steps and not let it all materialize by
means of a rather casual telefax.
Although the Serbian authorities did not later defend
their actions in BiH on the basis of the fake declaration of war,
it was one of several means successfully applied to agitate
fellow-Serbs, especially the simple-minded ones.
Two or three days before 30 April 1992, the Serbian army
had established itself in all strategic positions on the
mountains surrounding Prijedor town. In the town itself there
were small groups of two or three JNA soldiers at all important
places. The local population did not recognize these soldiers as
coming from the area. The JNA soldiers looked tired, they were
unshaven and were wearing shabby uniforms. It is believed that
they may have arrived from the war in Croatia. They did not talk
to anybody outside their circle. The groups of soldiers were,
however, visited by officers driving around among them. They
were provided with food which was distributed by army vehicles.
After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, these soldiers, who
were alien to the local population, were replaced by Serbian
soldiers well-known in the district.
In the early morning of 30 April 1992, there were Serbian
flags on all official buildings in Prijedor town. Sandbag
shelters for soldiers with automatic weapons had been erected at
all the main intersections, in front of the banks and other
important buildings. There were snipers on the roofs of most
tall buildings.
The JNA, paramilitary men, policemen, and local Serbs
participated in the actual power change. Among the paramilitary
soldiers were units from the Marticevci (the Krajina Militia, see
Chapter V.C. infra).
The premises of Radio Prijedor were crowded with military
people. There were some 40 to 50 armed people in the studio and
a Serb employee of the radio, Mile Mutic, was with them. Milomar
Stakic was introduced to the Radio Prijedor editor-in-chief as
the new mayor in Opstina Prijedor. At 6:15 a.m., the editor (who
was a non-Serb) was presented by Serbs with a written text and
told «We have taken power in Prijedor, and you have to read this
text.» The editor requested that Milomar Stakic join him to read
the text himself, and to answer questions from the editor. In
the studio, he asked Milomar Stakic what it meant that they - the
Serbs - had taken power. Milomar Stakic replied that they,
meaning the Serbs, were only interested in areas where there were
Serbs. The editor asked him, «What then about the Muslims?»
Milomar Stakic replied, «The Muslims may organize themselves as
best they can.» Thence the text was read by the speaker.
The key point in the statement was that the Serbs had
taken power without one shot being fired against them. They had
taken over control of all public buildings, and from then on
everything was to be organized by them - the Serbs. From now on,
it was the Srpske (i.e. the Serbian ) Opstine Prijedor. Earlier
other institutions and activities had already been given the pre-
fix «Srpske».
According to an interview with Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police in Prijedor, see Chapter IV.E. supra, and
member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor):
Bijelina is a town not far from the BiH border with Serbia
proper, on the BiH side of the Drina River. It has been selected
as seat for the Interior Ministry due to its geographical linkage
between east and west, north and south. Earlier in the era of
the SFRY, the secret police had an office in Prijedor.
It was announced over Radio Prijedor that the Serbian
people and the SDS had taken power and control to secure their
survival. Reference was particularly made to the imminent threat
posed by the above-mentioned (see Chapter IV.H. supra) and
disputed «telefax». It was also argued that neither the Prijedor
Assembly nor the local banks functioned properly; this was cited
as further indication that the Serbs were endangered. Prior to
the Serbs taking power, there had been pressure on the Sluzba
Drustvenog Knjigovodstva (i.e. the Public Accountancy Service) to
stop all transactions with Sarajevo and redirect them to
Belgrade. The non-Serbs in Opstina Prijedor had not agreed to
this, which was the practice in the Bosanska Krajina SAO. After
the Serbs took power, they changed the money flow according to
their own wish; that is also financially they withdrew from BiH
and made Belgrade their federal capital. Financial assets
belonging to non-Serbs were frozen and later confiscated together
with everything else belonging to them (see Chapter X.D. infra),
and the financial links with the authorities in BiH were severed.
But as Simo Drljaca and other Serbian leaders in Prijedor
later told visitors, the underlying reality was that:
The Muslims wanted to make the country an Islamic State
again as it had been once before in history, so the argument
went. Although there were no real indications of that at the
time, it would be better for the Serbs to take pre-emptive
measures against it, Serbs asserted. «If we cannot reach an
accommodation, we will fight to annihilation», Simo Drljaca
reportedly later told visitors.
Radio Prijedor also broadcasted an interview with Major
Radmilo Zeljaja asking him what was happening. He answered that
he was not interested in civilian questions and that the army was
not involved. He added, however, that the army was on the alert
as it had intelligence information indicating that the army would
be attacked. But the attack did not materialize, and Major
Slobodan Kuruzovic proclaimed himself on the radio as leader of
the TO of the Serbian people. According to the forged telefax,
it was the TO which was ostensibly to attack the JNA (see Chapter
IV.H. supra).
Concerning the change of power in Opstina Prijedor and the
subsequent Serbian use of force, this seems not to represent an
aberration, but rather the events seem to an unpleasant degree to
follow a pattern well-established in the by then Serbian-
controlled areas in Croatia and the now Serbian-ruled areas in
BiH.
A key position in the changes was held by the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor. Key roles in the Krizni Stab Srpske
Opstine Prijedor were held by the military, the police and the
SDS leadership.
All recorded information ascertains that the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor had, among others, the following members.
Military:
The chairman of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor
was possibly Major Slobodan Kuruzovic.
The President of the Red Cross is said to have been
responsible for the propaganda against the non-Serbian people.
He is allegedly personally responsible for plunder and physical
and psychological terror. As a President of the Red Cross, he
made the false pretence that the Red Cross was helping prisoners
in the concentration camps. He, moreover, is accused of having
organized «ethnic cleansing» by using Red Cross vehicles.
Mile Mutic, reporter and (after the Serbs took power)
editor-in-chief of Radio Prijedor, and editor of the local
newspaper Kozarski Vijesnik, and Jovan Vukoja, Director of the
Centre for Social Welfare, were probably not members of the
Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor. Both men have, however,
been mentioned as members in some information.
Concerning his meeting, on 5 August 1992, with some of the
members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor journalist Ed
Vulliamy related:
According to an interview Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor):
The concept of the Krizni Stab existed already in military
strategic theory in the former Yugoslavia prior to the wars. The
military as such was in a sense always afraid of the people. The
military were above the people and had privileges which easily
could lead to the people turning against the military. The
military consisted of rather conservative or reactionary
Communists, whereas the people seemed to be progressing towards
democracy. The military wanted to control the people and thus
needed to give the people the impression that in actual fact, the
people controlled the military. In this the military, generally
speaking, succeeded. The worst case scenario contained the plan
that the military would establish the Krizni Stab. Thus, the
military would make sure to have included in the Krizni Stab
people whom they trusted. Trust in this context means loyalty
and subordination.
The Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor was involved in
the logistic support and production for the army. The Krizni
Stab was an instrument of gaining complete control of the
entirety of Opstina Prijedor (or over any other geographic area
where a Krizni Stab was proclaimed). Soldiers who worked for the
interests of the army were posted also in industry and other
production units to control the production, to gain support, and
to control civilians.
The Krizni Stab also had as its function to arm the Serbs
within its operational area. Other functions were to block
communications and make provocations within mixed ethnic
settings. The pivotal function, however, was to voice that the
Serbian people as such were threatened by the non-Serbs, the
consequence of which was the urgent need for the JNA to act to
protect the people. The idea was to be able to mobilize
strategically with the consent of the people, i.e. to take up
positions with artillery and tanks, etc. and soldiers to «defend»
the Serbian people.
On 30 April 1992, the JNA still existed. On 27 April
1992, the Presidency of BiH had issued a decree to the effect
that the JNA was to leave the country. At the same time, JNA
personnel were invited to join BiH's newly formed TO. As a cease-
fire agreement was signed in January 1992 for Croatia, a sizable
number of JNA military personnel withdrew to BiH.
When the Serbs took power in Opstina Prijedor, the army in
the area was still officially under the leadership of the
Minister of Defence in Belgrade, General Veljko Kadijevic. The
Acting Federal Secretary for National Defence and Chief of
General Staff at the time was General Blagoje Adzic (who later
replaced Veljko Kadijevic as Minister of Defence).
Opstina Prijedor belonged to the 2nd Army District of the
JNA. At the time, Lieutenant General Milutin Kukanjac was the
commander of the 2nd Army District. His deputy was Lieutenant
General Milan Aksentijevic. The regional command for Opstina
Prijedor was in Banja Luka, where the 5th Corps was
headquartered. In March and April 1992, the 5th Corps was under
the command of Major General Vladimir Vukovic and his deputy
Major General Momir Talic. Major General Vladimir Vukovic was
ill at the time, and died later in the year in Belgrade; he thus
is considered to have taken no active part in the military
operations in Opstina Prijedor in 1992. (Also the 9th, 10th and
13th Corps were under the same 2nd Army District of the JNA.
These corps were, according to Croatian military sources, engaged
in military operations in Croatia from February to April 1992.)
Colonel Arsic was among the brigade commanders in the 5th Corps.
The 11th Partisan Brigade of the JNA was stationed in
Prijedor, its headquarters was the 5th Corps in Banja Luka. The
commander for the 11th Brigade was probably Colonel Mainkovic.
The 343rd Motorized Infantry Brigade (with its artillery support
unit) of the 5th Corps is likely to have been stationed in
Prijedor already by February 1992.
A partisan brigade is one of the regular brigades in the
JNA. The JNA has motorized brigades, infantry brigades, mountain
brigades, heavy armour brigades (with tanks), partisan brigades,
and the TO. The JNA also has de facto ties to paramilitary
groups. The different units are well-coordinated to work towards
the same goals.
A partisan brigade is a light infantry brigade armoured
with light weapons (including 60 millimetre and 80 millimetre
mortars). Whereas a motorized brigade may have 6,000 members, a
partisan brigade will be some 1,000-1,500 men large. Normally,
the partisan brigades operate in the home areas of their soldiers
where they are fully familiar with the terrain. Primarily, a
partisan brigade will be stationed in an area where it is
difficult for a motorized brigade to advance or operate at all.
The small partisan brigades are ideal for the task of moving into
an area to clear it.
On 4 May 1992, the Federal Presidency in Belgrade ordered
the complete withdrawal within fifteen days of all JNA personnel
(and their families) who were citizens of the FRY. On 8 May
1992, General Blagoje Adzic, the Acting Federal Secretary for
National Defence and Chief of General Staff of the JNA, retired
and 28 other commanders - Lieutenant General Milutin Kukanjac
among them - were forced to retire, probably in order to placate
outside concern over the fact that the JNA was Serbian-dominated.
From late May 1992, when the JNA ostensibly had left BiH
territory as far as its members originating from outside BiH were
concerned, the remaining Serbian military in the region of Banja
Luka (as well as in other regions) officially converted the
remaining JNA into the Army of the SRBiH (also known as the BSA,
i.e. the Bosnian Serb Army). The transformation essentially was
characterized by a change of name and insignia. The Army SRBiH
was to be commanded by General Ratko Mladic. When he was
appointed to his new duty in the first half of May 1992, General
Ratko Mladic was still commander of the Knin Corps (based in the
Croatian Krajina). Under his leadership, large areas had been
laid waste during the war in Croatia. The overall command
structure, the lion's share of the military personnel, the
weaponry and the ammunition of the JNA, remained in place with
the Army SRBiH. In Banja Luka, the 5th Corps of the JNA thence
became the 1st Krajina Corps. The commander was Major General
Momir Talic (who had previously been the deputy commander of the
5th Corps). His deputy commander was Bosko Kelecevic. When the
SRBiH changed its name on 12 August 1992 to the Republic of
Srpska (see Chapter III.D. supra), the Army SRBiH changed its
name and acronym to VRS (Vojska Republika Srpska, i.e. the Army
of the Republic of Srpska).
It is recalled that the Republic of Srpska was proclaimed
as a separate entity only in the sense that this new Republic
would remain within the joint State of Jugoslavia (now the FRY)
as one of its units (see Chapter III.D. supra).
Under the new regime, the 5th Corps, as mentioned, became
the 1st Krajina Corps; the partisan brigades were renamed as
light infantry brigades; and the 343rd Motorized Infantry Brigade
thenceforth became known as the 43rd Motorized Brigade.
The 1st Krajina Corps has two divisions, the 30th and the
10th Division - including the 1st and the 2nd Armoured Brigade.
The 1st Krajina Corps uses the T-12 cannons, 120 millimetre
calibre. The light infantry brigades equal the partisan
brigades. These are the brigades which together with the
paramilitary groups have caused the most destruction. In the
case of the military attacks in Opstina Prijedor, the military
forced the non-Serbian inhabitants to hand over their property to
the military. As far as the military operations were concerned,
the military had the command and the civilian administration had
marginal direct influence.
The 43rd Motorized Brigade was stationed in Prijedor. It
is said about the Brigade that it fought fiercely in Hambarine,
Kurevo and Kozarac (as in many other areas outside Opstina
Prijedor). *16 The 6th Battalion of the 43rd Brigade was formed in
the village Ljeskare (a village in the Ljubija area in Opstina
Prijedor) in June 1992. The 6th Battalion is also known as
«Ljubija» or «Bilbija's» after its commander, Rade Bilbija.
«Combatants of this Battalion played an important role in the
`cleansing' of the Kurevo area». *17 According to Commander Rade
Bilbija:
To add a sense of urgency, fully enlist the local Serbs in
the military course, and take advantage of their capabilities,
local inhabitants were also used as infantry. In order to
persecute the non-Serbs (who cannot be distinguished from the
Serbs by appearance and not automatically by language) with
military means without wiping out the entire population, thorough
knowledge about the people in the district was required. The
declared enemy was not an entity of combatants.
According to former high-ranking military personnel in the
JNA, there was within every military corps a recognized need for
having (concentration) camp personnel. The personnel to be
available for the camps were from:
The intervention units were to trace and capture the
potential camp inmates. The military police would guard the
camps. The sluzba bezbjednosti personnel would interrogate,
torture, and kill camp inmates and be in charge of the
psychological part of the operation. The most brutal functions
of the sluzba bezbjednosti personnel could alternatively be
carried out with the assistance of paramilitary units. Among
such paramilitary units were the Red Berets (also reported on by
Television Banja Luka). The Red Berets were trained in the
Kozara military barracks in Banja Luka. They were so-called SOS
forces (Srpske Obrambene Snage i.e. Serbian Defence Forces). The
Red Berets were possibly also used in Prijedor town when the
Serbs staged their coup on 30 April 1992, these Red Berets were
particularly well-armed.
Concerning the composition and functions of the
intervention unit in Opstina Prijedor, Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor) in an interview stated that:
The intervention unit was in other words an amalgamated
entity with shared responsibility for the police and the
military. The intervention unit was used, inter alia, to trace
and capture the non-Serbian leadership, and allegedly members of
the intervention unit killed prisoners arbitrarily during
transport to the Manjaca camp and participated in mass-killings
of «deported» prisoners in the Vlasic Mountain area (see Chapters
XII.C. and XII.D. infra).
Several paramilitary forces were operating in Opstina
Prijedor in 1992 and possibly later. Among them were units from
the Marticevci, the Krajina Militia created by Milan Martic -
Milan Babic's Interior Minister and military organizer. The
Marticevci units have earned the reputation as one of the most
terrifying organizations which participated in the fighting
between Serbs and Croats during the war in Croatia. Another
entity was Arkanovci - or Arkan's Tigers. Zeljko Raznjatovic -
alias Arkan - is a Montenegrin by birth. Arkan himself
reportedly claims that he has a past as an assassin for the
secret police in the former Yugoslavia. He was probably called
upon by the same secret police to take the leadership in the fan
club of the Red Star football club in Belgrade to channel the
political energy of the football fans and the hooligans. In any
event, Arkan has a criminal record from several countries. His
followers in the former Yugoslavia are known to have committed
very violent crimes. Now, having made himself a fortune, Arkan
has become a Serbian politician. Arkan's Tigers are normally
dressed in black, but on occasion may carry red berets. A third
unit, also named after its leader, is the Seseljovci. Vojislav
Seselj is the self-proclaimed leader of the Cetniks in Serbia.
As a politician, he runs the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska
Radikalna Stranka, the SRS). Seselj is considered to have
adopted a fanatical ultra-nationalist stance, thus he is also
referred to as the Red Duke. Finally, as far as major
paramilitary groups are concerned, there are the White Eagles
(Beli Orlovi) under the command of Dragoslav Bokan. The White
Eagles are the paramilitary formation of the extremist Serbian
National Renewal Party (Srpska Narodna Obnova, the SNO) founded
by Mirko Jovic. (For more information on these and other
paramilitary groups, see Annex III.A, Special Forces.)
When, in July 1992, Captain Milovan Milutinovic,
spokesperson of the Army SRBiH in the regional centre in Banja
Luka, was asked about the multitude of uniforms and insignias in
use, he was adamant that this did not change the fact that there
was only one army. After 15 May 1992, he stated that there were
no more irregulars or paramilitary forces. There had been such
fighters previously, but all military forces were subsequently
put under a unified command. He added that those who had
resisted a unified command had been imprisoned.
It may be informative to pay attention to what Serbs later
say about the relationship between the political leaders and the
regular military forces on the one hand and the paramilitary
units on the other. In an interview with Vreme, Colonel Milan
Milivojevic, speaking about the army which he has been serving
for 35 years, explained:
A Serbian association of war veterans related its plight
in an interview with Vreme:
In a general article about the army and the paramilitary
published in Vreme, it is alleged:
Often such unlawfulness were concealed: the best
example is the relationship of the official authorities
of the Republic of Serbia towards grave breaches of
international humanitarian law regarding armed
conflicts conducted first in Croatia and then in Bosnia
and Hercegovina. The data about that arrived from
various sources. They were registered by the
international community through its authorized bodies.
Regular army units have been blamed, along with
numerous paramilitary formations (established by
various political parties) whose influence and power
grew so much that they were equated with the official
authorities, as simultaneously existing institutions of
growing anarchy. SPS [Socialisticka Partija Srbije
i.e. the Socialist Party of Serbia] and the Republic of
Serbia ignored those events. Not by accident: in the
circles of newly established VIPs who first accumulated
enormous material wealth by breaching all norms of the
international humanitarian law, showing in such a
manner an amazing appetite for political influence and
power, representatives of the official government in
Serbia found the safest footholds to maintain their
drastically shaken position. The crimes were covered
up, denied, and at the same time instigated so that the
noble cause of the Serbian national interests be
realized: the ethnically pure regions for the future
Greater Serbia.» *23
In September 1991, the United Nations had introduced an
arms embargo against the whole of the SFRY. Although the United
Nations recognized the State of BiH and accepted it as a member-
State on 22 May 1992, the arms embargo was not lifted for this
new and independent State. Even if the embargo continued to
apply also for the Serbs, the Serbs were in control of most of
the stockpiles of the JNA (which had just been augmented with an
extra 14,000 tons of weaponry from the Middle East prior to the
arms embargo being introduced).
Misha Glenny wrote the following about the «peculiar
political development» in Opstina Prijedor prior to Serbs taking
power:
Later, when Simo Drljaca once was to explain to visitors
the Serbian taking of power on 30 April 1992, he started with
contemplating the previous political situation in Opstina
Prijedor. As he said, 85 per cent of the Muslims in the district
had voted for the SDA. However, because of «that robber Ante
Marcovic» the Serbian votes were divided. Ante Marcovic's party
received the votes of the intellectual Serbs and 90 per cent of
the votes from Serbs living in mixed marriages (12 per cent of
the population). Other Serbs also voted for the leftist party.
The SDS got only 28 per cent of the votes, although the Serbian
population counted for 42.5 per cent of the population. When
Simo Drljaca was asked how the SDS then took power, he did not
hesitate to state that it happened by force. The power change in
Opstina Prijedor had been by the gun. Thenceforth, the Serbs had
submitted to the SDS.
Opstina Prijedor had two main local media: Radio Prijedor
and the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik. Both became, almost
immediately after the Serbian takeover, mouthpieces of the new
Serbian leaders, or rather the latter took control over these
media. Strict censorship was one aspect of this; the
dissemination of propaganda another. Smaller media entities
followed suit if operated by Serbs; if their executives were non-
Serbs, these media were silenced with the persecution of the non-
Serbs.
After 30 April 1992, the Serbs working in Radio Prijedor
were even dressed in camouflage uniforms. It made no difference
that Radio Prijedor was financed mainly by advertisements.
Serbian leaders who wanted to make statements over the radio or
to have announcements read came with military people and guards
to the studio to have their will.
All the time, during the first days after the Serbs took
power, terrified listeners called the radio for advice and
solace. At 9:00 p.m., probably on 2 May 1992, Becir Medunjan
and Ilijaz Memic, both from Kozarac - the latter the local leader
of the SDA, came and asked permission to broadcast a statement.
The two, who were both Muslims, wanted to state that there was no
reason for unrest in Kozarac; no Serb had or should have anything
to fear and guards had even been posted outside the Orthodox
church. The editor of Radio Prijedor agreed to let them
broadcast their message. As they were half way into the studio,
they were stopped by four or five Serbian military people with
guns. Three identified Serb leaders whose names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, spoke on
behalf of the Serbs and said that the Muslims from Kozarac had to
seek permission from the police in Prijedor town before they
could transmit their communication. It made no difference that
the editor became upset and questioned the independence of the
radio threatening to resign if it was not restored. The Muslims
from Kozarac were prevented from broadcasting their message of
reconciliation - Kozarac was a predominantly (approximately 90
per cent) Muslim town.
On 3 May 1992, the entire editorial staff met and the
Serbs insisted that the radio was independent and that everyone,
that is the Serbs and the non-Serbs, should work together. The
next day, however, an instruction came from the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor that the editor had to read a
communication which was biased against the Muslims. Being the
chief editor, he had the speaker read the communication. Thence
the editor-in-chief asked for and accepted his resignation. The
Serbs let him off «for annual leave».
The Serbs spread much fascist and Serbian nationalist
propaganda at the time also through the two main media. As the
radio was operating full time and the newspaper published only
once a week, the radio became the key propaganda instrument for
the new Serbian leaders. Previously banned Cetnik songs were
again allowed and much played in radio programmes. Radio
Prijedor was used also for political and private attacks on
leading SDA members, such as Mirza Mujadzic, Becir Maduwjanin (it
was stated that he was a Kosovo-Albanian which was not true), and
Muhamed Ceharic, the now unseated mayor of Prijedor town. The
propaganda was malevolent. The Serbs claimed that, in
particular, Muslim extremists were many in the area and
dangerous, preparing genocide against the Serbs.
The general situation deteriorated with the propaganda.
There were occasions when Serbs were walking in the streets in
Prijedor town shouting «All Muslims and Croats ought to be
slaughtered», or «Your Alija [President Izetbegovic] will lead
you to extinction.» When the killings started later, males with
the first name Alija were targeted - if for nothing else -
because of their names.
From the outside, radio amateurs in Zagreb were among the
first to pick up information that Prijedor was afflicted. As
others learned it from them and tried to call relatives and
friends in Opstina Prijedor, the latter would - if their
telephone lines had not yet been disconnected - briefly state
that everything was fine and hang up the telephone. Fear was
immediately pervasive among non-Serbs. Soon most non-Serb
telephone lines were disconnected.
An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was
severed communications between Opstina Prijedor and the outside
world. It became more difficult to travel even within the
district. Bus services were closed down.
From when the Serbs took power, people could be asked to
show their identification cards at any time. On 30 April 1992,
identification papers were asked at almost every intersection in
Prijedor town at least if the people in question were not known
to the controllers as being Serbs. Later, identification was
asked at checkpoints, and also at random. Non-Serbs easily had
serious problems when they were identified as such - even if
their identification cards were valid and carried at all times.
Almost all the mjesna zajednica (the administrative units
into which an Opstina is subdivided - one for each village and
part of town) had its Serbian Krizni Stab which could issue
travel permits, but in practice the travel permits had limited
value and the roadblocks were actually effective. One example: A
20-year old young man, whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, lived in Rakovcani. He
had a Serbian girl-friend and with a travel permit went on his
bicycle to see her in Prijedor town. On his way back, he was
stopped near the suburb Tukovi by policemen in a car, one of
them, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons, asked for his identity card and travel
permit. The young man had his papers in order, but regardless of
that he was brought to Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B.
infra). Some ten days later the young man was called out in
Keraterm at night, beaten for hours, and died just after he was
carried back into the hall where he was detained.
Starting probably on 2 May 1992, a nightly curfew was
introduced in Prijedor town. Later a curfew was introduced also
in Ljubija town. The curfew was in effect for non-Serbs as well
as Serbs. Even medical doctors on duty had to get a special
permission to move anywhere during the curfew hours.
After the attack on Prijedor town (see Chapter VII.C.
infra), the inhabitants even needed a written permission in order
to move from one part of the town to another.
Within days - in most cases - of the Serbs taking power,
most of the non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as
public officials or manual workers. In all key functions, such
as in the local administration, the empty posts were taken over
by Serbs. But it was no precondition for workers being
discharged, that there were Serbs who could fill their places.
Rather, even when it was a clear disadvantage also for the Serbs
that a certain job was left vacant, the non-Serb was - save for a
few exceptions - fired.
After the power change the courts put all their non-
Serbian legal staff on a list (all were Muslims, two Croats had
left the Opstina earlier). Later everyone on this list was
detained in a concentration camp.
At the time of the coup, the police received two sets of
conflicting instructions. Sarajevo gave their normal
instructions that were the same for all the police officials
regardless of ethnic group. Banja Luka ordered the police to
split up and Serbian and non-Serbian police to be treated
differently. Just after the coup, the non-Serbian police were
called for a meeting in the town hall chaired by Simo Drljaca.
The latter informed everyone that henceforth they would have to
abide by Serbian law and sign a declaration to that effect within
a 15-day time limit. Furthermore, they would have to display
Serbian emblems. Very few non-Serbian policemen signed the
declaration of consent, and no one remained in the police more
than the first 10 to 15 days. The non-Serbian policemen did not
dare to appear at the police stations, and they did not receive
the last salary from prior to the coup. Retired Serbian
policemen and reservists from among the Serbs were called in for
service. Simo Drljaca had a law degree, but earlier he had only
held posts of a marginal character in the legal profession.
Former non-Serbian policemen were soon among the people
particularly targeted for persecution. One former inmate, whose
name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons, in Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. infra) claims that
on one occasion, 20 non-Serbian policemen from Prijedor were
executed by the Serbs in that concentration camp. *25
Only in a few cases is it known that the Serbs accepted
the continued services of non-Serbs. A female doctor was
permitted to continue her work, as was a scientist working on
technical questions. The latter worked from a position of house
arrest imposed by the Serbs, and he was provided with his work by
the Serbs. A number, fewer than 30, workers from Autotransport
Prijedor also kept working until they were allegedly executed in
late July 1992 (see Chapter VIII.E. infra). Considering the
latter instance and the extreme need for transport facilities
which the Serbs soon were to have, it may be assumed that it was
the needs of the Serbs that gave the remaining non-Serbian
workers some respite concerning the fate awaiting them under the
new regime.
The Serbs continued as they had started before taking
power, and enforced a unilateral demilitarization of Muslims and
Croats and all other non-Serbs. The process of Serbs visiting
non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demanding that
they give their weapons up was intensified after 30 April 1992.
It was now combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and
TOs were also instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-
Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms. However,
those who were registered for illegally having bought arms from
Serbs - many of these Serbs were prominent under the new regime -
were not approached at the time like those who were licensed to
possess arms. Later, illegally held weapons were used against
non-Serbs as a warrant to annihilate them.
Most important, the self-appointed Serbian administration
in Prijedor started soon to give ultimatums to the non-Serbian
population. Using the radio, the Serbs every day named a
village, a town or a part of town where at a given time the
Muslim and Croatian inhabitants and other non-Serbs had to hand
over their weapons. Two distinguished Muslims, whose names are
not disclosed for confidential or prosecutorial reasons, tried to
convince the Muslims to give up their weapons. Most Muslims and
Croats did hand over their weapons. The Serbs were none the less
not satisfied and used this to brand them as extremists. It
seemed as if the Serbs were constantly looking for something for
which to blame the non-Serbs.
In named areas in the Ljubija region, for example, there
were ultimatums issued that the weapons held by non-Serbs were to
be presented to the Serbian administration between 22 and 30 May
1992. Shelling of non-Serbian habitations gave weight to the
urge in the Serbian demands. Subsequent to the Serbian
ultimatums, weapons were surrendered as follows:
It happened, possibly one of the last days in April or on
the first day of May, that a Serbian reserve policeman was killed
in the centre of Prijedor town. Both Radio Prijedor and the
newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik were implying that the Serbian
policeman possibly was killed by a Muslim. People - among them
the SDA chairman - called the radio afterwards claiming that
Serbs had killed the Serbian policeman. The main belief was
probably that the policeman had been killed in the wake of an
argument with fellow Serbian policemen, when at night time they
had been drinking at the Cafe Bijelo Dugme in the town. Another
version has it that the Serbian policeman was shot dead by an
unidentified man who ran away from the scene of the crime in the
direction of some Muslim dwellings, on the basis of which it was
concluded that the perpetrator was a Muslim. Others claim that
the Serbian policeman was killed by two of his colleagues, whose
names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons (one of them by then retired as a policeman), according
to a plan to have Muslims blamed.
The Serbian policeman lived in a village some four
kilometres north of Prijedor town in the direction of Bosanska
Dubica. Probably on 2 May 1992, after the policeman had been
killed, a bus heading south from Bosanska Dubica and towards
Prijedor was stopped by a neighbour of the policeman. The
neighbour asked the passengers to show their identity papers.
Coming across a Muslim woman and her young daughter, he forced
them both to leave the bus and shot them dead on the spot, for no
other reason than that they were Muslims. Approximately half an
hour later, a tractor loaded with hay came on the same road
driven by the manager of the agricultural pharmacy in Prijedor
town who was with one of the workers (their names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). The
neighbour once again asked for identity cards and established
that the two were Muslims. He killed them by allegedly using a
knife. Both victims lived in villages near Prijedor town.
The next day the elected but just ousted mayor of
Prijedor, Muhamed Ceharic, wanted to speak over Radio Prijedor,
and he invited everyone to join the funeral of the manager of the
agricultural pharmacy as a demonstration. The editor-in-chief of
the radio was very much criticized for allowing the former mayor
to speak over the radio. No incidents occurred in connection
with the funeral on 5 May 1992, but the cemetery was heavily
guarded by Serbian military and police. The people participating
in the funeral were reportedly scared.
Radio Prijedor later reported that the liquidation of the
four Muslims was under investigation, which the non-Serbs
considered a lie. It was also stated on the radio that Serbian
police and army (after the Serbs took power they referred to
their military just as Vojska, i.e. the Army, and not as the JNA
or other specific military entities) tried to stop people from
Gornji Jelovac from assailing Gornja Puharska - the suburb Donja
Puharska was where the alleged killer of the Serbian policeman
was to have been running.
Serbian-controlled television stations sent, moreover,
propaganda from other districts causing trepidation among simple
minded Serbs. The Serbs were constantly referring to three or
five killed Serbs and showing pictures of arsenals of weaponry
allegedly confiscated from non-Serbs who had planned to use these
arms against Serbs. Rumours among non-Serbs would have it that
the Serbs collected some of their dead soldiers from Pakrac in
Croatia and used them for propaganda purposes, throwing them
carefully around in other places where that seemed to be of
advantage. The Serbs were quite successful with their
propaganda, and they constantly reiterated that the Croats and
the Muslims were extremists.
Before any of the major Serbian military operations
started, an SDS official had been questioned in an interview
broadcast by Radio Prijedor whether members of the Arkanovci and
the Seseljovci were in town. He had answered in the affirmative.
The Serbs continued their arms race also in the days just
after taking power. On 2 May 1992, people saw long columns of
artillery being transported through Prijedor town in the
direction of Sanski Most, i.e. to the south towards the Hambarine
area.
Before Hambarine and later other villages on the left bank
of the Sana River were attacked by the Serbs, the population in
many of those villages had been augmented by an influx of Muslims
and Croats who had fled from attacks - similar to those to come
in Opstina Prijedor - by the Serbs on their home villages to the
west of Opstina Prijedor. Many Muslims seeking shelter in
Hambarine and nearby villages had fled from the destruction of
Donji Agici and Budimlic Japra. The non-Serbian villages in
Opstina Bosanski Novi had been purged before the Serbs took power
in Opstina Prijedor. Over Radio Prijedor, the people in the
Ljubija region had been called upon to receive and shelter the
fleeing non-Serbs from Opstina Bosanski Novi.
