Judgment in the Trial of Adolf Eichmann 

[Part 18]

153. The camp for Jews in Bergen-Belsen was set up because of the desire of the German Foreign Ministry to concentrate Jews of foreign nationality in an "Exchange Camp," with a view to their being exchanged for German prisoners in the hands of the Allied Powers.  Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry, in a letter dated 2 March 1943 (T/762), which was sent to the RSHA for the Accused's attention, demands the concentration of some 30,000 Jews regarded as suitable for exchange, and states that these Jews are not to be evacuated to the East.  The RSHA dealt with putting up the camp.  One of its officials (from the police department dealing with foreigners) reports confidentially to von Thadden in the Foreign Ministry that, 

"... although he had been informed that, from the point of view of work, they would not treat these Jews harshly enough for them to die, yet the impression to be gained from the camp regulations which were in process of being drafted, etc., was that at any rate they would treat them with considerable harshness," 

and this disturbs von Thadden, because such an attitude towards the prisoners is likely to defeat the purpose of the camp (T/789).  The history of the camp shows that there was a sound basis for this anxiety. 

The camp was set up at the beginning of July 1943.  Seidl, who until then had been the commander of Terezin, was transferred to Bergen-Belsen (T/842, third record of proceedings, p. 26).  During the same period, a conference took place at the Accused's Section with the Advisers on Jewish Affairs, at which representatives of the Section announced that the new camp would have a capacity of 10,000.  "Jews in protective custody" would be housed there, as well as Jewish communal leaders and Jews with contacts abroad who could be considered for exchange, and also Jews of repute (T/554). 

Questions reached the Accused's Section (T/555) and instructions were sent out from it (T/557, T/558) in relation to the categories of Jews to be sent to Bergen-Belsen.  On 27 January 1944, the Accused's Section (over his signature) orders the transfer to Bergen-Belsen of all Jews holding Argentinian nationality (T/500), and on 29 February 1944 (over Guenther's signature) the Jews of foreign nationality in Greece (T/997).  Seidl also testified (T/842, third record of proceedings, p. 27) that the letters which had been written by the camp prisoners were collected together on the spot and sent to the Section of the Accused. 

In the autumn of 1944, a representative of the International Red Cross applied to the Foreign Ministry for permission to visit Bergen-Belsen (T/799).  Von Thadden promised to look into the matter, but in an internal memorandum, he wrote that there would be serious hesitations on the part of the RSHA about such a visit.  A similar request was presented to the Accused in April 1945 by a representative of the Red Cross (T/865), but, 

"Eichmann stated that a typhus epidemic had broken out in this camp, and that the Reich authorities responsible for sanitation and health were fighting it with all the means at their disposal.  He promised me that he would tour this camp with me in a few days' time.  This visit did not take place, because I could no longer find Eichmann in Berlin." 

The witness Melkman (Session 34, Vol. II, p. 618) was in Bergen-Belsen from 15 February 1944 until 9 April 1945.  His evidence makes it clear why the Accused opposed visits by foreigners to the camp.  This is what the witness said: 

"When I came to Bergen-Belsen, the living conditions at first were no worse than those in Westerbork, perhaps a little better... In the course of time, the situation at Bergen-Belsen became worse, and the situation deteriorated terribly, until it received this horrible and awful name, as many more people arrived.  At first the camp was intended only for some thousands, but in the end there were tens of thousands there.  There was no food.  The sanitary conditions - it is almost impossible to describe them.  In a hut for 400 people, there was one toilet, and this was always out of order.  Everybody suffered from diarrhoea... In the end there were tens of thousands of people.  The dead lay in the roadway... I also entered the concentration camp of the women who had arrived at Auschwitz, I think that this was in November 1944.  And there I saw terrible things - women who fell upon some barrel where a few remnants of food still remained... There were even instances of cannibalism there." 

Dr. Chen (Session 71, Vol. III) and Mr. Hoter-Yishai (Session 73, Vol. III, pp. 1349-1350) gave evidence of the terrible situation prevailing in the camp when the liberators arrived.  At the time of the liberation there were 52,000 people in the camp, of whom 27,000 died from weakness, in spite of the medical attention they received.  To illustrate this evidence, photographs taken at Dr. Chen's instructions were submitted to us (T/1347-T/1355), and a film was shown to us which had also been taken after the liberation of the camp. 

It is clear from the documents we have mentioned that the RSHA, and within it the Accused's Section, controlled the fate of the Jewish prisoners in the Bergen-Belsen camp.  In this regard, therefore, there is a resemblance between Terezin and Bergen-Belsen. 

