Judgment in the Trial of Adolf Eichmann 

[Part 13]

113. The Allies landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944.  Important personages, including the King of Sweden and the Pope, intervened with Horthy to stop the deportations.  Budapest was bombed heavily from the air.  Under the impact of these events, Horthy gathered courage and ordered that deportations be stopped at the beginning of July (T/1212; T/1113, the Kasztner Report - pp. 57, 69).  This step came too late to save the Jews in the provinces, but it did, for the time being, foil the plan for the evacuation of the Jews of Budapest.  That the plan for this operation was ready, we read in the report prepared by von Thadden, of the German Foreign Ministry, who visited Budapest at the end of May 1944.  The information about the plan of action against the Jews was provided for him by the Accused's office (T/1194, p. 3).  Later, in a memorandum prepared by him for his superiors (T/1195), he describes a plan to evacuate all Budapest Jews within 24 hours in the middle or at the end of July in one huge operation, for which auxiliary help would be mobilized, including all the postmen and the chimney sweeps.  The intention was to collect all the Jews of Budapest together on an island in the Danube, and to deport them from there. 

The Accused could not reconcile himself to the cessation order, and on 14 July 1944 he tried to deport another 1,500 Jews, imprisoned in the Kistarcsa camp, near Budapest.  This came to the knowledge of the Jewish leaders, and they managed to inform Horthy about this action.  The latter ordered the return of the train carrying these Jews before it crossed the Hungarian border (evidence of Dr. Alexander Brody, Session 52, Vol. III, pp. 957-958).  This setback enraged the Accused, who organized the transport anew, in spite of Horthy.  SS men under the command of Novak, of Eichmann's unit, appeared in the Kistarcsa camp on 19 July 1944.  Novak informed the Hungarian commander of the camp that the very same 1,500 who had been brought back on 14 July would be expelled again, because "Eichmann will not tolerate his orders to be countermanded, not even by the Regent of the state himself (Evidence of Dr. Brody, supra, p. 957).  SS men loaded the Jews onto trucks with great brutality and brought them to the railway station, and this time the expulsion took place.  To avoid another intervention with Horthy by prominent Jewish personalities, the Accused resorted to a ruse.  He assembled all of them in his office, where they were kept by his assistant, Hunsche, for the whole day on various pretexts, and were sent home only when word was received that the train had crossed the border (evidence of Freudiger, Session 52, pp. 947-948).  About those events, as seen through the eyes of the deportees themselves, who were returned to Kistarcsa and deported a second time, this time reaching Auschwitz, we learn from the witness Elisheva Szenes (Session 53,Vol. III, p. 961 seq.). 

In his evidence, the Accused claims (Session 104, Vol. IV, p.xxxx6) that all he remembers is "that a train left and returned."  On further cross-examination by the Attorney General, he seeks refuge behind the naive question: If all this be correct, where did the trucks come from, in which the Jews were taken the second time from the Kistarcsa camp? (supra, p. xxxx8).  When he is reminded that trucks could be obtained from the Hungarian gendarmerie, again he remembers nothing at all.  We have no doubt that the Kistarcsa incident occurred, as testified by the witnesses for the Prosecution.  Witness for the Defence, Grell, who at the time served as an adviser at the German Embassy in Budapest, also confirms in his declaration (T/691, p. 8) that he heard about the Accused's resorting to some stratagem in order to deport the inmates of some camp to Germany.  We are convinced that the Accused remembers his victory over Horthy quite well.  The whole incident is very significant as proof of the Accused's position in Hungary, and the traits of obstinacy and cunning which characterized his actions. 