On 22 May 1992, at about 7:00 p.m., a black car - probably
a VW Golf - came up to a checkpoint on the road to Ljubija held
by non-Serbian TOs near a cluster of houses just outside the
village of Hambarine. Except for the driver who was a Croat,
there were four Serbs in the car - all reportedly members of the
White Eagles (Beli Orlovi) paramilitary unit. The Serbs had
allegedly forced the driver to bring them to the Hambarine area.
The car was stopped at the checkpoint and the Serbs were asked to
surrender their arms which would be returned to them on their way
back. At that moment, one of the Serbs opened fire with his
machine gun. The commander at the checkpoint was wounded. The
other non-Serbs at the checkpoint returned fire and killed two of
the Beli Orlovi and wounded the two others and the driver. The
Serbs thence asked the non-Serbs to surrender themselves and the
checkpoint. The wounded non-Serbian TO commander later died from
his wounds. An identified Serb, whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, interviewed one of the
wounded Serbs on Radio Prijedor. The interviewee confirmed that
the Serbs had fired the first shot. The wounded Serb used the
interview as an opportunity to state that all Serbs should
welcome and support the members of the Arkanovci and the
Seseljovci.
A Muslim former policeman, whom the Serbs had dismissed
after they took power in Opstina Prijedor, lived in a house
alongside the road from Prijedor to Hambarine, not far from the
checkpoint. After the shooting incident, the Krizni Stab Srpske
Opstine Prijedor delivered an ultimatum over Radio Prijedor in
which they demanded that the former policeman be handed over to
them (probably together with three identified persons whose names
are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons,
who had manned the checkpoint when the shooting took place) and
that all weapons in Hambarine be surrendered to the Serbs. There
was no information to indicate that the former policeman had been
a party to the events at the checkpoint. Unless the ultimatum
was met by noon the next day, the Serbs would attack Hambarine.
As the ultimatum was not met on time, the Serbs more or
less immediately after the deadline was passed started a heavy
bombardment of Hambarine with artillery fired from the aerodrome
at Urije, across the valley where Prijedor town is located.
People in Prijedor town could see that a number of houses in
Hambarine caught fire. As the artillery fire ceased, the village
was attacked by tanks and by infantry in full cooperation and
coordination with paramilitary units. There was grenade and gun
fire and more houses were set on fire, starting all along the
road leading from the Serbian-inhabited quarters in the suburb of
Tukovi (in Prijedor town) and up to Hambarine.
When the bombardment of Hambarine started, large numbers
of villagers fled to other nearby Muslim or Croatian-dominated
villages and sought shelter there, others took to the woods and
remained under the open sky until they considered the immediate
danger over. Those who had escaped to the Kurevo woods also came
under artillery fire. Many of the runaways later came back to
Hambarine of which Serbian soldiers had taken control. The
mosque in Hambarine had by then been destroyed by the Serbs.
Some of the returning civilians were at first pushed back again
to the woods by the Serbian soldiers. Save for the houses having
been burnt to the ground - allegedly some fifty only in the first
day of the attack - other houses had been damaged. Rampant
pillaging by Serbs took place and lasted for some two weeks.
Also on 22 May 1992, the so-called Serbian army entered
the town of Ljubija (further to the south) and occupied its main
square. All cultural, entertainment, and sports activities
stopped in Ljubija. The people were terrified. The Serbs
introduced a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and it was
prohibited for people to meet in groups on the streets and to use
the main square for traffic. Soon after, the Serbs started to
arrest people from Ljubija town and intern them in the
concentration camps.
The number of dead and wounded after the attack on
Hambarine is not yet known. Some estimate it at approximately
100.
After Hambarine was conquered the Serbs renamed it Petrovo
Brdo (i.e. Peter's Mountain).
When the ousted mayor of Prijedor was arrested in his home
in Prijedor town on 23 May 1992, the Serbs charged him with
having arranged the «attack» on Serbian soldiers in Hambarine the
previous day. *26 There is no information to sustain such an
accusation against the former mayor, who later apparently was
killed by the Serbs.
Kozarac was a small town located approximately 12
kilometres east of Prijedor town, at the foot of the Kozara
Mountain. Regardless of its size, Kozarac was an industrious
town with small-scale industry, trade and service industry.
Including villages and hamlets in the surroundings, the Kozarac
area had almost 27,000 non-Serbian inhabitants. The area as such
was relatively wealthy also because many people living there had
been guest workers in Western Europe and had brought home their
hard currency savings.
Having consolidated their power and position in Prijedor
town, the new Serbian administration at one point in time urged
all Muslims to leave Prijedor town for Kozarac which would become
a kind of Muslim borough, ethnically pure. This idea never
materialized. If it had, it would probably have achieved nothing
but to add more victims to those actually afflicted in the
Serbian military onslaught on the Kozarac area.
The Kozarac area had regular defence positions on the road
Prijedor - Banja Luka at Trnopolje, and at Mrakovica (on the
Kozara Mountain) near Kotovatze where there were eleven TOs and
also police both in active service and reservists.
After the Serbs took power in Opstina Prijedor, all Muslim
police were ordered to join the Serbian police and to wear
Serbian uniforms and Serbian insignias. Before the attack, the
Serbs had moved in heavy artillery and posted it strategically on
the mountains. The Serbs even had a rocket unit on the Kozara
Mountain. Those who controlled the main weapons were Serbs from
Serbia proper and Knin. The Prijedor Brigade had been fighting
in the Pakrac area and was nicknamed «The Wolves». There were
also other «Wolves» from an area east of Prijedor. The Serbian
military had started to be posted in the area two or three years
back - «for training purposes», it was said.
Following the Serbian takeover in Prijedor, a number of
Serbian driven cars in the town had «The Wolves of Vukovar»
written on them. In mid-May 1992, a number of Serbian trucks
were observed in Kozarac. The head of a bull had been placed on
the first truck. Attached to this truck was an inscription
reading, «These are the Wolves of Vukovar» - the area of Vukovar
in Croatia had by then been heavily ravaged. Locals interpreted
this as intended to frighten them. As the weapons locally
available were being collected by the Serbian army at the same
time, the overall situation rendered the non-Serbian people with
the feeling that they could do nothing. On occasion, Serbian
aeroplanes were flying low over the roofs of private houses,
scaring the dwellers and the local population at large even more.
The telephone lines were disconnected by the Serbs and so
was the electricity supply. The area was surrounded by the
Serbian army. No buses were in operation, and on 24 May 1992,
the Serbs closed the main road traffic. Traffic between Prijedor
and Banja Luka was then redirected via Tomasica and Omarska. On
24 May 1992, the air-raid alarm sounded.
Major Radmilo Zeljaja from the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine
Prijedor allegedly gave a delegation from the Kozarac civilian
defence council an ultimatum either to sign a loyalty pledge to
the Serbian self-appointed leaders (and hand over their weapons)
or Kozarac would be attacked. The delegation asked for two days
to consult with the population. The Serbian military attack
followed.
Before the attack on the Kozarac area started on 24 May
1992, an announcement was made over Radio Prijedor that military
forces with tanks were on their way from Banja Luka to Prijedor,
and that if these were stopped, fire would be opened. Radio
Prijedor insinuated that a barricade might exist near the village
Jacupovici along the road - this, however, does not seem to have
been the case. Simo Drljaca later claimed that there had been
both barricades (in the plural) and mines on the road, and that
the Serbian army went to the Kozarac area to clear the road and
remove the barricades.
Colonel Vladimir Arsic is said to have been the superior
in charge of the Serbian military operation in the Kozarac area.
Commander for the Serbian military in the field was allegedly
Major Radmilo Zeljaja. Over the communication system, he
allegedly instructed destruction of all Muslim property such as
houses and mosques. The commander of the Serbian military police
is identified, but his name is not disclosed for confidentiality
or prosecutorial reasons. Also, a Serbian police commander from
Prijedor, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons, was one of the leaders of the attack.
Major Slobodan Kuruzovic was allegedly involved as a military
leader and especially as coordinator of the subsequent
deportation of the population.
Initially, the Kozarac area was subjected to heavy
bombardment by artillery, coming possibly from eleven different
places (like Benkovac on the Kozara Mountain, Topica Brdo -
another mountain, and nearby Serbian-dominated villages such as
Babici and Gornji Orlovci), and from tanks and smaller firearms.
On 25 May 1992, after 24 hours of shelling and after
approximately 5,600 grenades had fallen on the area, Serbian
tanks and Serbian infantry moved in all at once with an estimated
3,600 people. Prior to this, civilians had, inter alia, observed
that one of the villages outside of Kozarac was completely on
fire. Panic had spread. The local population did not organize
any real resistance; it was considered futile anyway. The
Serbian military men came into the area like ants from all sides,
as described by one female non-Serbian survivor.
In came regular soldiers, paramilitaries, Serbian TOs, and
armed local Serbs, all of whom acted in a coordinated manner in
the operation, to the extent that people believed that all these
Serbian armed entities were under one unified command. Some
Serbian soldiers were wearing the five-pointed red star of the
JNA on their caps and no other insignia. Other fighters carried
various insignia of the «White Eagles of Knin», the like-sided
cross with the four Cs above an eagle, or just an eagle on their
camouflage uniforms. There were also armed Serbs from Banja Luka
and Arkanovci.
Another paramilitary unit was the so-called «Gypsy
Brigade» from Omarska. The leader of the group was Momcilo
Radanovic nicknamed «Cigo» (i.e. Gypsy). He was a taxi driver
who fought in the war in Croatia. He is now said to be the Vice
President of Opstina Prijedor. During the attack by infantry and
paramilitary units on the Kozarac area, the «Gypsy Brigade»
apparently was one of the most cruel, committing massacres in the
villages Alici, Softici, Br_ani, and Jakupovici. He and his
group are also ill-reputed for other alleged heinous acts against
non-Serbs, for example, in the concentration camps Omarska and
Keraterm.
Infantry and paramilitary troops went searching for people
in every building. In some areas, like in Kozarac town, the
incoming soldiers first went from house to house to ask the men
to come out and assemble in front of the mosque. There the Serbs
told their gathered congregation that in half an hour all women
and children would have to gather as well; if not, the Serbian
military would go from house to house and burn and pillage the
entire area. In other areas - villages and hamlets - the latter
was the first strategy.
When the first Serbian soldiers entered Kozarac town, they
brought with them lists of names of people who were called
forward and killed. These people were the politicians,
influential people, police officers, and reserve police officers.
Other intellectuals and prominent people from the Kozarac area
were incarcerated in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. Dusan
Tadic, who was a local of Kozarac, was among those who allegedly
had produced such death lists.
The police, approximately 35 people, from the Kozarac
police station all gave themselves up after the shelling had
stopped. They were reportedly executed en masse by gun fire in
front of the primary school in Kozarac.
Information was sent over Radio Prijedor that everyone had
to surrender voluntarily and with white flags. People followed
the instruction and moved out, for example from Br_ani, in a very
long column of women and children. The Serbs fired more grenades
as the column moved ahead, killing some women. The column passed
by a number of Serbian TOs, who also killed some women and
children at the roadside. As another column from another village
walked along, a Serbian man from Serbia arrived and spoke to one
of the local Serbian leaders saying that «This way we want to
show you our gratefulness for what you did for us in Croatia!»
Civilians were, moreover, allegedly taken out of the columns at
random and killed on the roadside. Mock executions were also
performed.
Extremists put civilians - women and children - in front
of them and wanted to leave the area, that is why the civilians
suffered casualties as the Serbs «never really killed women and
children», as Simo Drljaca explained afterwards.
Non-Serbs, who were enrolled in the TO but unarmed and
without uniforms, were arrested if recognized and taken to police
stations or military barracks for interrogation before they were
incarcerated in concentration camps.
In contradistinction to what happened after the first
attack on Hambarine (see Chapter VII.A. supra), the entire non-
Serbian population from the Kozarac area was herded out in the
course of and after the Serbian military attack. Men were
detained in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm, while children,
women and the elderly were first taken to Logor Trnopolje and
then deported out of Opstina Prijedor. Due to the large numbers
involved, some of the children, women and elderly men were at
first temporarily housed in Prijedor town, and villages just
outside of the attacked area. They were, however, soon gathered
by the Serbs for deportation. People who at first had tried to
seek shelter on the Kozara Mountain were sought out there or
surrendered either to be killed or to follow in the footsteps of
the rest of the civilian population to the concentration camps.
Grenade bombardment had also been aimed at fleeing civilians. En
route to the main concentration camps, some of the captives were
detained over night in the Rade Kondic school in the Serbian-
dominated village Radvjice.
A number of young Muslim women were reportedly sexually
abused after being shepherded to Serbian military positions -
such as the barracks on Benkovac, on the top of Mrakovica, in
Hotel Mrakovica, in Bijele Vode on Mrakovica, and in Tito's
Villa. The latter location was allegedly frequented especially
by military superiors.
According to surviving witnesses, Serbian military
subjected significant numbers of local non-Serbs to the most
outrageous torture and extermination under extreme pain when
clearing the Kozarac area of its non-Serbian population.
Just one example of summary executions: on 27 May 1992,
eight elderly people, whose names are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, were shepherded into a
cellar and massacred.
When asked later about how many civilians had died in the
military operation in the Kozarac area, Serbian leaders related
that it probably was many, but that they had no records.
Some claim that a total of 5,000 people were killed in the
Kozarac area. One informant was taken back to Kozarac from one
of the concentration camps in the area together with 39 other men
to collect dead bodies. He himself counted 610 dead people, he
stated.
The Serbian military attack on the area south of the
Kozara Mountain afflicted, inter alia, the following Muslim and
Croatian habitations: Alici, Br_ani, Dera, Forici - Donji and
Gornji, Hrnici, Jakupovici, Kamicani, Kevljani, Kenjari, Kozarac,
Kozarusa, Mahmuljini, Mujanovici, Rajkovici, Rustici, Salesi,
Softici, and Suhi Brod.
After the population had been ousted from the Kozarac
area, all buildings were pillaged and everything else of value,
such as vehicles and heavy equipment, were stolen by Serbs. A
large number of homes, which had not been destroyed by artillery
shells or set ablaze in the military attack, were blown up by the
Serbs - one at the time from inside - destroying especially the
inside and the roof.
Captain Milovan Milutinovic, spokesperson of the Army
SRBiH in Banja Luka, later explained to visitors that:
Simo Drljaca ascertained that the reason why Kozarac
subsequently did not look like it had been hit by war, but rather
by systematic destruction, was that every house had a bunker and
thus was destroyed (separately). He claimed that before this was
done all Serbian houses had been burned, but provided no
information to sustain that claim.
Later another school of thought seems to have developed
and the Serbian administration both in Opstina Prijedor and
Opstina Banja Luka started to inform visiting journalists that
the Muslim population of Kozarac had left the town voluntarily -
for economic reasons to better themselves elsewhere in Europe.
At that time, Kozarac was deserted, except for a few Serb
policemen and soldiers who had occupied the municipal building.
When a prisoner later was transported by Serbs through
Kozarac, he was told by his Serbian guards that this was no more
Kozarac, but «Radmilovo» after the commander Major Radmilo
Zeljaja. Allegedly, the name «Radmilovo» was for some time
written on a sign on the roadside replacing the sign announcing
Kozarac. It is also reported that the area was referred to as
«Radmirovac» after the conquest.
One day after the people in Hambarine had been given an
ultimatum (see Chapter VII.A. supra), an ultimatum was also
issued to the non-Serbs in Prijedor town that every policeman and
TO member in possession of weapons had to hand these over to the
Serbs in the military barracks at Urije. Afraid that non-Serbian
quarters could be bombarded like Hambarine had been, the weapons
were handed over. This transfer of weapons was filmed by
Television Banja Luka.
On about 20 May 1992, an identified Muslim, whose name is
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons,
attacked a drunken Serbian soldier in the latter's car and stole
his arms. «The Muslim» was about 40-years old, he was a drug-
addict, and having a criminal record, he had spent some 20 years
in prisons. He was arrested for the attack-cum-theft and brought
to Banja Luka, but turned up again, surprisingly enough, in
Prijedor only two days later.
Since about 10 May 1992, there had been a group of non-
Serbs hiding on the Kurevo Mountain on the left bank of the Sana
River. The group gathered more members by the day. The group
had organized itself and was without linkage to any party or any
military unit. Although the leader (whose name is not disclosed
for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) was a Croat, he had
been fighting together with the Serbs and against the Croats in
the war in Croatia. Some non-Serbs believe that «the Muslim»
during his brief detention in Banja Luka had agreed to
collaborate with the Serbs. In any event, «the Muslim»
approached the leader in the forest and convinced the latter that
they ought to stage an attack on Prijedor town. «The Muslim»
claimed that there were many well-armed Muslims, especially in
Stari Grad (the Old Town) and the suburb Puharska who wanted an
insurrection, but that they needed support from outside - the
claim was ill-founded.
In the early morning of 30 May 1992, before 4:30 a.m., the
«troops» of the leader and «the Muslim», probably not more than
150 men, attacked Prijedor town. These attackers were reportedly
badly armed, having only guns and perhaps ten hand grenades.
Twenty of the attackers had no weapons at all, but joined in the
hope that they might be able to obtain arms during the attack.
One Serbian version, as related by Simo Drljaca, is that
the attack on Prijedor town was organized by the Muslim political
party, the SDA, under the leadership of Mirza Mujadzic, Hilmia
Hopovac and Hasan Tulundzic. The attackers numbered 2,000 non-
Serbs. They killed 11 Serbian policemen. There was fighting all
around before the attackers withdrew to the mountains, where
Drljaca claimed that the Serbs were looking for them even months
later. This account is not corroborated by any other available
information.
As almost all Serbs deserted Stari Grad the night before
the attack started on 30 May 1992, it seems likely that they had
been alerted. This does not correspond with the proposition that
the attack was a Muslim and Croatian attack on Serbs.
Special police units from Nis (in Serbia proper), which at
the time were stationed in Banja Luka, Marticevci from Knin (in
Croatia), and a unit with some 50 tanks and canons from Banja
Luka participated on the Serbian side in the fighting. The
mentioned groups came in addition to approximately 5,000 military
men stationed in Prijedor after the destruction of the Kozarac
area. Numerous Serbs from Prijedor town, moreover, participated
in the fighting.
The «troops» of the leader and «the Muslim» apparently
divided themselves into four smaller groups for their attack on
the centre of Prijedor town from across the Sana River. All
groups seem to have made their way through Stari Grad (the old
part of Prijedor town) which is located on an island surrounded
by the Sana River and a canal, two groups seeking to enter the
town via the one bridge to the west and the two other groups
fighting their way across one of the two eastern bridges each.
The building used by the Serbian reserve officers is located just
across one of the latter bridges, and nearby is also Hotel
Prijedor. There was fighting on the eastern bridges and near the
mentioned buildings and at the police headquarters which some
from the leader's group entered.
As the attacking group received no support from people in
Prijedor town, it was soon defeated by the Serbs. By 9:00 a.m.
the same morning, the Serbs had regained total control. Some of
the attackers were killed, some 40 were captured alive and
brought to the concentration camps, the rest probably managed to
flee across the river and back in the direction of the Kurevo
Mountain. «The Muslim» seriously injured a Serbian military
leader (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons) who subsequently died from his injuries.
A Serbian military unit later was named after him. «The Muslim»
himself was killed after wounding the Serbian military leader.
The leader of the non-Serb mountain group was captured alive and
brought to Logor Omarska, where it is said that he later was
killed.
People living in Prijedor town may have believed that any
rebellion on their part would only have resulted in the town
having suffered the same total devastation as Vukovar in Croatia
previously had.
According to a different version, the attackers did not
come from across the river but emerged from a butchery. It is
believed that this is misinformation spread by the Serbs, as they
killed particularly many civilian non-Serbs living in the quarter
around the slaughterhouse.
In the early morning the same day, Radio Prijedor
announced that «Green Berets», meaning Muslims, and Croatian «HOS
troops» (Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage or the Croatian Defence Force,
which is the military wing of the Croatian Party of Rights) had
attacked the town. The town population was called upon to behave
loyally to the Serbs - to stay at home and listen to the radio -
the Serbian army would very soon have solved the problem. The
«announcement to the citizens» read over the radio also stated
that the attack affected Stari Grad, the centre of the town and
the quarters of Skela, Gomjenica, Puharska and Raskovac, for
which reason the population there was endangered and would be
evacuated by the Serbs. These people were to leave their houses
to be brought to safe territory by Serbian buses.
As related by a non-Serbian woman who lived in Stari Grad,
the Banja Luka Corps attacked Stari Grad with tanks starting at
about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., shelling the Muslim houses and the
mosque. At 1:00 p.m., Cetniks from Prijedor came to gather all
the people in the area saying that they were to protect them from
the «Green Berets» meaning the Muslim forces. The gathered
people, who were all civilians, were transported to Logor
Trnopolje (see Chapter VIII.C. infra). Arriving in this
concentration camp on 30 May 1992, all the new arrivals were
registered. Most of the women and children were released after
some three days if they had relatives or others with whom they
could stay elsewhere in Prijedor town - namely in the suburb
Puharska. The civilians were not provided with food these first
days in Logor Trnopolje. The men remained detained when the
women and children were freed.
When the attack by the non-Serb mountain group was still
on, the Serbs had started artillery bombardment of some quarters
in Prijedor - Stari Grad, the suburb Skela and the vicinity of
Muharem Suljanovic Street. The bombardment of Stari Grad
continued throughout the day and the next two days. After the
fighting with the intruding non-Serbs had stopped as the latter
had been defeated, the Serbs attacked one quarter after the other
in Prijedor town and systematically forced out most of the non-
Serbian inhabitants. On 31 May 1992, it was especially the parts
of town known as Puharska and Cejreci/Raskovac which were
targeted.
At approximately 13.00 hours detonations were getting
closer to his home. People - men, women and children -
some barefoot, mainly Muslims, came running from the
neighbouring street. Then he escorted his wife and
children over to a Serbian neighbour walking through
his garden. His mother and two brothers lived on the
ground floor. One minute later Serbian soldiers (JNA)
came into the street. He watched this from the Serbian
neighbour's house. Six or seven soldiers entered his
garden and fired some shots. His brothers and mother
came out of the house. His brothers were beaten with
rifle butts, they were commanded to kneel down and hold
their hands up behind their necks, the same fate befell
also two other Muslims and one Croat plus three more
men. All the men who had fled into the street where he
lived, were also ordered to take up the same kneeling
position, women and children were lined up in a row. A
military car arrived. Four identified Serbs [whose
names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons] came out of their houses and
joined the Serbian fighting forces. In passing the
kneeling non-Serbian males the Serbs kicked them so
that they fell over. Later the 'captives' were ordered
to stand up and move towards the radio building, one
among them was an identified man almost 90-years old
[whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons]. In the Ilije Bursaca Street an
identified man [whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] was shot dead
in his garden when the Serbs asked him where his
children were and he answered that one of them was
married in Zagreb. From the area of Radio Prijedor the
subdued men were loaded on buses and taken to Logor
Omarska. Approximately ten people who had been killed
by the Serbs were left outside of the radio station,
among them were seven identified men [whose names are
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons]. Women and children were transported from the
area of the radio station to Logor Trnopolje.»
On the other side of the Sana River, in the suburb Tukovi
where all three ethnic groups lived together, people woke up to
see armed men in the intersection where the roads take off to
Ljubija and Sanski Most. Since World War II, the Serbs have
counted for the majority of the population in Tukovi (i.e. they
have at least been the largest of the ethnic groups). The armed
men were Serbs. All were in uniforms, some in the uniform of the
army, others in camouflage uniforms, some having the Red Star
emblem some the Cetnik insignia - some were known locally, others
were new faces. The people living in Tukovi were surrounded by
the Serbian military and they could not leave the area or even
their houses. People learned, moreover, from Radio Prijedor the
order for the non-Serbs to hang out a white flag. When the non-
Serbs had done what they had been instructed to do, their houses
were ransacked - people knew who lived where anyhow.
All over the town, Serbian military claimed that they were
looking for weapons among the non-Serbs. They looted many houses
at the same time. They went on like this for about one week.
During this time, they hit some people. In general, they
attacked people both physically and psychologically. Some of the
pre-World War II Serbian inhabitants in Tukovi assisted non-Serbs
in the area so that these people were spared from the «ethnic
cleansing» - it was an exception that an area was spared like
this.
At the intersection of Partizanska Street and JNA Street,
there was a bakery. All Croatian and Muslim men living in that
area were gathered outside the bakery. Women and children were
shepherded into a house vis-a-vis and were not allowed to look at
the area where the men were. This was at about 8:00 a.m. At
about 10:00 a.m., the women and children were transported to
Logor Trnopolje, as they left there were allegedly some 30-35
dead non-Serbian men laying in a heap outside of the bakery.
On the outskirts of the city, at Pecani near the stadium,
there was reportedly another heap with some 20 dead non-Serbian
men.
In all the targeted areas, the same happened - everyone
had to get out of their houses and men and women were separated.
The adult males were brought to concentration camps to be
detained there. The women, children, and elderly men were
transported to Logor Trnopolje - some to be deported out of
Opstina Prijedor more or less immediately, others to be
temporarily released after some days. In Prijedor town, Stari
Grad and adjacent areas were «ethnically cleansed» first, that is
already on 30 May 1992. Other parts of the town were «cleansed»
in raids or in connection with ransacking the following days. As
Serbs spotted non-Serbs, they could report on them to have them
arrested.
The fate befalling non-Serbs when apprehended was often
violent. Just one example: one survivor from the area relates
that an identified Serb commander of a so-called intervention
unit (see Chapter XII.A. infra) (his name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), in June 1992, had come
together with three or four other Serbian soldiers to arrest four
brothers in their home in the suburb Tukovi. When their mother
started to weep because she did not want her sons to be arrested,
the Serb commander of the so-called intervention unit shot dead
both the mother and her four sons (the names of the five victims
are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons).
On 20 July 1992, a commission was established in Prijedor
town by the executive committee of the Opstina. Allegedly, it
was the task of the commission to provide expert opinions
concerning the restoration or the demolition of buildings in
different quarters of the town. The buildings in question were
especially to be found in Stari Grad, and the streets most
heavily damaged during the attack on Prijedor town. Ostensibly,
the commission was to revive a town planning project dating back
to 1987, according to which a number of buildings had to be
demolished. The experts were to advise on whether renovation of
a building was still possible, or whether it was inevitable that
the building be razed. The real purpose of the commission seems
to have been to give a justification to the public why entire
quarters of the town - Stari Grad in particular - were to be
flattened after these quarters had been captured following their
Muslim and Croatian inhabitants having been killed, deported or
expelled. One indication of this being the purpose was the fact
that the whole of Stari Grad (save for three houses used for
military purposes) was levelled when the commission was still
working on its recommendations concerning the houses there. The
expert commission by then had completed its work concerning about
100 buildings, recommending that 20-30 buildings be renovated.
The latter buildings were, however, demolished as well. Some 20
new buildings in Stari Grad - which had been built in a
traditional Muslim style - were also torn down. If a building
belonging to a Serb was flattened, the owner was granted
compensation. No compensation was offered to Muslims or Croats.
Attractive housing facilities, which had belonged to
purged non-Serbs and which were not demolished, were taken over
by Serbs.
Starting on 20 July 1992, a larger area of predominantly
non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the
larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner
as the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra). Here, however,
it was predominantly Serbian infantry - paramilitary groups
included - who performed the destruction. Artillery was not used
to the same extent as in the Kozarac area. At the time of the
attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 non-Serbian
people, including people who had come for shelter after their
villages to the west of Opstina Prijedor had been assailed.
On 19 July 1992, the Serbs rounded up non-Serbs in Ljubija
filling four buses. The passengers in one bus were adult males,
some of whom were brought to the police station in Prijedor town
and the others to Logor Keraterm. The three other buses held
children, women, and elderly men. These buses passed Logor
Trnopolje and continued straight to the Travnik area deporting
the passengers (see Chapter X.C. infra).
In the beginning of July 1992, after the inhabitants in
the neighbouring villages of Biscani and Rizvanovici had handed
over their weapons, but before the village was attacked, a number
of Serbian soldiers from the JNA came to Rizvanovici and
plundered the area. The soldiers, inter alia, demanded that the
villagers hand over calves and lambs. On 19 July at about 3:00
p.m., a quarrel erupted between some Serbian soldiers and/or
policemen. There was a truck parked in Rizvanovici which
belonged to someone in Hambarine (see Chapter VII.A. supra). The
Serbs asked the local administration to get the key to the truck.
Thence, the Serbs started to argue about who was to have the
loot. One Serb was shot dead, it is said, by another Serb in the
argument. The dead was an identified Serb from the district,
whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons. The other Serbs brought the dead over to the checkpoint
at Biscani and accused the «Green Berets», i.e. Muslim
fundamentalists, of having killed the Serb. The Serbs then
abducted ten old men from Rizvanovici as hostages to a camp in
Ljubija. The villagers were given an ultimatum to name the non-
Serbian perpetrator who the Serbs claimed had killed the Serb,
and to hand over their arms. Neither alternative was possible as
there was no such perpetrator and no more arms to be
relinquished.
Subsequently, the area was bombarded with grenades from
the surrounding heights. The villages there are situated in a
kind of depression and were bombarded from positions at Karan,
Spalanciste, Volar or Topica Brdo. On 20 July 1992, at about
6:00 a.m. the bombardment stopped. On the radio, it was
announced that none in the area were to leave their houses as
imminent searches were to be expected.
At about the same time, the army - one personnel carrier
and several lorries - came to the intersection next to the gas
station in Tukovi. An identified army commander, whose name is
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, read
out some kind of a command to the soldiers and they split up -
some going to Sredice and Biscani, others to Hambarine. Another
group of soldiers went to Hegic. Other groups of Serbian
military were apparently coming in from other directions
simultaneously.
When the Serbian forces arrived at Sredice, all the
villagers were ordered to leave their houses. Women and men were
separated. Children and elderly men were incorporated in the
women's group. Men were gathered in the intersections of the
roads in the area, where most of the men killed were reportedly
executed. Women, children, and elderly men from 10-12 houses
were herded into one house. In the wake of the Serbian military
assault, buses came to bring the men who had not been killed to
Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska. Hall No. 3 in Keraterm had
been emptied to receive them (see Chapter VIII.B. infra). The
women and children were kept overnight in the houses where they
first had been gathered before they were taken to the new
athletic field in Tukovi.
A small village further to the west, Hadzici, was not
attacked that same day and some men from the village were
gathered by the Serbs to collect dead bodies. Allegedly, they
picked up about 30 dead people in Hegic, and from the
intersection between Biscani and Rizvanovici some 40 dead. They
were ordered not to move far away from the roads. In Kadirici,
they found 12 dead bodies partly covered by soil. In Durtovic,
there was a larger group of dead people but their number is
unknown. They used three or four days to collect dead people.
Altogether, including the above-mentioned corpses, it was eight
truck-loads of dead people. The women and children were brought
to the stadium on 21 and 22 July 1992. In passing, they could
see many of the corpses.
Every non-Serbian village and hamlet on the western bank
of the Sana River was now visited and house by house destroyed by
the Serbs, including regular army personnel, paramilitary
fighters, police, and armed local Serbs. Almost all non-Serbian
males were beaten before being killed or thrown into buses. One
bus with male prisoners, for whom no room could be found in Logor
Keraterm or Logor Omarska, was parked in an open field. Some 20
Serbian soldiers reportedly surrounded the bus and the prisoners
were ordered to get out and leave the place. As they were
leaving, almost all of them were shot dead (see Chapter VIII.E.
infra). Some people could observe some of this from nearby
houses; for others, the firing was within earshot, and some of
these listeners later went to see what had happened. There were
some holes in the sandy ground in the area, but the executed
prisoners were left behind in the open.
In July 1992, some 40 prisoners from Biscani were killed
in Logor Omarska, according to other camp inmates. It was
gruesome. The prisoners from Biscani cried out in agony as they
were pulled out of the bus and thrown head first against a brick
wall. Their heads were allegedly smashed into the wall for each
of them to «dig» out a five centimetres deep hole, the Serbian
perpetrators announced.
After the attack on the Hambarine area in July 1992, women
and children were detained at the stadium near Tukovi before
being deported. Others were held captive - often for several
days - in the athletic field in Ljubija before internment in
camps and deportation.
