Judgment in the Trial of Adolf Eichmann 

[Part 11]

98. Outside the Reich, the RSHA, and within it the Accused's Section, acted through the medium of "Advisers on Jewish Affairs" attached to Commanders of the Security Police (BdS) or to local diplomatic representatives, or within a similar administrative framework, as explained by the Accused on page 151 et seq. of his Statement T/37.  In spite of the fact that these Advisers were subordinate to the BdS or to the local diplomatic representative, they received their substantive orders from headquarters in Berlin, and especially from the Accused's Section, to which they were directly subordinate.  This is admitted by the Accused in his Statement, at p. 412, when asked about the status of these Advisers: 

"Q. ...They belonged to your Section IVB4? 

"A. They belonged to IVB4...as did all the others who handled Jewish affairs in the Secret State Police authorities, the Gestapostellen, if one can express it thus by way of comparison. 

"Q. Is it correct, that these representatives received directions for action in their territory from your Section, which was headed by you, and were later to report to you? 

"A. Yes." 

The accuracy of these facts was confirmed by the Accused when cross-examined by the Attorney General (Session 96, Vol. IV, pp. xxxx13-15). 

The administrative variations in the respective countries were insignificant, as the Accused says in his Statement, page 152: 

"Of course, all this cannot be brought to a common denominator; but - not in each country, but almost in each country - a small variation could be found in the administrative procedures." 

99. The technical implementation of the evacuations in the various countries did not differ much from that in the Reich.  The differences between one country and another were more connected with creating the preliminary conditions for evacuation, and these depended on various factors, for instance the extent of German domination over the country, collaboration or the contrary, the opposition of the government institutions, and the population of each country.  For instance, the help extended by the Dutch people to the persecuted Jews was considerable, and yet the losses borne by Dutch Jewry were exceedingly heavy because of the complete domination by the Germans over that country.  We do not intend to go into these matters at length.  Here, too, we shall follow our usual plan and point out, in connection with each country, only those matters which in our opinion are required for the evaluation of the Accused's responsibility. 

100. In Vichy France it was Abetz, Hitler's Ambassador, who first proposed measures against the Jews as early as August 1940.  But Heydrich, jealous of the authority of the RSHA, immediately demands that the Security Police unit in the country be brought in (T/388).  In fact, the handling of Jewish affairs is handed over to Advisers from the Accused's Section, first Dannecker, and then Roethke and Brunner.  The first document written by Dannecker, in T/389, is dated 28 January 1941 and contains a proposal to set up concentration camps for Jews of foreign nationality, of whom there were many in France.  Indeed, we see that in October 1941 over seven thousand Jews had already been placed in the concentration camps of Drancy, Pithiviers and BeauneÞla-Rolande, most of them stateless Jews.  In a memorandum dated 22 February 1942 (exhibit T/400), Dannecker describes the continuation of preparations for evacuation, with the help of the Judenpolizei of the Vichy Government and stresses the central role which he demands for himself in all activities against the Jews of France. 

On 11 June 1942, a consultation was held in the Accused's Section in Berlin, attended by the Advisers on Jewish Affairs in Paris, Brussels and The Hague.  It was decided that the evacuations would include 15,000 Jews from Holland, 10,000 from Belgium and 100,000 from France (including the unoccupied territory) - see T/419.  Dannecker prepares detailed instructions concerning the categories of Jews to be evacuated, and methods of carrying out the evacuation (T/425, dated 26 June 1942).  On 1 July 1942, a conversation takes place between the Accused and Dannecker, in which Himmler's order for the evacuation with all speed of all Jews from France is mentioned.  There will be no difficulty in implementing the evacuation in the occupied part of France, but when it comes to the unoccupied part, the Vichy Government begins to make difficulties; therefore pressure must be put on it.  In the meantime, transports will begin from the occupied territory.  The proposed rate of three weekly transports of one thousand Jews each is to be increased considerably within a short time (T/428).  Dannecker continues preparations for transports to Auschwitz (T/429) and agrees with representatives of the French police that the latter carry out, on 16 July 1942, a round-up of thousands of stateless Jews in Paris for the transports (T/440).  On 1 July 1942, Dannecker fixes the places from which the first transports will be dispatched (minutes, attached to T/429, of a conversation with the Security Police officials). 