114. On 14 August, the Hungarian Minister of the Interior informed the Accused that the Council of Ministers had decided to propose 25 August to Horthy as the date for the commencement of the evacuation of the Jews of Budapest.  The Accused was not satisfied with this, and at his request the Minister of the Interior agreed to advance the date of the evacuation to 20 August (T/1217; T/1218).  In his evidence he explains that his demand for the speeding-up of the evacuation was apparently due to an approach from the Ministry of Transport in connection with timetables (Session 86, Vol. IV, p. xxxx18).  The plot failed once more because of the resistance of Horthy, who ordered instead that the Jews of Budapest be collected in camps outside the capital, but that they were not to be deported to Germany.  In Veesenmayer's report to the German Foreign Ministry on 24 August 1944 (T/1219), he adds that "Eichmann will report the matter to the RSHA and will request that he and his unit be withdrawn, since they have now become superfluous." 

115. The situation again changed radically in mid-October 1944.  The Germans intervened again, to avoid Horthy's surrender to the Allies, and forced him to appoint Szalasi, the extremist leader of the "Arrow Cross," as prime minister.  This again opened the way for the deportation of Jews from the country.  Horthy submitted to the Germans on 16 October (evidence of von dem Bach-Zelewski, p. 13).  Two days later, the Accused returns to Budapest and starts negotiations for the handing over of more Jews to the Germans.  Veesenmayer's cable to the German Foreign Ministry, on the same day, states that the Accused 

"began negotiations with the Hungarian authorities for the deportation of 50,000 able-bodied Jews on foot (im Fusstreck) to work in Germany" (T/1234). 

Veesenmayer cables again on the same day (T/1235), reporting the results of the negotiations between the Accused and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior: The minister will attempt to obtain consent for the handing over of the 50,000 male Jews.  Veesenmayer adds that,              

"according to top secret information, after completing the above foot march successfully, Eichmann intends to ask for another 50,000 Jews, in order to achieve the final aim of complete evacuation of the Hungarian area, while having due regard for the attitude taken on principle by Szalasi." 

(Szalasi, it follows from the same cable, demanded that the Arrow Cross themselves deal with the Jews within Hungary proper.) 

The idea of marching the Jews from Budapest to the Austrian frontier, some 220 kilometres distance, emerged because Allied bombing had destroyed the railway line. 

This march of tens of thousands of Budapest Jews began on 10 November 1944. Mrs. Aviva Fleischmann, who took part in the march,  told us about this operation, and Dr. Arye Breszlauer, who was employed by the Swiss Embassy in Budapest, saw the marchers on their way and also wrote a report on the subject at the time (Session 61, Vol. III, p. 1102; T/1237).  The Arrow Cross men assembled all the Jews from the special Jewish houses.  Those taken were not only adults - mostly women, as many men were away from home on work service - but also children and old people.  Thousands of Jews were crammed into the yard of a brick factory which was used as the assembly point for the marchers.  There they were kept, terribly crowded, in the open and in the rain.  From there, they started to march in large groups.  Witness Mrs. Fleischmann spent only one night at the factory, but others stayed there two or three days until they set out on their way.  The escort consisted of Arrow Cross men, who behaved cruelly towards the Jews, robbed them of all their valuables, clothes, blankets and the provisions they had taken with them.  Thus they marched for seven or eight days, without food for days on end.  They slept in stables, in pigsties or even in the open, during cold November nights.  No medical help was afforded them.  Those who fell by the way from exhaustion were shot by the Arrow Cross men or died by the roadside.  The survivors were handed over to German SS men at the Austrian frontier. 

Twenty-five thousand Jews had been dispatched in this manner by 22 November 1944. Veesenmayer estimated the total number of Jews thus brought to the frontier at no more than 30,000 (T/1242).  Mr. Breszlauer, in evidence, set the figures at 50,000 (Session 61, Vol. III, p. 1101). 

