Judgment in the Trial of Adolf Eichmann 

[Part 20]

168. We have before us the following material, proving the Accused's part in the introduction of the system of killing by Zyklon B at Auschwitz, and in the supply of this gas to Auschwitz: 

(a) In his autobiographical notes (T/90), Hoess describes his conversations with the Accused on the preparations for mass extermination operations at Auschwitz and, inter alia, he mentions a conversation in Berlin at the end of November 1941 (supra, p. 4).  They spoke about various matters, but 

"I could not secure information about the date the operation was to begin.  Eichmann had not yet managed to obtain suitable gas." 

Later, Hoess' deputy came across Zyklon B gas and used it to execute Russian prisoners, as mentioned above.  And Hoess continued (supra, p. 5): 

"When Eichmann visited [Auschwitz] again, I told him about this use of Zyklon B and we decided to introduce this gas in future for the mass exterminations." 

(b) When Superintendent Less showed these excerpts to the Accused (T/37, p. 287), the latter reacted with a vigorous denial but continued: 

"All the time, this comes back to the gas.  I never had anything to do with gas.  The first time that I heard anything at all about gas in my Section was when I was in Hungary.  Then Guenther ordered gas for himself somehow, this I do know, and I also said to Guenther, I say: `What on earth have you got to do with gas, man?  We do not have anything to do with gas.  It is not my concern.'"

 The Accused emphasizes that at the time of this incident it was not he who was in charge of the Section, because of his absence from Berlin.  Superintendent Less asked him (apparently because of other material which was in his possession, and which we shall mention presently) about March-April 1942, and the Accused confirmed that at that time he was in Berlin.

(c) Again the Accused returned to the same subject quite spontaneously and said (p. 933 et seq.):

 "I had a row with Guenther because he, sometime or other - I do not know when, at any rate it was during the time that I was away from Berlin, I think - he had begun to do something in connection with gas.

At this point Superintendent Less reminded the Accused that he had spoken about this earlier in connection with the Hungarian period, and the Accused continues:

"It is possible that when I was in Hungary, apparently this was so.  Matters of this kind, you see, Guenther never weighed up in his mind...why he interfered in matters which were no concern of his...that, altogether the Section was not geared for this.  For how could I bring this matter now to the head of the office - he would tell me to go to hell.   He reprimanded me severely for much less serious offences."

 Later, Superintendent Less asks the Accused if he had had any connections with a man called Gerstein, and if he had sent Guenther to him. The Accused replies in the negative and adds that he now heard the name Gerstein for the first time.

 (d) We have already mentioned Gerstein elsewhere and the exhibits connected with his name.  The reference is to exhibits T/1306-T/1315, manuscripts by engineer Kurt Gerstein, who wrote them in April 1945, and statements which he gave in May 1945 to a British officer and an American officer; also a manuscript dated 4 May 1945, which reached his wife a year later (T/1310; T/1311).  Gerstein was later detained by the French and examined by them (T/1313/b and T/1313/c).  In July 1945 he was found dead in a French prison and apparently had committed suicide, though his wife doubts that this was so.  From 1941 Gerstein worked in the Medical Technical Service attached to the SS Command, and in January 1942 he was appointed Technical Director for Disinfection, and during his service he handled highly poisonous gases for disinfectant purposes.  It appears that the supply of gas to  Auschwitz went through him.  In the summer of 1942, on his return from the extermination camps, he met a Swedish diplomat on the train and, according to his statement, poured out his heart to him and confessed to what he had seen.  He also tried to pass information on this subject on to church and neutral circles.  The Swedish diplomat confirmed that in August 1942 Gerstein gave him a detailed report on the extermination procedure at Belzec, and thus this part of Gerstein's statement received confirmation from a trustworthy source (T/1312).

According to Gerstein, Guenther ordered 100 kilograms of potassium cyanide from him on 8 June 1942 (T/1309, p. 4 of the English document, p. 3 of the German document).  Elsewhere (T/1313/a, p. 3) he says that Guenther on this occasion ordered 260 kilogrammes.  Gerstein also relates (T/1309, p. 8 of the English document, p. 12 of the German document) that at the beginning of 1944 Guenther again requested very large consignments of potassium cyanide for an unknown purpose (see also T/1313/a, p. 11).  Gerstein attached to his statement accounts from February to May 1944 relating to a quantity of gas of more than 2,000 kilogrammes, and in a handwritten document in French he wrote that these quantities had been ordered by Guenther.