Very hard hit in this major Serbian military attack on
villages on the left bank of the Sana River were, among others,
the villages Biscani, Carakovo, Rizvanovici, Sredice, and Zekovi.
A total of more than 1,500 people were allegedly killed on 20
July 1992 alone. The mass killings in Carakovo first started on
23 July.
In Sredice and Rizvanovici, for example, the Serbian
infantry, paramilitary soldiers, and other Serbs with them
reportedly went from house to house mutilating, killing, and
deporting the inhabitants and other civilians having sought
shelter there (refugees from Opstina Bosanski Novi and fugitives
from the previous attack on Hambarine, see Chapter VII.A. supra).
Within a few days, no living beings were left in the villages,
but in numerous places there were piles of dead men - often
fathers and sons together. Many of the dead bodies are said to
have been terribly mutilated, 15 dead persons had been chained
together, many smaller piles contained approximately 10 dead
bodies each. Smaller piles were found even on the doorsteps of
private homes, larger ones were in more central locations. In
front of one particular house, in a sand pit, there was a
relatively larger pile. From here, the Serbs had intended to
take numerous captive non-Serbs by bus for detention. But, as
the bus was totally overcrowded, it is claimed that the Serbs
forced almost half of the passengers to leave the bus and
executed them on the spot.
Carakovo was encircled on 23 July 1992 at about 3:00 a.m.
by Serbs coming in from all directions, not only from the main
road along the Sana River. The majority of the Serbs were
wearing the uniform of the Serbian army. Some were dressed in
the light-blue uniform of the reserve police. Some of those in
the army uniform in addition wore red ribbons and red berets. It
was believed that the latter belonged to the Marticevci - among
them were Serbs from neighbouring villages. Some soldiers were
wearing white ribbons on their shoulders - they may have been
White Eagles. All around were the sounds of bombs and grenades
exploding and machine gun fire. Some of the Serbs gave commands
such as «Burn down!» and «Kill!». It was like a hunt, as one
survivor recounts, in which also the nearby forest was searched
for non-Serbs. Hundreds of people were killed - shot, burnt
alive, beaten or tortured to death in other ways.
The Serbs were also looking for some civilians such as the
leader of the Muslim political party, the SDA, in Prijedor (see
Chapters VI.A. and VII.C. supra), and the party's secretary (see
Chapter VII.C. supra). In Caracovo, there was a very large
family with a name similar to that of the SDA leader. The Serbs
mixed up this name with the family name of the SDA leader and for
this reason allegedly killed every member of that family which
they could find. Two elderly non-Serbs from the area registered
268 people whom they knew by name, killed in Carakovo on 23 and
24 July 1992. On their list are 31 identified persons with the
surname of the family mistaken for that of the SDA leader (their
names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons). Reportedly, a total of approximately 100 members of
this family were exterminated during the attack. There is also a
hamlet named Hopovci in the area, where people had the same
family name as the SDA secretary. The elderly men have 19
identified persons with this name on their list (their names are
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). The
SDA secretary is not on the list. On the list there are,
however, other large family groups included, such as 29 people
sharing a common family name. Altogether there are only 30
surnames on the list, save for an identified murdered imam (whose
first name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons) whose surname was unknown to the two elderly men.
In the settlement Donja Mahala, some 50 women were
gathered and allegedly raped.
There is information to indicate that altogether more than
760 people were killed in the onslaught on Carakovo. According
to the 1981 census, Carakovo then had 2,263 inhabitants. A
number of non-Serbs who had managed to run away when their
villages in the area were attacked the previous days may have
been caught in Carakovo.
It is claimed that young women from, inter alia, the
villages Gornja Ravska, Gornji Volar, Stara Rijeka and Surkovac
together with young women from other districts were detained and
sexually abused by Serbian military in Korcanica Motel. It is
claimed that they were abused to «give birth to better and more
beautiful Serbs». Among the high ranking Serbian military named
as rapists and/or organizers of these sexual orgies are two
identified members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor,
whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons.
Other registered killings committed allegedly by Serbs of
named non-Serbs in their place of residence and non-Serbian
residents from the same areas killed in (a few missing from)
Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska are, to give but a few examples,
from villages not mentioned specifically above:
There are also allegations of, inter alia, the following
executions:
In Redak (strip mines, part of the Ljubija iron ore mines,
but south of Ljubija) on approximately 1 August 1992, more than
200 Muslim civilians were killed. The Muslim civilians had been
arrested in the village of Miska Glava where they had sought
refuge from the Serbian attacks on the villages Biscani,
Rizvanovici, Hambarine, and Carakovo.
In Lisina (a part of the Kurevo forest, approximately two
kilometres south-east of Ljubija), between 20 and 25 July 1992,
between 70 and 100 Muslim civilians were killed.
Near the hamlet of Volaric (in the village of Surkovac,
approximately two kilometres north of Ljubija) nine civilian
Gypsies were killed.
At the Prijedor-Donji Volar and Jugovci-Cikote crossroad,
called Trzna (approximately eight kilometres north-east of
Ljubija) at the end of July 1992, between 100 and 120 Muslim
civilians from the village of Jugovci were killed.
In the area of Prijedorsko Polje, next to the left bank of
the Sana River (close to the villages of Biscani and Rizvanovici)
at a place known as Bajeri (gravel pits, approximately 8
kilometres north-east of Ljubija) in the period from May to
August 1992, more than 100 non-Serbian civilians from the
Prijedor area were killed.
Like the attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B.
supra), the Serbian attack on the villages on the left bank of
the Sana River was aimed at the total subjugation of the non-
Serbs. They were no longer (like in the first attack on
Hambarine, see Chapter VII.A. supra) given a possibility de facto
to seek shelter in nearby villages (which in any event would have
been difficult at this time when all non-Serbian villages and
hamlets in the area were targeted).
When this larger Hambarine/Ljubija area was targeted, the
pressure on both detention facilities and means of deportation
reached a peak, as it had two months earlier, in late May 1992,
when first the Kozarac area and then, in part, Prijedor town had
been «ethnically cleansed». Thus there were also improvised
detention facilities made in the Ljubija iron ore mine. In the
central mining area, it is claimed that the main separator was
used temporarily to incarcerate prisoners. Also other areas
which could relatively easily be guarded may have been used -
possibly also some of the open pits. Logor Ciglane is mentioned
in this context; it may have held at least up to 1,000 prisoners
at the time. Limited numbers of captives from the southernmost
parts of the Ljubija area were moved south for detention in
Opstina Sanski Most (from where a number of the Serbian armed
forces participating in the attack had come).
After the non-Serbs had been ousted from the area, their
property was pillaged and many buildings were destroyed.
The main target of all the Serbian military attacks has
been the non-Serbian peoples in Opstina Prijedor and not
installations and positions of strategic importance.
Over Radio Prijedor, the Serbs also demanded that the
Muslims and Croats living in areas with mixed ethnic populations
of Serbs and non-Serbs should mark their housing by hanging out a
white flag, and identify themselves by wearing white armbands
when they moved outdoors as a sign of surrender. This applied
for some time.
In early June 1992, all non-Serbs in Prijedor were ordered
to wear white armbands when they went outdoors. During World War
II, in comparison the Nazi regime in Belgrade legislated that all
Jews were to wear yellow armbands.
The Serb taking over the position as editor-in-chief of
Radio Prijedor was Zoran Baros. In Prijedor town, women,
children, and elderly men were detained for deportation in the
sports hall at the high school after the attack on the Kozarac
area. Zoran Baros was removed from his position as editor-in-
chief of Radio Prijedor after he had permitted Muslims to use the
radio to trace missing family members after the Serbian attacks
had started and the first non-Serbs had been taken into detention
at the high school.
Notably all involvement by paramilitary and irregular
units were fully synchronized with the efforts of the regular
Serbian armed forces, and can have been nothing but well-
coordinated, the regular army being in charge. One reason for
this conclusion is that all the major Serbian military operations
started with heavy artillery barrages or the use of tanks as
operated by the regular army, and were immediately followed by
the onslaught of paramilitary and irregular units working in
tandem with regular army infantry. There is, moreover, not one
single report to the effect that there was ever a paramilitary or
irregular unit working to obstruct or even slightly hinder the
objectives of the regular army. The same reportedly has been the
case when individual Serbs from the neighbourhood or elsewhere
have participated in the attacks.
There were, of course, a number of non-Serbs who managed
to run into hiding on the mountains, in the forests, and even in
adjacent villages when their homes were attacked. However, given
the overall situation in and isolation of Opstina Prijedor, that
was in the vast majority of cases only a temporary escape from
the oppression. The forests and mountains were searched
meticulously by the Serbian military and all their different
Serbian collaborators - often with the understanding that any
living being caught was to be killed. Non-Serbs in hiding
tempered a difficult time in the forests and on the mountains -
although it was summer and reasonable temperatures, on the
average, for outdoor life - people were not accustomed to
foraging for food. Some of the people in the forests and on the
mountains tried more or less immediately to return to their home
areas as the military attacks seemed to be over. Others
preferred the relative security of the uninhabited areas until
the scavenging for food became rather unbearable or medical
problems called for assistance. When leaving the mountains and
forests the non-Serbs tried to return to inhabited or former
inhabited areas, sometimes with the hope of blending into a not
too unfriendly environment, sometimes knowing that they would
have to surrender immediately. In hamlets, villages, and towns,
there were, every once in a while, round-ups of non-Serbs, or non-
Serbian individuals being reported on by supporters of the new
Serbian-dominated system.
It is extremely difficult to have any precise idea of the
number of non-Serbs who perished in the Serbian military attacks
and later when detained by the Serbs. There are, however,
general characteristics of the overall situation that give some
indications. After the military attacks, the Serbs had a
consistent practice of singling out the surviving non-Serbian
males from 16 to 60-years old (sometimes even younger boys and
men up to the age of 65) and incarcerating them in the two
concentration camps - Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm.
Significant numbers (the exact figure is unknown) of these men
were killed after they had been gathered and before the rest
boarded buses. Others were killed literally en route to a
concentration camp. Save for very limited numbers of men who
were able to flee Opstina Prijedor, for example, by bribing their
way out - the vast majority of the non-Serbian male population
suffered the above-mentioned fate.
Today, a total of some 9,000 non-Serbs remain in Opstina
Prijedor (see Chapter XIII.G. infra). One fourth of the
population is in the age group 0 to 15-years old in most Western
countries. In developing countries, the ratio is up to one to
three of the total. According to the 1991 census, the total
population in Opstina Prijedor was 112,470 - the Serbs counted
for 47,745 and the non-Serbs were 64,725. Considering that
approximately half of the latter group (some 32,000 people)
probably were males, a breakdown in age groups will give a rough
idea about how many men between 16 and 60 years there were in the
first place, even without including those who had fled into the
area after Opstina Bosanski Novi was purged. It is recalled that
the surrounding districts - Opstina Bosanski Novi, Opstina
Bosanska Dubica, and Opstina Banja Luka - had Serbian majority
populations already prior to the difficulties started in Opstina
Prijedor. Opstina Sanski Most saw the non-Serbs «ethnically
cleansed» at about the same time as it happened in the district
of Prijedor. There was, in other words, no safe haven nearby to
which the non-Serbs in Opstina Prijedor could have recourse.
Comparing the total group of non-Serbian men in the age groups
taken to the concentration camps Omarska and Keraterm, and the
number of male prisoners released from there (see Chapter XII.
infra), a high fatality rate is indicated and the overall picture
of males in these age groups exterminated is at best bleak.
Questioned by a foreign visitor about how many people had
been killed in the Serbian military operations in the region,
Mico Kovacevic from the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor
reportedly replied that:
In the village Sivci (south of Kozarac), at least 45 non-
Serbian people, possibly as many as 120, were killed by uniformed
Serbian soldiers wearing caps with the Cetnik insignia. The dead
were buried at the village cemetery, four or five in each grave.
A cemetery in the nearby village of Hrnici was probably also
used. Some corpses were interred in the meadows as people came
across them. After the Serbian military attacks, it seems that a
number of the dead were buried by survivors almost wherever it
was feasible under the circumstances: at graveyards, in gardens,
along roads, in fields and meadows, in the woods and on the
mountains.
On 5 November 1992, it is claimed that in the immediate
vicinity of Ljeskare village, in a area known as Dubocaj, at the
foot of the Ljubijica Mountain, Serbs were burning the remains of
people killed between 20 and 25 July 1992 in the part of the
Kurevo forest located east of Ljubija. Serbian police sealed off
the area of Dubocaj at the time, among them was one identified
police officer from Ljubija whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. The odour was carried
by the wind and could be smelled kilometres away.
In the Borik forest north of Carakovo, a survivor claims
that he, his father and his uncle buried 370 people in small
graves with five to 10 dead people in each. When the Serbs
launched their military attack on the villages on the left bank
of the Sana River, many villagers from neighbouring villages
sought shelter in both Carakovo and the Borik forest. When the
Serbian soldiers attacked Carakovo, it is claimed that they
killed a minimum of 760 and probably an even higher number of non-
Serbs. The Serbian forces also searched the forest for
fugitives, allegedly killing all human beings they came across.
Serbian soldiers have reportedly said that after the
destruction of the villages on the left bank of the Sana River,
non-Serbian survivors were transported by buses and trucks to
locations which belonged to the iron ore mine, where they were
executed by shooting, and thence buried with the use of
construction machinery from the mine. Non-Serbs, first
shepherded into mine pits, may have been among those thus
exterminated and interred. According to the Serbian soldiers,
some kind of powdery substance was put on top of the bodies to
accelerate the decomposition process.
Some dead bodies may have been discarded in abandoned mine
shafts.
Some days after the attack on the villages on the left
bank of the Sana River started, there was an announcement on
Radio Prijedor that people in Prijedor town should stay away from
the area behind the Sose Mazar Street for a certain time. People
did, however, observe five (there may have been more) trucks with
dead bodies coming across the Sana River (from its left bank) and
turning down the Partizanska Street towards the mine in Tomasica.
Blood stained the passage route for days. The dead bodies were
supposedly disposed of or destroyed in Tomasica.
From 1 to 12 July 1993, Serbian police blocked the
Svoznica Road which connects Ljubija to villages to the south
(such as Stara Rijeka) and which in part passes through the
Ljubija iron ore strip mines. In this period, underground
explosions (making houses quake kilometres away) and the motors
of heavy mining equipment could be heard around the clock. As
the road was reopened to traffic, passers by noticed that areas
where mass graves were known to have been located, were dug up
and filled in with fresh soil and gravel. It is claimed that the
Serbs had removed the remains of people who had been buried here
during the months of July and August 1992, and taken the remains
in the direction of Prijedor possibly to the Tomasica iron ore
mine where there are machines, inter alia, for grinding iron ore.
As illustrated by the above examples, the dead non-Serbs
may have been disposed of in many different areas - varying from
the odd locations almost anywhere to the regular graveyards to
large-scale burials on the estates of Rudnika Ljubija (see
Chapter II.D. supra; see also Annex X, Mass Graves).
After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, they opened
three concentration camps in Opstina Prijedor. No concentration
camps had existed in Opstina Prijedor at the time of the Serbian
takeover, or for that matter, in the region since World War II.
Two of the concentration camps were de facto death camps - Logor
Omarska and Logor Keraterm. The third - Logor Trnopolje - had
another purpose as it functioned as a staging area for massive
deportations of primarily women, children, and elderly men (see
Chapter X.A. infra). Whereas the death camps were under the
authority of the Serbian military and the Serbian police, Logor
Trnopolje had more of a civilian image, notably with the local
Serbian Red Cross having a pivotal function.
Throughout this analysis the word logor, which in
translation means just camp, is used. The reason is that the
word «camp» in the English language is associated with everything
and anything from leisure to rigour. Using the term «logor» is
intended to link these institutions to their inhumane
characteristics, as described below.
Special mention ought to be made of the fact that the
United Nations Commission of Experts, as represented by Chairman
M. Cherif Bassiouni, prepared a separate report on camps and
detention facilities with analysis of, inter alia, Omarska,
Keraterm and Trnopolje (see Annex VIII, Prison Camps).
A Serbian guard in Logor Omarska told (before 29 June
1992) a friend outside the camp that:
The informant asked the Serbian guard, his friend, if the
Serbs were going to kill the people.
Numerous leading Muslim and Croatian citizens had notably
been immediately targeted for extermination when still in their
homes, towns or villages.
Among the prominent citizens of Prijedor who had survived
the initial phase of the devastation and were detained in
Omarska, are long lists of identified persons whose names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Among
them were (to mention but some): the mayor; politicians from the
SDA and the HDZ in Prijedor; an imam; judges and lawyers;
employees from the military and civilian sectors; a veterinarian,
a physiotherapist, a dentist, and a number of medical doctors; an
engineer and some economists; headmasters and teachers from
schools at different levels; journalists and an editor of Radio
Prijedor and of Kozarski Vjesnik; an author and an actor;
directors and members of the Rudnika Ljubija management board;
directors and managers of Bosnamontaza, Kozaraturist, Celpak, and
the biscuit factory Mira Cikota; the director and the secretary
of the Prijedor Red Cross, the president of Merhamet (the Muslim
charity organization) in Prijedor; restaurant owners, business
men and entrepreneurs; leaders of sports clubs and football
players.
In Logor Omarska (and in part for reasons of space in
Logor Keraterm), the Serbs detained almost the entire non-Serbian
elite - including political and administrative leaders, religious
leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders, and
others. In addition to the judges and lawyers, all other
segments of the non-Serbian law-enforcement personnel, policemen
in particular, were incarcerated. Media people, artists and
sports men - all the groups of people who in their different
fields led and influenced the non-Serbian populace, were
incarcerated. The leaders of the voluntary agencies - such as
the local Red Cross and Merhamet - endured the same fate.
Thirty-seven women were among the captured brought to
Logor Omarska. There were 36 non-Serbian women in leading
positions and/or politically active. One of the first women
arriving at the camp recounts that:
One Serbian woman, whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, was arrested reportedly
because her late husband was Croatian. She was, however,
released from the camp.
Simo Drljaca, chief of the Serbian secret police in
Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor,
later told a foreign visitor to Prijedor that Logor Omarska
opened on 27 May 1992 when 700 prisoners were detained there. At
this time, Logor Keraterm was already operational, and there is
information to indicate that a number of individual prisoners or
smaller groups of prisoners may have arrived at the camp from at
least 25 May 1992. Several survivors report that the camp
leadership was not fully on top of the situation the very first
days when there were prisoners in the camp. There may even have
been some initial confusion among the Serbs concerning, for
example, how to treat female detainees and concerning who was who
(one early detainee may, as described infra, have just walked out
of the camp and back into freedom, passing as a Serb).
It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of
prisoners who were detained in Logor Omarska, both in total and
at any given time. The number varied over time as new prisoners
were moved in, especially in the wake of the major Serbian
military operations, but more or less continuously due to
individual arrests and smaller round-ups. On 15 June 1992, there
were reportedly 2,736 plates used by camp inmates, each detainee
having utilized one plate. In late July 1992, before the
emptying of the camp into other camps started, there may have
been approximately 3,000 camp inmates. The estimated total
number of inmates to have been in the camp also varies
considerably. Some estimate that there may have been a total of
5,000 prisoners, others believe that it may have been closer to
7,000. Under these circumstances, it is even more difficult to
make any approximation concerning prisoners directly or
indirectly killed in the camp - according to Serbian leaders
there were only two prisoners in the camp who died from natural
causes.
It is, however, possible to establish with a relatively
high degree of certainty the total number of males in the
relevant age groups in Opstina Prijedor (see Chapter VII.E.
supra). The fate of this group was, save for the limited numbers
still remaining in the district (see Chapter XIII.G. infra),
death outside of camps or detention in Logor Omarska or Logor
Keraterm - a very limited number may have been taken into other
camps primarily, at least initially, in the district of Sanski
Most. The exact number of people included in each group, thus,
is less relevant to appreciate the true character of the
catastrophe which the Serbs brought about for the non-Serbs in
Opstina Prijedor.
Serbian leaders have made some statements relevant to the
questions of numbers. Simo Drljaca, chief of the Serbian secret
police and member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor, was
asked about the numbers of prisoners, their crimes, and fate by
journalist Roy Gutman who reports from that encounter that:
In the official version, detainees were interrogated
for four days and shipped out. Drljaca said 800
detainees who were alleged to have 'organized the whole
thing,' among them rich Muslims who financed the Muslim
SDA political party, were taken to Manjaca, which was
operated by the Bosnian Serb army as a prisoner-of-war
camp, to await criminal trial. Taken with them were
600 people who reputedly commanded units of the Muslim
and Croat resistance. The remaining 1,900 were found
innocent and taken immediately to Trnopolje, which
officials said was a transit camp, Drljaca said.»*27
Zeljko Meakic, the chief of security in Logor Omarska,
reportedly told a journalist from the New York tabloid Newsday
that:
According to an interview with Simo Drljaca:
Interrogation - or informative talks - were conducted in
Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm, but not in Logor Trnopolje.
The number of prisoners in Keraterm may have been about half of
the number in Omarska.
The number of people, who were killed or who died in Logor
Omarska, has yet to be established by outsiders. Confronted with
the statement, «People say that 1,200 to 2,000 people were killed
at Omarska», Mico Kovacevic (member of the Krizni Stab Srpske
Opstine Prijedor and deputy mayor in Prijedor in the Serbian
regime) reportedly replied that:
Logor Omarska was hastily opened in the administrative
centre of the Omarska iron ore mine - one of the three main
extensions of Rudnika Ljubija - located to the south-east of the
Kozarac area. The Omarska mine is situated just south of the
railway from Prijedor town to Banja Luka. Omarska village, which
was and remains predominantly Serbian populated, is positioned
next to the railroad on the northern side of it. The mine is
primarily an open pit mine, and there are numerous open pits in
the vicinity of where the camp was established.
There was almost no reconstruction of the mining company's
facilities before they were converted into a concentration camp.
There were none the less rumours in the surrounding area before
the concentration camp was opened that something special would be
arranged at the place. The premises were not used by the mining
company after the main change of usage - there are not known to
be any mining related activities there, even at present.
The compound had four buildings which all definitely were
used as part of the concentration camp. These buildings were the
canteen building, the larger building, the White House, and the
Red House. The canteen building had a canteen and a kitchen on
the ground floor, where there also were toilets, showers and a
wardrobe for the miners. There was also a small garage. On the
first floor in the canteen building, there were one main office
and several smaller ones, or altogether eight rooms used for
interrogation of camp inmates. The larger building was in part a
huge garage for dumpers, etc. On the ground floor, in addition
to the garage, there was one relatively large room. The first
floor - which covered only parts of the ground floor - had
several rooms (one, ill-famed, was known as No. 26) and an
electrical workshop. The White House was a tiny construction
totally out of proportion to the horrors reportedly taking place
there. It had four rooms all allegedly constantly used for
torture and killings. One of these rooms was known as «the room
of death». The Red House, which was small as well, also had an
ignoble function - this reportedly was where prisoners were taken
for more or less immediate execution. For the latter reason, all
reports about this building are from prisoners who have not been
inside it themselves. There are limited numbers of survivors of
the White House.
There are also reports to indicate that prisoners have
been detained in a separator belonging to the mining company -
this may, however, have been in another extension of Rudnika
Ljubija, namely in Ljubija.
Around the canteen building and over to (and on three
sides of) the larger building, the ground had a cement layer on
top. This cement area was known as the «Pista». Outside of
that, the ground was grass-covered.
Concerning the general conditions in the camp, a marked
difference existed between the main period when the camp was open
and after it, for all practical purposes, was closed on 6 August
1992. Thenceforth, the camp was more of a showcase for foreign
journalists and the ICRC to visit. By then, most of the
prisoners had been moved from the camp, the camp had been cleaned
up and to some extent renovated (bullet holes had been covered
and walls painted, etc.), beds had been brought into the camp,
and more food and better hygiene were provided for the detainees.
More importantly, the extreme violence and in-camp killings
prevailed no more (see Chapter XII.A. infra). This chapter is
focused on the main period when the concentration camp was open.
Logor Omarska was not surrounded by barbed wire or
otherwise directly fenced. The camp was however, in the iron
grip of three groups of guards - each comprised of 30 men. There
was one group of guards in the camp itself, then one group of
soldiers some 50 meters outside and another group some 100 metres
away from the camp. The last group would reportedly shoot
anything that moved. It is said that the two first groups
primarily were to prevent prisoners from trying to leave the
camp, whereas the third group was to protect the camp from
attacks from outside. Former prisoners state that there were
only two detainees who ever managed to flee from the camp. Both
of them were later captured and returned to the camp, where one
of them was allegedly immediately killed. The fate of the other
appears to be unknown.
In addition, there is the non-Serb who claims that he was
arrested and brought to the camp at the time of its opening. As
the camp was not yet well- organized, and the people involved on
the Serbian side were not yet fully familiar with one another, he
pretended to be a Serb and walked out of the main entrance. He
was not searched for as a fugitive, but was eventually persecuted
as a non-Serb.
The Serbian leaders (as quoted supra) claim that 49
«disappeared» from the camp, seven of whom they say fled during a
power outage during the night of 27 July 1992. Simo Drljaca
later told a foreign visitor that, «In legal terminology we use
that term [disappeared]. Maybe some who disappeared died in
disappearing.»
Starting, at the latest, on 27 May 1992, the conditions in
Logor Omarska were more than crowded. One former detainee
arriving at the camp on that day, recounts that he was squeezed
into the room adjacent to the huge garage together with an
estimated 400 other prisoners (the group was to prepare lists
with the names of those present, with 30 names on each list). He
states that the prisoners were packed so close together that
their situation resembled that of sardines in a tin. After the
doors to the storeroom had been closed, the prisoners had to
remain there and in that position for four days, with neither
food nor water or any toilet facilities. Everyone had to stand
in an upright position all along as there was no space for anyone
to lie down. Others estimate that this room may have contained
up to 500 detainees at the time. The huge garage may have taken
up to 1,000 men at the time. There were also several hundred men
cramped in on the first floor of the same building. In addition,
hundreds were ordered to stay on the cement floor outdoors -
there are said to have been some 700 in early June 1992.
In the canteen building, there was only the garage which
held any sizable number of prisoners. It is with reference to
this garage that a former prisoner is reported to have informed
that he, on 30 May 1992, was «stuffed with 130 others [prisoners]
into a one-car garage». *30 Others claim there were times when
there were as many as 160 prisoners squeezed into this garage.
In the canteen building, the women had their quarters on the
first floor in the offices where prisoners were interrogated in
the daytime. Concerning the number of prisoners kept at any one
time in the White House, this may have varied considerably.
There may have been up to some 70 people in one room at the same
time, but often far less - for example, only 20 people in each
room or even less. As prisoners were killed/died in the White
House, their place was not necessarily immediately filled with
new prisoners - although there reportedly were always some
prisoners in each room. The detainees taken to the White House
had reportedly normally been detained elsewhere in the camp at
first, but this was not always the case.
Not only was the camp crowded, but the detainees were not
to move around freely in the camp either. Whether detained
indoors or in the open area outside, they were only to move when
specifically permitted to do so - regularly only to receive food
and to go to the toilets/the open fields. Under these
circumstances, which were aggravated by several other factors as
well, sanitation more or less immediately became a problem for
the prisoners.
There was far too little water provided for the detainees
to drink, and personal hygiene thus naturally came second in the
competition for water in the camp. This was mid-summer when the
days often were hot. Also, indoors it was hot due to the
generally cramped conditions there. The prisoners' clothing was
never properly washed, and it became more and more dirtied and
ragged by the day. Since most prisoners had only one pair of
summer clothes on them when coming to the camp, the clothing also
had to serve as bedding such as pillows and blankets. There were
no beds or bedding provided for the prisoners in the camp, with
the exception that the women were provided with some kind of
mattresses, two women sleeping on each. One female prisoner
relates that she made good use of two sets of underwear that she
stuffed into her pocket before she had to leave her house during
one of the Serbian military attacks. No clothing was provided
for the detainees. Soon pieces of cloth were also needed to tie
around wounds and other inflicted injuries.
Rainy weather would bring temporary relief concerning
water, but there was not much chance of collecting the rainwater,
and the rain had other sanitary disadvantages. In the emaciated
condition of the prisoners, being soaking wet was far from ideal.
The mud that followed the rain also made life in detention more
difficult.
Twice before the camp for all practical purposes was
closed on 6 August 1992, male prisoners had a «shower». In
groups of 50, the guards had them disrobe and aimed fire hoses at
10 of them at a time. The high pressure of the water on the
prisoners' weakened bodies was painful and not a relief,
particularly so as the guards reportedly amused themselves with
aiming at the prisoners' wounds and genitals.
There were no sanitary provisions for the prisoners in the
camp; some rooms had plastic barrels at times. Reportedly, the
Serbian guards frequently beat the prisoners on their way to
meals as well as on their way to the toilet - a reason why there
were occasions when the prisoners preferred rather to urinate or
defecate in their trousers or shoes.
The women in the camp had much better general conditions
for personal hygiene, engaged as they were also in cleaning both
in the kitchen and the offices (the rooms used for
interrogation), etc. But, the relative cleanliness of the female
prisoners was possibly more for the advantage of the Serbs
abusing them than to themselves under the circumstances.
As there were no sanitary provisions for the prisoners,
the women had to manage as best they could during menstruation.
The women improvised sanitary napkins from newspapers. They also
stole toilet paper from the toilets of the Serbian inspectors
(which they had to clean) if the inspectors had forgotten any
paper there. At a late time in the history of the camp, the
women received one kilo of cotton to share between them.
As the prisoners hygiene deteriorated, so did the hygiene
in the detention locations. This soon became a vicious circle
exacerbated as prisoners were maltreated and wounds and illnesses
entered the scene. In the White House, it is said, blood, hair,
teeth and small pieces of human flesh and bones made the rooms
look like a primitive slaughterhouse. Bullet holes and damage to
the construction reportedly also affected the prisoners' mental
soundness.
Hair and beards grew long. Soon lice were a problem.
Diarrhoea and dysentery quickly became unwelcome frequent, and
then later permanent, visitors. Under these circumstances, even
minor wounds could represent serious - sometimes lethal -
problems because they were easily infected and there were no
proper remedies for disinfection available. Like the lice found
their breeding ground in open wounds, so did reportedly worms. A
variety of illnesses found suitable general conditions to break
out, but this does not seem to have plagued the camp inmates to
the extent that one could have feared, or which could have become
the case, if the camp had been open for a longer period of time.
The combination of unsanitary and depressing conditions,
fatigue due also to malnutrition and nutritional deficiencies,
physical and mental stress, and maltreatment rapidly weakened the
prison population.
The Serbs had, as already mentioned, detained a number of
medical doctors in Logor Omarska (names are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). All of these doctors
were prisoners themselves, and their high social status due to
their profession seems a main reason for their detention.
Whether they died in the detention or survived varied, as did the
length of time before they were unable to assist anyone.
It can be expected that all of them tried to assist their
fellow inmates to the extent possible. One doctor, for example,
was an ear, nose and throat specialist who to the extent possible
provided all kinds of medical assistance in the camp until he was
taken out of it in early August 1992 (for exchange supposedly,
but he was probably executed possibly on the next day, see
Chapter XII.B. infra). His medical and other assistance to
fellow inmates is remembered with much affection and
appreciation.
The medical doctors were called upon also to assist
Serbian guards and officials in the camp, primarily when they
were in need of first aid and concerning minor ailments. Though
this was assistance to their actual tormentors, it probably
benefitted the prisoners, both because medical doctors could live
on and as there were no repercussions for disobedience.
The medical doctors had no medical equipment to assist
their fellow camp inmates. Albeit inventive skills were
stretched to a maximum, there is just so much that can be
achieved with wooden pieces, bits of cardboard, and pieces of
cloth.
There are reports that one small room on the camp premises
was used as a sick ward - for some time at least - where
prisoners could be kept for some days. But there was neither
medical assistance nor food to be received there. Camp guards
came by at times and allegedly mistreated the people in the room
for no special reason.
When the prisoners first arrived at Logor Omarska, most of
them, it is said, did not receive food or water the first four
days or so. Later, they were permitted to come out from the
buildings and rooms where they normally stayed to obtain daily
food rations.
The routine in Logor Omarska allegedly was that when the
prisoners were to receive food in the canteen (on the ground
floor in the canteen building), they had to run through an L-
shaped corridor. The camp guards frequently tossed wax on the
floor to make it slippery. There were metallic wardrobe cabinets
along the corridor and prisoners fell and hit the cabinets and
were beaten by the guards. There were four Serbs in particular
who allegedly beat the prisoners. The names of the alleged
perpetrators are known but not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons.