Even SS officers who saw the marchers on their way regarded the march as an atrocity.  Krumey, the Accused's assistant, discussed the march with him.  The Accused's reply was simply: "You saw nothing!"; that is to say, he ignored the matter completely and ordered Krumey also to close his eyes to it (Evidence of Krumey, on pp. 15, 16).  The witness Juettner, who was an SS General, describes the sight of the marchers as shocking.  He approached Winkelmann, the Higher SS and the Police Leader in Hungary, but Winkelmann said that in this matter he was helpless, since this was in the hands of the Accused's unit, and the Accused did not take orders from him [Winkelmann].  Juettner then approached the Accused's office.  A young officer was sent over to him from the Accused's office to explain to him that he [Juettner] was not to interfere in the matter, as the Accused's unit took orders only from the RSHA (declaration T/692 and the evidence of Juettner in this trial).  Finally, the march was stopped by order of Himmler.  The credit for this is claimed by a number of German witnesses (Becher, Juettner, Winkelmann).  We need not decide whether one of them or someone else secured this order to stop the march.  It should be stated that Szalasi, on his part, also ordered the stopping of the march (See Veesenmayer's cable of 21.11.44, T/1242). 

116. We wish to mention two more matters from the Hungarian chapter. 

(a) At the beginning of June 1944, Blaschke, the Mayor of Vienna, requested Kaltenbrunner to supply him with labourers for war work in Vienna.  Kaltenbrunner replies in the affirmative on 30 June 1944 (the reference on this letter is IVB4b - the Accused's Section, managed in his absence by his deputy, Guenther).  He writes there that, in the meantime, four transports with some 12,000 Jews will be sent and will arrive shortly at the Vienna-Strasshof camp.  He adds that, according to his estimate, about thirty per cent of the Jews will be fit for work, and that they can be employed, provided that they can be withdrawn at any moment.  As to the wives and children of those Jews, who are not fit for work, they will all be kept ready for special action (fuer eine Sonderaktion), and will therefore be removed in the future, but are to stay in the camp in the meantime, under constant guard also during the day.  Kaltenbrunner asks Blaschke to discuss further details with the representative of the State Police and with SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Krumey of the Special Operations Unit in Hungary (i.e., the Accused's unit) (T/1211).  The meaning of the words "special action" need not be explained: All those Jews were to be taken away and exterminated, but in the meantime, those fit for work would be employed at the pleasure of the Mayor of Vienna, and their wives and children would wait with them as prisoners until their turn came to die. 

The Accused made use of this order by Kaltenbrunner, which he had to obey, to mislead the Hungarian-Jewish leaders and to extort money from them.  From the report of the Jewish Relief and Rescue Committee in Budapest written by the late Dr. Kasztner, it is apparent that the Accused made a show of agreeing to the request put to him by Jewish communal leaders to save Jewish lives by allowing the transfer of 15,000 Hungarian Jews to Austria, in order to "put them on ice."  In consideration for this simulated concession, he demanded a large sum of money from them, alleging that this was needed for food for these Jews and for the care of the sick (see T/1113, pp. 49, 50). 

When cross-examined by the Attorney General, the Accused does not deny this act of deceit.  He says: "It is possible that I painted a bright picture for Kasztner" (Session 104, Vol. IV, p.xxxx6). 

If some of these Jews were finally saved from the fate which was in store for them, this was not thanks to the Accused, but because extermination by gassing at Auschwitz was stopped in October or November 1944.  There is proof here of the deceitful methods to which the Accused resorted in regard to his victims. 

Mention should also be made of another remark by the Accused to Dr. Kasztner, to the effect that there should be no Jews from the Carpathians or from Siebenbuergen amongst the Jews to be sent to Austria, because they were "elements of much greater ethnic value and more fertile, and he was not interested in keeping them alive."  These words were confirmed by witness Mrs. Hansi Brand (Session 58, Vol. III, p. 11052). 

(b) We listened to long testimony from Mr. Joel Brand and his wife, Mrs. Hansi Brand.  Also documents were submitted to us about negotiations carried on between Jewish communal leaders and Himmler's agents concerning a barter of Jewish lives against goods required by the Germans, especially trucks.  We do not intend to follow all the details of these complicated negotiations, which are now a matter of history, but shall only make a few comments on the Accused's contentions regarding these negotiations. 