154. We have also touched, in passing (for example, in the Hungarian chapter), on the transportation conditions when the victims were expelled from their homes and sent to the concentration camps and to other deportation places.  We shall now add that the method of transportation in every place resembled the transportation of cattle and worse - sealed freight trucks, in intense cold or blazing heat, without food supplies (except what the evacuees brought along with them), a scant supply of drinking water, and at times no water at all for days on end, the most terrible sanitary conditions (one pail per truck to take care of physiological needs), not less than 70 to 100 people and even more in each truck. 

In this matter, the line of increasing harshness is clearly recognizable from the documents: In T/37 (the instruction for evacuation to the Generalgouvernement area) of March 1942, it is still stated that it is forbidden to dispatch more than 1,000 Jews in each train.  Compare this with exhibit T/765, dated 20 February 1943 (instructions for evacuation to Auschwitz) where we read that every train must transport at least 1,000 Jews.  At a conference in his Section on 9 September 1942, the Accused told his officials that there was room only for 700 people on the trains, but 1,000 Jews would have to be transported in them.  When Superintendent Less put this statement to the Accused, he replied: 

 "Mr. Superintendent, this does not alter the fact that I was the person authorized and responsible for this - this is clear." (T/37, p. 774) 

And so he continued right up to the deportations from Hungary, when 100 people and more were packed tightly into a single truck.

The police who accompanied the transports were generally members of the Order Police.  But the Order Police were not responsible for the overcrowding in the trucks, nor for the supply of food and water during the journey, nor for the sanitary arrangements.  Responsibility for these matters rested solely upon the section which organized the transports, namely the Section of the Accused.  It is no exaggeration to say that the very process of transporting people under such conditions was the first stage in the extermination of the deportees.  Thus, it often happened that when a transport reached its destination, or was still at one of the intermediate stations, the bodies of persons who had died en route were taken out of the trucks.  This applies not only to the period of the Final Solution, but also to the second stage, when Jews were deported from the Warthe zone, etc., and Stettin under disastrous conditions of transportation. 

155. We shall now devote some comments to the activity of the Accused in regard to the prevention of the immigration of Jews into Palestine and the prevention of their emigration to other countries overseas.  These matters are connected with the chapter of desperate attempts made by Jewish institutions and individuals to save Jewish lives from the Nazis, and the degree to which the various governments responded to these rescue efforts.  This, too, is a complex chapter of history full of heartbreak, which deserves to be examined thoroughly by the historian, and this Court cannot take this task upon itself.  We shall content ourselves with a statement of the facts, which were proved before us, relating to the Accused's activity in this matter. 

The first hint of the Accused's attitude to the question of aliyah (immigration) to Palestine is found in a comment in a report submitted by him, together with Hagen, on their joint journey to Palestine in 1937 (T/124).  As will be remembered, in the report he says that the plan for the emigration of 50,000 Jews

"...is out of the question, in view of the fact that it is the policy of the Reich to avoid the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine."

Mention has previously been made that during this journey he was going to meet the Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, in Palestine, but at the time the meeting did not take place. 

During the period of the Final Solution, there were two contributory factors in German policy preventing immigration into Palestine: First, the pact signed between the Nazis and certain Arab leaders, headed by the Mufti; and second, the desire to complete the extermination of all the Jews within the area of German influence without leaving any remnant.  With regard to emigration to other countries, the second factor operated and was sufficient in itself to stop emigration, not only from the Reich itself - in accordance with Himmler's order already mentioned above - but from the whole area of German influence.  Deviations from this general line were permitted solely because of overriding considerations of high policy. 

The Accused was faithful to the official line, as will be shown from the documents which follow, in addition to those which we have already mentioned in the sections on Romania and Croatia: 

(a) On 11 May 1942, the Accused requests the German Foreign Ministry to prevent Jewish emigration from Romania via Hungary, Croatia and Italy "by taking appropriate measures," and the reason he gives is that:            

 

"Since, in general, Jews of means are under discussion, there is a danger that in the end only the mass of Jews without means will remain in Romania." (T/1016) 

(b) The Accused also fought the immigration of children into Palestine.  On 3 March 1943, he seeks to prevent the immigration of one thousand children via Bulgaria and Turkey (T/1048).  And again Guenther, of his Section, takes action against the immigration of four thousand children (T/950, dated 2.4.43).  On 9 April 1943 Richter, from Budapest, informs the Accused (T/1050) that he has taken steps to prevent the transport of the children via Bulgaria, and he writes as follows: 

"The President of the Jewish Centre has been officially informed that he has to act against the departure of the transport of the Jewish children, since on our part we shall take steps to halt the transport on Bulgarian territory and direct it elsewhere." 