(e) Gerstein's documents were submitted to the Accused (T/37, p. 2256), and he denied all knowledge of their contents.  He admits that at the beginning of 1944 he was in Berlin (p. 2260), but emphasizes that he was away from the office very frequently (p. 2268).  He mentions the possibility that a special assignment had been given to Guenther, though such a matter also should have come to his attention (p. 2269).  However, it is a fact, states the Accused, that not all Guenther's special duties came to his knowledge.  And how does he explain such a possibility? 

"Possibly this was a case where Mueller had assigned a duty to Guenther directly...since Mueller knew me generally as a more sensitive person than Guenther... I am not trying to say that I displayed the sensitivity of a girl, but I was much more sensitive than Guenther, for example." (p. 2274) 

Elsewhere the Accused surmises that possibly Guenther had direct contact with Globocnik and ordered the material for him (p. 2340).  The Accused thought that this possibility was more likely, because Mueller would not decide on a matter of this kind on his own responsibility but would receive instructions from the head of the Security Police, in which case he, the Accused, would have known of it, because during that period in 1942 he was not away from Berlin for more than eight days at a time, and during such a short period a matter of this nature would not have been completed (pp. 2246-2347).  At this stage, the Accused mentions yet another possibility, namely that he had not heard about the whole matter from Guenther but only read about it in the literature, in the books of Poliakov or Reitlinger (p. 2346, p. 2488).  On pp. 935-936, supra, he even argued that he heard the name Gerstein then for the first time.  In his evidence before us, he repeated his general denial, but here he already remembers that he had heard about Gerstein and his report while he was still in Buenos Aires (Session 95, Vol. IV, p. xxxx16). 

169. As already stated, exhibit T/1312, with regard to Gerstein, was submitted to us.  Though it does not provide corroboration of the contents of Gerstein's statement, because it only proves that as far back as 1942 Gerstein disclosed particulars which also appear in his statement in exhibits T/1309 and T/1313, still this fact adds weight and credibility to this statement of his.  We do not doubt the accuracy of his statements with regard to Guenther's visit and the requisitions made by the latter. 

In our view, there is also sufficient corroboration of Hoess' statement on his discussions with the Accused on the subject of introducing Zyklon B gas for the mass execution of Jews at Auschwitz, and also of Gerstein's statement about the supply of gas by the Accused's Section.  Corroboration of Hoess' statement on this matter can be seen in the fact that the Accused visited Auschwitz in the autumn of 1941 (see section 143 above), i.e., during the period in which preparations were being made there for mass extermination of Jews, and at that time the question of executing by gas occupied the Accused, and he also took part in the preparations for execution by means of gas vans, as we have seen.  As for the supply of gas to Auschwitz, we see corroboration in the fact that the Accused made a partial admission, namely that he had heard at the time of Guenther's activity in connection with the supply of gas.  As we shall make clear below, the acts of Guenther - his permanent deputy in charge of Section IVB4 - are prima facie to be regarded as the acts of the Accused himself, and we do not accept the Accused's allegation that he had no connection with this activity and did not know about it.  The Accused admits that, as Section Head, Guenther's activities should have come to his knowledge, and he also admits that even had he been away from Berlin temporarily, a matter of this kind would not have been concluded prior to his return.  There remains, therefore, only his assumption that there was some kind of secret negotiation between Globocnik and Guenther - so remote a possibility that it cannot be seriously considered.  And again, in the first part of his Statement, the Accused said spontaneously that he had been informed of the matter at the time and had discussed it with Guenther.  Only at a much later stage did he try to alter his version and contend that he had learned of the whole matter only in recent years from the literature.  We reject this attempt on the part of the Accused, and consequently, as stated, we do not accept his version, with the exception of his statement as mentioned above, which in fact lends further weight to our acceptance of the statements by Hoess and Gerstein. 