The Accused alleged that Becher, Himmler's chief agent for economic affairs in Hungary - in particular responsible for robbing Hungarian Jews of their property - trespassed into his domain, by handling matters of Jewish emigration which were reserved for the Accused, he being the expert on the subject.  Moreover, Becher pressed him (the Accused) to step up deportations to Auschwitz, in order to force the Jews to hurry up with the supply of the goods.  But actually, Becher dealt with these matters only in a small way - the emigration of a few thousand Jews.  Becher's interference angered the Accused, for here - so he explains - comes an outsider and interferes in a field in which the Accused had become expert over the course of many years - namely Jewish emigration - and what is more, presses him to increase the pace of the despicable work of deporting Jews to Auschwitz.  That is why he, the Accused, thought up a far-reaching plan for the emigration of a million Jews, in order to have the better of Becher in this competition.  And here the unbelievable happened: He is informed by Mueller, to whom he put the plan, that it has been authorized by his superiors.  He therefore sends Brand to Istanbul; and now he understands the feelings of Brand, who is bitter about the failure of his mission, because of his arrest by the British Intelligence Service, and the Allies' refusal to respond to the proposal for the supply of goods.  He further alleged that he stipulated with Brand - and this, too, with the consent of his superiors - that ten per cent of the total number, i.e., 100,000 Jews, would be allowed to emigrate to any country they wished, as soon as Brand brought the consent of the other party to the supply of the goods, and even before the actual supply began.  In the meantime, he was already busy working out the organizational measures involved in the transport of these 100,000 emigrants (Session 86, Vol. IV, p. xxxx15).  He concludes his long explanation as follows: 

"If, later on, an obstacle was put in the way of this transaction abroad, this caused me sorrow at the time, and I permit myself to say that I can very well understand Joel Brand's fury and pain.  I only hope that Joel Brand, too, in the light of the documents which now prove to him that I was not the man who carried out the extermination, understands on his part my own fury and my anger...." (supra) 

We are of the opinion that this whole effort to appear now before this Court as the initiator of the above transaction is nothing but a lie. 

There is no doubt that the order to begin negotiations about the exchange of Jews for goods came from Himmler himself.  What caused Himmler to make this proposal, we do not know.  Possibly, all this was nothing but a manoeuvre, or he was seeking to prepare an alibi for himself or wanted to show what he could achieve by obtaining essential goods for the Reich.  In any case, all these were matters of general high policy, entirely beyond the sphere of activity of the Accused, who concentrated all his efforts on the implementation of the Final Solution.  On receiving the order to conduct negotiations with the Jews, he carried it out.  There is proof that when Brand did not return and the whole matter collapsed, the Accused expressed satisfaction (the evidence of Hansi Brand; report by Wisliceny, T/85, p. 21).  The most that can be said is that the Accused conducted the negotiations as he was ordered, in the same way as, in accordance with orders received, he allowed the departure of 1,700 Jews from Hungary to Bergen-Belsen, and later on from there to Switzerland.  But it is sheer hypocrisy to come now and testify that his reactions to the failure of the negotiations were sorrow, fury and anger, like the feelings of Joel Brand.  This entire version was invented by the Accused only after he had read Joel Brand's book, from which he thought he could find something to hold on to, in order to show himself in a more favourable light.  To this end, he also exploited an error made by Joel Brand, in connection with the 100,000 Jews whom the Accused allegedly agreed to release as soon as the barter agreement was concluded, and even before the goods were supplied.  In the detailed report drawn up by Mr. Moshe Sharett (Shertok) after his conversation with Brand in Aleppo (T/1176), there is no mention of such a promise, but Brand is quoted as saying that only a few thousand would be released immediately (supra, p. 4).  Incidentally, it seems to us - although Brand's evidence is borne out by that of his wife, and we do not doubt the subjective sincerity of both these witnesses - that Brand was mistaken in regard to one further detail, namely that the Accused promised him to blow up the extermination installations at Auschwitz the moment an agreement was concluded.  This, too, is not mentioned in Mr. Sharett's report, and it is inconceivable that Brand would not report two such important promises to Mr. Sharett or that Mr. Sharett would not have noted them in writing, had they been communicated to him by Brand. 