It is easy to imagine the meaning of the word "elsewhere." 

(c) In May 1943 (T/1055), the Accused notifies the Foreign Ministry of Himmler's attitude to the emigration of children:  

"1. Emigration of Jewish children is to be rejected on principle. 

"2. Approval would be given for the departure of five thousand Jewish children from the Eastern Occupied Territories, provided that, as a result, German prisoners receive permission to return to the Reich from abroad by way of exchange at a ratio of 1:4, that is to say, a total of twenty thousand.  But it must be emphasized that the question here is not one of twenty thousand elderly Germans, but of Germans fit for begetting offspring, and under forty years of age.  Moreover, the negotiations must be conducted with speed, because the time is approaching when it will no longer be possible technically to enable the five thousand Jewish children to leave the Eastern Occupied Territories, because of the implementation of our activities against the Jews. 

"3. In spite of what has been said in paragraph 1, as far as the need becomes apparent to agree to the departure of Jewish children from Romania or from other Balkan countries, importance is attached to the fact that this, too, should not be done without a quid pro quo, but in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph 2." 

In this connection, we shall mention an additional memorandum of the Foreign Ministry of May 1944, a year later.  There it is stated (T/1258): 

"Secret information has come from the RSHA that five thousand Jewish children, who could be considered for departure, are still to be found only in the Lodz Ghetto.  But this ghetto will be closed down shortly, in accordance with the instructions of the Reichsfuehrer-SS." 

(d) In Hungary, the diplomatic representatives of a number of neutral countries strove devotedly to rescue Jews, both by granting them letters of protection, and also by assisting their emigration.  These humanitarian efforts are linked with the names of men of noble spirit - Raoul Wallenberg of Sweden and Lutz of Switzerland.  The Accused takes action to thwart these efforts.  On 24 April 1944, he writes to his Section in Berlin as follows (T/1216): 

"We have seen to it that the [German] Embassy here will also do everything to delay the emigration efforts, and finally, after the continued evacuation of the Jews, will stop the emigration efforts completely." 

And he requests, 

"the phrasing of the German Government's consent which had been given at the outset, with more clarity and sharpness on this point.  It should be said that emigration to Palestine...does not meet with Germany's approval." 

(e) The consent of the Reich Government, mentioned in the previous paragraph, referred to the proposals for Jewish emigration which had come from the governments of Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.  In reply to these proposals, Hitler agreed to the emigration of several thousand Hungarian Jews, on condition that Horthy should hand over the rest of the Jews of Hungary (especially the Jews of Budapest) to the Germans (see T/1214, para. 5; N/85).  And here the Accused reaches the extreme limit in his struggle against the rescue efforts.  Veesenmayer writes in a cable dated 25 July 1944 (T/1215, para. 2): 

"SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, head of the Jewish Operations Units of the SD here, has taken the stand that, as far as he knows, in no circumstances does the Reichsfuehrer agree to the emigration of Hungarian Jews to Palestine.  The Jews in question are without exception important biological material, many of them veteran Zionists, whose emigration to Palestine is most undesirable.  Having regard to the Fuehrer's decision, of which he had been informed, he is about to submit a report to the Reichsfuehrer-SS and, if necessary, he will seek a new decision from the Fuehrer.  Furthermore, it has been agreed with Eichmann that, to the extent that assent will be given to additional evacuations of Jews from Budapest, these are to be carried out as far as possible suddenly, and with such speed that the Jews in question will already have been deported before the completion of the formalities." 

It is also stated there that, in the event of permission being given for emigration to the West, the Accused is considering preventing the emigrants from continuing their journey, for example, by taking appropriate steps on French territory. 

And what has the Accused to say on this matter, which is more damning than a hundred witnesses could be?  Apart from empty talk to the effect that Veesenmayer erred in his reporting of matters, he explains that the Fuehrer's order was not in writing before him, whereas Himmler's order was given to him in writing.  The Attorney General refuted this explanation by pointing to the fact that the order for the total extermination of the Jews was also notified to the Accused only orally, yet all his actions were guided by it.  This incident is characteristic of the Accused's attitude, not only from the point of view of the subject with which we are dealing at the moment.  We shall return to this subject of his attitude in another context. 