Accordingly we find that Hoess' deputy began to use Zyklon B in Auschwitz for the execution of Russian prisoners.  Hoess informed the Accused of this, and jointly they decided to introduce this method for the mass killing of Jews in Auschwitz.  Guenther - with the knowledge of the Accused - made an attempt to introduce this system also in the other extermination camps, and to that end ordered a quantity of Zyklon B from Gerstein in June 1942.  But this plan was not implemented, and in the other camps the use of motor exhaust gas was continued.  In 1944, the Accused's Section ordered additional large quantities of Zyklon B for use in Auschwitz, possibly also in other places, such as Terezin, where in the end the gas chambers were not put to use. 

We have said that the activities of Guenther, the Accused's deputy, are to be attributed prima facie to the Accused.  This finding requires further elaboration, together with discussion of the Accused's contention that everything he did was not on his own initiative but solely on the basis of, and in accordance with, the instructions regularly received from his superiors.  At this point, we return to the general subject of the Accused's status within the apparatus of the RSHA. 

170. The Accused has given us a truly amazing portrait of himself during those days.  He was in charge of a Section in the RSHA, with the SS rank appropriate to the grade of "Oberregierungsrat" in the general administrative service and the military rank of lieutenant-colonel.  Subordinate to him at his office in Berlin were many officials, from low grades right up to the SS ranks appropriate to the grade of Regierungsrat in the administrative service and to the military rank of major.  In addition, he was in control of a group of Advisers on Jewish Affairs who were themselves persons of considerable status in the various lands in which they worked.  The Accused asks us to believe him when he says that, being a person in such a position, and in spite of his being in such a position, he always acted only under explicit instructions received by him in every case, and only when a precedent existed which exactly fitted the case before him would he refrain from approaching his superiors.  On the other hand, he ascribes to his subordinates no small degree of initiative in their specific fields, for example in questions of property, which were within the special field of duty of Suhr and Hunsche.  As for his deputy Guenther, the Accused not only attributes considerable personal initiative to him, but even actions behind the back of the head of his Section.  In accordance with the evidence before us, let us therefore examine whether this is, in fact, the way in which matters were administered in the Accused's Section and in the RSHA as a whole.

171. The Attorney General has submitted to us the "Joint Administrative Rules for Ministries of the Federal Republic (of Western Germany), General Section" (T/1423).  It is the 1958 edition, but the preface states that the present text is based on that of 1927, well before the Nazi period.  This exhibit was submitted to the Accused in cross-examination (Session 95, Vol. IV, pp. xxxx21-22), and he did not deny that these rules were also in force in the central institutions in the Reich during the Nazi period, but with regard to the SS institutions, he added: 

"In the light of the change in the line of command and in the system prevailing in the Third Reich, the procedure employed in the Weimar Republic was frequently changed, because here different degrees of responsibility and command obtained.  Accordingly, a considerable number of basic orders, which had been valid during the Weimar period, were changed."

In paragraph 4 (p. 13) of T/1423, it is stated: 

"The Ministry is divided into departments (Abteilungen) and the department into sections (Referate).  The basic unit in the organizational structure of the ministry is the section... Head of Section (Referent) is an official of the senior service, who directs the section on his own responsibility and is directly subordinate to the head of the department or to the head of the group.  In his hands lies the first decision on all matters which come within the scope of his section."

 (The RSHA, as a central authority (Hauptamt) is parallel, according to this terminology, to a ministry, and its divisions (Aemter) to departments.) 

The following exchange of questions and answers took place between the learned Attorney General and the Accused (Session 95, Vol. IV, pp. xxxx23-24):    

"Q. ...Is it your contention that, whereas all the heads of sections had authority as herein described, in Department IV, Mueller did not agree that his subordinate should possess such authority, or are you arguing that in the Nazi period none of the heads of sections had authority as stated herein?

 "A. I would not dare contest what has just been said.  I am only saying what I know from my own experience and from what I myself went through.

"Q. That is to say, a head of section had the right of decision, but you, as Mueller's head of section, did not have the right of decision?

 "A. It seems to me that it may be said that at that time the matter depended upon the personality of one's superior, insofar as he had - if one may say so - dictatorial qualities.

 "Q. Did Mueller have such qualities or not?

 "A. As far as decisions were concerned, he was very pedantic and intolerant and reserved for himself all decisive action.  This much I can say.

 "Q. Was this the case also on minor matters, on details?