To receive their daily food rations, the prisoners
normally arrived in groups of 30. They received a piece of bread
and a ladle of some soup-like fluid. The groups had to eat their
food within two to three minutes. Each peice of bread weighed
approximately 800 grams, one piece was normally divided between
eight people, sometimes between four. The last prisoners
sometimes received no bread at all. The female prisoners (who
were charged with distributing the food) sometimes tried to give
prisoners in special need a little extra, mainly from their own
rations.
Some prisoners were so afraid of being beaten that they
disregarded some of their daily rations. The daily food rations
were handed out between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Thus, it was
often more that 24 hours between times when each person received
his rations. Once, a prisoner received some crumbs of bread in a
newspaper. He remembers how he tore up the newspaper to get hold
of every single of the crumbs.
One of the women relates that she had some sugar which she
mixed with water for prisoners who fell unconscious. After
serving the prisoners food, she had to prepare coffee for the
guards, and that was the occasion on which she could steal some
sugar. She also stole some coffee to be able to provide it for
prisoners with dysentery. During one period, the women were
permitted to go outside to the area where the kitchen garbage was
thrown away. Here these prisoners harvested some plants that
would help prisoners suffering from diarrhoea.
Diarrhoea, as mentioned, was one problem for prisoners,
and so was its counterpart, constipation. Several prisoners
reportedly did not defecate for more than a month, some for up to
two months - a highly painful experience. Regardless of physical
ailments, all the prisoners soon lost considerable weight.
During one and a half months, one prisoner says he lost 25
kilograms of weight. Other prisoners lost as much as 39 to 45 or
even 50 kilograms during their stay in Logor Omarska.
When the prisoners arrived at the camp, they were normally
searched. Either then or later Serbian guards demanded to have
the prisoners' money, watches, and shoes - the latter only when
they were in a good condition. All of a sudden, a guard would
demand DEM 50 or 100 from a group of prisoners. If the guard did
not receive what he had asked for, guards would often take out
one of the prisoners and mistreat him. The guards, moreover,
made money from selling cigarettes - not food or water - to the
prisoners.
For the prisoners, camp life was at best an endless period
of waiting - waiting for the present to pass, never sure if there
was going to be any future, or more concrete, a new day tomorrow.
A constant worry for self and not the least for those next of
kin. Many fathers and sons, brothers and other close relatives
were interned together, but could do next to nothing to assist
one another. Similar pains related to friendships.
The prisoners spent their waiting periods standing,
sitting or laying down when there was space enough for that. The
prisoners laying on the cement floor outside often had to lay
face down in the daytime so that they would not be able to
observe in full what was happening around them.
The male detainees were not given any ordinary work to do,
but were called upon to carry maltreated and dead fellow inmates
in and out. It was more often than not that the prisoners
themselves had to lift corpses up on trucks that would remove the
dead, and on occasions when the number of dead was reportedly
relatively high, the live workers out of the camps as well. The
prisoners who had to follow such transports have allegedly not
been heard of again.
After some two months in the camp, the youngest of the
adolescents and the men over 65-years old were transferred in two
buses to Logor Trnopolje. This was not long before Logor Omarska
was to be practically closed on 6 August 1992 (see Chapter XII.A.
infra). There possibly may have been a few people released from
the camp. The Serbian leaders later interviewed about the camp
have, however, made no mention of any prisoners released, and
camp inmates say that they are not aware that any non-Serbian
prisoners were ever released. It is only known that one of the
female prisoners was out of the camp for a while before she was
brought back in again. It is possible that some of the prisoners
who disappeared from the camp were not executed as feared, but
actually were helped or bribed into safety somewhere. There
were, moreover, a few so-called exchanges of prisoners arranged,
but there is concern that the term «exchange» may have been but
an euphemism for execution (see Chapter XII.B. infra). The vast
majority of detainees thus stayed in the camp until it was
closed, if by then they were not yet dead.
Concentration camp inmates were called for interrogation
in the offices on the first floor of the canteen building.
Interrogations were normally conducted from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. The interrogators are generally referred to with the more
civilized title of «inspectors». The inspectors arrived at the
camp in the morning in a small bus together with clerks assisting
with typewriting. Thence, camp guards went around in the camp
and collected the unfortunate ones to be interrogated. Camp
guards participated in interrogation sessions as well. Sometimes
the guards seemed to have started the interrogation sessions
elsewhere in the camp before they brought the prisoners to the
inspectors. All the time, it is claimed, beating screaming and
moaning could be heard from the interrogation offices. Survivors
relate that they were badly maltreated and tortured when
interrogated. Beatings with a variety of implements were
probably most common, but there are long lists of other methods
used as well. The number of prisoners who died during
interrogation is not known to anyone other than the Serbs in
charge; the number is allegedly not very small. Time and again
other prisoners claim that they observed dead bodies taken out
from interrogation and left on the ground outside for others to
see. Fellow prisoners also noted that a number of prisoners
taken for interrogation never returned to their detention room
and were later not seen elsewhere either.
During interrogation, some were asked about political
activities, a majority perhaps about their access to weapons. In
general, the inspectors seemed to have asked all kinds of
questions - sometimes they questioned the prisoners of things
that seemed of no relevance to their case whatsoever. If a
prisoner denied any charges made against him or her, the person
allegedly was likely to be or continued to be maltreated. Many a
time prisoners reportedly agreed to anything held against them
just to avoid or reduce the mistreatment, but then the guards and
interrogators would find just another excuse to proceed with the
mistreatment it seems. In a number of reported cases, there
appears to be limited, if any, correlation between what the
prisoners explained when interrogated and the records made from
the interrogation sessions. One detainee, for example, was
questioned about participation in the Serbian plebiscite and the
referendum held in BiH, and about political activity in general.
This person was convicted on the basis of the interrogation
session, but for armed revolt, stealing weapons, and for planning
genocide against the Serbs - which were issues not at all
addressed during the interrogation. It was a death sentence.
There were not many prisoners officially sentenced to death. Of
those who were sentenced, some were executed immediately, others
were just to remain in the camp until death one day caught up
with them. The person just mentioned was in the second category
and survived.
Allegedly, the inspectors had long lists prepared ahead of
time according to which the prisoners were called for
interrogation - it was not done at random or at the whim of some
individual Serbs. The precise character of the lists used is not
yet known to outsiders, meaning non-Serbs. Since they were lists
with thousands of names, they were not prepared readily although
camp facilities to some extent seemed improvised in practical
terms. One possibility could have been that the lists were taken
straight from the 1991 census. This possibility, however, does
not seem to correspond with the actual lists which prisoners
themselves claim to have seen on occasion.
All the women reportedly experienced bad interrogation
sessions.
In general, when prisoners were called for interrogation,
other prisoners tried to provide them with some clothing which
was not all in tatters so that they would have a little
protection for the skin. It is stated that it even happened that
prisoners - before potential interrogation sessions - smeared
themselves with blood from fellow prisoners maltreated already,
with the hope that it could give them an easier time. Blood
stained clothing served a similar purpose.
Mistreatment and torture were not confined to
interrogation sessions. Extreme abuses were reportedly carried
out by camp guards at any time, but especially at night.
Sometimes the guards seemed to select their victims at random.
Sometimes they probably had personal grudges to settle with
someone. Sometimes they seemed to act in a kind of follow-up
after the day's interrogations, coming back for victims from
then.
At night, the guards were often more or less drunk.
Sometimes they were joined by unruly elements from outside the
camp, but that could happen in the daytime as well. Dusan Tadic
is one example. Also, the Red Berets from Banja Luka (see
Chapter V.C. supra) came to assist their Serbian comrades in the
camp. Normally, the guards lit a bonfire at night and played
loud music to overpower screams and moaning from prisoners.
When prisoners were called out at night - it could, for
example, be five to 10 people from the large garage plus some
from other rooms - they reportedly more often than not did not
come back to their rooms ever.
Every night the prisoners were seized with fear that this
could be their night - the night when they would be subjected to
maltreatment and possibly, or rather probably, death. The guards
allegedly organized sheer orgies in brute force and destruction.
Some prisoners were victimized next to or in the bonfire, others
in the White House, and some were walked towards the Red House.
Some experienced two of these options. It seems that the same
prisoners were not taken both to the White House and the Red
House.
One former prisoner relates:
Starting from the very beginning of the camp, female
prisoners were allegedly raped by the Serbian camp guards,
Serbian camp officials, and other Serbs. Rapes were reportedly
often combined with beatings and other abuses. Often rapes were
committed by several perpetrators one after the other. Sometimes
the rapist had an audience, sometimes it was merely fellow
perpetrators waiting to take turns. Like the rest of the prison
population the women were not as such protected against either
ill-treatment or torture.
Two of the youngest women spent most of the time in the
White House where they were raped and tortured. Almost all the
women were badly tortured when in the camp. Most women were
subjected to sexual assault - they were humiliated by being
promised privileges and threatened that if they did not obey,
they would not survive.
The guards reportedly tried to force one prisoner (whose
name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons) to rape his fellow prisoner (whose name is also not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), a young
woman. He did not want to. He had angina pectoris. The guards
stripped both. The male prisoner begged and screamed, «I cannot,
I cannot, she could have been my daughter». The guards beat him,
his heart could probably not take it. In any event, he was
carried outside where it was raining heavily. The next morning
other prisoners saw the male prisoner's dead body laying outside
of the White House.
Men were also reportedly sexually abused in the camp.
Prisoners were, inter alia, forced to have homosexual intercourse
with one another, close relatives - like fathers and sons - among
them. Worst of all were numbers of reported castrations carried
out by a variety of primitive means. On one occasion, Dusan
Tadic allegedly forced one prisoner to bite off the testicles of
other prisoners who all died subsequently. In most cases, the
guards are said to have performed the castrations themselves.
Probably all the victims of castrations died due to severe losses
of blood. On one occasion, the guards aimed a fire hose on the
victim's wound afterwards. (For more information regarding rape
and sexual assault, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault.)
According to the Gregorian calendar, Saint Peter's Day is
on 29 June, but according to the Julian calendar, which is
followed by the Serbian Orthodox church, all religious feasts are
celebrated 13 days later. Christmas, just to mention one other
example, is celebrated on 6 January. On 12 July 1992, Petrovdan
(Saint Peter's Day), the Serbian guards reportedly took care to
beat every single prisoner on their way to receive the daily food
rations. There were 30 prisoners eating at a time. The guards
beat them both on their way in and on their way out. The guards
reportedly also celebrated this religious feast with other more
severe acts of violence, killing more prisoners than they did on
an average day and night.
Due to the violence in the camp, all the inmates felt a
strong urge to blend into the background and be as invisible as
possible. It was a matter of life or death never to do anything
that possibly could provoke a Serb - but it was unpredictable
what could inflame someone. Whatever a prisoner did, it could be
wrong. In general, it was not advisable for a prisoner to look a
Serb camp official in the eye. The subservient prisoner's
position was head bent low and eyes looking to the ground, with
the hands at the back. One prisoner eating a piece of bread from
his meal was addressed by a guard and offered the latter to have
some. The prisoner used a Turkish word used in Bosnia, saying
«Bujrum!» - meaning «Please have some!» The guard was infuriated
and allegedly killed the prisoner (whose name is not disclosed
for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). Those who
successfully avoided drawing attention experienced relief. But
at the same time, they also had an irrational feeling of guilt of
having some personal responsibility for those prisoners who under
these circumstances remained visible and thus were targeted by
the Serbs.
When new prisoners arrived at Logor Omarska, they were
normally received with beatings from the very moment they
disembarked from the vehicles in which they arrived. Some
newcomers died, as they immediately had their heads smashed into
a brick wall. Killed upon arrival - they were murdered, but not
actually detained in Logor Omarska. How these captured non-Serbs
were recorded in the camp files is unknown.
Survivors suggest that of five deaths, four were due to
torture and one resulted from shooting.
In general, the suffering of each individual prisoner
became a burden for all the prisoners. There was so little they
could do to assist one another under the circumstances. There
were obviously some small practical things that one could do to
be of some help. But, when it really counted in matters of life
and death and personal integrity and dignity, they were all
powerless victims. It did none the less make a difference that
they shared in the horrors and that they to some extent could
console one another. It was probably also important for those
dying and being abused that there were witnesses to their
suffering or at least to the general situation.
The terror of never knowing when something would happen
and what that would be not only incapacitated the prisoners, but
it also affected their mental health. The latter was also the
effect of the overall suffering in the camp. It did not ease
this situation that the dead prisoners normally were thrown out
on the grass where the other prisoners would see them. Some
prisoners estimate that on an average there may have been 10 to
15 bodies displayed on the grass each morning, when the first
prisoners went to receive their daily food rations. But there
were also other dead bodies observed in other places at other
times. Some prisoners died from their wounds or other causes in
the rooms where they were detained. Constantly being exposed to
the death and suffering of fellow prisoners made it impossible
for anyone over any period of time to forget in what setting he
or she was.
There are reports to indicate that a few dead prisoners
were soaked with gasoline and set on fire next to the garbage
container in the camp. But most of the time, the dead bodies
were removed from the camp in a small yellow pickup truck. Five
Serbs, who were in charge of the actual removal of the dead
bodies, are known by name. However, their names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
Given the length of time Logor Omarska was used, the
numbers of prisoners detained in the open, and the allegations
that dead bodies were exhibited there almost every morning, it
will be surprising if there are no satellite photographs of the
camp facilities when still in use, which may shed some light on
the issues addressed in this chapter.
Simo Drljaca, chief of police, when asked by a visitor (in
1992) if Omarska did come under the civilian government of
Prijedor, replied that Logor Omarska «was run together with the
[Serbian] army and the [Serbian] police». Being told that an
army spokesperson had said the camp was run under the local
police, Drljaca just said «Maybe». Questioned again under whose
authority the camp was run, he responded that, «Military was
doing the investigation: they had 40 inspectors».
Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor
Omarska, their names are all known to the United Nations
Commission of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the
camp leadership and the different shifts of guards inside the
camp, the inspectors, and the clerks are available. In addition,
the names of individuals who visited the camp and allegedly
committed serious crimes there, such as Dusan Tadic, have been
registered. Here it suffices to mention but some of the central
people involved.
The names of the camp leadership and the commanders of
shifts of guards are known, but not disclosed here for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. One of the identified
camp leaders was suspended on 27 June 1992, because he attempted
to help his Muslim brothers-in-law and some other Muslims and
Croats.
Four of the members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine
Prijedor are known to have visited Logor Omarska. Their names
are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
Also, one identified journalist, whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons,
reportedly did visit the camp. Whether he was a member of the
Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor is not quite clear.
Two members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor
have themselves allegedly on occasions performed brutal
interrogations and torture in Logor Omarska. Their names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
Some high-ranking Serbian officers from Banja Luka once
visited Logor Omarska, arriving by a large transport helicoptre.
In leaving, they brought with them from the mine and ore
processing plant a huge quantity of rubber conveyer belts. (It
is known that this kind of rubber belts are used in the wars in
the former Yugoslavia to protect tanks.)
As concerns the local Serbian leadership - military as
well as civilian - there is nothing to indicate that Logor
Omarska was ever considered a secret. Conversely, all available
information indicates that the existence of the concentration
camp as such was common knowledge when it still was used as a
camp. Ed Vulliamy reported that:
Before 6 August 1992, when the camp was virtually closed,
no humanitarian organization (neither the ICRC nor anyone else)
had visited Logor Omarska. In actual fact, it was the focus of
the international media on the camp that prompted the camp
closure (see Chapter XII.A. infra). Both when journalists were
eventually permitted limited Serbian guided tours in the camp and
the ICRC visited, the five women still detained in the camp were
always hidden. Sometimes in such cases, the women were squeezed
into the back seat of a Mercedes and driven to Omarska village,
where they were guarded. After 6 August 1992, the ICRC thus
registered only the male prisoners remaining in Logor Omarska,
not the women as they were hidden. From this time on, the ICRC
visited the camp once or twice a week. Now, the male detainees
received food twice a day.
When the camp for most practical purposes had been closed
and cleaned with only a limited number of prisoners left to be
paraded for international media and aid agencies, journalist Ed
Vulliamy described those deemed in good enough condition to be
paraded for him as follows:
Furthermore, according to Ed Vulliamy:
In short, all information available about Logor Omarska
seems to indicate that it was more than anything else a death
camp. The detainees were not there to work or serve a specific
purpose. There is no information to sustain a claim that the
detainees were in transit to somewhere else. As far as the
prisoners were concerned, the interrogations led nowhere out of
the camp, and the camp conditions were such that very few, if
any, prisoners would have survived long-term detention.
In most respects, Logor Keraterm resembled Logor Omarska.
The two camps had much the same status and organization. In a
sense, it is probably correct to consider Keraterm almost like a
smaller, but basically not better, extension of Omarska.
Also, Logor Keraterm received non-Serbian male adults. To
this camp came leaders from the villages and those further down
on the social ladder. It seems, however, to some extent, to have
been a question of space where a specific group of prisoners were
to be detained. At least on one occasion, it is known that a bus
with captive non-Serbs was driven between the camps in order to
unload the prisoners in any one of the detention facilities. As
there was considered to be no room available in any of these
camps, all but two of the prisoners were reportedly executed (see
Chapters VII.D. supra and VIII.E. infra). Logor Trnopolje was,
it seems, not viewed as an alternative for these prisoners.
Trnopolje had, as will be related in the next chapter, a
different character from that of Keraterm and Omarska.
Also when describing Keraterm, one could start with a list
of prisoners incarcerated, but in an analysis like this that
seems unnecessary. The point is already made that the entire non-
Serbian leadership who survived the military attacks was brought
for detention in Omarska or alternatively, in Keraterm. In the
following, the focus will be on the respects in which Logor
Keraterm differed considerably from Logor Omarska.
No women were apparently detained in Logor Keraterm for
any length of time or killed there. After the Serbian military
attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra), a mixed
group of captured civilians were reportedly taken through
Keraterm. Ssubsequently, a number of males and at least one,
though possibly a few, women were taken to Omarska. Some other
women and elderly men passed the camp probably on their way to
Trnopolje. Later there were reportedly transfers to Omarska once
or twice a week. Between 10 and 20 women may have passed through
the camp with a more or less immediate onward transfer.
The exact number of detainees in Logor Keraterm varied
over time. The average was reportedly between 1,000 and 1,050
captives. But on occasion, the number of prisoners may have been
considerably higher, up to 1,500 men.
Keraterm was built as a ceramic tile factory in 1987. The
industrial production reportedly first started in 1990. The
factory premises are located in the Cirkin Polje district of
Prijedor town, next to the main road Prijedor - Banja Luka, and
not far from the railway linking the same towns.
There is one main building at the industrial plant - the
factory building - in which the prisoners were detained. The
factory building is possibly a combination of two structures.
The entire complex was not far from rectangular, rather long and
narrow, with one part (a little less than half the length of the
building), narrower than the rest. At the back of the building
was the production area of the ceramic factory. The narrower
part of the entire structure was two stories tall. On the first
floor, there were two halls (No. 1 and No. 2) where prisoners
were detained. At the short wall of the factory structure, there
was an entrance to the production area and to interrogation rooms
on the second floor. Where the overall structure widens out and
connects with the second part, or the rest of the building
complex, there is a storage room which apparently was not
normally used to detain prisoners. In the previous in-between
storage room or next to it, there was a room with toilet
facilities. Next to this again were Hall No. 3 and Hall No. 4
which both were used to detain prisoners. At the far end of the
structure, adjacent to Hall No. 4, there was a room to which
prisoners, at least on occasion, were taken to be beaten or
otherwise tortured.
The camp was surrounded by a wire fence (approximately two
and a half metres high), and had one guard house at the entrance
to the camp and another one next to a cargo scale for trucks -
also close to the camp entrance. All the main doors to the
detention halls faced the camp entrance.
There are allegations that the military police of the Army
SRBiH had a base on the first floor in the area where the
interrogation rooms were. There was no first floor above the
toilet, Hall No. 3, Hall No. 4 and the adjoining chamber of
maltreatment.
Across the main street, there was a separate office
building for the Kozaraputevi, a separate road repair entity.
Reportedly, there were two military units occupying this office
building, one is referred to as merely a military unit, the other
one as a communication unit which also had at its disposal three
vehicles - TAM 150 - with sizable antennas. In the period when
Keraterm was used as a concentration camp, the Kozaraputevi
office was, however, used as a facility related to the camp and
used also by Serbian camp officials for different purposes. Some
prisoners, who were never detained in Logor Keraterm, were taken
there for interrogation.
Like in Omarska, the prisoners in Logor Keraterm were
squeezed into detention in a sardines-in-a-tin-like fashion. In
Hall No. 1 and Hall No. 4, there may have been an average of up
to 200 prisoners detained in each at any time. Hall No. 3 may
normally have had a population of 200 to 250 detainees. Hall No.
2, however, being the biggest one - possibly 120 square metres -
may have given room for between 500 and 700 inmates.
The cramped conditions in Keraterm and a similar lack of
sanitary provisions and hygiene as in Logor Omarska gave the same
ensuing problems of hygiene as in that camp (see Chapter VIII.A.
supra). The toilet room had four urinals which the prisoners
could use if and when the guards agreed. As maltreatment was
part of the camp routine in Keraterm also, the picture of
everything from blood stained walls to lethally injured prisoners
with infected wounds were part of the overall camp scenery. It
is not known if there were any medical doctors who stayed for any
length of time in Keraterm, but at least one medical doctor
passed through the camp on his way to Omarska. There is no
information to suggest that ill or wounded prisoners in the camp
were ever provided with any medical aid by the Serbs, and there
is no information about any sick-ward. Conversely, reports
suggest that some seriously ill or severely wounded prisoners
were deposited together with dead camp inmates (see Chapter
VIII.F. infra).
The food provided to the detainees in Keraterm was similar
to that provided for the Logor Omarska inmates. Generally
speaking, the prisoners would be provided with their daily food
rations from the time when they arrived at the camp. Two cooks
came every day to the camp to arrange for the prisoners' daily
food rations. The food is said normally to have consisted of a
piece of bread and a spoonful of boiled cabbage or beans. The
cooks took up their position next to the toilet facilities. The
prisoners had normally less than 30 seconds to finish their daily
rations, some say. Others think that it was arranged so that 10
prisoners had a total of two minutes to get hold of their daily
rations. As many as one third of the prisoners would face the
risk that there would be no more food available for them in one
particular day. Sometimes the detainees were instructed to crawl
to receive their rations. Sometimes the guards reportedly amused
themselves by shooting above the heads of those coming up for
their meals or eating. The prisoners were reportedly beaten on
the way to their meals.
Inside the camp, the dead prisoners would normally be
collected in a refuse dump or in a garbage container. Sometimes
an identified psychiatrist, whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, reportedly came to the
camp and issued death certificates for such prisoners. When
there were transports of corpses out of the camp, fellow
prisoners would, it is said, normally be the ones to pile them on
transport vehicles. These prisoners were, in most cases,
allegedly ordered to follow the transports out of the camp.
Later, it is said, these prisoners were not heard from again.
About one month after the Serbian military attack on the Kozarac
area, a number of detainees were taken out to collect and bury
dead bodies in that area. At least one of them survived later to
tell about the undertaking.
As mentioned, some prisoners just entered Keraterm to be
transferred to Logor Omarska or to Logor Trnopolje (women and
elderly males). Allegedly, a few prisoners were released from
Logor Keraterm up to 5 June 1992 - after interrogation - but
there are said to be no known cases of releases after this time.
The rest of the inmates either succumbed in the concentration
camp or were transferred out of the camp as it was closed in
early August 1992 (see Chapter XII.A. infra). There is no
information to suggest that anyone successfully fled the camp -
possibly there may have been some such cases from among those
taken out of the camp with such working obligations as described
above - to inter corpses from the camp and people killed during
Serbian military-cum-«ethnic cleansing» campaigns.
Reportedly, Serbian military police, civilian police,
ordinary military and paramilitary fighters almost every day came
with new groups of non-Serbian captives to the camp. The
prisoners were ordered out of the vehicles just inside the camp
entrance, normally next to the scale. Here they were lined up
and were asked for identity papers and valuables. More often
than not, a guard would approach the prisoner or prisoners first
in line and ask them what they were doing in the camp. Without
waiting for an answer, the guard would beat the one or those
questioned, or have them beat one another, all according to the
whim of the guards. As the prisoners were pushed and hurled into
one of the detention halls, most of them were beaten.
Sometimes the maltreatment upon arrival was even worse.
On 14 June 1992, it is claimed that two bus-loads of captives
from the hamlet Sivci (in the Kozarac area) were brought into
Logor Keraterm. These prisoners were ordered to leave the buses
ten at a time and lay down on the ground where allegedly guards
(the name of their identified shift commander is not disclosed
for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) beat the newcomers
with rifle butts, before the same prisoners were ordered up
against the wall where another group of alleged perpetrators
(from outside the camp) came to cut the prisoners' armpits and
pierce their arms and legs with bayonets. Afterwards these
prisoners were taken into Hall No. 3 and a majority was probably
later moved on to Logor Omarska.
At night time, the guards - not on one of the commander's
shift, it is stated, but under the two other shift commanders,
and allegedly with the approval of the camp commander - called
prisoners out from the detention halls and beat and otherwise
tortured them. (The names of the four identified commanders are
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.) The
guards would, for example, call out every prisoner with a certain
surname. Participating in these orgies were reportedly people
from outside the camp - locals like an identified taxi driver
whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons (the taxi driver is said to have been a frequent and
particularly brutal participant), soldiers back from the front
for some days, and a gang of villains dressed entirely in black
(long black leather coats, large wide-rimmed black hats, black
boots, etc.) and with shaved heads. The men in the latter group
were about 30-years old; they reportedly also came to Logor
Omarska and carried out torture and killings. Sometimes camp
guards and/or people from outside the camp came into detention
halls and fired shots above the heads of the prisoners. As the
walls were of metal some bullets allegedly ricochetted and
wounded prisoners. One day in mid-July 1992, to give but one
example of the brutality, an unknown Serb came to the camp and
pointed out some five or six prisoners from the village Gornji
Orlovi, who thence were severely tortured. One from the latter
group of prisoners - his name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons - reportedly died during
this torture.
Reportedly, there was almost no day with less than two or
three prisoners killed in Logor Keraterm.
One Serb is known to have been detained in the camp -
allegedly for having participated in the referendum in BiH (see
Chapter III.F. supra) and having voted in favour of a unified and
sovereign BiH. His name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons. He came from the village Ljeskare (in the
Ljubija area).
One former inmate in Keraterm relates the following about
the by far largest alleged massacre taking place in the camp:
All available information supports by and large this
account. As for the fate of the corpses from the massacre and
wounded prisoners removed from the camp with the dead, see
Chapters VII.F. supra and VIII.F. infra.
On the morning of 26 July 1992, it is reported that a
total of 21 dead prisoners were placed in front of the factory
building. Before being removed, the corpses were photographed
laying face up.
At daytime, prisoners were taken for interrogation, like
in Omarska. The prisoners were interrogated in the camp itself
in the interrogation rooms on the first floor. Also in Logor
Keraterm, the interrogators were inspectors coming into the camp
for this specific purpose - again like in Omarska. The
inspectors were assisted by camp guards in mistreating their
victims. Among the inspectors were policemen in active service,
retired policemen, and lawyers.
It is said that approximately one half of the camp guards
were in police uniforms, and the other half in military outfits.
The camp location next to the main road Prijedor - Banja
Luka, made even the dead prisoners visible, at least on occasion,
to bypassers. Normally, the dead would be laying outside of the
factory building in the morning, before they were removed to the
refuse dump/garbage container or out of the camp.
Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor
Keraterm, their names are all known to the United Nations
Commission of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the
camp leadership and the different shifts of guards inside the
camp and the inspectors are available. In addition, the names of
individuals who visited the camp and allegedly committed serious
crimes there, have been registered. Here it suffices to mention
but some of the central people involved.
The names of the camp leadership and the commanders of
shifts of guards are known but not disclosed here for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Reportedly, there was
a change of camp commander and general chief of security from 28
or 29 July 1992.
Former inmates in the camp allege that some named members
of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor visited Logor
Keraterm. The names of the «visitors» are not disclosed here for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
Logor Keraterm has for several reasons been given less
attention than Logor Omarska. The latter was the camp where the
very elite of the non-Serbian community - the upper echelons in
all fields - were primarily incarcerated. Logor Omarska was
furthermore more than double the size of Logor Keraterm, and
Logor Omarska became the main focus of the media - both
television and newspapers. Several books - chronicles in part -
about Logor Omarska have also been published.
None the less, Logor Keraterm has the same character as
Logor Omarska in terms of being a death camp. For the individual
prisoners, the traumas of having been detained in Logor Keraterm
and Logor Omarska respectivly may have been much the same. Both
concentration camps presented the inmates with utterly gruesome
experiences.
Prior to Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm being closed,
essentially only children, women, and elderly men were taken to
Trnopolje. The adult and not too old men (normally those between
16 and 60 or 65-years old) were taken to Omarska and Keraterm
camps. It was, in other words, the non-Serbian people in the
categories later deported (see Chapter X.A., X.B. and X.C.
infra) who were detained in Logor Trnopolje. Some non-Serbs
rounded up for deportations were reportedly brought to the camp
even from the Sanski Most and Kljuc districts.
The total number of camp inmates reportedly varied on an
average from between 4,000 to 7,000 people. In the wake of the
major Serbian military attack on the non-Serbian villages on the
left bank of the Sana River (see Chapter VII.D. supra), there may
have been altogether some 7,000 detainees in Logor Trnopolje.
This period - together with the one just after the military
campaigns in late May and early June (see Chapters VII.A., VII.B.
and VII.C. supra) - may have been the single most crowded time in
the camp's history.
Some people stayed in the camp for a very limited period
of time, such as for a few days (some reportedly even stayed for
one night only), others remained there for months as they were
not deported. Some arrived at least twice to the camp - first
rounded up and detained, then released for lack of space, and
then rearrested.
Non-Serbs were, after the Serbian military attack on
Prijedor town (see Chapter VII.C. supra), first gathered in
different locations inside and just outside of Prijedor town and
then taken to Trnopolje. A number of women and children from
houses in Prijedor town, which had not been destroyed, were at
least temporarily released after some three or four days. In
late June 1992, non-Serbs who had sought refuge in the Puharska
suburb of Prijedor town together with long-term inhabitants from
this suburb (which had a predominantly Muslim population) were
rounded up and brought to Trnopolje.
There are reports of non-Serbs having approached the local
Serbian Red Cross in Prijedor to ask for the whereabouts of
relatives who had «disappeared», were detained or deported, and
who then were forcibly taken by Serbian Red Cross personnel into
one of their buses and transported to Logor Trnopolje to be
incarcerated without any reason given.
The camp was located very near the first station, Stanica
Kozarac, on the railway from Prijedor to Banja Luka. The area is
said to have been predominantly Muslim. The local school had,
however, been occupied by Serbs who made it a stronghold before
they converted it into a concentration camp.
The camp was opened in a area of and adjacent to a primary
school. The entire area used has the shape of an irregular
triangle. There were three main building complexes in the camp
compound: the school with its sports hall, a cinema hall with
some smaller rooms next to it, and a storage building. A number
of tents were put up in the camp yard as well.
Some of the detainees were instructed as to where in the
camp they were to stay. Others were simply told to find
themselves a place where they could sleep.
The camp was surrounded by barbed wire, and a number of
camp guards watched the detainees. The inmates had limited
possibilities to move or to find anything to eat. A permission
could be obtained to leave the camp for some hours - but that
gave no inalienable rights for those going out neither vis-a-vis
those guards who had given them permission to go out nor those
guards who happened to be around when they came back. These
detainees were left at the mercy, behest, or whim of the guards.
At best, those going out had no problems when outside or upon
return to the camp, in other cases they were lucky if they could
pay in cash or kind to return. Outgoing prisoners often had
family members in the camp so that they were likely to return -
if for nothing else than for the safety of their relatives.
Outside the camp, they were outlaws, and de facto they had
normally nowhere to run. It was bad in the camp and so it was
outside as well (see Chapter IX.C. infra).
Furthermore, as the camp was a staging area for
deportations, those going out of the camp ran the risk that they
would be separated from family members in case they were not all
in the camp when detainees were deported. The separation of
relatives together in the camp could, however, happen at any time
during the deportations. The deportees were to move at the
behest of their Serbian captors. Bribes could bring about some
flexibility, it is said, but not necessarily.