The first train was due to leave the city of Bordeaux on 15 July, but it transpired that not enough Jews had been made ready to fill this train.  Therefore, the Paris office cancelled the train (T/435).  This enraged the Accused, as is evident from document T/436, which was signed by Roethke and is worthy of quotation, as evidence of the Accused's driving power and his status in the eyes of his subordinates: 

"On 14.7.42...SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Eichmann, Berlin, telephoned.  He wanted to know why the train scheduled for 15 July 1942 was cancelled.  I answered that originally the `wearers of the Star' in the provincial towns as well were to be arrested, but because of a new agreement made with the French Government, only stateless Jews were to be arrested in the meantime.  The train scheduled for 15 July 1942 had to be cancelled, because, according to information received from the SD unit in Bordeaux, there were only 150 stateless Jews in Bordeaux.  Because of the short time at our disposal, we could not find other Jews for this train.  Eichmann pointed out that this was a matter of prestige.  This matter had necessitated drawn-out negotiations with the Reich Ministry of Transport, which had been successfully concluded, and now Paris caused the cancellation of the train.  A thing like this had never happened to him.  The whole business was `disgraceful.'  He would not inform Gruppenfuehrer Mueller of this at once, in order not to disgrace himself.  He would have to consider whether France should not be dropped altogether, as far as evacuation was concerned.  I requested that this should not be done and added that it was not the fault of our office if this train had had to be cancelled...the following trains would leave according to plan."

And indeed, the trains left, although the arrests did not bring the desired results (T/445), and on 3 September 1942 a report was submitted, showing that, up to that date, 27,000 Jews had been evacuated, of them 18,000 from the occupied territory and the remainder from the unoccupied territory (T/452). 

Notice of each transport was sent to the Accused's Section and to the place of destination.  Many such reports were submitted to us (T/444, T/447 (1)-(18), T/455, T/457, T/461, etc.), which refer to the period from July 1942 to March 1943.  Most of the transports were directed to Auschwitz, and in such cases notices were sent to the Accused's office, to the Inspector of Concentration Camps in Oranienburg, and to the Auschwitz camp.  A number of transports were sent "in the direction of Cholm" (for instance, T/1421, T/1422), which was a railway junction near Lublin, and in these cases the notices were sent to the Accused's Section and to Commanders of the SD and Security Police in Cracow and Lublin. 

We heard the testimony of Professor Wellers (Session 32, Vol. II, pp. 579-591), who was arrested in December 1941, held at the Drancy camp from June 1942, and sent on to Auschwitz in June 1944.  He described the round-up of the Jews and the expulsion from the Drancy camp to the East.  An especially horrifying chapter was the expulsion of 4,000 children, separated from their parents and sent off to extermination, accompanied by heart-rending scenes described to this Court by the witness.  In the documents, this chapter is reflected in an enquiry from Dannecker to the Accused on 10 July 1942, asking what was to be done with these 4,000 children (T/438).  On 20 July 1942, Dannecker makes notes of a telephone conversation between himself and the Accused (T/439): 

"The question of the deportation of children was discussed with Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann.  He decided that, as soon as transports could again be dispatched to the Generalgouvernement area, transports of children would be able to roll"  (Er entschied, dass sobald der Abtransport in das Generalgouvernment wieder moeglich ist, Kindertransporte rollen koennen). 

On 13 August 1942, Guenther, of the Accused's Section, sends a cable (T/443), saying that the children can be included in the transports to Auschwitz. 

