Source: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm
Accessed 16 May 2000

REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

15 DECEMBER 1999

Part IV

Part I   Part Ia  Part II  Part III  Part V

Annex I: Chronology of Events (October 1993 Ė July 1994)

1993

October 5: The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 872 (1993), which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a six-month period. This resolution was the response to the Secretary-Generalís proposal of 24 September 1993 (S/26488) that requested the establishment of UNAMIR with a peacekeeping force of 2,548 military personnel (including two infantry battalions). But the Security Council only authorised the deployment of one infantry battalion.

Resolution 872 also approved the Secretary-Generalís proposal that the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), established by Security Council resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June, should be integrated into UNAMIR.

The UNAMIR was assigned the following mandate: a) to contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, inter alia, within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city; b) to monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarised zone and other demilitarisation procedures; c) to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional governmentís mandate, leading up to the elections; d) to assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes; e) to investigate at the request of the parties, or on its own initiative, instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, and to pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General; f) to monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner; g) to assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations; and h) to investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.

October 21: In a military coup in Burundi, Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye, who was elected on 1 June 1993, was killed. Tens of thousands were killed and up to 600,000 refugees (including 375,000 into Rwanda) fled into neighbouring countries.

The Hutu extremists in Rwanda claimed that the coup in Burundi proved that Tutsi were reluctant to share power with Hutu.

October 22: UNAMIRís Force Commander, Brigadier-General Romeo A. Dallaire of Canada, arrived in the capital city of Kigali.

October 27: An advance party of 21 military personnel of UNAMIR arrived in Kigali.

November 1: The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II) was integrated into UNAMIR.

November 7: The Military Observer Group, consisting of elements of the advanced party of UNAMIR and NMOG II, became operational. The Group monitored the situation of the southern border of Rwanda following the coup in Burundi.

November 23: The Secretary-Generalís Special Representative, Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh of Cameroon, arrived in Kigali.

Dallaire sent Headquarters a draft set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNAMIR, seeking the approval of the Secretariat.

November: The Secretary-General, in his report of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), noted that some 60 civilians were brutally killed in the two separate incidents taking place in the vicinity of Ruhengeri during the month of November.

December 7: Massive flow of Burundese refugees into Rwanda and allegations of cross-border military movement along the Rwanda-Burundi border limited the operations of the Military Observer Group. The Secretary-General instructed Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr James O. C. Jonah, who was in Burundi to attend the funeral of President Ndadaye, to visit the southern border area of Rwanda and assess the situation.

Jonah also visited Kigali and discussed the Burundese crisis with the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana. In this meeting, Jonah warned the President that he had information that killings of the opposition were being planned, and that the United Nations would not stand for this.

December 10: Booh Booh convened a meeting between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF in Kinihira, 80 kilometres from Kigali, at which the two sides had agreed to set up the Broad-based Transitional Government (BBTG) by 31 December 1993 (The original target date of establishing a transitional government was 10 September 1993, according to the Arusha Peace Agreement, which was signed by Habyarimana and Alexis Kanyarengwe, the leader of the RPF, on 4 August 1993).

December 15: The UNAMIR deployment of Kigali was completed.

French troops, who had been stationed in Rwanda since 5 October 1990 in response to the invasion of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) from southern Uganda to Rwanda on 1 October 1990, withdrew from the country.

December 20: Security Council resolution 891 (1993) extended the mandate of UNOMUR for another six months from 22 December 1993 to 21 June 1994.

December 22: The KWSA agreement was approved by all of the parties.

December 24: The KWSA was established in and around Kigali.

December 27: Phase 1 of the UNAMIR deployment proceeded as scheduled, consisting of a total of 1,260 military personnel drawn from 19 countries, i.a., Austria (5), Bangladesh (564), Belgium (424), Botswana (9), Brazil (13), Canada (2), the Congo (25), Fiji (1), Ghana (37), Hungary (4), Mali (10), the Netherlands (10), Poland (5), Senegal (39), Slovakia (5), Togo (15), Tunisia (61), Uruguay (21) and Zimbabwe (10). These figures included the 81 military observers serving with UNOMUR.