When one compares the Accused's evidence in Court with what he said in Statement T/37 on the same matter, the untruthfulness of his version is glaring (supra, p. 294 et seq.).   He says there that he received the order to conduct the negotiations directly from Himmler, and that he does not remember who initiated the idea, whether it was Becher, or he himself, or Himmler.  And again, on p. 2905, in answer to a question by Superintendent Less as to how things got to the stage of negotiations with Brand: 

"Mr. Superintendent, this, too, I do not know; I left this matter entirely open, this I do not know.  When I read the book [by Brand], I always thought to myself: I do not know who gave the order or the idea.  The order, of course, came from higher up, this is clear - but the idea, if it was I, if it was the Reichsfuehrer, if it was Becher, someone must have thought of it - and in any case I was the one to send it on higher up.  Whether I was the initiator of it or someone else gave me the idea and I only passed it on higher up and received the necessary instructions, this I do not know any longer; this I can no longer say." (See also pp. 1089-1090.) 

It is therefore evident that he devoted much thought to this question, but he cannot give the answer - although the first hint of an effort to claim credit for the initiative already appears at this stage.  Is it possible that he would not remember so important a matter, if it were indeed true that he initiated the idea of sparing the lives of one million Jews?  But in his testimony in Court everything seems to have become quite clear: He, and he alone, initiated the plan, brought it before Mueller (not directly to Himmler) and received, from or through Mueller, authority to conduct the negotiations (Session 86, Vol. IV, p. xxxx13). 

We learn from the documents the kind of plans the Accused was concerned with, after Brand's departure.  He was not engaged in preparations for the emigration of 100,000 Jews, as he had the temerity to allege in his evidence, but in the deportation of all Hungarian Jewry to Auschwitz at an accelerated pace, that is to say, the extermination of those Jews who still remained in German hands and who were to be the subject of barter against goods.  He is already preparing the evacuation of the Jews from Budapest at this very same time, that is, the second half of May 1944.  This we learn from von Thadden's report mentioned above (T/1194). 

117. With regard to all the Accused's activities in Hungary, he reverts to his usual tactics of shifting responsibility to other authorities, until his Counsel has to put the question to him: 

"Witness, what else remained of your activities, because I do not know what there was left for you to do?" 

And the Accused answers: 

"This I already said in my Statement when questioned by the Superintendent on behalf of the Israeli Police, but I know that these things sounded incredible.  In fact, the documents prove that I was associated with the preparation of the timetables, but only marginally.  At first, all that was left for me to do was to report and pass on information to my superiors...I know that this is incredible, or almost incredible, but what am I to do?  This is how things were."  (Session 86, Vol. IV, p. xxxx11.) 

Indeed, this version is not credible, because there is no truth in it.  As to the relationship between the Accused and the Hungarians (especially Endre and Baky and Ferenczy of the gendarmerie), we have already said that they were his loyal partners, that their desire to get rid of the Jews was no whit less than the Accused's desire to get hold of them, in order to send them to extermination.  But in this partnership the Accused was undoubtedly the one to guide and decide, both as the representative of the German conquerors and as being the expert in the Solution of the Jewish Question, who had become famed as such after his feats in other countries.  The true relationship between the partners is quite evident from Ferenczy's reports, which were submitted to us.  Representatives of the Accused were present in the assembly camps, into which Jews were collected before deportation, and the deportation plans were drawn up by joint committees of Hungarian and German representatives (see, for instance, T/1160, para. 3).  The Accused claims that his representatives fulfilled only one function: They were present to exclude Jews of foreign nationality from these deportations, in accordance with Veesenmayer's directives (Session 103, Vol. IV, p. xxxx6).  This, also, is a false contention; for this task was kept for the German Embassy officials themselves (see T/1188, and von Thadden's report, T/1194, pp. 3, 4).  Finally, we see who was really in authority, from the report by Ferenczy, T/1163: "Mishaps" were discovered in one of the camps: The Hungarian in charge enabled Jewish notables to leave the camp, etc.  It was therefore decided that German Security Police units, led by German officers - i.e., the Accused's men - would in future take over the command within the camps, as well as the technical arrangements for loading the Jews on to trains.  The Hungarian gendarmerie were left to attend only to external security and security within the camps (supra, pp. 1, 2; see also T/1164, para. 2).  Escorting the trains remained a function carried out by the Germans all the time, within Hungary as well.  German Security Police men also prevented Jews from being rescued from the assembly camps through the call-up for labour service in Hungary; they arrested Jews who had received such call-up notices, confiscated their papers and handed them over to the Accused (T/1161, para. 2; T/1163, para. 8).                 