In France, as in other countries, the Germans acted as it is written: "Thou hast murdered, and thou hast also inherited." The looting of the victim's property was carried out here by a special unit, set up for this purpose by Alfred Rosenberg (see report T/508 and the evidence of Professor Wellers, who was employed by the Germans in this unit - Session 32, Vol. II, p. 588).  Nor did the Accused leave out the Jews who escaped to the Principality of Monaco in Southern France.  His Section requested the Foreign Ministry to intervene with the Government of Monaco, so that the latter extradite the Jews from that territory (exhibits T/492-495). 

According to a summary dated 21 July 1943, the number of Jews evacuated had increased to 52,000 (T/488).  Two factors hindered the speeding-up of evacuations: (a) Collaboration by the Vichy Government in evacuating Jews of French nationality became halfhearted; (b) the Italians refused to collaborate in the part of Southern France they had conquered, and even permitted Jews to find shelter in territories occupied by them.  The Accused's Section and his representatives in France went to some trouble to remove the obstacles. (See, for instance, exhibit T/613 - a letter marked IVB4, signed by Mueller, mentioning current negotiations carried on by the Accused with the German Foreign Ministry to put an end to interference by the Italians.) 

In connection with Belgium, it was planned, as already stated, in the Accused's office on 11 June 1942 that 10,000 Jews be evacuated (T/419).  On 1 August 1942, the Accused instructed the representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Brussels (Ehlers, who was the first Adviser on Jewish Affairs in Belgium) to evacuate stateless Jews (T/513).  By 15 September 1942, 10,000 such Jews were evacuated.  By 11 November 1942, the number of those evacuated reached 15,000 (T/515).  A decisive date in the fate of the Jews of Belgium was the night of 4 September 1943.  In the plan for action of the Security Police for a round-up to be carried out that night (T/519), it is stated: 

"On the night of 3-4 September 1943, a large-scale operation will be carried out for the first time for the seizure of Belgian Jews, for posting to the East (Osteinsatz), as required by the Head Office for Reich Security." 

In the Belgian Government's report (T/520), the round-up is described as follows (p. 28): 

"At first, the hunt affected only Jews of foreign nationality.  Belgian Jews could believe at that time that they would never be molested.  A promise to this effect was made by General von Falkenhausen...on the initiative of Queen Elizabeth, who was supported by Cardinal van Roy.  In spite of these undertakings, on the night between the 3rd and 4th of September 1943, Gestapo men and Flemish collaborators broke into the apartments of Belgian Jews in Antwerp and removed them forcibly from their homes, to be taken in trucks to the Dossin barracks in Malines.  From this date onwards, there began the Jew-hunts all over the country, although the pace was slower in Brussels, because there the Gestapo did not have the same influence upon the other German administration services as they enjoyed in other places." 

From Malines, the Jews were evacuated to Auschwitz.  The number of Jews evacuated from Malines was 25,437, of whom 1,276 survived (p. 30 of T/520). 

101. Of the Accused's activities in Holland, we hear for the first time in December 1941, when the question arises as to the attitude to be adopted towards Jews who were members of a Dutch pro-German association.  He was of the opinion that they, too, should not be allowed to emigrate, but their evacuation could be postponed, so that "their turn will come last" (T/528). 

The Adviser on Jewish Affairs in Holland is Zoepf, one of the Accused's men.  We have already mentioned, in connection with France, that at a meeting held in the Accused's Section on 11 June 1942 (T/419), it was decided to evacuate 15,000 Jews for the time being from Holland.  On 24 September 1942, Rauter, Senior Commanding Officer of the SS and the Police in Holland, reports to Himmler that 20,000 Dutch Jews were "put on the march" to Auschwitz (T/531), adding that "on 15 October, Dutch Jewry will be declared outlawed."  (Himmler marks this report with the words "very good.")  The witness Dr. Melkman describes to us in detail the large-scale round-ups which took place as a result of this plan (Session 34, Vol. II, 613-614). 