By the end of phase 1, the operation was to number 1,428 military personnel.

December 28: UNAMIR accompanied 600 RPF troops to Kigali (called Operation Clean Corridor). An RPF battalion was installed at the Conseil Nationale de Developpement (CND) complex in Kigali in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. The RPF was expected to participate in the establishment of the BBTG.

December 30: In his report on UNAMIR (S/26927), the Secretary-General stressed that the situation remained unstable in Rwanda and urged the Security Council to authorise an early deployment of the second infantry battalion.

December 31: The Government of Rwanda and the RPF failed to establish the BBTG. The security situation in Rwanda continually deteriorated.

1993 December Ė 1994 March: UNAMIR had often witnessed inflammatory broadcasts by Radio-Television TV Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) which was set up with the assistance of Mr Felicien Kabuga, the father-in-law of a son of President Habyarimana, and the Akazu, the Presidentís inner circle. The RTLM had broadcast that the RPF had returned to restore Tutsi hegemony, labelling all Tutsi as RPF supporters and exhorting Hutu peasants to decapitate Tutsi.

1994

January 1: Rwanda became a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

January 6: The Security Council adopted resolution 893 (1994), approving deployment of the second infantry battalion to the De-militarised Zone (DMZ) and requesting UNAMIR to continue its assistance to the peace process in Rwanda. The Security Council stressed that its continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the two warring partiesí full and prompt implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The Secretary-General was requested to monitor the size and cost of the mission to seek economies.

In Kigali, Booh Booh and Dallaire met Habyarimana to urge him to be flexible in finding a solution to the deadlock of establishing the BBTG. In this meeting, Dallaire informed the President that he was informed that weapons were being distributed by the Presidentís supporters.

January 7: Booh Booh met with the RPF leaders and urged them to work actively for the installation of the BBTG.

January 11: There was an exchange of cables between UNAMIR and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Dallaire sent a cable to the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General at Headquarters, Major-General J. Maurice Baril, informing that a Hutu informant, a top level trainer in the cadre of Interahamwe (the largest and most deadly Hutu militia who were recruited from the youth wing of the Presidentís party, Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement, MRND), had told him that Interahamwe were registering all Tutsi in Kigali and planning to exterminate them. The informant also said that a number of Belgian soldiers were to be killed in order to guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda. In this cable, Dallaire said he intended to take action to raid the extremistsí arms cache.

The first response from Headquarters to UNAMIR was sent on the evening of 10 January New York time. It was a code cable from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr Kofi Annan (which was signed off by Assistant Secretary-General for DPKO, Mr Iqbal Riza), to Booh Booh. In this cable, Annan requested Booh Boohís considered assessment and recommendations, but said "No reconnaissance or other action, including response to request for protection, should be taken by UNAMIR until clear guidance is received from Headquarters."

Booh Booh replied to Annan in a cable also dated 11 January, describing a meeting which Dallaire and the political adviser to Booh Booh, Dr Abdula Kabia, had had with the Prime Minister Designate, Mr Faustin Twagiramungu, who expressed his total confidence in the informant.

Later the same day, Annan sent a reply cable (signed off by Riza) to Booh Booh and Dallaire, instructing them to immediately inform Habyarimana of the activities of the Interahamwe militia and make demarche to him. They were also instructed to meet the Ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United States in Kigali before their meeting with the President to ask them to consider making similar demarches.

January 12: As instructed by Headquarters, Booh Booh and Dallaire met with Representatives of the three countries, who had expressed serious concern and had said that they would consult with their capitals.

Booh Booh and Dallaire then met with the President and conveyed the message as instructed. In his cable to Annan, dated 13 January, Booh Booh said that the President had appeared alarmed by the tone of the demarche. He had denied knowledge of the activities of the militia and had promised to investigate.