 "A. Mueller took decisions on the most trifling matters, yes.  Surprisingly enough, this was also true of Himmler, who went right into the smallest of details."

 Thus, the Accused's version is that, in principle, exhibit T/1423 was valid also during the Nazi period, and in the RSHA as well.  But the scope of a section head's powers was set by the department head, and since his department head, Mueller (who was the head of Department IV), reserved all decisions for himself, he, the Accused, as head of Section IVB4, was not left with any power of decision.

 172. One thing is undoubtedly true: Letters from Section IVB4 and the other RSHA Sections, just as from every section in every central authority of the Reich, were sent in the name of the head of the service, and if the head did not sign himself (this happened only on rare occasions of special significance), another person signed - the department head or the section head - in his name, or on his behalf, or "upon his instruction."  These letters were always written in the first person, and the "first person" was not the signatory to the letter, but the head of the service in whose name or on whose behalf or upon whose instruction the signature was appended.  The "first person," who appears in all the letters submitted to us, and signed by the Accused or Mueller, or Guenther, or Suhr, or anyone else, is the Head of the Security Police and the SD, namely Heydrich, and after him Kaltenbrunner, and in the interim period between Heydrich's death and the appointment of Kaltenbrunner, Himmler himself.

The reference IVB4 on a document raises a presumption which the Accused has to rebut, that the document was sent on the Accused's responsibility, whether it was signed by one of his subordinates or one of his superiors.

As to the Accused's own signature on a document, it is clear that, by appending his signature, the Accused accepted responsibility for his subordinates who had dealt with the subject of the document, but the fact that he himself signed the document is still not proof that he had taken the decision on the subject of the document on his own initiative or had acted in accordance with the instructions of his superiors.

But just as it is impossible to ascribe to the Accused the initiative for a certain letter signed by him, by reference solely to the "first person," so also initiative cannot be ascribed to some other person, for example Guenther, when that person signed a letter.  For example:

T/1398 is one of the files of the Duesseldorf Gestapo,  the contents of which we dealt with in an earlier part of this Judgment.  The office in Duesseldorf was engaged in evacuation to Terezin, and in a letter dated 3 June 1943 (p. 247 of T/1398) sent to Section IVB4, raised the question as to whether certain persons were to be evacuated.  On p. 252, we find a cable signed by the Accused, and drafted in the first person, which contains certain instructions (that the persons in question should not be evacuated for the moment.)  On p. 253, there is a further cable, this time signed by Guenther, which states, inter alia: "I have in the meantime dealt in a special cable with the questions which arose in your letter, dated 3 June 1943."  Thus, the use of the "first person" in the first cable does not refer to the Accused, nor in the second cable to Guenther, but in both the reference is to the Head of the Security Police and SD. 

173. Of course, this formal arrangement does not mean that Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner personally dealt with all RSHA affairs or initiated all RSHA activities; and the same applies to Mueller, as Head of Department IV of the RSHA.  Superintendent Less asked the Accused what in general were the matters on which he himself was allowed to make decisions, and the Accused replied (T/37, p. 1261), that he could decide about anything by himself, provided he had before him: 

"The orders, instructions, commands, and appropriate directives from Himmler, Head of the Security Police and the SD, or Mueller, or, of course, laws or executive regulations applying to the matter..." 

And he continues:

 "After that, upon my own authority - in all other cases I could decide myself, of course, but then, if some mishap occurred, I would be the one to have to take the consequences."

 What, for example, was the origin of the evacuation instructions sent to the various authorities?  In his Statement T/37, (pp. 906-907), the Accused stated:

 "... I sat at my desk in Berlin, I had instructions from my superiors - in this case there were not even any such instructions - I cannot even say from my superiors - because when it came to giving orders in principle, Mueller scarcely ever gave any order of his own, independently, he never deviated from the orders given by his superiors, Heydrich, Himmler.  This was the first thing.