It was summer and early autumn, meaning harvest time.
Some prisoners - especially farmers from nearby areas - were
ordered by the camp guards to leave the camp to harvest
especially vegetables in their own or other local fields. These
workers had, however, no protection outside the camp either. One
even claims that the majority of the detainees from Trnopolje
killed in August 1992 were people on this kind of work
assignment, whom the camp guards killed outside the camp. The
one man who makes this allegation reports that he himself was
commanded together with others to bury eight people killed in
vegetable fields.
Basically, there was far too little space for all the camp
inmates in Logor Trnopolje, but the detainees were not cramped in
like in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. The sanitation in the
camp was far, far better than in the two other camps. There were
better toilet facilities and more water available for the
detainees who also had more private belongings such as the odd
cooking pots, buckets, some additional clothes, etc. Still the
sanitation and hygiene as such was bad in the camp. But due to
the deportations, the turn-over rate of the majority of the
prisoners was high and eased the sanitary situation. There were
no proper provisions for camp inmates in terms of food and water,
clothing, bedding, or medical care.
Sometimes the prisoners received no food for the first
three days in the camp. For the short-term detainees, there
could even be no food made available at all. Thus, many were
rather exhausted before being deported - during deportations
there would again often be no food at all made available for days
(see Chapters X.B. and X.C. infra). There was at least one
medical doctor detained in the camp for some period of time. The
doctor provided fellow detainees with assistance to the extent
possible, but did not have proper medical equipment on hand.
The detainees were, in general, not working in the camp.
Five boys 13 or 14-years old were once ordered to load or remove
some timber. When the job was done, they were reportedly all
shot dead by an identified camp guard, whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
The detainees in Trnopolje were more or less
systematically deprived of their valuables and frequently also of
their identification papers and other documents on hand. There
are numerous reports of embezzlement and pilfering by camp guards
and other camp officials. In addition to the actions of camp
officials, there are reports suggesting that a number of Serbian
soldiers back from the war for the weekend or a few days
functioned as camp guards to enrich themselves and take out
aggression in terms of committing rapes and otherwise seriously
abusing detainees. These occasional guards are even said to have
killed or participated in killing camp inmates.
There were no formalized interrogation sessions in Logor
Trnopolje. There were in other words no inspectors arriving to
question the camp inmates. The incoming captives only had their
names and whereabouts recorded.
Killings were not rare in the camp, nor was the infliction
of torture. Harassment in general is claimed to have been the
rule and not the exception. Rapes were reportedly the most
common of the serious crimes to which camp inmates were
subjected. The nights were when most of the injustice was
performed. The nightly terror of possibly being called out for
rape or other abuses was reportedly a severe mental constraint
even for short-term detainees in the camp. Many detainees
reportedly never returned after venturing with or without
explicit permission outside of the camp. Other former detainees
report that there were times when they were ordered to bury non-
Serbs, who had been killed, in fields and meadows near the camp.
The allegation is that on one occasion some camp inmates
had their hands and feet chained and were forced to lay down on
the ground in the camp enclosure. Then, tractors were driven
over their legs. Those who did not perish from their injuries
relatively quickly, were later shot dead. Guards had taken up
positions to prevent fellow prisoners from assisting those in
agony. Reportedly, mainly wealthy people were shackled and
killed. It is said that in the camp this kind of execution took
place at least on four different occasions.
The first period was allegedly the worst in Trnopolje,
with the highest numbers of inmates killed, raped, and otherwise
mistreated and tortured.
At night, the detainees could hear the noises of drunk
soldiers and other visitors to the camp, and the screaming of
fellow inmates abused or taken out of the camp. It was expected
that inmates taken out of the camp would be abused. A number of
those taken out at night allegedly never returned to the camp and
have not been heard from again. For this reason, fellow inmates
believe that they were killed after departure from the camp,
possibly after being abused or raped.
On 6 June 1992, to give just one example of what is
reported, Serbian tank drivers came into the camp and seized some
30-40 young female camp inmates. Arriving between 10:00 p.m. and
midnight, the soldiers - one identified name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons - were more or less
drunk. They forced the girls and women out with them. When the
female prisoners were returned to the camp, they had been raped
and mistreated, and their clothing was in tatters.
The people killed in the camp were usually removed soon
after by some camp inmates who were ordered by the Serbs to take
them away and bury them. These workers would normally come back
to the camp.
Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor
Trnopolje, their names are known to the United Nations Commission
of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the camp
leadership and the guards inside the camp are known. In
addition, the names of individuals who visited the camp and
allegedly committed serious crimes there were registered, but are
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
There are also long lists with names of Serbian soldiers who
served as occasional guards in the camp, or who arrived in the
camp to take out detainees to abuse them.
The name of the camp director in Logor Trnopolje, who was
also a member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor, is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
The local Serbian Red Cross was abused by the Serbs then
running it, to play a central role in the management of and the
abuses related to Logor Trnopolje - in clear violation of the Red
Cross mandate as such.
A staff member of the Red Cross in Prijedor, whose name is
not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons,
worked at the secretariat in Trnopolje where he was responsible
for food supplies coming to the camp. Allegedly keeping food
away from the internees, he caused terror and hunger, which was
one of the reasons why prisoners in the camp succumbed.
Also, Logor Trnopolje changed much - meaning that the
general situation in the camp was considerably ameliorated -
after Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm were closed (see Chapter
XII.A. infra). Most important was that the violence against camp
inmates decreased, especially killings. All of the food provided
by the ICRC did not reach detainees, but nutrition-wise the
conditions are said to have improved.
None the less, it was when trying to describe the
conditions in Logor Trnopolje at this later time (after it had
become an «open reception centre», see Chapter XII.A. infra) that
United Nations Human Rights envoy Mazowiecki said that «words
fail me». One other representative of the international
community relates (after a visit to the camp in the same period)
that the road in front of the camp was strewn with empty
cartridges when international observers first were admitted to
the camp. According to camp inmates, random shooting by Serbs
into the camp was just one of the various methods used to
terrorize the detainees.
In late August 1992, most detainees from Prijedor town who
had a house to return to, had been released from Trnopolje.
People from the Kozarac area (and other destroyed areas) were
registered by the ICRC. Former detainees from the camp (among
them people transferred to Trnopolje as Logor Omarska and Logor
Keraterm were closed) then returned to the camp to be registered
by the ICRC as well. Registration was considered the «passport»
needed to flee the Serbian persecution. Many released prisoners
had not dared to leave their houses upon return to Prijedor town,
as they reportedly were afraid of being killed. Later, there
were non-Serbs paying camp guards to enter the camp to seek a
safe transport out of Opstina Prijedor. This the Serbs used to
illustrate what an agreeable place Trnopolje was.
Albeit Logor Trnopolje was not a death camp like Logor
Omarska or Logor Keraterm, the label «concentration camp» is none
the less justified for Logor Trnopolje due to the regime
prevailing in the camp.
Several other places of detention were used at the same
time as the above-mentioned camps. These detention facilities
were mainly used for two purposes, one was initial interrogations
and the other staging areas for deportations. A number of people
were held in these areas for a relatively short period of time
prior to being taken to one of the above-mentioned concentration
camps.
Some of the male inhabitants of Prijedor town were, after
being forced out of their homes there in late May and early June
1992, detained temporarily in a school in Svodna (a village
outside Opstina Prijedor, located along the road to Bosanski
Novi). Another camp was established in a school building in the
small village of Cela, about six kilometres south of Prijedor
town.
Women, small children (sometimes only those below 12 years
of age, sometimes also adolescents up to the age of 15), and
elderly men (those from 60 or 65 years old and older) were
gathered for deportation in stadiums (such as in the suburb
Tukovi in Prijedor town, and in the town of Ljubija) or in sports
halls at different schools. For a night or so, they might
initially have been detained even in private houses in attacked
areas.
After the attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B.
supra), the high school in Prijedor town - its courtyard and
sports hall - was used to detain several thousand children,
women, and elderly men. Initially, for the first hours that is,
people from outside - such as relatives and friends - could enter
the high school to speak with people, bring them some food, and
even release the internees.
Men and other prisoners of special interest were
occasionally detained at police stations and in military barracks
or in other more or less randomly selected areas of convenience.
Normally, such detention facilities were used for the individual
prisoner for relatively short periods ranging from some hours to
a few days. From these detention facilities, the prisoners were
either released after having been given the message that they
were no more wanted in the Srpske Opstine Prijedor, or
transferred to one of the above-mentioned camps. Some were
killed when in detention - like non-Serbs could be killed
anywhere: in their homes or gardens, on the streets, in the
woods, on the mountains or in the hills, or actually wherever
they were captured or merely attacked.
A number of women may have been short-term detainees in
places, such as military barracks, where they allegedly were
abused (see Chapters VII.B. and VII.D. supra).
As for the civilian non-Serbs rounded up in the attack on
the villages on the left bank of the Sana River, many -
especially from the southernmost areas - were taken to detention
centres in Opstina Sanski Most, inter alia, to Logor Krings. For
some, at present unknown, period of time, there was also a
detention facility in the Ljubija area referred to as Logor
Ciglane. Whether the latter is identical with the detention
facility used in a central area of the iron ore mine - possibly
the separator - is not clear either. Allegations are, however,
that there may have been as many as 1,000 people detained in the
place at the same time. The detainees were reportedly a mixture
of both sexes and different age groups - a breakdown of which is
not available for the time being.
On 23 May 1992, Serbian spokesmen officially announced the
establishment of the first detention centre near Prijedor in
northern BiH.
Soon after the Serbs took power, in late May 1992, Muslim
and Croatian leaders in Prijedor started to «disappear», only
later it became known that they had been taken to Logor Omarska
and Logor Keraterm. Political leaders, officials from the courts
and the administration (inclusive the police), academics and
other intellectuals, religious leaders, leaders from enterprises
and businesses - the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian
communities that is - were no more tolerated at liberty, or
rather they were taken away apparently with the intent of their
removal being permanent. Left behind without guidance and the
strength of leadership were the much bewildered ordinary Muslim
and Croatian people. This way Logor Omarska and in a similar
way, but not to the same extent, Logor Keraterm became
instruments of the overall destructive policy. Forcibly
transferring children from one group to another group (not to say
killing the same children) may be intended to destroy in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group - i.e.
depriving the actual group of its future. Taking away the
leaders of such a group deprives it of its present vitality, its
ability to determine its political status and pursue its
economic, social and cultural goals. Taking away the leaders
means disarming the group intellectually and spiritually - it is
a tactical, but lethal move facilitating further destruction of
the group by rendering it open to almost any kind of abuse and
destruction. Moreover, revival of a group requires leaders.
Among those detained in the camps were former non-Serbian
policemen and other law and order people such as judges and
jurists in general. Moreover, former military personnel, such as
people enrolled in the TO, were particularly targeted. This left
the non-Serbs also without any legal or armed protection.
As the camps of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje were
opened, only a few cases from there were opened for investigation
although the criminal sector of the legal system was functioning
in its own exclusive Serbian way.
In running the concentration camps, the Serbian police and
the Serbian military cooperated. As in the military campaign
against the non-Serbian habitations, the police and the military
took advantage of the assistance of quasi-military elements and
locally gathered manpower (for example, from the villages nearby
Logor Omarska) also in the concentration camps. A number of the
camp guards may have been recruited into the police or the
military from the reserve, others were possibly new recruits.
Whether to have assistance in exterminating detainees, or to give
an outlet for general aggression and to legitimize aggression
against non-Serbs, or a combination of these purposes, the
Serbian leaders furthermore opened up the camps to the most
brutal people around - belonging to paramilitary forces or just
anybody. Especially in Logor Trnopolje, but also in the other
camps, Serbian soldiers on leave from their ordinary service seem
to have gratified both their greed and whatever sadistic
inclinations they had.
Almost all the people in offices after the power change
reportedly had knowledge of the death camps. These camps were
spoken of in the SDS party, in broadcasts from Radio Prijedor and
Television Banja Luka. The media mentioned names of some of the
detainees and charged that the mentioned people were accused of
having undermined society and of having prepared genocide against
the Serbs.
According to an interview of Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police and member of the Krizni Stab Srpske
Opstine Prijedor):
The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed
with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. At least
on one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of
newly captured non-Serbs being executed en masse. The bus, which
was packed with captives from villages on the left bank of the
Sana River, first tried to leave passengers at Logor Keraterm,
then in Logor Omarska, and finally at Keraterm again - but in
none of these places was there any room for the prisoners. Then,
the bus was driven back across the Sana River. The bus passed
the athletic field in Tukovi and continued towards the
Rizvanovici area stopping at the gravel pit in «Suhi Prijedor» in
front of a private house. All the captives but two were shot
dead (see Chapter VII.D. supra). Another bus with fewer
passengers - 27 all together - was on its way to the same gravel
pit, but the bus-load of non-Serb workers primarily from
Autotransport Prijedor were killed. It is believed that the dead
bodies may have been left in the area to be washed away by a
later inundation by the Sana River.
The dead bodies from the massacre in Hall No. 3 in
Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra) on 24 July 1992 were
possibly later driven to the Kozarac area. At least it is
reported that a truck with many dead bodies, from which blood was
dripping on the road, was observed on the road from Kozarac
towards Mrakovica (possibly some three kilometres from
Mrakovica). The non-Serb who observed and reported this belonged
to a group of concentration camp inmates who had been taken out
of the camp to bury dead bodies in the Kozarac area. This man,
whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons, also states that Serbian soldiers claimed that the dead
were the «soldiers of Alija Izetbegovic». One of the Serbian
soldiers reportedly stated that the truck had come from Logor
Keraterm and that it contained approximately 200 dead bodies.
The truck was green with a yellow car cover over the truck body.
At the time, there were allegedly also many other dead bodies in
the Kozarac area. Non-Serbs took part in digging graves along
the road, the bodies were covered with a thin layer of soil
between every layer of bodies.
The dead camp inmates from Logor Keraterm were usually
removed by truck. There is said to be a mass grave near the
location called «Bajr», the former brickyard, in the immediate
vicinity of Logor Keraterm. A non-Serb reports that according to
camp guards, seriously wounded prisoners from the camp were also
buried there without anyone having bothered to kill them first.
The mass grave may be covered by construction material from Stari
Grad which by then had been completely destroyed.
Prisoners from Logor Omarska were sometimes said to be
exchanged at Gradiska, but may have been executed in the village
of Gradina (nearby Omarska) instead. The bodies of the latter
groups may have been disposed of in that same area.
There are numerous reports of individual graves and graves
for small groups of prisoners outside both Omarska and Trnopolje
concentration camps - not the least in nearby fields and meadows.
Logor Keraterm was in the urban area where that kind of dumping
of the dead may both have been less feasible and also less
desirable from a Serbian point of view. Logor Omarska had more
of an isolated location. Logor Trnopolje was in a predominantly
Muslim area. Both these latter camps had open land in their
vicinity. Sometimes the graves were dug by camp inmates,
sometimes small excavators were used. Some dead bodies may have
been discarded in abandoned mine shafts, both in the Omarska and
the Ljubija areas. Even larger numbers of dead bodies may have
been dumped in open pits, especially in the Tomasica and Ljubija
area, but possibly also in the environs of Omarska. Rudnika
Ljubija is primarily an open pit mine with huge excavated areas.
The dead bodies may have been covered with some kind of acid
solution previously used by and available from the mining company
- for the bodies to decompose more quickly and to reduce the
stench. There are no reports of the use of chloride lime. Each
pit used was reportedly filled with soil. Rumours will have it
that bodies from Logor Omarska on occasion were thrown into two
lakes not very far from the camp, where a certain specie of fresh
water fish was feeding on the corpses; these allegations remain
unconfirmed.
Information also suggests that pre-existing burial
grounds, such as the Orthodox cemetery in Omarska, were used to
inter dead camp inmates. The same is said to have been the case
for a relatively new graveyard on a height in or near Prijedor
town. (For more information regarding disposal of the dead, see
Annex X, Mass Graves.)
The following report was made by a rapporteur mission from
the CSCE. On 31 August 1992, the mission met with Dr. Milomir
Stakic, the SDS mayor of Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor, and visited the «Open Reception Centre
at Trnopolje». The mission reports:
According to an interview of Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor):
During the two months of the Serbian military campaign -
from late May to late July 1992 - all the main clusters of non-
Serbian habitations were visited (see Chapter VII. supra).
Targeted in the military operation were the non-Serbs as such -
their persons and their bonds to the district. The military
crusade was the single most dramatic component of the «ethnic
cleansing» process after the Serbs took power. But, the «ethnic
cleansing» was not finished with the major military operations.
On the contrary, there were also other modi operandi aimed at
achieving the «ethnic cleansing» - these were methods applied
both in tandem with and after the military operations, involving
in part new Serbian cohorts. To understand the rigour of the new
Serbian order, as perceived by the non-Serbs, it is necessary to
recognize the interrelation between the different means of the
«ethnic cleansing» and the interaction between the Serbs involved
on the different levels and in the different operations.
Given the way the Serbs focused on weapons prior to taking
power and immediately after that, many non-Serbs believed that
after their homes and habitations had been ransacked for arms the
situation would be normalized. Thenceforth, they would be
permitted to move around freely again, and their homes would be
respected, they thought. Little did they foresee the Pandora's
box of disasters which the «ethnic cleansing» would actually
become.
To remove the non-Serbs from the district, the Serbs
targeted both the non-Serbs themselves and all that made them
feel at home in the area. The general social accord that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his or her
privacy, family and home was no longer applied by Serbs via-ˆ-vis
non-Serbs.
Homes of non-Serbs were searched, pillaged and/or more or
less destroyed. It seemed as if the non-Serbs could be evicted
at the behest of almost any Serb. Initially, the perpetrators
were military or paramilitary personnel and/or police or people
seen to cooperate directly with them. Later, attacks on non-
Serbs seemed to become a free-for-all - for the common purpose of
«ethnic cleansing».
The evictions had several implications. The practical
consequences were immediate as the evicted persons thereby became
homeless. For a majority, this meant that they had to seek
shelter with people they knew as there were not many other
alternatives. Unless the evicted were deported at the same time,
they could not just leave the district for somewhere else later.
Sooner or later, most of the evicted people were probably
simultaneously deported. In the meantime, many of them found
temporary shelter with relatives or friends.
To be evicted did not have only practical implications
related to basic material needs, it also had other tangible and
emotional consequences. For most people who find certain aspects
of the society at large difficult to relate to, street violence
being one example, their homes are where these persons may
retreat. When both one's person and home is targeted, the threat
to person may be perceived as ubiquitous and even more so when
one is also prevented from leaving the area temporarily or even
permanently on one's own initiative.
Evictions, sometimes repeated evictions for the same
people, became a harsh and influential messenger between the
Serbs and the non-Serbs conveying the central idea that the non-
Serbs were no longer to consider themselves at home in the
district. For many people, the physical existence of a home per
se, next to family relations and social networks, ties them
strongly to the geographical location of the home.
For many, the actual eviction did not merely result in
them having to seek alternative housing, but they were actually
at the same time evicted from their immediate community, such was
the case when the Kozarac area, the non-Serbian villages on the
left bank of the Sana River, and entire suburbs of Prijedor town
were purged. These evicted people were simultaneously exiled
from their social networks and social settings as such, even
their outer cultural frame of reference was disrupted.
Already prior to the military attacks on the different non-
Serbian habitations, prominent members of the non-Serbian groups
were seized and «disappeared» into detention. Soon the existence
of the newly opened concentration camps, Logor Omarska and Logor
Keraterm, became common knowledge, but most people still knew
little more about the camps. Also during the military attacks,
specific individuals of high social rank or otherwise regarded as
leaders were singled out for execution or, at least at first,
incarceration in the concentration camps. Other non-Serbs in
high positions were arrested later, in their homes or wherever
they were caught sight of, to have the same destination not to
say destiny as the other non-Serbian leaders.
In the building where he lived there were 74 flats in
addition to his, the residents were from all the three
different ethnic groups. At this time all Serbian
males were in uniform and carrying weapons. A watch
routine was arranged so that the residents had to take
turn to sit in front of the building and note down who
was coming and who was going.
On 24 June 1992, he was on duty in front of the
building, a Mercedes with his neighbour [an identified
Serb political leader whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] stopped in
front of him, and he was taken to the police station in
Cele. There he was detained with seven other men
[whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons] - one of the seven, a cafe owner
from Prijedor town, was later killed in Logor Omarska.
At 22.40 hours that same evening they were beaten with
batons, and the people maltreating them were swearing
at them calling them Ustasa devils. Thence they were
transported to Logor Omarska, stopping several times on
the way.»
As long as Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm were still
open, one or more buses of new captives arrived to these camps
almost daily, also on days when there were no major military
operations.
Family members of the «disappeared» or arrested leaders
were vulnerable without their heads of family around, and as the
«stigma» given to the head of the family by the Serbs also
reflected on the rest of the family. Moreover, many were
desperately unwilling to leave the district whatever other
difficulties they faced, as they were afraid to give up whatever
chance which could possibly arise to safeguard the well-being or
at least the life of the head of the family.
Later, when Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm had been
closed, some former detainees, who eventually were released, were
searched by, inter alia, the intervention unit of an identified
commander, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons, and killed (see Chapter XII.A. infra).
The core of the «ethnic cleansing» policy was a general
climate in which all non-Serbs as such, not merely individuals in
their personal capacity, were targeted. Everyone who was not a
Serb was as such ostracized, and could at any time be subjected
to persecution. Never knowing when severe difficulties would
arise and their character was in itself an ordeal for many non-
Serbs.
After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, the non-Serbs
lost their general legal protection. The existing court system
with judges and lawyers stopped functioning. Tentatively the
court system was rebuilt with Serbs, but obviously only with
people who were prepared to compromise, to say the least, and
tolerate a reign of no justice for more than half of the
population of Opstina Prijedor - the non-Serbs. The entire
police structure was immediately replaced by a pre-organized
fully Serbian police organization. Non-Serbs could be harassed
or subjected to just any kind of persecution for the sole reason
that they were not Serbs. The situation was aggravated already
when the first disappearances and arrests of leading non-Serbs
started, and became extreme when the main Serbian military
operations commenced.
As prominent non-Serbian citizens were targeted first and
the majority of them were men, the lawlessness for those left at
liberty, more or less temporarily, plagued the more unprotected
segments of the non-Serbian society in particular: the young,
the old, and not the least women of all ages. There was no
longer any respect for non-Serbian property rights, and worse,
there was not even any respect for the personal integrity and
dignity of the non-Serbs, not even for their lives. Not only
military or police, but other civil servants and any private
individual or group of such - be it neighbours or former
competitors of any kind - could do as they pleased knowing that
they would de facto have impunity. For thefts, harassment,
threats, sexual and other abuses, even killings, there was no
prospect of any punishment for the perpetrators. Rapes under
these circumstances were probably as frequent as the nights, but
happened also often in broad daylight. Bodily and mental harm to
the immediate victims and their next of kin became elements of
the «ethnic cleansing» policy. The more or less overt message
was always the same: There was to be no decent living and no room
at all for non-Serbs in the district.
On occasion, the persecution even took the shape of small-
scale military attacks on non-Serbian homes and massacres of
many, if not all, their inhabitants.
After the major Serbian military operations in late May
and early June 1992, non-Serbs started to depart or rather flee
Opstina Prijedor on «their own initiative». For some it was the
consequence of having had to seek temporary shelter elsewhere as
their habitations and homes were attacked. Other groups had been
targets of other kinds of persecutions. Some only left after
they (or one or more family members) were released from a
concentration camp. As the mene tekel was crystal clear, some
left as a preventive measure.
Those leaving on «their own initiative» normally departed
by road, buying tickets on Serbian-provided buses and trucks out.
This transport was frequently not any safer than the transport
for those deported by road (see Chapter X.C. infra). Often there
was simply no distinction made between non-Serbs leaving Opstina
Prijedor of their own volition and the deportees. One member of
the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor, who was engaged in the
local Red Cross (his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons), allegedly had people pay DEM 50 per
person to be transported in Red Cross vehicles towards Travnik.
The Serbian leaders even organized an Office for
Population Resettlement and Property Exchange where people who
had not yet been deported and who «wanted» to leave were to
register their property as available for a Serbian family, before
they joined a convoy out. The non-Serbs wanting to leave also
had to sign forms entitled «requests of voluntary emigration for
economic reasons». According to an interview of Simo Drljaca,
there were more than 20,000 visas, guarantees and requests for
voluntary emigration for economic reasons signed (see Chapter
X.D. infra). *36
«Exit-visas» for non-Serbs were a stock-in-trade at the
time. Relatives of prisoners who had been incarcerated in Logor
Keraterm or Logor Omarska sometimes tried to approach the police
station in Prijedor town. Instead of gaining information
concerning the whereabouts of their family members, they were in
some cases told that it could possibly be an alternative to opt
for buying an «exit-visa» for the family at large.
People who got, or rather paid to get, their «exit-visas»
had simultaneously their names deleted from the census.
Thenceforth, they were literally and practically non-existent as
citizens. For more details about the situation for the non-Serbs
who obtained «exit visas», see Chapter X.D. infra.
A key to understanding the nature of the conflict in
Opstina Prijedor is to recognize that the non-Serbian population
was not fleeing from a war in the district. Their departure was
not a side effect of an armed conflict. Conversely, their
removal was exactly what the Serbs used military might to
achieve. The aim of the entire operation was the «ethnic
cleansing» of Opstina Prijedor, i.e. to remove the non-Serbs so
that the population which would continue to live on in the
district would be almost exclusively Serbian. One consequence of
this is that the classification «deportees» is more correct than
«refugees» for the vast number of non-Serbs who de facto left
Opstina Prijedor. «Deportees» here meaning people with a
particularly distinct need for protection in addition to what is
characteristic for refugees at large.
The events in Opstina Prijedor are unfortunately no
aberration in this respect. The «ethnic cleansing» is the core
of the Serbian military operations in BiH. It may even be
argued, as some observers do, that the events in Sarajevo - where
there is a more traditional theatre of war with all its horrors -
are staged, in part at least, to take away international
attention from the eradication of entire ethnic groups in areas
where there has not even been any real war, only tremendous abuse
of military power - such as in Opstina Prijedor. Similarly, to
some extent, the destruction of cultural heritage in the Croatian
city of Dubrovnik diverted international attention. With an aura
of history and fame both Sarajevo and Dubrovnik kindle media
attention easily. At the same time, both cities were flourishing
multi-cultural centres, and as such a thorn in the flesh of those
aspiring after mono-ethnic power bases.
Most of the deportations from Opstina Prijedor were staged
from Logor Trnopolje, from which they started the last week of
May 1992 - the very first period when non-Serbian children,
women, and elderly men were rounded up in the district. Later,
more improvised detention facilities, such as the stadium in the
suburb Tukovi in Prijedor town, also became staging areas for
deportations. Some non-Serbs were even loaded on buses and
trucks for deportation straight from their home areas in the wake
of the military assaults on these areas (see Chapters VII.B.,
VII.C. and VII.D. supra).
Large groups of deportees were sent off on trains to
Muslim and Croatian held areas in central BiH. The destination
for the trains was primarily Zenica. At least one group of
deportees was let off the train in Doboj, from where the
deportees were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla.
Frequently, the deportees were cramped into cattle wagons
having at best only barred windows high up on the walls of the
wagons. The passengers were not provided with water or food, and
they had no access to toilets. They sometimes had to endure such
constraints for periods from two to five days before reaching
Zenica. There was little fresh air during the transports. It
was mid-summer and generally very hot in the daytime. Even when
trains stopped for some time, the deportees were deprived of any
opportunity to leave the trains. Some babies, small children,
elderly, and sick people did not survive the railway transport.
Even to remove the dead bodies from the cattle wagons or to have
them removed was not permitted.
When the Serbian police chief of Banja Luka, Stojan
Zupljanin, was later asked by a visitor about the cattle car
transports, he explained that there had merely been a certain
number of citizens who had expressed a wish to move to central
BiH. For these people, the Public Security Centre in Banja Luka
(see Chapter V.B. supra) and the Public Security Service in
Prijedor (see Chapter V.A. supra) arranged the mentioned «safe
transportation for them». Not to allow the passengers food,
water, access to toilets, etc., was «just a means of security».
The trains (cattle wagons among them) were all that could be
provided under conditions of war - the railway authorities had
asked everywhere for better facilities. Stojan Zupljanin
concluded by stating that none of the passengers had said that
they would not go if they were not provided with passenger wagons
- «Anything is better than to walk.»
A Muslim political leader in Banja Luka apparently saw it
differently. Calling on 9 July 1992, he said:
Large-scale deportations on buses and trucks took place
from the very beginning. A few were taken the shorter and
relatively safer way to Bosanska Gradiska on the Croatian border.
The majority by far were deported on buses and trucks down
through the desolate and mountainous area of the Vlasic Mountain
towards Travnik in central BiH. The last leg of this trip the
deportees had to finish on foot. Their first destination on the
road to Travnik was Turbe, the first larger populated area on the
other side of the front line - outside Serbian control that is.
From the place where the deportees were dumped from the trucks
and buses, they had to walk almost 30 kilometres across the front
line to reach Turbe. United Nations military personnel, having
passed through the same area later, recount that especially the
last part of the journey - in the area where the deportees had to
start walking - the United Nations military men had an eerie
feeling. Along the narrow road high up on the mountainside,
personal papers, such as passports, were strewn on the roadside
as were children's clothing and women's underwear. The United
Nations military personnel interpreted this to mean that the
deportees had been deprived of whatever little bundles of private
belongings they still possessed.
Some deportees allegedly were singled out and killed on
the roadside. Their dead bodies were thrown off the road and down
along the mountainside. Moreover, Serbian soldiers were shooting
in the air above the deportees as they started walking, and parts
of the terrain, which the deportees had to walk through, were
mined.
It is with reference to such deportations from northern
BiH at large that the ICRC in its position paper of August 1992
regarding The Establishment of Protected Zones for Endangered
Civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina wrote that:
Sometimes the trucks used for deportations were closed
army trucks having many of the disadvantages as the cattle cars
on the railway. Some deportees reportedly did not have the
physical strength to sustain life under such conditions. Also
the latter reached their final destination on the roadside -
normally in the area where the survivors had to start walking.
Deportations by buses and trucks were under the
supervision of the intervention units as used by the Serbian
military (see Chapter V.C. supra). The soldiers from the
intervention units were reportedly no more benevolent or lenient
towards the deportees than they were in carrying out other of
their functions. Concerning the mass-killings on the Vlasic
Mountain, see Chapter XII.D. infra.
Ordinary and paramilitary soldiers participated in
arranging the deportations. Reportedly, it happened several
times that a soldier grabbed a non-Serbian child and forced a
pistol into the child's mouth or held a knife against its throat.
Simultaneously a plastic bag was thrown into the truck with
deportees and an amount of money was demanded lest the child be
executed. No child is said to have been killed under such
circumstances; but the menace was a means of terror and
extortion. Reported are also a variety of other crimes allegedly
committed by these soldiers.
From the very inception of the Srpske Opstine Prijedor,
looting of non-Serbian property was a problem. In a sense, it
commenced already when the Serbs started impounding weapons
legally held by non-Serbs. This was not a confiscation, i.e. it
was not authorized by the lawfully elected authorities and it did
not augment the State coffers. Pillaging on a large scale
followed in the wake of the military attacks on non-Serbian
homes. As the people were forced to flee their homes and real
estate, everything left behind was considered bounty by the
attackers and other Serbs. As those forced to leave their homes
rarely brought with them more than they could carry with them or
rather on them, there were complete homes and hitherto productive
and fully functioning communities to be plundered.
An article in Kozarski Vjesnik relates a statement made by
Bogdan Delic (the new chief of the Serbian police in Prijedor) at
a meeting in the district assembly:
Furthermore, a large-scale transfer of machinery,
industrial equipment, cars, etc. soon started from Opstina
Prijedor as such. Reportedly, even most of the machinery of
significant value from Rudnika Ljubija were removed for use in
Serbia so that the mining company now is non-operational.