Booh Booh and Dallaire also met with the President and National Secretary of the MRND, who both denied that their Party militia was involved in the alleged activities. Booh Booh and Dallaire urged them to investigate and to report back to UNAMIR as early as possible.

January 14: The Secretary-General in Geneva telephoned Booh Booh, asking to meet Habyarimana and convey the Secretary-Generalís concern over the deterioration of the situation in Rwanda and the prolonged delay in the setting up of the BBTG. Booh Booh informed the Secretary-General of his efforts of finding a solution in cooperation with four Ambassadors from the United States, France, Belgium and Tanzania.

Habyarimana telephoned the Secretary-General. The President said that he had received the four Ambassadors and Booh Booh and needed both the Ambassadorsí and Booh Boohís support in order to impose a solution on the parties. In this phone conversation, the Secretary-General asked the President to do his best to resolve the problem.

January 27: The Secretary-General sent a letter to Habyarimana to express concern over delays in establishing a transitional government and national assembly in Rwanda.

February 2: In a cable to Annan and Jonah, Booh Booh noted that the security situation had deteriorated significantly and made clear that the President never informed UNAMIR of any follow-up to the information he was confronted with on 12 January. Booh Booh also requested Headquarters for prompt arms recovery operation, warning that if the arms continued to be distributed, UNAMIR would be unable to carry out its mandate.

February 7, 10, and 13: Booh Booh convened a series of all-party meetings at the UNAMIR headquarters, at which a new deadline of 14 February was fixed for setting up the BBTG.

February 10: The Senior Political Adviser and Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Security Council, Mr Chinmaya Gharekhan, informed the Council that the failure of setting up of the BBTG had created a deterioration of Rwandaís security and economic situation.

February 14: The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr Willy Claes, sent a letter to the Secretary-General, expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda might impede UNAMIRís capacity to fulfil its mandate. In this letter, Claes argued in favour of a stronger mandate for UNAMIR.

February 15: In a meeting with representatives of France, the United States, Belgium and Germany, Booh Booh and Dallaire reiterated their concern about the worsening security situation.

February 17: In a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/8), the President of the Security Council expressed deep concern about the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda, reminded parties of their obligation to respect he KWSA, and called for the prompt installation of the BBTG.

February 18: The 14 February target date for the installation of the transitional institutions was reset for a new deadline of 22 February.

February 19: The Security Councilís presidential statement of February 17 was handed over to Habyarimana.

February 21-22: Tensions rose throughout the country as Minister of Public Works and Secretary of the Parti Social Democrate (PSD), Mr Felicien Gatabazi, and the President of the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), Mr Martin Bucyana, were killed. The PSD was the second largest of the main opposition parties. The CDR was an extremist party which initially supported Habyarimana, but went into opposition when it found him too moderate.

February 23: In his cable to Headquarters, Dallaire said that information regarding weapons distribution, death squad target lists, planning of civil unrest and demonstrations abounded.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Special Representative, Mr Michel Moussali, called for action to restore stability in Rwanda, warning of possible "bloodbath of unparalleled proportions."

February 24: The Secretary-General telephoned Habyarimana and stressed the need for urgent action to break the political deadlock and for the establishment of the transitional institutions.

February 28: With the increasingly deteriorated security situation in Kigali, UNAMIR redeployed 200 troops to Kigali from the Ghanaian battalion stationed in the northern DMZ.

March 1: The Secretary-General received a special envoy of Habyarimana, the Minister for Transport and communications, Mr Andre Ntagerura. In this meeting, the Secretary-General warned that the United Nations would withdraw UNAMIR unless progress was achieved in Rwanda.

March 22: The number of UNAMIR troops reached 2,539 from 24 participant countries including 440 Belgians, 843 Ghanaians and 942 Bangladeshis.

March 30: The Secretary-Generalís report to the Security Council (S/1994/360) expressed serious concern over the deterioration of the security situation in Rwanda, and especially in Kigali. He requested an extension of the mandate of UNAMIR for a period of six months.

April 5: The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 909 (1994), extending the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress would be made in the installation of the BBTG. The Security Council recalled that continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Agreement. The Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies.