 Secondly: I had the reports from people who were abroad, and here it was their duty to make suggestions on the basis of their practical experience, because they, above all, could see what action was at all practicable.  From these two sources, Section IVB4 prepared a report which was later either approved or rejected.  The directive followed from this procedure.  In practice, this could mean that a proposal which came in from Paris or from Zoepf in The Hague went out fourteen days later to Paris or The Hague in the form of a directive approved by the RSHA.  This is how things always developed in practice, and it was not the case at all that a directive was prepared at the beginning, once and for all, and that afterwards action was to be taken in accordance with it and a pattern set, but everything was in a state of continuous flux, a steady stream, and every moment addenda were prepared or cancellations made of details which had ceased to be valid, perhaps because Himmler had issued new rules, or perhaps the Head of the Security Police and the SD had given other orders, or perhaps also because new ideas had been culled from the reports of the officials in the occupied territories or territories under [German] influence, as a result of which other directives were given from above."

 Hence, also according to the statement of the Accused, he too, was competent to issue general instructions according to his discretion, within the limits of the orders which had come from above and by which he was bound.

 174. In his evidence before us, the Accused tried, as was his wont, to limit his personal role, and he argued that in fact he did not even make use of the authority he possessed, and never put forward any proposals of his own.  At the same time, he admitted that every draft prepared by the officials of his Section had to be approved by him.  Accordingly, he was asked (Session 106, Vol. IV, p.xxxx5):

"...whether everything issued by your Section had first to pass through your hands, or, in your absence, the hands of your permanent deputy and be initialled by you, or, in your absence, by him?"

To this the Accused replied:

 "Yes, this was so."

During the same session (p. 7), internal correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry was placed before the Accused.  From this correspondence it appears that the head of section (Referent) made a certain proposal, which went up to the Minister for Foreign Affairs via the department head, and returned to the section head after the minister had inserted a certain correction.  The Accused agreed that in the Foreign Ministry it was the custom for the section head to put forward proposals.  And when it was put to the Accused (p. 11) that it was difficult to understand why the same procedure did not apply to his own Section, he could only find the following reply: 

"...On the Jewish Question there were so many instructions, so many orders...so many points of contact with the central governing authorities, with all the Party authorities, that it was altogether difficult for the State Police to deal with this and to do what all the authorities wanted.  Its hands were full, occupied with executive work.  The orders and the aims used to contradict each other.  They interfered in everything, they demanded and requested, and this is why there was not even any need to make suggestions.  Not only my Section was not called upon to make proposals, even Mueller, as a general rule, was not called upon to make suggestions.  Everything that the police did here was by way of carrying out the requests of others who were exerting pressure, making requests, making demands, and making numerous suggestions."

There is no doubt that other authorities in the Third Reich also sought to show their ability in the handling of Jewish affairs.  But this explanation that the RSHA as whole was only the servant of others does not appear to us to be worthy of serious consideration, and we therefore reject it. 

Huppenkothen, who was a Section Head in Department IV of the RSHA, gave evidence about Mueller's work methods.  The gist of his statement is that Mueller had a strong tendency "to do everything by himself as far as possible" (p. 6 of the testimony), but the witness adds that this tendency was especially felt in Mueller's special field of interest, which was the war against Communism.  Similarly, Huppenkothen confirms (p. 8) that Mueller would at times pass individual cases for action to sections which actually had no competence in the matter, or devolve duties on a specific official, without the knowledge of the authorized Referent, and there were complaints about this practice.  This phenomenon was also connected particularly, but not solely, with Mueller's special field, the war against Communism.  Mueller did not rush to make decisions (p. 9) but in all unusual cases asked for instructions from above, and this also limited the activities of his own subordinates.  There were also complaints about this, but Huppenkothen does not remember the Accused complaining.  Here we shall mention the following statement made by the witness:

"It often happened that Mueller did not approve the orders submitted to him without further discussion, but altered them or addressed questions to his superiors." (pp. 9-10)

 Six, who was Head of Department VII in the RSHA until 1941, gave evidence about the status of the Accused himself in the RSHA (pp. 4-6 of his evidence):

 "The authority which Eichmann had is not known to me in detail, but there is no doubt that he had greater authority than the other Heads of Sections.  This was the general opinion in the RSHA.  The general impression was that Eichmann was not merely subordinate to Mueller, but to some extent already stood alongside him.  Mueller was known as one of the worst whips, and I must say that the two matched each other well.  It can be assumed that, had Eichmann been under somebody else's orders, and not Mueller's, he would not have had such wide powers as he in fact had...in line with his whole attitude, Eichmann did not go beyond the instructions had been given."