Similarly, the main equipment from other factories and plants in
the Opstina was allegedly relocated out of the area. The
consequence of this is that Prijedor has been left with hardly
any on-going industrial production as the cornerstone production
units of the local economy have been made non-operational. This
means a lack of income-generating possibilities for the Opstina
as such. Although the main workforce in the depleted industries
may have been non-Serbian, this draining of material resources
will have longer term consequences also for the Serbian
population. An article in Kozarski Vjesnik addresses how «war
profiteers sacked Prijedor . . . on the model of the Sicilian
mafia». *39 The article cites a leader from the Serbian Democratic
Union - the National Front, inter alia, saying that:
The Serbs have unilaterally taken over all communal
property in Opstina Prijedor whether it still remains in the
district or has been brought out of it to other areas. The
communal property belonged, as always, to the community at large
- a community in which the Serbs had made up approximately 42.5
per cent of the total population before the upheavals. Non-Serbs
as well as Serbs had built up the communal property and
contributed to it together.
The Serbian authorities have been issuing so-called «exit-
visas». These visas were provided only after the adult non-
Serbian person who «wanted» to leave Opstina Prijedor, had filled
in a form to the effect that the person renounced all personal
property rights and transferred them to the Serbs. The person
was never to return to the area. By signing this document, the
person would become «stateless» (or rather with no rights to
remain in this or other Serbian-controlled areas). After having
signed, the person normally had 14 days to leave the area.
Sometimes, there was no way of getting out of the area within
that time limit, but the non-Serb was none the less bound by his
or her pledges. Bribes were needed at every level and, moreover,
an entry-visa to be admitted into Croatia. Even though
extensions to stay were granted temporarily, individuals were
hunted when their time expired. Whether «exit-visas» are still
available is unclear (see Chapter XIII.G. infra).
In this context, it is noted that the «Agreement on the
Release and Transfer of Prisoners» of 1 October 1992 contains,
inter alia, the following provision:
The Agreement was initiated by the ICRC and accepted among
others by Mr. D. Kalinic, «Representative of Mr. Radovan
Karadzic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party», Mr. M.
Popadic, «Liaison Officer of the Serbian Democratic Party», and
Mr. A. Kurjak, «Representative of the Party of Democratic
Action».
In April 1993, Simo Drljaca claimed that the Serbs had
issued a total of more than 20,000 «exit-visas» for non-Serbs
from Opstina Prijedor. In the interview printed in Kozarski
Vjesnik, Simo Drljaca stated that:
The visa material may provide highly interesting
information about the people leaving - names, family
relationships, sex, age, residence in Opstina Prijedor, time of
departure, etc. This information ought to be compared with the
updated census of the population in the district or even the
telephone directory as existing prior to the disruption.
Together these sources may contribute an informative overview of
the demographic changes in Opstina Prijedor following the Serbian
takeover in April 1992 - also concerning non-Serbs not registered
for «emigration».
There is no real distinction in biological terms among the
three main «ethnic» groups - the Serbs, the Croats and the
Muslims - in Opstina Prijedor and in BiH at large. Differences
among the groups are primarily related to culture and religion.
This is probably one reason why the various expressions of
culture - religion included - became an explicit target for the
Serbian military campaign.
The cultural heritage and the expressions of a flourishing
culture give people a strong sense of attachment also to a
specific geographical area. By erasing the cultural frame, the
Serbs further estranged the non-Serbs from the district.
In Prijedor town, the following five mosques - and all
objects and buildings belonging to them such as mausoleums and
religious schools, etc. - were destroyed:
It is said that in the Kozarac area all 16 mosques have
been destroyed.
It is actually claimed that not a single mosque, or other
Muslim religious building in the whole of Opstina Prijedor has
been spared and remains intact. Most religious constructions are
not only damaged, but reduced to rubble. The sacral edifices
were allegedly not desecrated, damaged and destroyed for any
military purpose nor as a side-effect of the military operations
as such. Conversely, most of the destruction was due to later
separate operations of dynamiting. At least on one occasion,
some non-Serbs and Serbs concerned alerted the local Serbian
police that a mosque in Prijedor seemed to be in the process of
being dynamited. The police reportedly refused to take any
action and even stated that the police were not opposed to the
destruction in progress.
Also, other buildings and habitations considered as
typically Muslim have been demolished. The Old Town in Prijedor
town, Stari Grad, was one such area with strong Muslim
architectural influence. After the Serbian forces purged the
area, Stari Grad was levelled almost completely, including a
number of new houses which had been erected according to Muslim
traditions (see Chapter VII.C. supra).
The Catholic churches and religious buildings in Opstina
Prijedor listed below have allegedly been destroyed and damaged
as follows:
The sacral institutions were allegedly desecrated,
destroyed and damaged for no military purpose and not in
connection with any military activity as such.
A Serbian official in Banja Luka, who later was asked
about the destruction of mosques and churches, responded that a
number of such buildings had been misused as convenient places
for battle. Being tall and of solid construction, mosques and
churches were suitable for snipers to shoot from. «From that
point on», these buildings «cease to have sacred importance», he
added. Obviously, every building fitting a sniper has not been
razed in Opstina Prijedor. On the contrary, there is no report
of any general communal or Serbian construction in the district
which was levelled to prevent snipers from misusing it.
According to an article printed by the Ministry of
Information of the Republic of Serbia (i.e. Serbia proper), not a
single Serbian sacred object has been destroyed or damaged in
Opstina Prijedor. *42 The map, which is attached to the article,
shows destruction and damage related to Eparchy seats,
monasteries, religious service objects (cathedrals, parish
churches and chapels) and parish seats, and other church objects.
Save for buildings not specific to the non-Serbian
traditions - especially in Prijedor town - most of the non-
Serbian homes and habitations have been severely damaged, if not
completely destroyed. Large-scale devastation is the case in the
Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra) and in the villages and
hamlets on the left bank of the Sana River (see Chapter VII.D.
supra). Heavily damaged are not only the variety of
architectural expressions, but also the outer frame for the
sociological and anthropological expressions of the pluralistic
culture in the district.
The material destruction of non-Serbian cultural property
has obviously had implications for both spiritual and other
immaterial aspects of the same culture. This in addition to the
fact that the main bearers of the traditions - the different non-
Serbian groups and their leaders, religious leaders, and artists
among them - having been exterminated or deported, leaves limited
traces of the living non-Serbian cultures in Opstina Prijedor.
The non-Serbian cultures, with religious and secular aspects,
have furthermore been ostracized and targeted as such for
dismantling also through the persecution of the remaining non-
Serbs in the area (see Chapter IX.C. supra). The non-Serbs still
living in the district have more than enough with securing their
physical integrity (see Chapter XIII.G. infra) that they should
not also provoke antagonism by trying to revive in public their
non-Serbian cultural characteristics - despised as these are by
the Serbs in power. By exiling non-Serbian cultural expressions
to the private domain of a, in every sense, deprived and marginal
population, the non-Serbian cultures as such are almost totally
ruined in the district.
The destruction of the broad platform of the multi-ethnic
culture in Opstina Prijedor makes an impact not only on the non-
Serbian aspects of this culture, but on the local cultural
situation as such. Being Serbian in Opstina Prijedor - in
interaction with the non-Serbian majority population - was
probably quite different from being Serbian in an all Serbian
environment. It takes little imagination to foresee that the
devastation of large parts of the local culture in combination
with the violence utilized to accomplish the destruction, will
create, in part, a cultural vacuum in an overall situation which
is dominated by negative and destructive forces. This is
undoubtedly a threat also to what was known to be the Serbian
culture in Opstina Prijedor with its «Kozara brotherhood».
Traditional names, which were used in the multi-ethnic
society but which under the Serbian regime are considered
inappropriate, have been or are to be altered to satisfy «the
wish of the Serbian people». The pre-fix «Bosnian» is deleted.
In general, there is a strong Serbification not only aimed
at excluding everything non-Serbian but also at eliminating
anything specific for the Bosnian Serbs, to make the latter group
homogeneous with the Serbs in Serbia. One thing is that now the
Latin alphabet has been replaced by the Cyrillic script.
Problems arise, however, when even, as now, the Bosnian Serbian
written language (the Jekavian dialect) is ostracized, and
replaced by the written Serbian language used in Serbia (the
Ekavian dialect). The latter has made even the Serbian Academy
of Sciences in Belgrade, the incarnation of Serbdom, protest what
they consider to be cultural linguistic destruction. There are
also other signs of harmonization which means replacing anything
genuine or distinctively Bosnian with what is main-stream
Serbian.
The main purpose of the Serbian manoeuvres in Opstina
Prijedor was «ethnic cleansing» of the non-Serbs to secure a
homogeneous Serbian district. If the Serbs could achieve their
objective of «ethnic cleansing», it already looked as if that
would be rewarded by the international community. A pure or
almost pure Serbian population appeared to be the precondition
for Serbian territorial supremacy. What was new was that it
seemed as if an internationally recognized State - here BiH -
could be divided up along ethnic lines when at the same time very
little, if any, attention was paid to the means used to make the
population in the respective areas homogeneous. Peace proposals
along such lines were soon to be made by peace negotiators
appointed, inter alia, by the United Nations. How can one of the
most basic concerns of the United Nations - to liberate mankind
from the odious scourge of genocide (see the Preamble to the 1948
Genocide Convention and Part Three, Chapter II. infra) - be
achieved, when it de facto may be remunerated by the United
Nations?
The main phase of the «ethnic cleansing» in Opstina
Prijedor came close to a natural completion as the principal non-
Serbian habitations had been wiped out and most of the non-Serbs
exterminated or deported. Left of importance were primarily the
concentration camp inmates in Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A.
supra) and Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra). These
were the leaders of the non-Serbian community. Although their
numbers had been much depleted already, even their limited
continued presence could possibly still promote a return to the
area of non-Serbs and be conducive to claims to this end.
During the first year of conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, the international community primarily reacted with a
combination of inertia and appeasement - keeping its distance
from what was considered merely a civil war and «a blood feud»
grown «out of age-old animosities». Under these overall
circumstances, the power change in Opstina Prijedor was initially
not taken much notice of internationally. Naturally, one may
say. There was not even war in the district, and Opstina
Prijedor was not the only district in the former Yugoslavia
producing deportees.
Little by little, however, the story of the non-Serbs,
arriving especially in central BiH, reached the international
community. At first, it was the aid agencies - organs of the
United Nations among them - which received the testimonies,
personal accounts of agony, and allegations of massive violations
of international humanitarian law. At the same time, or probably
even earlier, the different foreign intelligence entities
operating in the region knew essentially what was happening.
Finally, the charges reached the media. On 2 August 1992, the
New York tabloid Newsday printed a report by journalist Roy
Gutman headlined «The Death Camps of Bosnia». The reports were
based on eyewitness accounts. One former detainee told of
routine daily slaughter in Logor Omarska. The newspaper article
made an immediate impact in the Western world. This was the time
when the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, told
visitors that:
Within days, the first foreign television crew asked
access to Logor Omarska, and by mid-September 1992 some 360
reporters had visited Serbian-controlled BiH. The media
attention was de facto life-saving.
Ahead of schedule, the Serbian leaders hastened to clean
up and close down both Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. supra)
and Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra), as especially
Logor Omarska became a focus of world attention. Also, Logor
Trnopolje (see Chapter VIII.C. supra) improved image-wise in this
washing-of-hands-operation. As writes journalist Ed Vulliamy:
The concentration camp first emptied was Logor Keraterm.
From there, all the prisoners were ostensibly taken to Logor
Omarska or Logor Trnopolje. The young and the old were almost
all taken to Logor Trnopolje, the rest were divided between Logor
Omarska and Logor Trnopolje. Those immediately recognized as
more important were taken to Logor Omarska.
As concerns Logor Omarska, on 6 August 1992, 1,360 camp
inmates were transferred to Logor Manjaca (in the Banja Luka
area), 700 prisoners - the younger and the older ones - were
transported to Logor Trnopolje, and 175 men were locked up in the
garage in Logor Omarska. Prior to the transfer of male prisoners
to Logor Trnopolje, 31 female prisoners were sent there from
Logor Omarska. Five female prisoners remained detained in
«their» rooms above the «canteen» in Logor Omarska. The same
night - the night of 7 August 1992 - beds for the first time
arrived at Logor Omarska.
On 5 August 1992, a last bus with captives from outside
came to Logor Omarska, but these prisoners were moved that very
same night. Allegedly, they would be used as farm labour in the
area of Banja Luka. Later, it was stated that these people had
been taken to a camp named Topola to which the ICRC had no
access. These prisoners were former inhabitants of villages on
the left bank of the Sana River, for example, from Rizvanovici.
At least one of the men from this group may at present be kept in
a detention centre - probably a mine - at Aleksinac in Serbia.
It is also reported that a former detainee from Logor Keraterm
died in the camp in Aleksinac.
On 22 August 1992, the male prisoners still remaining in
Logor Omarska were taken to Logor Manjaca. On 23 August 1992,
two women (whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons) were taken to Logor Trnopolje. The three
remaining women (whose names are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) have not been heard
from since, and other female former detainees in Logor Omarska
believe that the three are dead.
The two women transferred from Logor Omarska on 23 August
1992 were detained in Logor Trnopolje together with two women
from Trnopolje village. After being registered by the ICRC, they
were allowed to move more freely around in Logor Trnopolje. The
other women, who had been relocated from Logor Omarska to Logor
Trnopolje earlier, were never officially registered as
concentration camp inmates by the ICRC.
As Logor Trnopolje was exposed to international attention
and its appearance improved, and especially as evacuations out of
the camp by international agencies started, there were non-Serbs
finding life at liberty in Opstina Prijedor so difficult, not to
say dangerous, that they, on their own initiative, out of lack of
better options, tried to move into Logor Trnopolje. Some even
paid the guards to be accepted as inmates in the camp. It may,
of course, be speculated that what they really wanted was third
country resettlement. In most cases, that is likely to be theory
only, given that at the time the non-Serbian inhabitants in
Opstina Prijedor as such and as a whole had well-founded fear of
persecution. Still the Serbian regime in Logor Trnopolje
included severe abuses of camp inmates. But hiding among the
other inmates, detention in the concentration camp may have been
perceived as a safer option than venturing out on one's own.
Quoting a woman who had come «voluntarily» to Logor
Trnopolje from the village of Trnopolje, Ed Vulliamy wrote:
On the other hand, some of the former Omarska and Keraterm
detainees were released from Logor Trnopolje, and returned to
Prijedor town or sought shelter there as other non-Serbian
habitations were virtually non-existent in the Opstina at the
time. These returnees were especially people who still had
family members in the district, or who wanted to check if that
was the case before they would consider leaving Opstina Prijedor.
One identified and especially ill-reputed Serb (whose name
is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons),
belonged to a so-called intervention unit, the kind of units used
to trace and capture potential camp inmates (see Chapter V.C.
supra). After prisoners had been released from the concentration
camps, he and his unit traced and killed some of the former
Omarska inmates in Prijedor town. Eight others, who allegedly
killed former concentration camp inmates and other non-Serbs, are
also identified but their names are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.
On 28 July 1992, an exchange of prisoners was to take
place. It was to involve 41 male prisoners and two female
prisoners from Logor Omarska - the women's names are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. They
were to be exchanged for other prisoners in Bihac. All were to
wear uniforms and Green Berets (Muslim military outfits that is)
and to be provided with weapons. It was a bus marked Bihac, and
«Seselj» was written on it. Sitting in the bus were men with
huge beards and uniforms; they were wearing fur hats with Serbian
emblems. The day after, as a female camp inmate was serving
food, a Serbian military cursed the mothers of the prisoners and
asked who could say that Kozarac had not been attacked by the
«Green Berets», i.e. the Muslims! None of the prisoners who were
taken out, ostensibly for exchange, have reportedly ever been
seen again.
Vojislav Seselj is the self-proclaimed leader of the
Cetniks, and as a politician he runs the Serbian Radical Party.
He is occasionally referred to as the Red Duke. One hallmark of
his Cetniks is uncombed long hair and flowing black beard.
According to the information gathered, no one taken out of
Logor Omarska or Logor Keraterm to be supposedly exchanged have
ever been seen or heard from again.
According to journalist Ed Vulliamy, he was told about
four different categories of prisoners in Logor Omarska when
visiting it in August 1992 - at the time when the camp still had
some inmates:
On 4 August 1992, two buses arrived with prisoners from
Logor Keraterm, as Keraterm was being closed. It was the most
«dangerous» prisoners who were transferred to Logor Omarska. The
next day, at about 11:30 p.m. all these prisoners and one
prisoner from Logor Omarska (an ear nose and throat specialist
from Prijedor, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons, who was held in particularly high esteem
by his fellow non-Serbs) were taken out to an unknown
destination. A prisoner, whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, later told a fellow
prisoner that another man, a Serb, had approached him boasting
that he had killed the medical doctor, and that all the other
prisoners as well had been killed on 5 August 1992 at Lusci
Palanka in the area of Sanski Most. Apparently, none of these
prisoners have been heard from again.
The Serbs had their codes, it is claimed. When they said
that prisoners were to be taken to Gradiska for exchange, they
would allegedly be taken to nearby Gradina to be executed.
If in Opstina Prijedor people ever were rounded up for the
sole immediate purpose of exchanging them - to serve as «the
currency of war» as the expression is in the vernacular - is
unknown. Obviously, round-ups for detention and/or deportation
also served the ultimate goal of having the non-Serbs leaving the
area.
On 6 August 1992, as Logor Omarska was to close, all the
prisoners were called forward. The name of one former employee
of Radio Prijedor (whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) was not on the list.
After one hour it was, however, arranged that he too was included
on the list. From this event, it was understood that someone had
helped him by having had his name removed from the record of
detainees earlier. This was how he had been spared from ever
being called forward for interrogation in the concentration camp.
In retrospect, camp inmates think that the Serbs intended,
however, to kill him during the transport from Logor Omarska.
When convened, on 6 August 1992, the camp inmates thought
that they were to be transferred to Trnopolje. But the prisoners
understood that this was not the case as 100 persons were
squeezed into each bus. What started was the transfer to Logor
Manjaca in the area of Banja Luka. Some prisoners had to lay
down under the seats in the buses. The prisoners sitting on the
seats were to sit three prisoners on each two seats. The
employee of Radio Prijedor was ordered to sit in front on the
left side behind the driver. All prisoners had to bend down
their heads. With the prisoners in this bus was the previously
mentioned (see Chapter XII.A. supra), identified and especially
ill-reputed Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality
or prosecutorial reasons), who belonged to a so-called
intervention unit.
On 6 August 1992, it was still very hot. The Serbs had
turned on the heat in the buses and kept all windows shut. Shots
were fired, and Serbs along the roadside were throwing bottles
and stones at the buses. The distance between Logor Omarska and
Logor Manjaca is some 60-70 kilometres, the bus ride none the
less lasted from about 1:00 p.m. until about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m.
Save for water given to one prisoner (an author whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) as a
pretext for beating him, the prisoners were not given any water
during the trip. The employee of Radio Prijedor fell asleep. As
the bus had stopped, he woke up hearing something that ruptured
and someone crying out in agony like a child. Later, he learned
that the sounds probably had come from a fellow prisoner (the
victim's name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons) who after torture was killed as he was
gored from below on a sword. At the same moment, the employee of
Radio Prijedor was hit in his neck (maybe with the handle of a
spade). A scream came from his stomach, and as a reaction, he
bounced to his feet trembling uncontrollably. Then, he sat down
again.
Afterwards, the especially ill-reputed Serb from the
intervention unit boasted that there was a Serb who manufactured
a special baton for his comrades to use to handle non-Serbs.
After being seated for about 10 minutes, a Serbian
military person came to call the employee of Radio Prijedor to
leave the bus. Outside five identified prisoners had been
mistreated and had had their throats slashed (the victims' names
are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons).
As he came out, he found himself surrounded by some eight or nine
Serbs beating him. He could no longer sense pain, but he knew
that as soon as a prisoner was on his knees that prisoner's
throat would be slashed. All of a sudden, he ran towards the
bus, where he was stopped by a knife in its sheath pressed into
his stomach. Possibly because of the scream he had made when he
first was hit in his neck, the commander of Logor Manjaca had
come out to the buses and told the Serbs there to stop the ill-
treatment.
Back in the bus, the employee of Radio Prijedor realized
that it was the collar of his jacket which had protected his
neck. He was soaking wet with blood. He had a wound in his
forehead, one behind the left ear, and one on his chin/mouth;
some teeth had been beaten out. Utterly fearful of what could
happen if he ventured outside of the bus again, he urinated in
his trousers.
The next day the prisoners were thrown out on a field and
called forward by name. The first they called for was already
dead. Then, an identified Serbian guard, a former policeman, now
retired (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons), stabbed one other prisoner in his stomach
and cut the prisoner's head from the side of the neck.
One member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor, who
was engaged in the local Red Cross (his name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), allegedly had people
pay DEM 50 per person to be transported in Red Cross vehicles
towards Travnik. Non-Serbs in four such buses were allegedly
among those liquidated at the Vlasic Mountain.
Primo June 1992, the ICRC listed the misuse of the Red
Cross emblem as one main obstacle to humanitarian activities in
BiH. The misuse was, according to the ICRC, one of several
factors causing insecurity for everyone - the local population
included.
On 21 August 1992, a convoy of vehicles with people
leaving Prijedor for Travnik stopped by Logor Trnopolje and
prisoners from the camp could freely enter the buses. More
prisoners wanted to join the convoy than there was space for in
the buses. One elderly woman warned prisoners against going,
saying that she had «heard horrible things». When the convoy
reached the Vlasic Mountain the prisoners from Trnopolje were
separated from the people from Prijedor. The prisoners - men
only - were cramped into two buses, conceivably 100 men in each
bus. The total number was probably no less than 250. Nearby a
mountain top, perhaps called Koricanske Stijene (or Kocinske
Stjen), the prisoners had to leave the buses next to a cliff
above the Ukrina (or Ugljenika) River. The prisoners were lined
up in two rows and ordered to kneel down and face the river. It
was several hundred metres down to the river. The cliff as such
was very steep, but there was also a slope next to it. There was
a house on the other side of the valley. It is not far from
Skender Vakuf - where some military or paramilitary Serbs had
entered the buses.
A firing squad of some 15 Serbian soldiers started
shooting the prisoners, of whom a limited few jumped off the
mountain before being shot. One of the survivors hid himself
laying some 50 or 60 metres down the slope, under the body of one
other man who was already dead. Serbian soldiers were also
throwing grenades down the slope from above. Some soldiers even
came down the slope to see to it that all the prisoners were
dead. The next day, dead bodies were piled up and put on fire by
Serbs in camouflage uniforms. One of the soldiers was wearing a
badge with a white eagle on his cap.
The river, which is reportedly also known as Ugar, is a
relatively small stream and there was a small mill there.
The leader of the soldiers was the previously mentioned
(see Chapter XII.A. supra) identified and especially ill-reputed
Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons) who belonged to a so-called intervention
unit. Another soldier is also identified, but his name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Other
people have identified the latter as a member of the Serbian Red
Cross working in Logor Trnopolje, who once had boasted that he
had blown up a Muslim with a bomb.
Reports suggests that another group of prisoners from
Logor Trnopolje may have been executed in a similar manner on the
Vlasic Mountain on 24 August 1992. Whether this is the time when
the prisoners were brought to the cliff in four buses and
executed with the assistance also of five White Eagles (Beli
Orlovi), is not clear. On the latter occasion, an estimated 250-
300 men were killed.
It is suggested in the reports that it may have been a
member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor who was the
camp director in Logor Trnopolje (his name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), who had organized the
massacres. Mostly Muslims were executed on the Vlasic Mountain,
but also Croats.
On 1 October 1992, the two women transferred from Logor
Omarska and detained in Logor Trnopolje were released and joined
the first convoy to Karlovac (in Croatia).
In early October 1992, the ICRC evacuated some 1,500
concentration camp inmates - mainly men - from Logor Trnopolje.
Later a limited number of non-Serbian detainees were exchanged
for Serbs from other areas. The first group of prisoners
evacuated from Logor Trnopolje left the camp on 1 October 1992.
In November 1992, the ICRC was able to evacuate also the group of
prisoners who had been moved to Logor Manjaca after Logor
Keraterm and Logor Omarska had been closed down.
The evacuated came to Karlovac in Croatia, wherefrom they
were resettled, inter alia, in Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
In August 1992, the spokesperson of the UNHCR in the
organization's headquarters in Geneva, Silvana Foa, announced
that «We will not be accomplices to the despicable policy of
ethnic cleansing.» Accepting the haunted people from BiH into
Croatia for the UNHCR to find third country resettlement for them
from there, could, of course, at a first glance be construed as
the UNHCR doing «the dirty job» on behalf of the Serbs as the
Serbian ambition was precisely to get rid of the non-Serbs.
On second thought, the UNHCR changed its view. In my
opinion, it is morally and ethically indisputable that the
international agencies having evacuated and resettled people in
need cannot be criticized for that. Every human being has the
inherent right to life. The sole responsibility for the «ethnic
cleansing» remains with those who made it impossible for the
people to remain in Opstina Prijedor and those who let that
happen. The agencies ameliorated acute suffering and ought not
to be accused of having «cleansed» or drained the area of non-
Serbs even if some non-Serbs, then not targeted themselves, took
the opportunity to leave with the evacuations. The overall
situation was ominous and remained so for all non-Serbs, that is
the heart of the problem. If any castigation is due, it is for
those individuals in international organizations who directly or
indirectly concealed the truth and thereby facilitated the
perpetuation of the crimes.
In late 1993, Vreme reportedly quoted Lyndall Sax, the
Belgrade spokesperson of the UNHCR, as follows:
After the main phase of the catastrophe was over, a
sinister system to prompt an ever higher degree of ethnic
homogeneity has continued to prevail. The means applied range
from the use of brute force to sophisticated bureaucratic
regulations.
On 17 February 1993, «A dramatic cry for help by the
[Catholic] Bishop and priests of the Banja Luka diocese» was
issued. Opstina Prijedor is part of the Banja Luka diocese.
After «subjugation over the past ten months to totally unlawful
deprivation of our [the Catholics and other non Serbs'] human
rights» the situation was considered dramatic and rapidly
deteriorating. Massacres and torture being the most grievous
crimes, the following was also complained of:
Despite the Catholic church having been present in the
region for seventeen centuries, some of the Catholic parishes had
already at that time been totally emptied of their Catholic
populace.
According to the interview of Simo Drljaca (chief of the
Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Stab
Srpske Opstine Prijedor), Drljaca ascertained that:
On 31 October 1992, the BBC reported that representatives
of the Serbian enclaves in BiH and Croatia had met and agreed to
establish a common currency and common armed forces. This is not
a very surprising move to be taken by units in the same federal
State. There are also other signs of harmonization not to say
preparations for future unification. The official rubber stamps
used by the Serbs in BiH display the revitalized old Serbian coat
of arms, and the flag is that of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. From the point of view of the Bosnian Serbs, they
constitute one of the units of the FRY, although this probably
for reasons of convenience and international political pressure
has been downplayed by the latter. In general, there is strong
pressure to establish a new, exclusively Serbian and conform
social order in the district (see Chapter XI.B. supra).
As concerns violence befalling non-Serbs at the hands of
Serbs, the overall picture is that incidents of torture, rape and
summary executions still occur. Beatings, general harassment and
intimidation have reportedly shown an exponential increase. The
local Serbian leadership disclaim responsibility normally, and
accuse «totally uncontrolled elements» of the misdeeds, or drunk
soldiers on their way home from the war, or intoxicated locals.
The ensuing upsurge in crimes which follows a general
breakdown in law and order does not qualify as persecution. A
general breakdown in law and order may, however, be a
premeditated instrument - a situation carefully orchestrated to
hide the true nature of the evil. Thus, it should not be
accepted at face value that the perpetrators are merely
uncontrolled elements, especially not when these elements target
almost exclusively non-Serbs who are otherwise discriminated
against and persecuted. Unwillingness to chasten, prosecute, and
punish «uncontrolled elements» may be another indication that
these elements in reality are but a useful tool for the
implementation of a policy of persecution.
As violence against non-Serbs was and is conducive to the
overall ambition of the Serbian regime, and neither in the past
have lead to or at the present leads to prosecution, it may be
concluded that this kind of violence at best has been and remains
tolerated. It may even have been kindled not to say carefully
orchestrated.
Still there may be a few Catholics (i.e. Croats) living in
the Kozarac area, but no Muslims. Only one street in the town is
intact. The Serbian administration for some time reportedly made
futile efforts to have Serbs move into the area.
Along the main road Prijedor - Banja Luka, in the Kozarac
area, for a distance of more than 10 kilometres, almost every
house has been destroyed. Many houses were hit in the heavy
artillery barrage against the area in May 1992. Later, each
house was looted and apparently blown up from the inside -
destroying especially the inside and the roof (see Chapter VII.B.
supra). This means that the entire area now is more or less a
ghost area, and the housing needs major repair before being
reinhabited on a permanent basis.
Most of the blown-up houses along the main road have been
marked with an X with a circle around it painted in blue. Just
after the Serbian military destruction of Kozarac, it was
reported that the same sign was painted on the houses in Kozarac
with the following colour code: yellow meaning «to be inhabited»,
blue indicating «to be rebuilt», and red signifying «to be
destroyed».
The former non-Serbian habitations on the left bank of the
Sana River (see Chapters VII.A. and VII.D. supra) reportedly
remains mainly depopulated as well.
More recently, the main evictions took place in Prijedor
town, where non-Serbs were evicted to give room - or better
housing - to Serbs. Some non-Serbs have been evicted several
times; first from their villages to Prijedor town, thence from
bigger flats to smaller flats, and finally to nothing. There is
information that non-Serbs have been murdered in their own homes
by Serbs interested primarily in taking over the housing
facilities.
Numerous reports relate to violence and abuses committed
by paramilitary or irregular military units or armed bandits.
Local Serbian authorities time and again emphasize that these
groups are not under their command or control. However, the said
groups are only uncontrolled in that they do not attack Serbs
without facing charges and trials. On several occasions, it has
been reported that Serbian police, when called upon during and
after incidents where the victims are non-Serbs, have done
nothing to stop the perpetrators or to secure any evidence. The
police have only told the victims that they must understand that
there is no protection for non-Serbs in the Serbian-controlled
community and that they had better leave it as soon as possible.
Sometimes the perpetrators are said to be Serbian policemen.
Whether premeditated or tacitly tolerated, the Serbian leaders de
facto accept the activities of the groups as an instrument to
further some overall Serbian ambitions. The same is reportedly
the case when individual Serbs commit crimes against non-Serbs.
It is a basic principle that the law shall prohibit
discrimination and guarantee all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
religion, political or other opinion. Never the less, not even
the courts have reportedly seen it as their obligation to seek
justice for the non-Serbs. There seems in other words to be no
legal protection which can be obtained by the non-Serbs. This is
so not only when they have been subjected to violent crimes, but
also when non-Serbs are denied their basic rights as citizens,
for example, when they are evicted, dismissed from their work,
and/or enrolled for working obligation in disregard of the rules
for such labour.
Other civil services are also being denied the non-Serbs.
Of particular significance, is that they are denied hospital
services and other medical services. In this respect, as well,
the non-Serbs are without any recourse to a legal system which
will help enforce their civil rights.
The non-Serbs remaining in Opstina Prijedor are, in
general, not permitted to return to their former occupations.
Many - probably almost all ablebodied men - are, however,
conscripted to work for the Serbian army to dig trenches on the
front lines and to transport live ammunition, for example. Other
non-Serbian conscripts work for the civilian Serbian authorities
- engaged in cleaning and electrical repair in particular (the
latter allegedly with no consideration taken of whether or not
the person in case is actually trained to handle this kind of
work). The latter is in disregard of Article 5 in the «Decision
on Organization and Carrying out of Working Obligation for
Defence Matters» which regulates that:
The regulations are possibly applied differently to Serbs
and non-Serbs. There are no age limits in the regulations for
people subjected to working obligation. The working obligation
seems to be an added burden on the non-Serbs as it is reportedly
frequently combined with harassment and other kinds of abuse.
If a person deserts the forced labour, repercussions are
likely to befall not only the individual himself, but also that
person's relatives.
As a general rule, pensions have been terminated for non-
Serbs, with exceptions such as for relatives of some of those
doing forced labour.
There are allegations of the following new prison camps in
Opstina Prijedor:
It is unknown when the camps have been or if they still
are operational.
Whether non-Serbian prisoners continue to be incarcerated
on the estate of the mine in Ljubija and in the Prijedor suburb
of Puharska is also not known. Unconfirmed rumours will have it
that some tunnels used to cultivate mushrooms, and also the
tunnel between the football stadium and the dressing rooms, both
in Ljubija, are used to imprison non-Serbs.