156. This is the place to add a few words about the Accused's personal contact with the Mufti, Hajj Amin al- Husseini. 

It has been proved to us that the Mufti, too, aimed at the implementation of the Final Solution, viz., the extermination of European Jewry, and there is no doubt that, had Hitler succeeded in conquering Palestine, the Jewish population of Palestine as well would have been subject to total extermination, with the support of the Mufti. 

Memoranda sent by the Mufti to the German Foreign Ministry, Ribbentrop (T/1260, T/1261), and to the satellite governments of Romania and Bulgaria (T/1263, T/1264), have been submitted to us, containing the insistent demand that all Jewish immigration into Palestine be prevented. 

In the memorandum to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, dated 6 May 1943 (T/1263, p. 3), it says: 

"I take the liberty of drawing your attention to the fact that it would be indeed appropriate and advantageous if the Jews were to be prevented from emigrating from your country, and if they were sent to a place where they would be placed under strict control, as for example Poland." 

It is unnecessary to make any comment upon the phrase "strict control," when the subject under reference is Polish Jewry in the year 1943. 

In his notes, exhibit T/89, dated 26 July 1946, Wisliceny quotes the Accused as saying that the Mufti visited his office in Berlin at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.  The Accused gave him an account of the Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe, and the Mufti was duly impressed.  The Mufti told the Accused that Himmler had agreed to his request that a member of the Accused's Section should come to Jerusalem to serve as personal adviser to him (the Mufti) upon the latter's return to Jerusalem after the victory of the Axis Powers.  The Accused asked Wisliceny if he would like to take this task upon himself, and he, Wisliceny, declined to consider the suggestion. 

In his Statement, the Accused admitted that he had met the Mufti, though not in his office, but on the occasion of a more widely attended gathering, and continues (p. 564): 

"But it is correct that those who accompanied the Grand Mufti visited me, and certainly there was some discussion then, though I cannot remember that I ever had a longer conversation with these Iraqi majors beyond general greetings and receiving them and handing them over to the members of my staff." 

Shortly afterwards (pp. 568-569), he speaks of a visit paid to his office by a nephew (or other close relative) of the Mufti's. 

In the light of this partial admission by the Accused, we accept as correct Wisliceny's statement about this conversation between the Mufti and the Accused.  In our view it is not important whether this conversation took place in the Accused's office or elsewhere. 

On the other hand, we cannot determine decisive findings with regard to the Accused on the basis of the notes appearing in the Mufti's diary which were submitted to us. 

Discussions with Regard to the Descendants of Mixed Marriages 

157. Nazi legislation defined in paragraph 5 of Regulation No. 1 under the Citizenship Law (one of the Nuremberg Laws) who was to be regarded as a Jew (T/68).  The Nazi legislator had no doubts that a person who had three Jewish grandparents was to be regarded as a Jew, whereas a person having only one Jewish grandparent was not regarded as a Jew.  Special instructions existed with regard to half-Jews, but we do not propose to detail them here. 

During the first period, evacuation orders were based upon this legislation.  They laid down that Jews were to be evacuated, and they defined who was a Jew for this purpose in accordance with paragraph 5 above (see, for example, T/713, T/664, T/730, T/737). 

The evacuation orders issued by the Accused's Section also deal with this subject.  For example, in the instructions for the evacuation of Jews to Terezin, dated 20 February 1943 (T/850), we see that various categories of descendants of mixed marriages (in the language of the indictment before us, children of mixed marriages) who were regarded as Jews, were to be evacuated to Terezin and not to the East. 

But, in the meantime, the question of how to deal with borderline cases concerning children of mixed marriages did not cease to occupy the experts on race theory and the Nazi jurists. 

In exhibit T/526, dated 19 September 1941, a person named Stiller, who worked in the German administration in Holland, reports on a conversation with Loesener, the Referent for Jewish Affairs in the German Ministry of the Interior.  According to Loesener, there are circles which recommend making the existing regulations more stringent, and especially that half-Jews should be regarded as Jews for all purposes.  The Accused also, it is there stated, adopts this point of view zealously.  Army circles opposed this extention, because of the bad impression which such severity was likely to make upon soldiers who were one quarter Jewish, and whose parents would thus be regarded as Jews in the full sense of the word.  The matter went right up to Hitler himself, and he rejected the proposal for widening the scope of the law. 

In a sworn affidavit, dated 24 February 1948 (T/693), Loesener states that he tried to prevent the harsh treatment of children of mixed marriages, and that Nazi Party and SS circles were angry with him because of this.  In this connection he mentions the name of the Accused as that of one of the most fanatical and vicious Jew-haters. 