April 6: At approximately 20.30, Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntariyamira of Burundi, who were returning from a regional summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were killed in a plane crash just outside the Kigali airport.

Within an hour of the plane crash, roadblocks were set up at many streets in Kigali and the killings started, initiated by the Interahamwe militia and the Impuzamugbmi (Hutu militia drawn from the youth wing of the CDR) and the units of the Presidential Guards. The first target for elimination was political leaders.

The UNAMIR patrol had been sent to investigate the crash, but was stopped on the way by the Presidential Guards. At 22.10, Dallaire telephoned Riza to brief him on the situation.

April 7: Early in the morning, the number of the guards in the residence of the Prime Minister, Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, was increased with a group of soldiers dispatched from the airport to the residence of the Prime Minister.

The RTLM broadcast that the RPF and a contingent of United Nations forces were responsible for the crash of the presidential plane.

During the morning, the Prime Minister sought refuge at the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) compound in Kigali, but members of the Presidential Guards broke into the compound and shot the Prime Minister.

10 UNAMIR Belgian peacekeepers, who were assigned to protect her, were tortured and murdered.

Gharekhan made an oral report to the Security Council about the serious situation and implications for the civilian population.

The Security Councilís presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/16) condemned all the acts of violence in Rwanda and urged the Rwandese security forces and military and paramilitary units to stop violence and to cooperate fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate.

April 8: The so-called Interim Government was established. The RPF rejected its authority, declaring that it was the old government in another form.

RPF units in the DMZ moved into Kigali. UNAMIR attempted to secure a cease-fire and protect civilian populations and United Nations personnel.

The Secretary-General sent a letter from Geneva to the President of the Security Council, informing him that UNAMIR had put intensive efforts into securing agreement on a cease-fire in Kigali and promoting the establishment of an interim political authority to fill the current vacuum. He was also concerned about the safety and security of the civilian population and of the foreign nationals living in Rwanda as well as of UNAMIR and other members of United Nations staff.

April 8-9: Six hundred French soldiers arrived in Kigali in order to evacuate expatriates and other nationals.

April 9: In a cable to Booh Booh and Dallaire, Annan instructed them to cooperate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the evacuation of foreign nationals.

Riza briefed the Security Council on widespread fighting and disorder in Rwanda.

April 10: Belgian paratroopers arrived in Kigali and conducted Operation Silver Back to rescue citizens and other expatriates.

April 11: After the expatriates had been evacuated, the Belgian UNAMIR forces, which were stationed at the Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO) at Kicukiro, left. At that time, up to 2,000 civilians had sought refuge at ETO.

Riza again informed the Security Council that the situation continued to deteriorate and that the fighting had intensified. Riza also advised the Council that the RPF demanded that all foreign troops promptly leave Rwanda.

April 12: As fighting between the government forces and the RPF intensified, the so-called Interim Government moved from Kigali to Gitarama, 40 kilometres south-west of Kigali.

The Secretary-General had a meeting with the Belgian Foreign Minister, Claes, in Bonn. In this meeting, Claes recommended the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda, informing the Secretary-General of the Belgian decision to withdraw its units from Rwanda.

April 13: The Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, informing him about the Belgian position. In this letter, the Secretary-General assessed that the Belgian withdrawal would make the effective operations of UNAMIR extremely difficult and such situations might necessitate the withdrawal of UNAMIR.

Nigeria presented a draft resolution, on behalf of the Non Aligned (NAM) Caucus, calling for expanding the size and mandate of UNAMIR. Nigeria stressed that the concern of the Security Council should not be limited to the security of United Nations personnel and foreigners but should also include the innocent civilians of Rwanda.

The RPF Representative at the United Nations, Mr Claude Dusaidi, in his letter to the President of the Security Council, said that "a crime of genocide" had been committed against the Rwandan people in the presence of a United Nations International force. He requested the Council to immediately set up a United Nations war crimes tribunal and apprehend those responsible for the massacres.