From all these details, a true picture emerges of the Accused's activities in connection with the round-up of Jews before their deportation, and also of the balance of power between him and the Hungarians.  It is true that he needed the help of the Hungarian gendarmerie, because only they knew the local conditions and had the large amount of manpower required to carry out these operations.  It is also true that the gendarmerie remained loyal to Regent Horthy, and this occasionally made it difficult for the Accused to carry on his activities when Horthy showed signs of independence and rebellion against the Germans.  But the incident of the Kistarcsa train shows that the Accused succeeded in having his own way, even in the face of an explicit order from Horthy.      

As to the German side, the Accused tried to shift responsibility in two directions: to Veesenmayer, the Reich Plenipotentiary and Ambassador, and to Winkelmann, Higher SS and Police Leader, and to Geschke of the BdS.  Veesenmayer was undoubtedly very active in Jewish affairs.  For instance, documents were submitted to us showing that in April 1944 he conducted negotiations with the Hungarian authorities for the handing over of 50,000 "Jews for labour" to the Reich (N/73; T/1181; N/75, and others).  He put pressure on the Hungarian Government regarding the expulsion of the Jews of Budapest (declaration by Lakatos, N/106, p. 4).  Obviously, the German Embassy did not engage in the actual rounding-up and deportation of the Jews.  Veesenmayer's duty in such matters was only to report to his Foreign Ministry on what had been done.  Generally, reading between the lines, Ribbentrop's concern is felt about the fact that Veesenmayer is not sufficiently assertive of his authority (see, for instance, N/70).  In reply to instructions couched in this spirit, Veesenmayer cables on 22 April 1944 in reassuring terms that the SD men handling Jewish affairs (i.e., the Accused's unit) are in continuous contact with the SD through a special liaison officer.  In any case, it is clear that the Accused was not dependent on Veesenmayer in the carrying out of his duties.  Even when it came to conducting top level negotiations with the Hungarian authorities, to prepare operations against the Jews, which, in the nature of things, was Veesenmayer's area of activity, the Accused frequently acted on his own, while Veesenmayer only sent in reports (see T/1219; T/1234). 

As far as Winkelmann and Geschke are concerned, it seems that there was some formal connection between the Accused's Special Operations Unit and the BdS Geschke.  But this connection was even weaker than that which existed between the Advisers on Jewish Affairs on behalf of Section IVB4 of the RSHA in various countries and the BdS in each country.  The position held by the Accused, as head of a Special Operations Unit, added independence to his status as special representative of Himmler and of the head of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner, as he received his order directly from Berlin.  In fact, there is no indication in the evidence that the Accused received any substantive instructions from Geschke or Winkelmann, except in the evidence given by the Accused himself, which is not trustworthy in this matter as well. 

We wish to point out that we have reached these conclusions without having recourse to the evidence of Veesenmayer and Winkelmann themselves, since for obvious reasons they were trying to keep themselves as remote as possible from any connection with actions against Jews, or even from knowledge of them, and their statements in this matter are unreliable. 