A Serb named Dusan, alias Dule, Tadic has been mentioned
several times in this analysis (see Chapters III.E., VII.B. and
VIII.A. supra). He is from Kozarac where he was the owner of
cafe Nippon. He is about 40-years old, approximately 180
centimeters tall, with black hair, and trained in karate (holder
of a black belt). When the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992,
Dusan Tadic was reportedly president of the SDS at Kozarac. He
was a reserve policeman. He was reportedly a highly active
participant in the ensuing violence after the bombardment of the
Kozarac area came to a halt (see Chapter VII.B. supra). He is
said to have been engaged in mishandling, torturing and killing
prisoners in Logor Omarska, where he allegedly, inter alia,
forced one prisoner to bite off the testicles of other prisoners
who died subsequently.
On 12 February 1994, Dusan Tadic was arrested in Germany
and has subsequently been transferred to the ICTFY for trial.
Immediately after the arrest of Dusan Tadic, a wave of violence
against non-Serbs was reported from Opstina Prijedor. It was
speculated that this was in reprisal for the arrest, or rather
for any efforts to follow up on the events in the district with
criminal cases against alleged Serbian perpetrators.
Without capitulating to speculations and fear, it ought to
be considered on the level of the United Nations and with
reference to the upcoming work of the ICTFY if reprisals against
non-Serbs still in the district could become a serious problem if
only those in inferior positions are held responsible and the
rest of the apparat is left in place. Unless the ICTFY attempts
to bring superiors to justice for their alleged crimes, they may
use the criminal action against underlings as just another reason
for abusing non-Serbs - although all available information
indicates that they need no pretexts for terror of any kind. For
potential witnesses, such theoretical, more than practical,
linkage may, however, be a strong emotional constraint which
ought not to be underestimated. Considering the amount of solid
information and other sources of evidence already available about
the events in Opstina Prijedor, justice is unlikely to suffer if
the international community first aims at prosecuting responsible
key leaders (whether or not they will be made available to the
court) and thence alleged perpetrators of less significance.
From the very beginning when the violence in Opstina
Prijedor commenced, Serbian people in the district have been
stating that they want an ethnically clean Greater Serbia.
The Herald Tribune reported that:
The last days of March 1994 became a time with a number of
reported killings:
There were other suspected murders as well but the
supposed places of murder could not be accessed at the time.
Later, it is estimated by people in the district that a total of
47 non-Serbs may have been killed in Opstina Prijedor during the
last days of March 1994. Among them were reportedly a group who
had to dig their own grave before they were shot and buried near
the cattle marked at Urije in Prijedor town.
From 29 to 31 March 1994, 20 houses of non-Serbs in
Prijedor were bombed and/or burned. One more house inhabited by
non-Serbs in Prijedor faced a similar fate on 4 April 1994.
These crimes were reportedly committed, in part, by
Serbian police officers in uniform. It was rumoured that the
violence was mass revenge killings after six Serbian police
officers from Prijedor had been killed in Bihac in the first week
of February 1994 (apparently the policemen were trapped and
attacked when the front line suddenly was withdrawn). The Bihac
pocket is outside of the Serbian-controlled areas in north-
western BiH and not at all connected to Opstina Prijedor.
At the time, all telephone lines were cut for the
minorities, who approached the ICRC and asked that all remaining
minority members in Opstina Prijedor be evacuated, asserting ,«If
we stay here, we will all be killed».
The international community, considering the situation
«simply disastrous», intervened with the local Serbian leaders.
The Serbian police chief admitted that there were problems, but
claimed that the events were part of a conspiracy by the non-
Serbs to slander the Serbs. He ascertained that the Serbs would
not stop non-Serbs from leaving the area. Another Serbian local
leader concluded that the three nationalities (the Serbs, the
Croats and the Muslims) could no longer live together in peace
and that there had to be territorial separation.
The President of the ICRC later, on 11 April 1994, in
Belgrade held talks even with Slobodan Milosevic the President of
the FRY to have the abuses stopped. Intervention by the ICRC to
have permission to evacuate all non-Serbs remaining in Opstina
Prijedor who want to leave has, for different reasons of lack of
cooperation and safety, not yet yielded any practical results.
The ICRC related the following in its 1994 report on BiH:
An identified Serbian violinist (whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) had been
awarded several international prizes for his music. He was
reportedly killed in Prijedor by fellow Serbs after he, when they
all were sitting in a coffee bar, had told them that he
disapproved of their brutality towards non-Serbs.
Serbian inhabitants in Omarska village held a protest
meeting against the existence of Logor Omarska.
From the village of Omarska, Serbian women approached
Logor Omarska to give food to the camp inmates, and to demand
their release. Serbian women even tried to stage a demonstration
against Logor Omarska in Prijedor town in front of the town hall
and the police centre (next to the town hall).
Serbs were among those alerting the Serbian police of
imminent destruction of cultural property in Prijedor, although
to no avail.
There is no question that there were many Serbian
individuals in Opstina Prijedor who had mercy for non-Serbs,
protecting and assisting them as best they could - at great risk
to their own security. The Serbian leaders did not tolerate any
such «collaboration». Serbs found to have assisted any non-Serbs
were severely punished, and some Serbs even paid with their lives
for their mercy.
The following discussion of the applicable law is also
found in the Final Report of the Commission of Experts. *49
Article 5 of the statute of the ICTFY affirms the
competence of the ICTFY to prosecute persons committing «crimes
against humanity», which are defined as specified acts «committed
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in
character, and directed against any civilian population», such as
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious groups.
The definition of crimes against humanity in Article 5 of
the Statute codifies accepted principles of international law
applicable erga omnes. As ascertained by the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, there are «elementary dictates of
humanity» to be recognized under all circumstances. The United
Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 95 (I) of 11 December
1946 affirmed the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgement of the
Tribunal. *50
The Nuremberg application of «crimes against humanity» was
a response to the shortcoming in international law that many
crimes committed during World War II could not technically be
regarded as war crimes stricto sensu on account of one or several
elements, which were of a different nature. «Crimes against
humanity» was, therefore, conceived to redress crimes of an
equally serious character and on a vast scale, organized and
systematic, and most ruthlessly carried out.
Crimes against humanity apply to all contexts. They are
not, therefore, confined to situations of international armed
conflict, but also apply to all armed conflicts including
internal ones - civil wars and insurrection - and whatever casus
mixtus may arise in between internal and international armed
conflict. Thus, it includes all armed conflict, whether they are
of an international or non-international character. However, not
every act committed by force of arms is an armed conflict; a
genuine armed conflict has to be distinguished from a mere act of
banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection. Crimes
against humanity are also no longer dependant on their linkage to
crimes against peace or war crimes.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute of the ICTFY address
«Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949» and
«Violations of the laws and customs of war». Article 5, which
concerns crimes against humanity, contains minimum provisions
which must be respected, a fortiori, whether or not Articles 2 or
3 are applicable to a specific conflict.
Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTFY protects «any
civilian population», which undoubtedly includes the whole of the
population of the area afflicted by the armed conflict, without
any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
nationality, religion or political opinion. Refugees are not
different from other civilians, and as such are protected within
the meaning of «civilian population». «Civilian population» is
used in this context in contradistinction to combatants or
members of armed forces.
It seems obvious that Article 5 applies first and foremost
to civilians, meaning people who are not combatants. This,
however, should not lead to any quick conclusions concerning
people who at one particular point in time did bear arms. One
practical example: in the former Yugoslavia, large-scale
arbitrary killings were one of the hallmarks of attacks by a
given group. Information about such arbitrary killings was then
used by the same group to instill fear and demand total
subjugation of the other group in other areas as well. Many of
the most barbarous onslaughts on villages started with heavy
artillery bombardments followed by the villages being stormed by
infantry in tandem, while paramilitary groups sought the
inhabitants in each and every house. A head of family who under
such circumstances tries to protect his family gun-in-hand does
not thereby lose his status as a civilian. Maybe the same is the
case for the sole policeman or local defence guard doing the
same, even if they joined hands to try to prevent the cataclysm.
Information of the overall circumstances is relevant for the
interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its
purpose. Under such circumstances, the distinction between
improvised self-defence and actual military defence may be
subtle, but none the less important. This is no less so when the
legitimate authorities in the area - as part and parcel of an
overall plan of destruction - had previously been given an
ultimatum to arm all the local defence guards.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated
the following concerning crimes against humanity and the
importance of the overall circumstances:
It is significant to note that Protocol II Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Part II «Humane
treatment», addresses «Fundamental guarantees» in article 4 and
includes in the protected group «all persons who do not take a
direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities».
The different acts constituting crimes against humanity
are enumerated in article 5 of the statute of the ICTFY, such
acts are: «murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial
and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts». «Other inhumane
acts» covers serious crimes of a nature similar to the other
crimes cited. It is not equally obvious if the eiusdem generis
principle of interpretation will rule out a wider interpretation.
It is necessary to ascertain that the acts included in the
concept of «crimes against humanity» correspond to what is
already considered international customary law.
In the context of crimes against humanity, it is relevant
to observe the same kind of prohibited acts listed in common
article 3 (relevant to conflicts not of an international
character) in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and in
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, are mere
codification of elementary dictates of humanity. Article 3
prohibits «violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of
hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituent court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples». Protocol II, Part II, article 4 bans
«violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being
of persons, in particular murder, as well as cruel treatment such
as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
collective punishment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism;
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assaults; slavery and the slave trade in all their
forms; pillage; and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts».
The former Yugoslavia signed Protocol II on 11 June 1979 and
ratified it that same day, without reservations, declarations or
objections.
Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations
where there exists an «intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such», which
are preconditions for genocide. Crimes against humanity are,
however, very serious international violations «directed
against» the protected persons, in contradistinction to a fate
befalling them merely as a side-effect, for example, of a
military operation dictated by military necessity.
Isolated acts constituting offences, such as extra-
judicial executions or other common crimes punishable under
municipal law, do not qualify as crimes against humanity by
themselves. The acts must be part of a policy of persecution or
discrimination. In addition, the acts must be carried out in a
systematic way or by means of mass action. Thus, the number of
victims and perpetrators are characteristically high. Because
the perpetrators have a common plan containing the elements
described above, they need not resort to the same means or acts
against their victims. It is the systematic process of
victimization against the protected group which is essential.
For example, a number of interviewees reported that some persons
had been crucified, but it is not necessary that all victims of
the protected group be crucified or that this particular
«inhumane act» be recognized in and of itself to be part of
crimes against humanity. It is the overall context of large-
scale victimization carried out as part of a common plan or
design which goes to the element of systematicity.
It should be noted that the ensuing upsurge in crimes that
follows a general breakdown of law and order does not qualify as
crimes against humanity. However, a general breakdown in law and
order may be a premeditated instrument, a situation carefully
orchestrated to hide the true nature of the intended harm. Thus,
it should not be accepted at face value that the perpetrators are
merely uncontrolled elements, especially not if these elements
target almost exclusively groups also otherwise discriminated
against and persecuted. Unwillingness to manage, prosecute and
punish «uncontrolled elements» may be another indication that
these elements are, in reality, but a useful tool for the
implementation of a policy of crimes against humanity.
Crimes against humanity may also amount to extermination
of national, ethnical, racial, religious or other groups, whether
or not the intent which makes such crimes punishable as genocide
can be proven. They may also, through «inhumane acts», amount to
large-scale human degradation. The scale and nature of such
crimes become of special significance and of concern to the
international community because of the abhorrent character of the
overall policy, the means employed to carry out the policy, and
the number of victims it produces.
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide states that «genocide is a crime under
international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations and condemned by the civilized world», and as the United
Nations recognized that «at all periods of history genocide has
inflicted great losses on humanity». *52
The Convention was manifestly adopted for humanitarian and
civilizing purposes. Its objectives are to safeguard the very
existence of certain human groups and to affirm and emphasize the
most elementary principles of humanity and morality. In view of
the rights involved, the legal obligations to refrain from
genocide are recognized as erga omnes.
When the Convention was drafted, it was already envisaged
that it would apply not only to then existing forms of genocide,
but also «to any method that might be evolved in the future with
a view to destroying the physical existence of a group». *53 As
emphasized in the Preamble to the Convention, genocide has marred
«all periods of history», and it is this very tragic recognition
that gives the concept its historical evolutionary nature.
The Convention must be interpreted in good faith, in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their
context, and in the light of its object and purpose. Moreover,
the text of the Convention should be interpreted in such a way
that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every word. No
word or provision may be disregarded or treated as superfluous,
unless this is absolutely
necessary to give effect to the terms read as a whole. *54
Genocide is a crime under international law regardless of
«whether committed in time of peace or in time of war» (see
article I). Thus, irrespective of the context in which it occurs
(for example, peace time, internal strife, international armed
conflict or whatever the general overall situation) genocide is a
punishable international crime.
The acts specified in the Convention must be «committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such» (see article II).
Destruction of a group «in whole or in part» does not mean
that the group in its entirety must be exterminated. The words
«in whole or in part» were inserted in the text to make it clear
that it is not necessary to aim at killing all the members of the
group.
According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur, B.
Whitaker:
If essentially the total leadership of a group is
targeted, it could also amount to genocide. Such leadership
includes political and administrative leaders, religious leaders,
academics and intellectuals, business leaders and others - the
totality per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless
of the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be
the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack
on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or
what happened to the rest of the group. If a group has its
leadership exterminated, and at the same time or in the wake of
that, has a relatively large number of the members of the group
killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example, deported
on a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations
ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the
provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its
purpose. Similarly, the extermination of a group's law-
enforcement and military personnel may be a significant section
of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless
against other abuses of a similar or other nature, particularly
if the leadership is being eliminated as well. Thus, the intent
to destroy the fabric of a society through the extermination of
its leadership, when accompanied by other acts of elimination of
a segment of society, can also be deemed genocide.
«National, ethnical, racial or religious groups» are all
protected. The different groups relevant to the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia - the Serbs, the Croats, the Muslims, the
Gypsies, and others - all have status as ethnic groups, and may,
at least in part, be characterized by religion, ethnicity, and
nationality. It is not a condition that the victim group be a
minority, it might as well be a numerical majority.
If there are several or more than one victim groups, and
each group as such is protected, it may be within the spirit and
purpose of the Convention to consider all the victim groups as a
larger entity. The case being, for example, that there is
evidence that group A wants to destroy in whole or in part groups
B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not belong to the
«national, ethnical, racial or religious» group A. In a sense,
group A has defined a pluralistic non-A group using national,
ethnical, racial and religious criteria for the definition. It
seems relevant to analyse the fate of the non-A group along
similar lines as if the non-A group had been homogenous. This is
important if, for example, group B and to a lesser degree group C
have provided the non-A group with all its leaders. Group D, on
the other hand, has a more marginal role in the non-A group
community because of its small numbers or other reasons.
Genocide, «an odious scourge» which the Convention intends «to
liberate mankind from» (see the Preamble to the Convention),
would as a legal concept be a weak or even useless instrument if
the overall circumstances of mixed groups were not covered. The
core of this reasoning is that in one-against-everyone-else-cases
the question of a significant number or a significant section of
the group must be answered with reference to all the target
groups as a larger whole.
It is the element of intent to destroy a designated group
in whole or in part, which makes crimes of mass murder and crimes
against humanity qualify as genocide. To be genocide within the
meaning of the Convention, the crimes against a number of
individuals must be directed at their collectivity or at them in
their collective character or capacity. This can be deduced from
the words «as such» stated in article II of the Convention (see
para. 638 supra). In most countries, penal codes do not regard
motives, rather only intent, as the subjective or mental
constituent element of a crime. Motive and intent may be closely
linked, but motive is not mentioned in the Convention. The
necessary element of intent may be inferred from sufficient
facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of actions or
omissions of such a degree of criminal negligence or recklessness
that the defendant may reasonably be assumed to have been aware
of the consequences of his or her conduct, which goes to the
establishment of intent, but not necessarily motive.
The different acts constituting the crime of genocide are
enumerated in article II of the Convention, such acts are:
«killing members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in
part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group». Each of these categories of acts can constitute the
crime of genocide, as could any combination of these acts.
Article III of the Convention lists the punishable acts as
being: «genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct or public
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and
complicity in genocide». This enumeration indicates how far the
crime needs to have advanced before it becomes punishable. For
example, an attempt will suffice. Secondly, it describes what
kind of involvement in an actual genocide may result in penal
responsibility under the Convention. Thus, criminal
responsibility extends to those involved in incitement,
conspiracy and attempt, as well as individuals actually executing
the specific acts prohibited by the Convention. Political
masterminds or propaganda people are no less responsible than the
individuals who perform the actual carnage. There are,
therefore, several legal bases for criminal responsibility for
individuals who engage in or are part of the various aspects of
genocide.
It is explicitly stated in the Convention that people who
have committed genocide shall be punished whether they are
«constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals» (see article IV). Public officials include both
civilian and military personnel and everyone who holds (or held)
a public office - be it legislative, administrative or judicial.
To meet the aims of the Convention, people in the said categories
must be treated equally irrespective of their de jure or de facto
positions as decision makers. As individuals, they are subject
to prosecution like any other individual violator. They cannot
hide behind any shield of immunity. The legal and moral
responsibilities are the same and the need to prevent genocide no
less clear because of the position of the violator.
The statute of the ICTFY, article 4, affirms the
competence of the ICTFY to prosecute persons committing genocide.
The definition of genocide in Article 4 of the Statute is
identical to the provisions of the Genocide Convention. 1991 1993 Reduction New arrivals
Serbs 47,745 53,637 --- 5,892
Muslims 49,454 6,124 43,330 ---
Croats 6,300 3,169 3,131 ---
Others 8,971 2,621 6,350 ---
The total number of killed and deported people as of June 1993
was 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people
missing). Since then, the number of non-Serbs in the district
has continued to decrease.
1948 1953 1961 1971 1981
Alisici 227 204 226 228 251
Babici 909 1,202 1,335 1,290 1,443
Bistrica 1,602 1,669 1,722 1,494 1,519
Biscani 638 734 928 1,319 1,384
Bozici 526 480 416 309 278
Brdjani 1,322 1,353 1,408 1,508 1,827
Brezicani 1,287 1,288 1,439 1,541 1,572
Brisevo 608 659 695 701 537
Busnovi 1,430 1,445 1,440 1,424 1,339
Cikote 315 318 366 339 295
Crna Dolina 480 477 435 261 262
Carakovo 1,074 1,205 1,533 1,929 2,263
Cejreci 523 567 647 658 709
Cirkin Polje 375 401 687 999 1,463
Cela 1,295 1,449 1,684 1,894 2,022
Dera 1,241 1,275 1,336 1,391 1,442
Donja Dragotinja 404 432 460 537 529
Donja Ravska 634 663 684 617 438
Donji Garevci 692 761 756 586 842
Donji Orlovci 499 521 540 646 802
Donji Volar 577 613 599 572 442
Gacani 525 528 497 474 388
Gomjenica 657 810 1,077 1,870 2,483
Gornja Dragotinja 1,049 974 912 822 623
Gornja Jutrogosta 645 643 784 618 527
Gornja Puharska 360 409 671 624 643
Gornja Ravska 459 488 428 389 378
Gornji Garevci 481 468 486 468 449
Gornji Jelovac 519 519 615 781 599
Gornji Orlovci 360 357 374 365 430
Gornji Volar 542 512 425 371 391
Gradina 941 1,043 1,085 1,124 1,005
Hambarine 992 1,158 1,548 2,114 2,499
Hrnici 731 833 804 821 767
Jaruge 485 434 369 538 337
Jelicka 948 991 1,023 1,026 990
Jugovci 437 465 528 582 586
Kalajevo 309 581 585 598 272
Kamicani 2,146 2,051 2,033 2,586 3,161
Kevljani 1,036 1,079 1,288 1,536 1,874
Kozarac 1,645 1,860 2,480 2,995 3,527
Kozarusa 1,959 2,107 2,239 2,560 2,994
Krivaja 1,195 1,216 1,276 1,244 1,236
Lamovita 1,669 1,893 2,093 1,913 2,048
Ljeskare 268 333 326 319 646
Ljubija 2,637 3,238 4,218 4,673 4,325
Malo Palanciste 288 309 289 227 199
Maricka 1,901 1,955 1,952 1,927 1,916
Marini 590 589 529 457 316
Miljakovci 664 729 734 661 670
Miska Glava 1,101 1,241 1,219 1,173 997
Nisevici 858 939 1,132 1,088 1,054
Nistavci 335 371 332 282 293
Omarska 1,816 2,002 2,373 2,695 3,280
Orlovaca 246 359 511 797 1,132
Pejici 448 476 472 502 645
Petrov Gaj 813 904 1,002 1,047 1,153
Prijedor town 6,941 8,894 14,295 22,126 29,449
Rakelici 1,028 1,066 1,017 966 792
Rakovcani 769 819 969 1,195 1,368
Raljas 710 729 699 852 722
Rasavci 1,162 1,265 1,247 1,176 1,066
Rizvanovici 742 851 1,007 1,174 1,433
Sanicani 678 708 657 585 621
Surkovac 979 995 936 878 686
Tisova 461 476 501 375 315
Tomasica 1,175 1,240 1,256 1,311 1,111
Trnopolje 1,689 1,854 1,965 2,564 2,847
Veliko Palanciste 610 643 635 598 539
Zecovi 738 796 828 874 897
Zune 532 575 618 580 530
(Some of the figures quoted vary slightly in the official statistics.)
C. Some remarks concerning the history
«Among the leading Cetniks there were several rabid
Serb nationalists whose desire it was to absorb not
only Bosnia but Dalmatia, Montenegro, parts of Croatia
and Slavonia, and even northern Albania, into the
territory of Serbia. Such aims were nurtured by two
dominant intellectuals in the Cetnik movement: the
Serbian lawyer and politician Dragisa Vasic and the
Bosnian Serb lawyer (from Banja Luka) Stevan Moljevic.
In June 1941 the latter drew up a memorandum entitled
'Homogeneous Serbia', in which he demanded the
inclusion in Serbia of the territories mentioned above,
and explained that the 'fundamental duty' of all Serbs
was 'to create and organize a homogeneous Serbia, which
must include all the ethnic territory inhabited by
Serbs'. In a letter to Vasic in February 1942 Moljevic
wrote that Serbian land should be extended all the way
to Dalmatia, and that there should then follow 'the
cleansing (ciscenje) of the land of all the non-Serb
elements. The thing to do would be to send the
offenders on their way: Croats to Croatia, and Muslims
to Turkey or Albania.' With people like this
influencing the policy of the Cetniks (Moljevic became
political director of the movement in early 1943),
there was clearly a theoretical basis for a virulently
anti-Muslim policy.
But on the other hand there is no definite evidence
that Draza Mihailovic himself ever called for ethnic
cleansing. The one document which has frequently been
cited as evidence of this, a set of instructions
addressed to regional commanders in December 1941, is
probably a forgery - though it must be pointed out that
it was forged not by enemies wanting to discredit
Mihailovic but by the commanders themselves, who hoped
it would be taken for a genuine Cetnik document.
Mihailovic was certainly capable of using the rhetoric
of Serbian nationalism. In one proclamation attributed
to him there is a declaration: 'I am from Serbian
Sumadija [district of central Serbia], from Serbian
land and of Serbian blood. As such, I shall fight for
the most sublime ideas which a Serb can have: for the
liberation and unification for ever of all Serbian
lands . . . Wherever Serbian graves are found, there
is Serbian land.'» *4
D. Rudnika Ljubija
E. Other economic activities
F. Political and administrative structure
III. Political and military background to the catastrophe
«It is important that the trial not become an inquiry
into the causes of war. It cannot be established that
Hitlerism was the sole cause of the war, and there
should be no effort to do this. Nor, I believe, should
there be any effort or time spent on appointing out
responsibility for causing the war among the many
nations and individuals concerned. The question of
causation is important and will be discussed for many
years, but it has no place in this trial, which must
rather stick rigorously to the doctrine that planning
and launching an aggressive war is illegal, whatever
may be the factors that caused the defendants to plan
and to launch. Contributing causes may be pleaded by
the defendant before the bar of history, but not before
the tribunal.» *5
A. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
«The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right
of every nation to self-determination, including the
right to secession [emphasis added] . . . have, . . .
united in a federal republic of free and equal nations
and nationalities and founded a socialist federal
community . . .
. . .
In order to carry these principles into effect the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall strive:
. . .
for the right of every nation freely to
determine and build up its own social and
political system by ways and means of its own
free choice;
for the right of nations to self-
determination and national independence, and
for their right to wage a liberation war to
attain these aims;»
«The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a
federal state having the form of a state community of
voluntarily united nations and their Socialist
Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of
Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, . . .»
«Yugoslavia has entered into the final phase of its
agony. The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia has not functioned for a long time, and
the illusion of the functioning of the Presidency of
Yugoslavia and its powers, which in reality do not
exist, has since last night finally expired.
. . .
the Republic of Serbia will no longer recognize a
single decision of the Presidency under the existing
circumstances because it would be illegal.» *6
B. Overall political changes
C. The war in Croatia
D. BiH
«[T]he crucial contribution to the outbreak and
expansion of the war was the fact that it was precisely
on April 6 last year [1992] that the European Community
recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and
sovereign state.
. . .
. . . what preceded the April 6 events and the
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent
and sovereign state.
What is involved were negotiations concerning the new
constitutional and political set up of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, conducted under the auspices of the
European Community by Portuguese diplomats.» *7
E. The Serbian plebiscite
«Do you agree with the decision of 24 October 1991 by
the Parliament of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Hercegovina for the Serbian people to remain in a
common State of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO
Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem and all
others wishing the same?»
F. The referendum in BiH
G. The general situation concerning arms in Opstina Prijedor
IV. Preludes to the catastrophe
The «Crisis Committees» were, at least in some areas, organized
by the TO.
A. Moving the artillery and military personnel into place
B. Disrupted communications with Sarajevo
C. Serbian control over the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain
D. The propaganda
«Having travelled widely inside Bosnia over fifteen
years, and having stayed in Muslim, Croat and Serb
villages, I cannot believe the claim that the country
was forever seething with ethnic hatred. But having
watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-2,
I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to
believe that they were under threat, from Ustasa
hordes, fundamentalist jihads or whatever. As the
independent Belgrade journalist Milos Vasic put it to
an American audience, it was as if all TV stations in
the USA had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan: 'You
must imagine a United States with every little TV
station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial
line - a line dictated by David Duke. You too would
have war in five years.'» *8
E. Secret Serbian police activities
«The man [Simo Drljaca], which the Serbian Democratic
Party [SDS] of the Opstina Prijedor put in charge of
forming the Serbian police, after half a year of
illegal work had done his job that well that in 13
police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting
to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was
coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he
directed the take-over of power [by the Serbs], which
was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without
any shots fired. The Assembly of the Srpske Opstine
Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992],
appointed him chief of the public security station
[i.e. in charge of the secret police].» *9
F. Serbs rearming other Serbs
«. . . RAM, a plan whose name was never uncovered
beyond its acronym. It has been alleged that the full
extent of this programme was Milosevic's concept of a
core Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia. . . . It also,
naturally envisaged Bosnia-Hercegovina as an integral
part of the core Yugoslavia. There is no proof as to
whether such a comprehensive plan existed . . .
That within the project of RAM there was a place for
Belgrad's strategy for Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, is
beyond doubt thanks to testimony provided by former
Prime Minister Ante Markovic, . . . Organized from the
Serbian capital by the SPS [i.e. the Socialist Party of
Serbia] MP Mihalj Kertes, . . . , at the heart of this
programme lay the distribution of arms throughout the
Serb communities of BiH. . . . Throughout 1990, Kertes
ordered the dispatches of hundreds of thousands of
pieces of weaponry mainly to the two militant Serb
regions of BiH, Bosanska Krajina in the north-west and
. . .
Throughout 1991, Kertes's secret convoys of lorries
bulging with guns and munitions ploughed their furrow
with a diligence not usually associated with Serbs.
Eastern Hercegovina and Bosanska Krajina were
especially privileged recipients of this booty as they
were both to play a critical logistical role during the
war with Croatia. . . . In August, when his
humiliation was reaching its peak, the federal Prime
Minister, Ante Markovic, revealed the existence of RAM
and leaked a tape conversation between President
Milosevic and General Nikola Uzelac, who ran the Banja
Luka corps of the JNA with his own particular touch of
evil. During this conversation, Milosevic ordered
Uzelac to release weapons to the leader of the SDS,
Radovan Karadzic.» *10
G. The ultimatum and official rearmament of the TO
H. A fake declaration of war
«BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF
SARAJEVO
29 04 1992
VERY URGENT
-----------
ORDER TO CARRY OUT
THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH 02-11-327/92
ON THE BASIS OF THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA NO. 11-327/92 OF
27.04.1992 ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS OF THE JNA
FROM THE TERRITORY OF BIH, AND DUE TO THE NON-
OBSERVANCE OF THIS DECISION AND THE COMMENCED ROBBERY
AND PILLAGE OF PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA BY THE FORMER JNA,
I H E R E W I T H G I V E T H E O R D E R :
1. CARRY OUT A COMPLETE AND MASSIVE OBSTRUCTION ON
ALL ROADS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA
AND HERCEGOVINA WHERE THE FORMER JNA HAS BEGUN THE
WITHDRAWAL OF TECHNICAL MATERIAL, IN DIRECT
COORDINATION WITH THE MUP [i.e. the Ministry of
Interior].
2. CARRY OUT A BLOCKADE IN A WIDER REGION OF
MILITARY OBJECTS FROM WHICH THE JNA WILL TRY TO TAKE
OUT TECHNICAL MATERIAL, THROUGH DIFFERENT KINDS OF
FORMATIONAL AND NATURAL HINDRANCES TO BE SAFEGUARDED BY
UNITS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH
AND THE MUP.
3. PREVENT UNITS OF THE JNA, UNLESS AUTHORIZED OR
ACCOMPANIED BY THE MUP, FROM LEAVING THE BARRACKS AND
COMMUNICATING ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH.
4. IMMEDIATELY MAKE PLANS FOR AND START MILITARY
ACTIONS ON THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF BIH AND COORDINATE
THEM WITH THE STAFF OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE
REGION, DISTRICT OR REPUBLIC OF BIH. IN CONNECTION
WITH THE MILITARY ACTIONS, MAKE PLANS FOR EXTENSIVE
SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE POPULATION AND THE MATERIAL
PROPERTY OF THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH
C O M M A N D E R
COLONEL
HASAN EFENDIC»
«As early as September 1991, President Izetbegovic
urged Lord Carrington's conference on Yugoslavia to pay
immediate attention to the question of the JNA in BiH.
With considerable foresight, Izetbegovic proposed that
the European Community open a fund which could finance
the pension of Bosnian officers and provide for the
gradual dismantling of the JNA in Bosnia and the local
military industries. Preoccupied with the war in
Croatia, neither the conference nor anyone else heeded
Izetbegovic's entreaties . . .» *11
V. The Serbs take power - 30 april 1992
A. The actual takeover
«In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he [Simo
Drljaca] directed the take-over of power [by Serbs],
which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes,
without any shots fired. The Assembly of the Srpske
Opstine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992],
appointed him chief of the Public Security Service
[i.e. in charge of the secret police and thus also the
ordinary police]. He was in charge of this job during
the most demanding period and remained in the position
until January 1993. These days he has been appointed
as Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian
Republic. He will commence in his new functions in
Bijelina on Monday.» *12
In the taking over of power, the workers of the SJB,
Serbs, one and all took active part. From the beginning
of the military actions, the workers of the police took
active part, until this very day.» *13
«The Serbs cannot allow a government in which they are
a minority. The Serbs in this area are a constituent
nation. We will never accept Izetbegovic as President.
The Muslims did not want to accept that policy. So, a
war happened.»
B. Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor
Civilian:
Those here mentioned have identified themselves publicly as
members of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opstine Prijedor. The names of
four other identified members and three possible members are not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Among
them are key people from the local industry, including the iron
ore mine Rudnika Ljubija.
«The next hurdle is a room full of local dignitaries on
the first floor of the police station. There is the
military commander of the region, Colonel Vladimir
Arsic. There is the 'civilian' mayor Milomir Stakic
(in military uniform) and his deputy, Milan Kovacevic,
whose job it is to oversee the 'transit centres',
including Omarska, and who was himself born in
Jasenovac in 1941. He says that 'what you will find
here are not concentration camps, but transit centres.
We are people born out of concentration camps,
determined to protect our nation from genocide yet
again.' . . . Colonel Arsic and Major Milutonic stress
that Omarska is run by the civilian authorities.
Manjaca is available for a visit, but not Omarska.