DPKO presented two alternatives based on the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR, sending them to UNAMIR for its comments and to the Secretary-General, who was visiting Madrid, for his approval. The first option was to retain a reduced UNAMIR after departure of the Belgian battalion, while the second was an immediate reduction of UNAMIR, simultaneously with the Belgian withdrawal, to a functional political nucleus with some protection for troops (a total of 200-250 all ranks and civilian staff).

Dallaire responded expressing support for the first option. In a separate cable, Dallaire made clear the calamitous consequences of the Belgian withdrawal.

Gharekhan informed Annan about the Secretary-Generalís preference for the first option.

April 14: The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr Alvaro de Soto, informed the Security Council that the Secretary-Generalís letter to the President of the Security Council, dated 13 April, was not intended to withdraw UNAMIR.

Riza made an oral presentation to the Council about the Secretary-Generalís options. A combination of the two options elaborated by DPKO on 13 April was mentioned as the Secretary-Generalís own preferred option.

The Belgian contingent began to withdraw from UNAMIR.

After rescuing up to 1,361 persons, including some 450 French nationals and 178 Rwandan officials and their families such as the widow and close associates of Habyarimana, the last French troops left Rwanda.

April 15: Claes reiterated in a letter to the Security Council his recommendation that UNAMIR be suspended.

April 19: As Belgium flew out the last of its United Nations forces, UNAMIRís troops strength was reduced from 2,165 to 1,515, and the number of military observers from 321 to 190.

April 20: The Secretary-General submitted a report (S/1994/470) to the Security Council with three options:

i) Immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR to stop the fighting and the massacres, requiring several thousand additional troops and enforcement powers under Chapter VII.

ii) Downsizing of UNAMIR (to 270 all ranks), acting as an intermediary between the parties and seek a cease-fire.

iii) Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

The Secretary Generalís spokesman announced that the Secretary-General preferred the first option and did not favour the third one.

April 21: The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 912 (1994), adjusting UNAMIRís mandate and deciding to reduce the number of UNAMIR to 270 from 2,539 troops.

April 23: The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Peter Hansen, led a team into Kigali to evaluate overall needs and to set priorities. Part of the team remained in Kigali to establish an advance humanitarian assistance office.

April 28: In the Security Council, Nigerian Ambassador Ibrahim A. Gambari stated that the discussion of Security Council on Rwanda in April 1994 had little to do with civilian massacres, but focussed on a cease-fire.

April 29: The Secretary-Generalís letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/518) urged the Council to re-examine its resolution of April 21, stressing that the revised mandate did not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres.

April 30, The Security Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/21), condemning the slaughter of civilians in Rwanda, but the term "genocide" was not used in this statement.

The Secretary-General wrote to a number of African Heads of State to request them to provide troops. He also asked the Secretary-General of the OAU to support his request.

May 2: The Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations, Ambassador Jean-Damascene Bizimana, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/531), urging the strengthening of UNAMIR to ensure respect for the cease-fire and stabilise the situation in Rwanda.

May 3: Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) which set strict conditions on the U. S. support for any future United Nations peacekeeping operation.

May 4: According to the United Nations Blue Book, the Secretary-General, in an interview with the United States television news programme Nightline, said, "Here you have a real genocide, in Kigali."

May 6: The President of the Security Council sent a letter to the Secretary-General (S/1994/546), requesting that he provide contingency plans for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and support for displaced persons in Rwanda.

May 9: In response to the letter on 6 May 1994 by the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General handed-over a non-paper to the Council on the future of UNAMIR. This non-paper proposed the expansion of UNAMIR to at least 5,500 troops.

May 11: The Security Council held informal consultations on the Secretary-Generalís non-paper, at which Gharekhan briefed the members of the Council on the latest developments in Rwanda. He indicated that Booh Booh and Dallaire had been asked to discuss the non-paper with the government of Rwanda and the RPF and to seek their concurrence to it.

May 11-12: The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, visited Rwanda to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during the conflict, as well as spoke both to representatives of the so-called Interim Government and the RPF.