From what has been stated above, a clear picture emerges of the Accused's activities in Hungary.  On the German side, which was dominant and made the decisions, the Accused was the chief stimulating force in implementing the Final Solution in Hungary.  Here, in the field itself, he acted with increased energy, initiative and daring, and stubborn determination to complete the work, in spite of all the difficulties in his way.  The measure of his responsibility for the catastrophe which befell the Jews of Hungary must be evaluated accordingly. 

118. In connection with the Hungarian chapter, we will have to deal with the Attorney General's contention that, while in Budapest, the Accused took part in the murder of a Jewish youth named Solomon, who was engaged in forced labour in the garden of the house in which the Accused lived.  One of the witnesses for the Prosecution, Mr. Avraham Gordon, testified on this matter that the Accused and his servant Slawik beat the boy to death in a tool shed at the house.  This charge does not appear as a special count of murder in the indictment, but the Attorney General wanted to bring this incident as proof of the Accused's cruelty and his attitude to the life of an individual Jew, apart from his attitude to the lives of Jews in general.  Although we have no formal accusation of murder before us, we think that we should evaluate the evidence in this matter according to a criterion befitting the nature of the deed attributed to the Accused (see C.C. 232/55, Piskei Din 12, 2017, 2064).  We have examined the evidence according to this criterion, and although the impression made on us by Mr. Gordon's evidence is positive, we do not consider it safe to find facts against the Accused on the basis of this evidence alone, without any corroborative evidence as to the details of the incident. 

Eastern Europe

119. We must now go back and consider the stage of the Final Solution, from its beginning in mid-1941, and turn to Eastern Europe - Poland, the Baltic countries and Soviet Russia - the valley of death in which millions of Jews were slaughtered by the order of Hitler.  This is where the Jews, who had been hunted down for this purpose in the other European countries, crammed into trains and brought to the East, were done to death in many different ways.  Documents were submitted describing the Holocaust in the East, but the bulk of the evidence consisted of statements by witnesses, "brands plucked from the fire," who followed each other in the witness box for days and weeks on end.  They spoke simply, and the seal of truth was on their words.  But there is no doubt that even they themselves could not find the words to describe their suffering in all its depth.  As one of them, Judge Beisky (Session 21,  Vol. I, p. 346) said, in trying to describe his feelings whilst being forced to watch the hanging of a young boy in the presence of thousands of Jewish prisoners: 

"First of all, I can no longer - and I acknowledge this - after eighteen years I cannot describe this sensation of fear.  This feeling of fear, today when I stand before Your Honours, does not exist any longer and I do not suppose that it is possible to define it for anyone... It is not physically possible to present the conditions of those days in the courtroom, and I do not believe, Heaven forbid, that people will not understand this, but I myself cannot explain it and I experienced this on my own person."

If these be the sufferings of the individual, then the sum total of the suffering of the millions - about a third of the Jewish people, tortured and slaughtered - is certainly beyond human understanding, and who are we to try to give it adequate expression?  This is a task for the great writers and poets.  Perhaps it is symbolic that even the author, who himself went through the hell named Auschwitz, could not stand the ordeal in the witness box and collapsed.  Moreover, this part of the indictment is not in dispute in this case.  The witnesses who gave evidence about this part were hardly questioned at all by Counsel for the Defence, and at a certain stage in the proceedings he even requested that the Court therefore waive the hearing of these witnesses.  To this we could not agree because, since the Accused denied all the counts in the indictment, we had to hear also the evidence on the factual background of the Accused's responsibility, and could not break up the indictment according to a partial admission of facts by the Accused (see Decision No. 13, Session 23, Vol. I., p. 366). 

Accordingly, we are obliged to sketch the background at least in brief outline, so that a fitting picture may be revealed of the crimes in which the Accused was a partner.  Here and there, we have interwoven verbatim passages from the evidence.  We shall begin with a general description, and afterwards examine the Accused's part in the events described.   

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