"The Einsatzgruppen Case"
Military Tribunal II

Case No.9

The United States of America

--against--

Otto Ohlendorf, Heinz Jost, Erich Naumann, Otto Rasch
Erwin Schulz, Franz Six, Paul BLobel, Walter Blume,
Martin Sandberger, Willy Seibert, Eugen Steimle, Ernst
Biberstein, Werner Braune, Walter Haensch, Gustav
Mosske, Adolf Ott, Eduard Strauch, Emil Hausmann,
Waldemar Klingelhoefer, Lothar Fendler, Waldemar von
Radetzky, Felix Ruehl, Heinz Schubert, and Mathias Graf,
Defendants

Einsatzgruppen Index Page

Part III

[I have not inserted hyperlinks in the text of the case everywhere where this would have been possible. The two files that are most likely to be of immediate interst are the Glossary and Bioprofiles, the latter providing brief biographical details, both files being continually updated. There are links to those files at the bottom of this `page', to which you can navigate by holding down the Ctrl key and pressing the End key. For information on the referencing of Internet sources see Chapter 4 of S D Stein Learning, Teaching and Researching on the Internet. Addison Wesley Longman. November 1998]


Page 89

V. ORGANIZATION OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN

a. Introduction

Before the invasion of Russia in June 1941, four Einsatzgruppen were formed, designated with the letters A, B, C, and D. Each Einsatzgruppe was subdivided into a group staff and several "Einsatz-" and "Sonderkommandos". Each was attached to an army group, a group of several German armies, except Einsatzgruppe D. Einsatzgruppe D was assigned to the 11th Army which later became a part of a 4th army group after the Germans reached the Caucasus. The following is reprinted here from the evidence on the organization of the Einsatzgruppen: a photocopy of a large chart which was exhibited in the courtroom throughout the trial, an Einsatzgruppen report dated 11 July 1941, and an affidavit of defendant Ohlendorf.

Page 90

[Organizational Chart of the Reich Securitity Main Office and the Einsatzgruppen]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2934 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 78

EXTRACT FROM OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT U. S. S. R. NO. 19, II JULY 1941

[Stamp] War Room

The Chief of the Security Police and of the SD

Room  Berlin, 11 I July 1941
32 copies
19th copy

-IV A 1-B. No. 1 B/ 41 top secret-

[Stamp] Top Secret

Operational Situation Report U. S. S. R. No. 19

I. Political survey.

In the Reich and in the occupied territories.
There are no special reports.

II. Reports of Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos.

For organizational reasons, the designations of the Einsatz-gruppen are changed, effective immediately, as follows:

Einsatzgruppe Dr. Stahlecker = Einsatzgruppe A
Einsatzgruppe Nebe = Einsatzgruppe B, up to now C
Einsatzgruppe Dr. Rasch = Einsatzgruppe C, up to now B
Einsatzgruppe Ohlendorf = Einsatzgruppe D.

The designations of the Einsatzkommandos remain unchanged for technical reasons.

Page 92

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2890
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 5

AFFIDAVIT OF OTTO OHLENDORF, 24 APRIL 1947, CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ElNSATZGRUPPEN

AFFIDAVIT

I, Otto Ohlendorf, swear, depose, and state-

1. The Einsatzgruppen for the Eastern Campaign (Russia 1941) began as a result of an agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service on the one hand, and the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army on the other. As I remember it, this agreement was signed by Heydrich and a representative of the High Command of the Army. On the basis of this agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army, the Einsatzgruppen were to take over the political security of the front areas, which, up to the time of the Russian campaign had been the charge of the army units them-selves. The secret field police were to occupy themselves only with security within the troops to which they were assigned.

2. As far as I remember, this agreement took effect about three weeks before the start of the Russian campaign and was as follows :

a. The Chief of the Security Police and SD formed his own motorized military units in the form of Einsatzgruppen, which were divided into Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos and were to be assigned in their entirety to the army groups or armies.
   The chief of the Einsatzgruppen was the deputy of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, who was assigned to the commanders in chief of the army groups or armies.

b. The armies or army groups had to supply the Einsatzgruppen with quarters, food, repairs, gasoline, and the like. Each army group and the 11th Army, the latter as nucleus of another army group for the Caucasus, was assigned an Einsatzgruppe, which in turn was divided into Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos.

3. During the Russian campaign there were four Einsatzgruppen, which bore the identifying letters A, B, C, and D. The

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area of operation of each Einsatzgruppe was determined by the fact that the Einsatzgruppe was assigned to a certain army group or army, and marched with it. The Einsatzkommandos or the Sonderkommandos formed from them were assigned from time to time to areas designated by the army group or army. The Einsatzkommandos were divided into Sonderkommandos in order to have more small units available for the size of the area of operation.

The areas of operation of the Einsatzgruppen were as follows:

Einsatzgruppe A operated from its central points: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, towards the east.