On 27 April 1943, Zoepf sends in a report to the Accused's Section (T/543) concerning evacuations up to that time, which included 58,000 Jews in sixty trains "for posting to labour in the East."  The summary is found in the report made by the Reich Commissioner for Holland in July 1944, which states: 

"The Jewish Question in Holland can be regarded as solved, since the great majority of Jews have been deported from the country."  

The number of those deported, according to this report, is 113,000 (T/577). 

At the end of 1943, a conflict of jurisdiction arose between the RSHA and the Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, who claimed authority to continue the handling of Jewish affairs ("especially mixed marriages, diamond Jews, etc."). 

About this, Zoepf writes in a memorandum (T/562), that: 

"The representatives of the RSHA" (that is the Accused, who was present during the discussion with Seyss-Inquart's representative) "expressed the opinion that it would be contrary to the order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS and illogical, if at this late stage other authorities again were to handle the Jewish Question after the Reich Commissioner himself had confirmed that this lay within the province of the Security Police." 

From a later cable (T/569), dated 3 February 1944, sent from the Accused's office, in which Kaltenbrunner demands that Sephardic Jews in Holland should also be included in evacuations, we learn that the RSHA had the upper hand in this dispute. 

As to the plunder of the victim's property in Holland, Seyss-Inquart's report of 28 February 1944 states that he estimates the value of the property seized at 500 million Dutch Gulden (T/571).  Here, too, Rosenberg's special unit was active in the robbery of the property (T/508, p. 9). 

102. Expulsions from Scandinavian Countries began at the end of 1942 and continued throughout 1943 

The Accused's Section sends a cable on 25 November 1942 (signed by Guenther) to the Commander of the Security Police in Oslo, ordering the immediate evacuation of Norwegian Jews via Stettin to Auschwitz.  The cable contains the usual instructions regarding the categories of the evacuees (nationality, mixed marriages, etc.) and the loss of Norwegian nationality on crossing the border.  The very same day, a message is sent from Oslo to Stettin that 700-900 Jews would sail the next day.  Arrests are carried out on the same day and, in fact, 532 Jews are deported from Oslo to Stettin, arriving at Stettin on 30 November 1942 and at Auschwitz on 1 December 1942 (exhibit T/591).  The second wave was from 25 to 26 February 1943, and this time 158 Jews are expelled from Oslo via Stettin.  The Accused's office (over his signature) instructs the local Gestapo office in Oslo to transfer these Jews to Berlin, "where they will be attached en bloc to one of the next transports of Jews to Auschwitz" (T/592).  We heard from Mrs. Samuel how a similar number of Jews were saved by escaping to Sweden (Session 36, Vol. II, p. 649).  In Norway, 64 Jews in all remained, all of them Jewish spouses of mixed marriages, and they were concentrated in one camp.  The Swedish Government made efforts over an extended period to secure their transfer to Sweden, inter alia by granting them Swedish nationality.  Already on 1 March 1943 (T/593), the Accused's Section, in a letter bearing his signature, strongly objected to these attempts, and on 2 October 1944, his Section finally rejected (over Guenther's signature) the Swedish request to have the 64 Jews transferred to Sweden (T/605). 

A total of 750 Jews was evacuated from Norway, and only 13  remained alive. 

103. In Denmark the action was concentrated over a few days at the end of September and the beginning of October 1943.  Most of the action failed, due to a `leakage' on the German side and the active assistance of all sections of the Danish people, from the King down to simple citizens, as was related by the witness Melchior in his testimony (Session 35, Vol. II, pp. 627-641).  Only 202 Jews of Copenhagen fell into German hands at the time and were sent to Germany on 3 October 1943 (T/582). 

The order for expulsion came from Himmler, through the RSHA and the Accused's Section, as appears from the affidavits made by von Thadden (T/584) and Mildner (T/585); from a letter from the Foreign Ministry, dated 13 September 1943, to the Head of the Security Police, for the attention of the Accused (T/580); from a report, T/582, sent to the RSHA with a copy to the Accused's Section; and documents T/587-588, which also reflect the activity of the Accused in the matter of Danish Jewry. 