Wisliceny gave evidence at Nuremberg (T/58, p. 2) that special powers had been given to the Accused by the Head of the Security Police and by Mueller, and he continued as follows (p. 8):

"I know that Eichmann dealt cautiously with all the questions relating to his special task, and especially with all the files.  In every respect, he was the complete bureaucrat.  He immediately prepared a memorandum on every conversation he had with any of his superiors.  He always used to remark to me that this was the most important thing, that he should always be covered from above.  He himself refrained from taking personal responsibility and made every effort to obtain cover for his responsibility vis-a-vis his superiors, i.e., Mueller and Kaltenbrunner."

 It is difficult to understand Huppenkothen's statement with regard to the Accused's status.  In his sworn affidavit dated 18 July 1946 (T/159), he said:

 "The Jewish Section (IVB4, afterwards IVA4b) and its director, Eichmann, held a special position in Department IV."

Huppenkothen's evidence in this case shows a clear desire on his part to retract these remarks in the affidavit he had given earlier.  To that end, he used special terminology, according to which he makes a distinction between (a) Sonderstellung, (b) besondere Stellung, (c) Ausnahmestellung, expressions which even a person well versed in the German language would have difficulty in distinguishing one from the other (if indeed any distinction exists).  In spite of this semantic hair-splitting, Huppenkothen now again confirms that the Accused had "special status" (`besondere Stellung') in Department IV (p. 7). 

Morgen, who had judicial duties in the SS, also gave evidence at Nuremberg as a witness for the defence on behalf of the SS, and his testimony was submitted to us by Counsel for the Defence (N/94).  Morgen stated there that, during the Third Reich, he had investigated the question of the extermination of the Jews and in mid-1944 had come upon mention of the Accused's activities. He continues (p. 51): 

"I requested the SS court in Berlin to conduct the investigation against Eichmann on the basis of my comments.  Therefore the SS court in Berlin submitted an order for Eichmann's arrest to Kaltenbrunner as the person competent in judicial matters (Gerichtsherr).  Dr. Bechmann (apparently the judge who submitted the order to Kaltenbrunner) told me that dramatic incidents then took place.  Kaltenbrunner immediately summoned Mueller, and the judge was then told that an arrest was absolutely out of the question, because Eichmann was carrying out top secret duties, of the highest importance, on behalf of the Fuehrer."

176. All these testimonies and affidavits, even the cautious evidence of Huppenkothen, point to the Accused's strong and influential position in the RSHA, and are incompatible with the tendency of the Accused to represent himself as having been devoid of any initiative or influence from 1941 onwards.  Of course, the statements by these witnesses must be examined carefully, for at least some of them were accomplices, and therefore their statements require corroboration, and not only in a formal sense.

 Corroboration of this kind comes from the Accused himself.  Exhibit T/1393 (File No. 17 of the Sassen Document) contains remarks and notes in the Accused's handwriting, and exhibit T/1393/a contains the same extracts from Sassen's own document to which the remarks in exhibit T/1393 refer, and without which the remarks are unintelligible.  These extracts were taken from the Sassen Document with the consent of the Attorney General and the Counsel for the Defence, and we regard them as authenticated by the Accused's handwritten remarks (Session 75, Vol. IV. p. xxx26).  In the first extract (p. 1 of T/1393/a) the Accused relates an incident which occurred between himself and Wolff, Himmler's adjutant, who held the rank of general (Obergruppenfuehrer).  Wolff requested that a certain person not be deported, and the Accused refused to comply with this request.  Wolff became angry and remarked that the Accused was only an Obersturmbannfuehrer, whereas he himself was an Obergruppenfuehrer.  To this the Accused replied:

 "Yes, Obergruppenfuehrer, I know that, but may I be permitted to reply that you are now speaking to the State Secret Police and to the Referent of the Secret Police Office, Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann."

Here we shall mention again the cable from Veesenmayer (T/1215) in which he reports the Accused's opposition to the emigration of Jews from Hungary.  What was the meaning of this opposition?  The Accused could not reconcile himself to the order, which was known to him, of the Fuehrer himself, lest some thousands of Jews might escape the general slaughter.  Here, is revealed before us not a bureaucratic official, but a man with a will of his own, who feels his own power to the point that even the Fuehrer's order no longer represents an unalterable decision for him. 