In the statements of Stiller and Loesener, we see adequate proof of the Accused's attitude on the question under discussion. 

In the minutes of the Wannsee Conference (T/185), the debate on the treatment of children of mixed marriages of the first and second degree occupies considerable space, and extreme views are expressed, including a proposal for sterilization; but the discussion on this question was not concluded. 

On 6 March 1942, a month and a half after the Wannsee Conference, a meeting takes place in the Accused's office, attended by representatives of the various ministries and offices.  The entire the meeting was devoted to the question of the treatment of children of mixed marriages.  The list of the participants does not include the name of the Accused, but that of Bilfinger, as representing the RSHA.  The discussion was most detailed, and in particular the question of sterilization was debated.  At this meeting, also, no final conclusion was reached. 

On 27 October 1942, a further meeting took place in the Accused's Section on the question of the children of mixed marriages, this time with his participation (T/190).  Those present agreed to the proposal for voluntary sterilization of children of mixed marriages of the first degree, in return for granting them permission to remain on Reich territory.  But here, again, the results of the meeting were to be communicated to various offices, so that they could decide upon their final attitude on the question, and we do not know how the matter ended. 

Thus, it has been shown that the Accused himself handled the question of the children of mixed marriages, but on the basis of the material before us, we are unable to find that the discussions on this question ever brought about a change in the racial legislation, as it existed until then, or in the implementation of the plan for the sterilization of the children of mixed marriages. 

On 30 January 1942, a meeting took place in the Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories (T/299), attended also by Suhr, one of the officials in the Accused's Section.  All the participants assumed that the Nuremberg Laws did not apply in the East, and the debate turned on the question as to how the term "Jew" should be defined in the East.  Heydrich also intervened in this debate (T/301), but again it has not been proved to us that matters went beyond discussion and correspondence and ever reached any final conclusion. 

Sterilization and the Prevention of Births 

158. As we have seen, a suggestion had already been made at the Wannsee Conference that the children of mixed marriages be sterilized.  But the Nazis' interest in sterilization went far beyond this.  Rudolf Brandt, one of Himmler's men, testified to this in his affidavit dated 19 October 1946 (T/816): 

"Himmler was especially interested in the development of a cheap, quick method of sterilization which could be used against enemies of the German Reich, such as Russians, Poles and Jews.  It was hoped thereby not only to defeat, but also to destroy the enemy.  Germany would be able to exploit the working capacity of the sterilized persons, while averting the danger that they might multiply." 

Brandt, in his declaration, describes some of the shameful acts by which Nazi doctors desecrated the name of medical science: At Auschwitz and Ravensbrueck, experimental sterilizations were carried out on women.  Many thousands of women, and especially Jewesses and Gypsies, were sterilized.  According to Brandt's statement, at Auschwitz men, too, were sterilized for experimental purposes.  Two of the victims of these experiments have given evidence before us. 

According to a letter (T/1379), dated 4 July 1942, sent to the Accused's Section for the attention of Guenther, a telephone conversation took place between Fischer, one of Himmler's adjutants, and Guenther.  Fischer attaches to his letter photographs which apparently relate to experiments which are to be carried out. Fischer also requests Guenther's close co-operation in this matter with the office of Pohl, the chief of the Economic-Administrative Head Office.  In his Statement to the police (T/37, p. 2237 et seq.), the Accused denies all knowledge of the matter and expresses his astonishment at the fact that Guenther's name appears on the letter, which had been sent from Himmler's office.  In his testimony before us, he surmised that apparently this had been a special task allotted to Guenther personally (Session 79, Vol. IV, p.xxxx8). 

On 10 July 1942, a letter (T/1377) was sent to Professor Klauberg (or Glauberg), whose name became infamous in connection with sterilization experiments on Jewesses.  The subject of this letter is: The experimental sterilization of one thousand Jewesses in Ravensbrueck. A copy of this letter was sent to the RSHA for information.  The words "SS Sturmbannfuehrer Guenther, IVB4, Jewish Department" appear typed on this document, but above that, the words "SS Gruppenfuehrer Mueller" were written by hand (see T/37 (178)). 

We have come to the conclusion that on this subject the Accused should be given the benefit of the doubt.  Mention of Mueller's name in exhibit T/1377 shows that it is not at all impossible that this matter was handled at a higher level.  Because of this doubt, we do not find that the Accused and his Section took part in the implementation of the sterilization programme or in its preparation.   

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