According to reports by the Danish Government (T/589), the total number of those deported was about 475.  They were all sent to Terezin, and thanks to the continuous interest taken by Danish institutions, their fate there was better than that of all other inmates.  The number of those who died in Terezin was 53. 

104. From Western and Northern Europe, we move to Central, Southern and South-Eastern Europe.  We shall deal first with Slovakia which was, by the grace of Hitler, an autonomous state.  Wisliceny acted as "Adviser on Jewish Affairs" in this country on behalf of the RSHA and the Accused's Section, being formally attached to Ludin, the German Ambassador in Bratislava. 

Three periods can be discerned in the fate of the Jews of Slovakia: 

(a) The first period was that of "relocation and Aryanization," about which we heard from the witness Dr. Abeles.  About the meaning of relocation we read in document T/1076, dated 22 October 1941: 

"The Slovakian Minister of the Interior...is planning the concentrated settlement of Jews in certain places in Slovakia, thereby achieving the complete evacuation of Jews from large areas, as well as the evacuation of the capital.  This will be done by the setting up of ghettos - suggested by the German Counsellor, following the example of the Generalgouvernement." 

Concerning Aryanization, Dr. Abeles stated (Session 49, Vol. II. p. 888): 

"It was the large Jewish firms which were Aryanized, primarily industrial firms, part of which were owned by Jews." 

(b) The second decisive stage, that of evacuation, begins on 16 February 1942 (T/1078).  On 13 March 1942, the German Embassy in Bratislava is informed that the Accused will arrive "for preliminary discussion of the evacuation of 20,000 Jews from Slovakia" (T/1079), and on 20 March 1942 (T/1080), the Foreign Ministry transmits to the German Embassy a detailed plan coming from the Head of the Security Police and the SD.  The Slovak Government is to pay the German Government the sum of 500 Reichsmark for every Jew received.  The Germans justify this demand by the low work productivity of the Jews, "not yet trained for new trades," and by the fact that Jewish property in Slovakia is worth three billion Slovakian Crowns.  On 29 April 1942, Ludin reports that the plan was confirmed by the Slovak Government, that three trains had already been dispatched, and that after the evacuation of 20,000 "labour Jews" the evacuation of the remainder (some 70,000 Jews (T/1081)) could be commenced.  The question of the payment of 500 Reichsmark for each evacuated Jew appears again a number of times in documents submitted, and for the last time in document T/1087, dated 2 May 1942, in which the Foreign Ministry defines the attitude of the German Government as follows: 

"The Reich Government undertakes responsibility that Jews removed from Slovakia and received by them will remain in the Eastern areas forever, and will not be given any opportunity to return to Slovakia.  No claim is put forward by the Germans in regard to the property of these Jews of Slovakian nationality, except the demand for the payment of 500 Reichsmark in exchange for each Jew received.  The Reich Government is to receive (abzunehmen) from Slovakia, during the month of May this year, 20,000 additional Jews, fit for labour, and send them to the East.  The details will be arranged as heretofore." 

On 15 May 1942, the Accused's Section (over Guenther's signature) reports on the situation to the Foreign Ministry: 20,000 Jews - most of them fit for labour - were evacuated to Auschwitz and to Lublin, and on 4 May the evacuation of 20,000 additional Jews to Lublin began, and it is intended to carry on the evacuation at the rate of from 20,000 to 25,000 persons per month (T/1089).  At the end of May, the embassy in Bratislava receives word that the Accused will pay a visit there, in order "to discuss problems connected with the operation of the evacuation of Jews from Slovakia now in progress."  The visit took place, and when in Bratislava, the Accused also met Mach, the Slovak Minister of the Interior  (T/37, p. 2879 etc.). 