May 13: The Secretary-General submitted a formal report (S/1994/565) to the Security Council with the same proposal he raised in the non-paper of 11 May 1994.

May 16: The Secretary-General met with Gharekhan and key Secretariat officals, including Annan and Under-Secretary-General for Department of Political Affairs, Mr Marrack Goulding, to discuss developments in Rwanda.

The Secretary-General issued a press statement, reaffirming his support for Booh Booh who had been facing accusations of partiality from the RPF.

May 17: The Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), expanding UNAMIR to a maximum of 5,500 military personnel and creating and mandating UNAMIR II to conduct a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation for humanitarian reasons (to protect displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk and to support relief efforts in Rwanda).

Resolution 918 also strongly urged all parties to cease any incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence or ethnic hatred. In addition, this resolution imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.

Mid-May: UNHCR opened a Kigali office to monitor the return of refugees and provide them with direct assistance.

May 18: The Secretary-General wrote to several African Heads of State and Government, requesting troops for UNAMIR II.

May 19: Ayala Lassoís report to the Commission on Human Rights was published. In his report, Ayala Lasso proposed the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Rwanda, assisted by human rights monitors.

May 20: Annan forwarded a request from the Secretary-General to Booh Booh that the Special Representative base himself in Nairobi for the following weeks and seek the support of the governments in the region.

May 21: The RPF captured the Kigali airport and refused to relinquish its control to UNAMIR II as called for in resolution 918.

May 22-27: The Secretary-General sent Riza and Baril to Rwanda. Their special mission was to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire, to ascertain from them their views on and intentions towards the implementation of resolution 918, and to review with the UNAMIR the modalities of the concept of operations outlined in the Secretary-Generalís report of 13 May 1994.

While the special mission was in Rwanda, Booh Booh, based in Nairobi, was visiting other countries in the region to obtain their contribution of troops for UNAMIRís expanded mandate established by resolution 918.

May 25: The Secretary-General, at a press conference at Headquarters, called the killings in Rwanda a genocide (SG/SM/5297/Rev.1).

The Commission on Human Rights appointed Mr Rene Degni-Segui as a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Rwanda and called upon all warring parties to cease immediately all human rights violations.

May 31: The Secretary-General reported to the Council on the special mission by Riza and Baril, recommending that the Council authorise the expanded UNAMIR mandate for an initial period of six months (S/1994/640). This report formally included the word "genocide."

June 3: The RPF wrote a letter to the Secretary-General, responding positively to the reference to genocide in the Secretary-Generalís report of 31 May, and calling on the Security Council to declare that the atrocities were a genocide. The RPF letter also called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution endorsing the jamming or destruction of radio RTLM and to take measures to suspend Rwanda from the Security Council.

June 8: The Security Council adopted resolution 925 (1994), extending the UNAMIR mandate from 29 July 1994 until 9 December 1994 and endorsing the immediate deployment of the two additional battalions.

Resolution 925 also requested the Secretary-General to ensure that UNAMIRís close cooperation with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office, and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights.

June 9-20: The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Degni-Segui, conducted his first field mission to Rwanda and neighbouring countries to investigate violations of human rights, particularly crimes against humanity and genocide.

June 16: The Secretary-General reported UNOMURís activities for the period from 22 December 1993 to 21 June 1994, recommending that its mandate be extended for three months until 21 September 1994 (S/1994/715).

June 18: UNAMIR consisted of a total force of 503 all ranks (354 troops, 25 military staff personnel and 124 military observers) under Dallaireís command.

June 19: In a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/728), the Secretary-General stressed the need to halt the genocide, secure a cease-fire and resume the Arusha Agreement. He also suggested that the Council consider the offer of the French government to undertake a French-led multinational operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda until UNAMIR was brought up to strength.

June 20: Dallaire sent Annan a cable entitled, "An Assessment of the Proposed French-led Initiative in the Rwandese Crisis." In this cable, Dallaire raised several potential issues of concern regarding the proposed Operation Turquoise.