. . . and then some extraordinary inexactitudes from
Mayor Stakic: 'We have tried to get the other side to
live in peace with us. Our problems are with the
extremists, not the population. We are trying to get
Muslims not to leave the area, but to stay and live
with us, but they want to go to Croatia, and Germany,
or back to Bosnia [we are in Bosnia, aren't we?] while
the extremists bring weapons into the area, kill the
Serbian people and commit appalling atrocities . . .
There are no camps, there are only transit centres
where people are taken for their own protection.
Others are people who want to leave and we are
assisting them.'» *14
It was unnecessary to make such a fuss about the
chief of the SJB and insist so much on changing the
chief. The change was demanded by those people who
urged the present vice president of the Opstina
Assembly to take over with his army the station in
Omarska, what he also did. At this occasion he wounded
a woman lodger at the second floor, destroyed an
official car and took prisoner the commander and the
staff on duty. All this he did when the police (500
men) this morning was about to go to Orasje. Against
this person were brought 3 (three) criminal charges to
the Military Court. A change was demanded by the
present leader of the SDS, because I did not go [to
him] every morning 'in order to get wise'. In the Law
on internal affairs it says that such 'wisdom' (orders)
is given by the chief of CSB Banja Luka and the
Minister of Interior (MUP). When two honest policemen
and the honest family of Butinski were killed in
Trnopolje, the same leader of SDS stated in front of me
and my men that if their chief had been elected, the
murders would not have happened. One knows who killed
the two policemen and the Butinski family, I believe
that no chair on earth is worth their lives.
For the first time I inform the public that I
personally insisted to the Minister of Interior that I
should not carry out this function any longer, in order
not to raise dust about the leader of the SDS. After
the presented arguments the Minister agreed that I
should no longer have the function of chief of the SJB.
In contrast to the present civilian authorities (i.e.
individuals), the cooperation was excellent with the
Army of the Republika Srpska and with the officers of
that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint
cleaning of the terrain of traitors [otpadnik which
also may be translated as heretics, renegades, or
deserters], joint work at the checkpoints, a joint
intervention group against disturbance of public order
and in fighting terrorist groups. Leaving this job I
wish that the officers of the Army of the Republika
Srpska and the army continue with a still better
cooperation with the SJB in order to achieve the common
goal.»
C. The military and the armed entities
«Regarding the ethnic structure of the population in
the region where the 6th Battalion was formed, it
included a large number of Croatian and Muslim
combatants. This did not reduce the military alertness
and the fierceness of this Battalion.» *18
«[T]hey [the police force (including the secret
services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the
CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the
Minister of Interior.
. . .
. . . the cooperation was excellent with the Army of
Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army.
The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing
of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the
checkpoints, a joint intervention group against
disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist
groups [emphasis added].» *19
«All volunteers fought under the command of the former
JNA. They were armed by the JNA and the Territorial
Defence. Today, some of those volunteer units are
being called Fascist due to certain political and party
interests. They are being accused of genocide. Well,
we all know who is responsible for that. Such
volunteers were suited for the purposes of the former
JNA authorities because they did their job for them.
And they did it the best they could.» *20
«Our proposed statute comprises only the most human
goals. The Association is a non-political organization
which includes all combatants, regardless of their
differences - JNA, Yugoslav Army, Territorial Defence,
all kinds of volunteers. All volunteers have been
armed and sent to the front lines by the JNA and the
Serbian Ministry of the Interior; they served under the
direct command of the JNA or the Yugoslav Army, the
Serbian Republic of Krajina and the Serbian Republic,
or under the command of the local commanders in those
armies.» *21
The introduction to the same article reads:
«The participants of the recent Yugoslav wars - since
1990 until date - are suddenly expendable: neither
Serbia for which they thought they were fighting, nor
the army under whose flag and command they fought, want
them any more. Serbia has not been at war, the army
have not had a State, and it cannot support its active
soldiers.» *22
«The police who has only recently helped bullies and
criminals, protected and armed them, and provided them
with undisturbed passage on the Drina and Sava rivers
in both directions, now arrests them, and brings them
to justice. In Srem, Nis, and other places, the
political showdown is at full swing, made possible only
due to the conditions of total anarchy.
D. Victory for the SDS
«For some unknown reason, the former federal Prime
Minister, Ante Markovic, had decided to hold the
founding conference of his Reformist Forces Party in
Prijedor before the 1990 elections in BiH. The
population of the Prijedor region was 44 per cent
Muslim and 42 per cent Serb, while 8 per cent
considered themselves Yugoslavs. Markovic's campaign
in the Prijedor region split the Serb vote, as many in
the town itself voted for the Reformist Forces. As a
consequence, Izetbegovic's Party, the SDA, secured a
relative majority which made Prijedor the only district
in the Bosanska Krajina which was not under the control
of Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party. This created a
problem for the local SDS leaders as they found it
impossible to co-opt Prijedor into their SAO (Serbian
Autonomous District) Bosanska Krajina, the pride of
Serb militancy. During the war in western Slavonija in
the summer and autumn of 1991, General Nikola Uzelac,
commander of the Banja Luka corps, mobilized the local
population in order to take part in the fighting in
Croatia, to the north. Not unnaturally, the Muslims
refused to respond to the mobilization and in Prijedor,
the SDA-dominated government refused to co-operate with
the issuing of the call-up papers.» *24
VI. Immediate consequences
A. Control of information and increased propaganda
B. Control of movement
C. Dismissal of the non-Serbian workforce
D. Disarming of the non-Serbs and ultimatums
E. Provocations or pretexts
VII. The major Serbian military operations
A. The attack on Hambarine
B. The attack on the Kozarac area
«In Kozarac, there was a really big group of
extremists. They were refusing any kind of
negotiations about organizing community life. They
resisted all attempts to find a peaceful solution or to
disarm. So we answered energetically. Power does not
pray to God. The majority of people were outsiders,
from Kosovo, Sandzak and foreign mercenaries. There
were some black people too. The majority were financed
by the Muslim organization in Zagreb, through financial
and material means.»
C. The attack on Prijedor town
«On 30 May 1992 at 04.30 hours, it was raining and one
could hear machine gun fire from Stari Grad and from up
along the river in an easterly direction. It lasted
for about an hour and a half. At about 07.00 hours he
heard two tanks passing to the street of the JNA (which
was a prominent street) from an area near the Sana
River. He heard shots from rifles and tanks. The
sirens had signalled that people were to seek shelter
at about 06.00 hours. Radio Prijedor announced that an
attack on Prijedor was imminent. There was a mortar
attack on Stari Grad and the New Hotel, possibly from
the direction of the airport at Urije. Infantry fire
ceased to be heard, but mortar fire lasted until about
13.00 hours. Someone who lived on the ninth floor
nearby Radio Prijedor said that tanks and soldiers
attacked the radio building. Radio Prijedor was
reporting that Ustasas and 'Green Berets' (i.e.
Muslims) were the attackers, and the Serbs were called
upon to take up arms to fight these enemies of the
Serbian people. At 08.00 hours Radio Prijedor
announced that the Army and the Serbian police were in
full control but moving on to wipe out all the snipers
in the town. He saw many soldiers on a main street
nearby his house. Radio Prijedor also instructed all
Croats and Muslims to hang a white piece of cloth
outside their dwellings, and not to leave their homes.
D. The attack on villages on the left bank of the Sana River
Names of victims are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons.
E. General characteristics
«It is in the thousands. If you want this [exactly]
you have to make it up yourself.»
F. The disposal of the dead
VIII. The concentration camps
A. Logor Omarska
«Interned here are reportedly Prijedor elite from
before the Serbian take-over of government control: The
President of the Council (Mayor), Members of the
Executive Council, The President of the Court, two
judges, doctors, presidents and directors of firms,
owners of private factories and businesses.»
«Oh no, we will not waste our bullets on them. They
have no roof, there is sun and rain, cold nights,
beatings twice a day, we give them no food and water.
They will starve like animals.»
«After she was first arrested and interrogated she was
moved on to a prison cell in Prijedor where she was
together with one other woman [whose name is not
disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial
reasons]. The latter was a teacher and politically
active, she was later most probably killed in Logor
Omarska. The next day the two women together with
three men were taken in a car (from which they could
not look out) via Tomasica to Omarska, where they
arrived at approximately 17.00 hours. In Logor Omarska
they were commanded to stand up along a wall, facing
the wall, with their hands up with three fingers lifted
(in the originally Serbian religious way to signify the
Holy Trinity) and thoroughly bodily searched, then the
chief of the guards arrived. He started to swear as
there were two women, and said he had no room for
women. He asked what he should do with them. The
women were subsequently taken to a prison in Omarska
village. The women were detained in a small cell with
no air and no electricity, the only thing they were
provided with was a bucket. They remained in this cell
over night. Thence they were taken back to Logor
Omarska. In Logor Omarska a Croatian woman arrived,
she worked in the postal service. This woman
threatened with hunger strike and thus was temporarily
released, but was returned again to the camp later.»
«Drljaca, . . . , said 3,334 people were arrested on
suspicion of resisting or plotting against the new Serb
authorities and were taken to Omarska. Drljaca
insisted that no one had been killed at Omarska and
that only two prisoners died between May 25 and mid-
August, both of 'natural causes'. Another 49
'disappeared', including the former lord mayor of
Prijedor . . . and were presumed dead, Drljaca said.
«There was a power cut at 11:47 P.M. on July 26, and it
lasted until 4:30 A.M. the next morning. [Cehajic]
disappeared among seven who left at that time.» *28
«In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm' and
'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were
held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were
sent to the camp 'Manjaca', on the basis of solid
documentation on active participation in the fighting
against the Army of Republika Srpska, and also
participation in genocide against the Serbian people.» *29
«It's your choice. The police chief has definitive
information. All the rest is Hitchcock.»
«Arriving to Logor Omarska they were ordered up against
the wall facing it and with their hands up - they were
beaten. All the eight of them were taken to the White
House, the second room to the right. The room was
approximately 25 square metres and there were some 60
to 70 barely alive prisoners there. It was mainly
young people who had surrendered themselves on the
Kozara Mountain. Himself he was allowed to settle down
next to a person [whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons], who later
was killed in the camp. Of all the other people who
were there, it was only one deaf and dumb man and
himself who were not killed in the camp. There was one
window in the room, and guards outside it. The door
was half wood and half glass. Maybe 30 minutes later,
it was dead silent in the room, a guard came in
screaming that the one who was intended to flee had to
come outside. He was ordered outside, where a bonfire
was lit. All the guards were drunk. They asked him
where he was hiding his weapon. He did not know how
Logor Omarska was operated. He said that he had no
weapon. They asked him for his name. He was then
allowed to return inside. The guards outside the
window were poking around like pigs, swearing at him,
calling him names. They told him to come to the window
and to lean his head out - he could see very little, it
was dark. He saw only a knife gleaming in the dark.
They asked him if he wanted to buy cigarettes, he
answered in the affirmative and was given two packets.
He shared one packet and was ordered to shut the
window. The next day he saw a horrible - unimaginable
and overwhelming - sight outside, they were all his
fellow men who had been tormented. [Five men were
named by the witness, who stated that two of them were
killed in Omarska].»
«[T]he local Red Cross had indeed visited Omarska, and
given it a clean bill of health. Dr. Dusko Ivic said
later: 'Oh yes, I have certainly visited Omarska, and
my professional assessment of the health of the people
there is very good, apart from some diarrhoea.'» *31
«Nothing could have prepared us for what we see when we
come through the back gates of what was the Omarska
iron mine and ore processing works, and are ushered
into the canteen area. Across a yard, a group of
prisoners who have just emerged from a door in the side
of a large rust-coloured metal shed are adjusting their
eyes to the sunlight and being ordered into a straight
line by the barked commands of a uniformed armed guard.
Then, as part of some rigid, well-worn camp drill, they
run in single file across the courtyard and into the
canteen. Above them in an observation post is the
watchful eye, hidden behind reflective sunglasses, of a
beefy guard who follows their weary canter with the
barrel of his heavy machine gun.
There are thirty of them running; their heads newly
shaven, their clothes baggy over their skeletal bodies.
Some are barely able to move. In the canteen, there
are no more barked orders, the men know the drill all
right. They line up in obedient and submissive silence
and collect their ration: a meager, watery portion of
beans augmented with bread crumbs, and stale roll,
which they collect as they file along the metal
railings. The men are at various stages of human decay
and affliction; the bones of their elbows and wrists
protrude like pieces of jagged stone from the pencil-
thin stalks to which their arms have been reduced.
Their skin is putrefied, the complexions of their faces
have been corroded. These humans are alive but
decomposed, debased, degraded, and utterly subservient,
and yet they fix their huge, hollow eyes on us with
looks like the blades of knives. There is nothing
quite like the sight of the prisoner desperate to talk
and to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet
so far, but who dares not. Their stares burn, they
speak only with their terrified silence, and eyes
inflamed with the articulation of stark, undiluted,
desolate fear-without-hope.
They sit down at sparse metal tables, and wolf down
their meal. It is very obviously the only one of the
day; if they ate even twice as much, they would not be
so gaunt and withered. The meal takes precisely one
minute; the guards signal that time is up, and the men
make up another queue by the exit.» *32
«In between more waffle about the jihad and genocide
against Serbs, we learn that Omarska is an
'investigation centre' for men suspected of being
members of the Government Army. The men are rounded
up, then 'screened' to determine whether they are
'fighters' or 'civilians'. Those found guilty of
'preparing the rebellion' go into 'Category A',
explains Mrs. Balban [who translated for the Serb
regime in Logor Omarska when Vulliamy visited the
camp]. There is no information on their next
destination. Those found to have been territorial
defence soldiers (but not 'preparing the rebellion') go
into 'Category B' and are sent to Manjaca, and the rest
go to another camp, Trnopolje, down the road. [A
fourth category was hostages, meaning people for
exchange, see Chapter XII.B. infra.]» *33
B. Logor Keraterm
«On 20 July 1992, Hall No. 3 was emptied for prisoners.
These detainees were dispersed into the three other
detention halls. Later in the day, new bus-loads of
captives arrived to the camp. At this time detainees
in Logor Keratem could observe that it was burning in
the Hambarine area [see Chapter VII.D. supra]. The
newcomers were detained in Hall No. 3. Starting at the
same time the prisoners in the three other halls were
ordered to urinate in plastic barrels only.
In Hall No. 3 the doors were firmly closed and there
was no fresh air for the prisoners squeezed in there.
No food and no water was provided for the newly arrived
detainees as long as they stayed in Hall No. 3. A door
from the toilet area to the hall was firmly blocked by
Serbian camp officials. Thenceforth the barrels with
urine were emptied next to this blocked door to flow
into Hall No. 3.
In the night of 24 July 1992, one camp commander's
shift [in the following referred to as shift A] came to
the camp possibly at about 19.00 hours, later also
another commander's shift of camp guards [in the
following referred to as shift B] appeared. [The names
of the two identified commanders are not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.] Earlier in
the day some 15 people in military uniforms had come to
the camp. There were four machine gun posts outside
the front of the factory building, now the weapons were
all aimed at Hall No. 3. In the evening the guards on
shift B took out in front of the factory building some
ten prisoners, had them kneel in a circle with their
hands behind their heads. The guards than ran around
the circle screaming as they beat the prisoners
severely. One of the people thus maltreated was
subsequently thrown next to Hall No. 2 by the guards,
and died there some 15 minutes later. Others may have
encountered similar consequences.
At about mid-night it could be heard that windows
high up on the front wall to Hall No. 3 were broken.
Someone cried out, 'Do not shoot unless the commander
of shift A instructs that.' (Shift A was on duty that
night.) Then someone else cried out, 'They [the
detainees] are fleeing.' Then heavy machine gun fire
started. The commander of shift A yelled that the
shooting should stop. His instruction was ignored, and
someone mocked him saying that, 'A Serbian mother has
given birth to an Ustasa son.' At first, prisoners
like himself detained outside Hall No. 3 thought that
the long-lasting shooting was merely to terrorize the
prisoners. At dawn he was told by fellow prisoners
that it seemed that the prisoners in Hall No. 3 had
been killed. A little later he himself saw a huge pile
of dead bodies outside of Hall No. 3. At about 05.00
hours a large lorry - FAD 1620, 24 tons - driven by an
identified man [whose name is not disclosed for
confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] arrived to
the camp. Some prisoners probably from Hall No. 1 and
Hall No. 4 (he was detained in Hall No. 2 himself) and
a few who appeared to be survivors from Hall No. 3,
were ordered to heap the dead bodies on the lorry.
First they had to take out dead prisoners from Hall No.
3, thereafter to remove the pile of corpses laying
outside this hall. One prisoner participating in
loading the dead - and with the corpses also wounded
prisoners - on the lorry, afterwards told him that he
had counted 98 dead and 62 or 63 wounded prisoners.
Others claimed the total of dead was 150, and that the
wounded numbered between 30 and 40. Later in the day,
two fire trucks came and hosed down Hall No. 3 and the
area outside it to remove all the blood there.
The night of the mass-killing and the next day the
main road (from Prijedor to Banja Luka) passing the
camp was closed for traffic.»
C. Logor Trnopolje
D. Other places of detention
E. General characteristics
Drljaca: «In the collection centres 'Omarska',
'Keraterm' and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative
talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and
Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjaca', on the basis of
solid documentation on active participation in the
fighting against the Army of Republika Srpska, and also
participation in genocide against the Serbian people.
Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment,
the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced
us to release them all from Manjaca.» *34
F. The disposal of the dead
IX. The general situation for the non-Serbian population
This preparation had reached a culminating point at
the end of April, beginning of May, when these armed
groups put up barricades, and when they started
shameful murders of the army of Bosanska Krajina and
the police.
As a result the army and police cleared the
barricades when they left Prijedor on the road to Banja
Luka. And as soon as they left the city the army and
police were attacked and three police and soldiers were
killed.
In spite of our invitation to their representatives,
religious leaders and well known citizens they did not
come to talk to us.
And why have I mentioned the religious leaders? When
we went to search the homes of the religious leaders we
found US made shotguns which in the US are forbidden
for hunting.
There were fighting and destruction, especially
Karasec [Kozarac], a suburb to Prijedor, and several
people were captured. We have called them to free the
women and children and let them go. They put the women
and the children in the front lines and followed with
their weapons. The police and army accepted these
women and children and put them in buses and took them
to safe havens.
In the course of the next few days army and police
captured several thousand people and put them in
Trnopolje to protect them from the fighting with the
extremists. That is how it was started as a collective
centre.
With the help of the ICRC we have transported some of
the inmates to ? but there are still some left and we
have evacuated those who want to leave this part of the
country.
But we have also Muslims and Croatians in the camp
who want to remain, around 10,000. They have normal
identification papers for our police. They are not
accused of anything and most of them are living in
their homes but some are in the camp. A minority wants
to go to Croatia and a majority wants to go to Western
Europe.
We have had more than ten contacts with UNHCR where
they have offices and tomorrow there is a delegation of
UNHCR coming here and will discuss the future of those
who want to go to Europe. Most of them have families
in Western Europe and wish to leave this part of the
country for fear of war.
We have certainly heard about Omarska where the
people were caught with weapons, where 45 investigators
interrogated the prison people and as a result 1,300
were transferred to the camp at Manjaca and others
either freed or transferred to the open camp here
exclusively because their homes have been destroyed so
they have to go somewhere.
With the help of local Red Cross and local economy
and thanks to international help from ICRC we are
trying to give them the minimum food and medicine.
Those who are more ill go to the hospital here.
I welcome the arrivals of delegations who have come
before you an you and hope there will be more help from
outside. And we appeal to you to help us evacuate
those who wish to go to these foreign countries to
ensure safe passage to their destinations.
We are very grateful to you that you have sent the
other mission to the Croatian side because we have
Serbs who have been there for a year. And we would
like to make it possible with help of you, UNPROFOR and
ICRC to get them back.»
Neither Croats nor Muslims left this territory nor do
we have the intention of kicking them out. There are
some who hold appointments in the town and some are in
the forces.
But the future is not clear because there is no
electricity and the war is on. The communal government
which just met had on the agenda food and heating for
the winter, and Mr. Kovacic is president for the
regional government [Dr. Mico Kovacevic, President of
the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor].»
The situation with electricity is complicated because
some parts have the generating power and others have
the distribution. We are on 10% of power and industry
is on 20% of normal production. I am appealing to
propose that the energy blockade should stop.
The main problem is that the Muslims wage their war
with electricity. The result is that no one has
electricity and the CSCE can do something about it. It
is much more important to have electricity than butter.
There are theories about food corridors. No fool
will shoot at food aid. Another thing is to ask the
Croats and Muslims to deblock Banja Luka airport
because the airport works but we cannot use the
airspace.»
Europe should know that dealings with Bosnia and
Hercegovina, that part of Bosnia and Hercegovina is
only a small part and what happened in Yugoslavia
happens here.
The Serbs very probably accepted the cohabitation of
three communities if it had not been for the
declaration. The Islamic declaration made on the
formation of an Islamic state in 1986 and which was
incorporated into the political programme.
And the demographers have made projections that in
less than 22 years the Muslims will be a majority of
over 50%. And the Serbs, who are the oldest people,
have no wish to find themselves in the situation of a
minority.»
The point was made that prisoners of war exchanges
were important, and they were asked if people who were
exchanged would be allowed back to their original
villages.
When we insist on not calling it [Trnopolje] a camp
it is because the Serbs from here know very well what a
concentration camp is, particularly on the other side.»
The conclusions to be drawn from what we have seen is
that the Muslim population is not wanted, and is being
systematically kicked out by whatever method is
available.
I know that a bloody war is right in front of us and
that is why I still only know this.»
A. Evictions
B. Persecution of individuals
«In early June 1992, he was walking on a street in
Prijedor town as a private car stopped and three or
four military men jumped out and took him with them in
the car to the military barracks near the airport.
There he was left in the car for about ten minutes
before he was taken to Keraterm. In Keraterm - or
actually in an office just across the street from the
camp, an office used in relation to road repairs - he
was kept an eye on by a guard as he was waiting. A
Muslim colleague of his was also brought in. A Serbian
inspector together with a judge, and another man
questioned them. [The three Serbs are identified, but
their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons.] The Serbs then let the Muslims
go without having mistreated them.
C. The non-Serbs as de facto outlaws
D. A climate conducive to the departure of non-Serbs
X. Deportations
A. From Logor Trnopolje and other detention areas
B. Deportations by rail
«Please try to come here. There is a lot of killing.
They are shipping Muslim people through Banja Luka in
cattle cars. Last night there were 25 train wagons for
cattle crowded with women, old people and children.
They were so frightened. You could see their hands
through the openings. We were not allowed to come
close. Can you imagine that? It's like Jews being
sent to Auschwitz. In the name of humanity, please
come.» *37
C. Deportations by road
«Forced and unprotected massive transfers of the
population to central Bosnia-Herzegovina are totally
unacceptable and cannot go on. Too many civilians,
while forced to cross the front lines on foot, have
already been killed either in the crossfire of
combatants, as there is no cease-fire, or deliberately
by snipers.»
D. Property rights and re-entry to Opstina Prijedor
«Delic said that 'approximately 50,000 residents of
other nationalities had lived in this district, and
their assets were unofficially estimated at several
billions DEM. Some of the assets were destroyed during
military operations, but at large they were preserved -
although only for a short period of time. By various
machinations, the whims of individual members of the
local police, army and civilian authorities, and the
governing political party - the largest part of the . .
. »preserved assets« disappeared. . . .
While carrying out their tasks at their stations and
in the field, military and civilian police and citizens
confiscated large quantities of goods, motor vehicles
[e.g. the Kozarac area alone had some 4,700 private
cars], cab units, trucks, agricultural vehicles, and
various technical equipment and other devices, and
handed them over to the units that the above-mentioned
governmental bodies established for this particular
purpose (Keraterm, TZS, Velepromet, and other
storehouses). It may be stated with certainty that
those storehouses have been emptied in a short time,
and that the greater part of the resources have either
been transferred to Serbia through private agents, or
have been expropriated by private individuals.'» *38
«tens of electric motors, assembly lines and other
valuable objects have disappeared from the workshops of
the Ljubija mine and other Prijedor enterprises. . . .
We must ask ourselves how these enterprises are to
continue their work once the situation settles down.
6,000 heads of cattle have been stolen and transferred
to Sremska Mitrovica and Sid [both in Serbia proper].
. . .
. . . large quantities of sawn lumber from the
Kozarac saw-mill have been taken across the Republic's
borders under mysterious circumstances, while the
Kozara forest has been mercilessly destroyed. Somebody
will have to answer for the disappearance of certain
gang mills and other equipment from the local saw-
mills.» *40
«Article 11 Validity of documents
(1) Any document, including a document renouncing
or transferring property rights, assets or
claims, signed by a prisoner who is to be
released or transferred has no legal validity
and does not in any way affect that
prisoner's rights or obligations.
(2) Paragraph (1) is also applicable to documents
signed by civilians to be transferred to an
area other than their area of former
residence.»
«What enormous task was undertaken in the
administrative-legal service [by the Public Security
Service, the SJB, see Chapter V.A. supra] is seen from
the fact that departure was orderly registered for more
than 20,000 citizens of Muslim and Croatian
nationality, due to emigration [or removal]. When
German TV came in order to prove that we force Muslims
and Croats to leave, we presented them with more than
20,000 visas, guarantees and requests for voluntary
emigration for economic reasons.» *41
XI. Destruction of culture
A. Material destruction of cultural property
B. Destruction of immaterial expressions of culture
XII. Finalizing the main phase of the catastrophe
«The Serbian side energetically denies the existence of
camps for civilians anywhere in the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Hercegovina. There are some prisons for war
prisoners established according to law and which the
Serbian side always offered for exchange.»
A. Closing of the concentration camps
«Four days after our visit to Trnopolje, the fence came
down and the authorities had painted a sign above the
entrance in English, for the benefit of the descending
television circus, reading: 'Trnopolje Open Reception
Centre'. But the armed guards and the beatings and the
atrocious conditions continued.» *43
«The conditions are terrible [in Logor Trnopolje], but
it is a little safer. There was terrible shooting and
bombing in the village, and we had no food. Here, we
have no idea what status we have. We are refugees, but
there are guards; and barbed wire. But it is safer
than at home.» *44
B. Exchange of prisoners or extermination?
«Then there is a fourth category: 'Hostages?' answers
Mrs. Balban [who translated for the Serbian regime in
Logor Omarska], 'of course we have hostages, people for
exchange. We have been offering them since the
beginning of the war, but the other side does not want
to trade.'» *45
C. Transfer of prisoners to Logor Manjaca
D. Executions on the Vlasic Mountain
E. Evacuation by international agencies
«From my point of view, it is better to help with the
removals. The people should be enabled to live where
they want to live. They should not be forced to stay
if they do not feel themselves safe. In any case, it
is better to keep people alive than do nothing in order
to avoid accusations of ethnic cleansing.»
XIII. The subsequent overall situation
«Due to the actions of war, the participation of the
authorized workers and their preventive-repressive
activity had a much weaker intensity than during the
years before. Thus were submitted 622 cases of
criminal persecution. At check points were controlled
61,290 cars and 72,550 passengers. Due to suspicion
that they originate from criminal acts, 19 motor
vehicles were confiscated and a large number of things,
and all this was orderly handed over to the Opstina
commission and stored in the firms Velepromet or
Bosnamontaza. About the later fate of the confiscated
things and cars, evidence may be given by the legal
authorities of the Opstina organs.
In the past period were registered 792 criminal
acts: 776 from the general criminal code and 16
economic criminal acts. The cleared up criminal acts
were committed by 261 person (220 adults and 31 under
age), and 22 returnees were registered. Of all 792
registered criminal acts, 250 of them were totally
cleared up, while 442 criminal acts remained uncleared
(due to unknown identity [of the perpetrators]).
A typical activity of the SJB [the Public Security
Service, see Chapter V.A. supra] and its operative
workers was fighting illegal trade with foreign
currency. 25 cases of currency criminality were raised
against 31 persons. Besides 28 smugglers of food taken
from Agrokomerc - the food was handed over to the
Opstina and stored in Velepromet - [arrested], the
following was confiscated and deposited at the Agriprom
bank of Banja Luka, Prijedor branch: 1,032,150 dinars,
DEM 10,580, ATS 9,720, ITL 2,000, CHF 32, BEF 200, USD
400, and in the coffers of the CSB Banja Luka 3,011,730
dinars RS [Republika Srpska, i.e. the Serbian
Republic], 129,700 dinars RSK [Republika Srpske Krajine
i.e. the Republic of Serbian Krajina], DEM 7,900, ATS
4,400, FRF 500, CHF 410, USD 290, and in the National
Bank of Banja Luka large quantities of gold and
jewellery.
On the territory of Prijedor, the SJB has registered
58 murders, the victims of which were 23 Serbs, 9
Croats and 20 Muslims, and in 6 cases the victims are
unknown. 31 of these cases were totally cleared up by
the SJB, and 18 cases were handed over to the
prosecutor in Prijedor, 13 cases to the military
authorities, 6 cases put ad acta, and 22 cases are
still under investigation. Most of these criminal acts
were committed while military actions were taking place
in the areas where they were committed. Officials of
the SJB intervened 1,097 times due to different causes
(disturbance of public order).
. . .
In spite of the documented work done by the workers
of the SJB Prijedor, it is normal that more could have
been done and better. I am satisfied that I leave
behind workers - professionals who know how to do their
job, they should just be allowed to do it. Political
conditions and war normally hinder professionals from
doing their job properly. Also among the police there
were profiteers, thieves and cowards, an indicative
sign is that so far 130 have been fired.» *46
A. Violence
B. Evictions
C. No legal protection
D. Forced labour
«Working obligation subjects must be assigned on duties
and tasks in accordance with their psycho-physical
abilities, professional qualifications and necessities
of the work and production.»
E. Continued detention?
F. Reprisals
G. Total evacuation of the non-Serbs?
«Two Muslim villages and a Gypsy one near Prijedor,
with a collective population of nearly 1,000 people,
have approached the UNHCR [the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees] office in Banja Luka to
request evacuation.» *47
The victims' names are not disclosed for confidentiality or
prosecutorial reasons.
«The plight of civilian minority groups in northern
Bosnia is a source of grave concern to the ICRC, which
has made repeated representations on the subject to the
relevant authorities, especially after a deterioration
of the situation in the town of Sipovo, south of Banja
Luka, in early March. Despite the guarantees about the
safety of minorities given to the ICRC by the highest
authorities, about 20 civilians belonging to minority
groups were killed in Prijedor on 29 and 30 March.
This compelled the ICRC to consider evacuating all
those who so wished, as a last resort to save their
lives.
The ICRC has therefore requested to be allowed to
transfer, in satisfactory conditions of security, all
those wishing to be evacuated. After an initial
favourable response from the Bosnian Serb authorities,
conditions were imposed on the ICRC that rendered the
evacuation unfeasible.
The ICRC is continuing its representation to the
Bosnian Serb authorities, asking them to take urgent
practical measures to guarantee the safety of Muslims
and Croats in the region and to convince these
minorities that they can remain safely in their homes.
At the same time, the ICRC is pursuing its efforts to
deploy delegates in Prijedor and facilitate the
transfer of persons wishing to leave the town.» *48
XIV. Endnote
Part Three
The lawI. Crimes against humanity
A. The Statute of the ICTFY
B. Armed conflict
C. Protected persons
«The defendant contends that steeling the personal
property of Jews and other concentration camp inmates
is not a crime against humanity. But under the
circumstances which we have here related [emphasis
added], this plea is and must be rejected. What was
done was done pursuant to a government policy, and the
thefts were part of a program of extermination and were
one of its objectives. It would be a strange doctrine
indeed, if, where part of the plan and one of the
objectives of murder was to obtain the property of the
victim, even to the extent of using the hair from his
head and the gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took
part in disposing of the loot must be exonerated and
held not guilty as a participant in the murder plan.
Without doubt all such acts are crimes against humanity
and he who participates or plays a consenting part
therein is guilty of a crime against humanity.» *51
D. Acts constituting crimes against humanity
E. Widespread and systematic
II. Genocide
A. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
B. The extent of destruction of a group
«'In part' would seem to imply a reasonably significant
number, relative to the total of the group as a whole,
or else a significant section of a group such as its
leadership. . . . considerations of both proportionate
scale and of total numbers are relevant.» *55
C. The groups protected
D. Intent
E. Acts constituting the crime of genocide
F. Punishable acts
G. Culpability
H. The Statute of the ICTFY