This stage of the evacuation was concluded at the end of June 1942, and at a consultation held at the office of Prime Minister Tuka, Wisliceny announced that the Jewish Action was in its final stages, that 52,000 Jews had been evacuated, and for the time being 35,000 Jews remained (T/1101). 

(c) There was a respite in evacuations up to 1944, when the Slovakians demanded that permission be granted to visit camps, as a preliminary condition for the renewal of evacuations (T/1106, dated 13.4.43; letter signed by the Accused, dated 8.1.44, T/1110; and the Foreign Ministry reply, dated 14.1.44, T/1111).  The answer to this request came in a letter dated 7 February 1944, signed by the Accused (T/1112): For understandable reasons, he objects to visits by strangers to the camps in the East, and proposes instead a visit to the "Ghetto for the Aged" at Terezin, which always served to mislead foreigners, as will be mentioned later. 

Evacuations from Slovakia were renewed once again after the outbreak of revolts there in the autumn of 1944.  From a report dated 9 December 1944 (T/1130), it is learned that Operations Units arrested nearly 10,000 Jews, and that 7,000 were taken to German concentration camps.

The summary is to be found in the testimonies of Dr. Abeles and Dr. Steiner (Sessions 49 and 50, Vol. II).  Dr. Steiner testified that from September 1944 to March 1945 over 12,000 Jews were expelled, some of them to Terezin and Sachsenhausen.  According to his statement, over 70,000 out of the 90,000 Slovakian Jews were exterminated, that is some eighty per cent (Session 50, Vol. II. p. 912).

105. The second "puppet state" to be set up by the Germans was Croatia. 

Anti-Jewish laws were published there already in 1941 (T/889), and on 25 February 1942, Artukovic, the Croatian Minister of the Interior, delivered a speech in parliament, calling for the purging of the state of its Jews (T/891).  Evacuations began in the year 1943.  On behalf of the Accused's Section (T/907 and p. 1142 of his Statement T/37), Abromeit dealt with these matters in co-operation with Helm, the Police Attache at the German Embassy in Zagreb.  The concentration of Jews in preparation for the expulsion was carried out by the Croatians (Ustachis) themselves.  The Croatian Government consented to pay to the Reich thirty Reichsmark for each evacuated Jew (T/903).  On 19 January 1943, an agreement was drawn up between Helm and Abromeit, on the one hand, and the Croatian Government on the other (T/907).  Helm and Abromeit divided the work between them, leaving Helm to supervise activities within the state, while Abromeit was responsible for the evacuation of Jews across the borders of Croatia.  On 4 March 1943 Helm cables the Foreign Ministry that the evacuation of 2,000 men is imminent and requests that the Accused be informed (T/908).  On 10 April 1943, the Accused's Section enquires (signed by Guenther) when the evacuation will begin (T/910).  The evacuation is carried out.  On 15 July 1943, the RSHA enquires from the Police Attache about 800 Jews who, according to rumours, are still in concentration camps, and demands action for their evacuation to the East (T/916).  A further letter sent by the Accused's Section during the same period deals with 400 Jews in Croatia for whom the Jewish Agency made efforts to obtain immigration permits to Palestine.  Immigration permits for 75 children from amongst these 400 Jews were already confirmed.  The Accused's Section issues an order to prevent the immigration to Palestine of the 400 Jews, by their early evacuation to the East. 

A part of Croatia was under Italian occupation.  The Italians rounded up and arrested the Jews in the area, but did not deport them from the country (T/905-906).  After the Badoglio coup, the RSHA took action in this area as well, and Abromeit was ordered to see to the evacuation of the Jews who still remained there (T/919, dated 16.9.43).  For this purpose, a special Operations Unit of the RSHA, commanded by Krumey, was sent there in October (T/920, dated 15.10.43). 

According to an official Yugoslav report (T/892, p. 9), only 1,500 out of 30,000 Croatian Jews remained alive. 

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