The Security Council adopted resolution 928 (1994), extending UNOMURís mandate to 21 September 1994 and providing for the mission to be phased out by that date.

June 21: The Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Mr Jean-Bernard Merimee, sent a letter to the Secretary-General (S/1994/734), requesting adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations as a legal framework for the deployment of a multinational force to maintain a presence in Rwanda until the expanded UNAMIR was deployed.

Dallaire decided to evacuate 42 peacekeepers from Congo, Senegal and Togo and to replace them with United Nations personnel from Nairobi, due to the RPFís negative reactions caused by their participation in Operation Turquoise.

June 22: The Secretary-General participated in informal consultations and argued in favour of an urgent decision to authorise the French-led multinational operation.

Later that day, the Security Council adopted resolution 929 (1994), authorising Member States to conduct a multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR was brought up to strength. The vote resulting in 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan)

On this day, French and Senegalese forces began Operation Turquoise.

June 30: The report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights recommended either the creation of an international court to try those responsible for the massacres in Rwanda or an extension to the mandate for the international tribunal dealing with crimes committed in former-Yugoslavia.

Late June: Rwandese government forces weakened as the RPF intensified its offensive to take control of Kigali and to seize other government-controlled areas between Kigali and the border with Zaire.

July 1: The Security Council resolution 935 (1994) requested the Secretary-General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information on the violations of international humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in Rwanda.

The Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations sent a letter to the Secretary-General to inform of the French governmentís intention to establish a safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in south-west Rwanda.

July 2: The Secretary-General transmitted the letter of the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/798).

July 3: A confrontation occurred between the RPF members and French forces attached to Operation Turquoise.

July 4: The newly appointed Special Representative, Mr Mohamed Shahryar Khan of Pakistan, who succeeded Booh Booh, arrived in Kigali.

The RPF forces captured Kigali.

July 6: The Security Council discussed the intention of the French letter of 1 July to create the zone in informal consultations where several delegations raised questions about the nature of the proposal. No formal response by the Security Council was given to the French letter.

July 9: Operation Turquoise troops began deployment into the humanitarian protection zone in south-west Rwanda.

By early July, Operation Turquoise troops consisted of 2,330 French soldiers and 32 Senegalese.

July 14: The RPF gained control of the so-called Interim Governmentís stronghold at Ruhengeri, the main town in north Rwanda, causing a massive exodus of Rwandan Hutu.

The Security Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/34), expressing alarm over massive refugee exodus and demanding an immediate cease-fire and the resumption of the political process in the framework of the Arusha Agreement.

July 17: Gisenyi, the last bastion of the government forces, fell to the RPF. The United nations Rwanda Emergency Office Liaison in Goma, Zaire, reported that over a million Rwandese had crossed into Zaire. Concern was expressed that a further outflow might follow from the Humanitarian Protection Zone under Operation Turquoise.

July 18: The RPF had gained control over the whole of Rwanda except the Humanitarian Protection Zone controlled by Operation Turquoise. The RPF unilaterally declared a cease-fire.

July 19: In Kigali, the Government of National Unity was sworn in for a transitional period set at five years, with Mr Pasteur Bizimungu as President and Major-General Paul Kagame as Vice-President, and Mr Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister.

July 22: The Secretary-General launched the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for victims of the crisis in Rwanda.

July 26: The Secretary-Generalís report on the establishment of the Commission of Experts on Rwanda (S/1994/879) was submitted, pursuant to resolution 935 (1994), to the Security Council.

July 29-31: Degni-Segui made his second visit to Rwanda to investigate the situation since his previous visit in June. He urged the deployment of field experts to help in Rwandaís reconstruction and the return of refugees to their homes.

July 31: France began to withdraw Operation Turquoise troops.

Part I   Part Ia  Part II  Part III  Part V

Document compiled by Dr S D Stein
Last update 16/05/2000
Stuart.Stein@uwe.ac.uk
©S D Stein

ESS Home Page
Holocaust Index Page
Genocide Index Page