177. There is no contradiction between this kind of status and the constant anxiety to be "covered," to which so many of the above witnesses testified.  And if Mueller, the head of the Gestapo, one of the key men in the Nazi security network - who sat in his office and was not prominent outside it, but pulled the strings from his office - if he, too, took care to be "covered" from above, this tendency is certainly understandable in the Accused.  When he was already "covered" by an existing instruction, he acted without asking questions, and if he had before him a new question of principle, he prepared a draft order, approached his superiors - first of all, of course, Mueller, and Mueller approved it, or, as Huppenkothen said, did not approve it without further discussion, altered it or also addressed questions on it to those above him.

178. The Accused's Section also dealt with many individual cases of Jews who tried to escape from the jaws of death.  Much evidence, from all parts of Europe, has been submitted to us on such cases.  Nearly all of them had a tragic end, and in this, too, the Accused and the officials of his Section had a hand.  Here we shall mention only one case out of many, to illustrate what has been said about the standing of the Accused in his Section - this time as seen by an outsider.

 In Holland, Professor Meyers, Professor of Law at the University of Leyden, was arrested together with his family and taken to Westerbork camp.  His friends mobilized support and funds on his behalf, in order to secure permission for him to emigrate to Switzerland.  This request was refused in letters (T/534, T/535) emanating from the Accused's Section - one signed by Guenther and the second by the Accused - because Professor Meyers was an "intellectual."  His friends did not give up hope.  Efforts for the rescue of Professor Meyers were concentrated in the hands of a Dutch lawyer, Mrs. Van Taalingen-Dols, who has also published a book on this matter, entitled The Battle for a Man's Life.  Counsel for the Defence submitted to us an affidavit from Mrs. Taalingen-Dols, accompanied by extracts from the book (N/104).  The intention of Counsel for the Defence was to prove that the Accused and his Section did not have authority to permit individuals to emigrate from the areas under German rule.  Indeed, this was so: When emigration was stopped in 1941, Himmler reserved this power to himself and only permitted emigration in isolated and exceptional instances (and in return for the payment of a considerable sum in foreign currency). 

With the aid of influential persons, including a member of the SS, Mrs. Taalingen-Dols sought an interview with the Accused, of whom she says in her affidavit: 

"They always hinted to me that he was the supreme chief of Department IV (the group of `Jewish Departments') in the RSHA in Berlin).  As such they described him to me as an important and extremely influential man."

 She was granted an interview in Section IVB4 and on 22 July 1943 visited the Section, accompanied by a member of the SS.  The Accused was on one of his service journeys, and she was received by Guenther who "according to what he said, was authorized to give a binding reply" (p. 214).  Guenther repeated the prohibition on emigration, emphasizing that of late Himmler had rejected all applications of this kind.  When the lawyer asked whether Guenther would object to her trying to take a certain step in SD quarters in Holland, Guenther replies that "all the activities against the Jews are decided in Berlin, and all operations must be subordinate to this" (p. 216).  The decision, announced by Guenther on the spot, was: 

"The Reich...is prepared, as a special exception, to prevent the deportation of the Meyers family to the East, even though the professor is not yet 65, and up to this age all the Jews are evacuated to the East." (p. 217) 

Guenther was asked what would happen to Professor Meyers in the event of a general evacuation, and his reply was that in such an event there were two possibilities - one of them, his being deportation to Terezin.  Counsel for the Defence informed us that the professor and his family were in fact sent to Terezin and survived. 

We shall also quote a statement by the same member of the SS who was present during this conversation (p. 218): 

"He says that, the fact in itself that I was allowed at all to appear personally at the RSHA -the holy of holies - and was permitted to speak there to the deputy of the supreme chief for Jewish affairs, must be regarded as an exception to basic procedure, because outsiders have no access there." 

From this case we have learned about the powers which existed in regard to emigration, and we have also learned that Guenther - and how much more so the Accused - had the power to decide upon the exceptional treatment of a specific Jewish family.  We have learned further that this decision could only be made in Section IVB4 in Berlin, and not on the spot, at the office of the Adviser on Jewish Affairs in Holland.  Finally, we must point out with what fear and trembling all of them, including the SS man,  mentioned the name of the Accused, the arbiter of life and death.

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