Einsatzgruppe B operated in the direction of Moscow in the area adjoining Einsatzgruppe A, to the south.

Einsatzgruppe C had the Ukraine, except for the part occupied by Einsatzgruppe D. At a later time, when Einsatzgruppe D advanced towards the Caucasus, Einsatzgruppe C was in charge of the entire Ukraine, insofar as it was not under civil administration.

Einsatzgruppe D had the Ukraine south of the line Chernovitsy, Mogilev-Podolski, Yampol, Ananev, Nikolaev, Melitopol, Mariupol, Taganrog, and Rostov. This area also included the Crimean Peninsula. At a later time, Einsatzgruppe D was in charge of the Caucasus area.

4. All of the Einsatzgruppen were made up of a number of Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos. For example, Einsatzgruppe D, of which I was chief, had the Sonderkommandos 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b, and Einsatzkommando 12.

5. The personnel strength of the Einsatzgruppe varied. It usually consisted of a total of 500 to 800 men. Einsatzgruppe D belonged to the smaller of the Einsatzgruppen. The officers and noncommissioned officers of the Kommandos were composed of men on detached service from the state police, criminal police, and in limited numbers from the security service. Aside from these, the troops were largely made up of emergency service draftees [Notdienstverpflichtete] and of companies of the Waffen SS and order police.

6. The Einsatzgruppen had the following assignments: They were responsible for all political security tasks within the operational area of the army units and of the rear areas insofar as the latter did not fall under the civil administration. In addition they had the task of clearing the area of Jews, Communist officials, and agents. The last named task was to be accomplished by killing all racially and politically undesirable elements seized who were considered dangerous to the security. I know that the

Page 94

Einsatzgruppen were assigned partly to the reconnaisance of guerrilla bands, fighting guerrilla bands, and to military tasks and, after completion of their basic assignments, were partly converted into combat units. All orders which pertained to the tactical and strategic situation or sphere of interest of the army groups or armies came from the commanding general, the chief of staff or counterintelligence officer of the army or army group to which the Einsatzgruppe was assigned. Orders concerning clearing out undesirable elements went directly to the Einsatzkommandos and came from the Reich Leader SS himself or by transmission through Heydrich. The commanders in chief were ordered by Hitler to support the execution of these orders. Through the so-called Commissar Order, the army units had to sort out political commissars and other similar undesirable elements themselves and hand them over to the Einsatzkommandos to be killed. The order pertaining to the sorting out of these elements from the prisoner-of-war camps was supplemented accordingly by executive orders from the High Command of the Army to the army units. The activity of the Einsatzgruppen and their Einsatzkommandos was carried out entirely within the field of jurisdiction of the commanders in. chief of the army groups or armies under their responsibility.

7. The reports of the Einsatzgruppen went to the armies or army groups and to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. Normally weekly or biweekly reports were sent to the Chief of the Security Police and SD by radio and written reports were sent to Berlin approximately every month. The army groups or armies were kept currently informed about the security in their area and other current problems. The reports to Berlin went to the Chief of the Security Police and SD in the Reich Security Main Office. After the creation of the command [headquarters] staff of the Chief of the Security Police and SD in about May 1942, this [staff] prepared the subsequent reports. The command staff consisted basically of Gruppenfuehrer [SS Major General] Mueller, chief of office IV, and Obersturmbannfuehrer [SS Lieutenant Colonel] Nosske, group chief in office IV, to whom specialists of offices III, IV, and VI were available for coordinating the composition of the reports. Questions which had to do with the personnel of the group and with garrisons went to office I. Administrative questions and matters concerning equipment were taken care of by office II. Information concerning the spheres of life (SD) went to office III. The chief of office IV received reports on the general security situation, including Jews and Communists. Information about the unoccupied Russian areas went to office VI. I have read the above statement, consisting of six (6) pages

Page 95

in the German language and I declare that this is the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I have had opportunity to make alterations and corrections in the above statement. I have made this statement freely and voluntarily, without any promise of reward and was subjected to no threat or duress.

Nuernberg, 24 April 1947. [Signature] OTTO OHLENDORF.

Page 96

VI. AUTHENTICITY OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN
REPORTS

a. Introduction

The case-in-chief of the prosecution consisted entirely of contemporaneous documents with the exception of 48 affidavits, 34 of which were affidavits sworn to by the defendants before the indictment was filed. The principal proof offered by the prosecution in support of counts one and two of the indictment were more than ninety Einsatzgruppen reports. These reports were consolidated reports prepared by a special office of the RSHA in Berlin from the reports of the individual Einsatzgruppen. These top secret reports were distributed to a number of state and Party offices in Germany. Between July 1941 and April 1942 approximate]y 195 consolidated Einsatzgruppen reports were prepared in Berlin and distributed.

The defense alleged that the consolidated reports contained many inaccuracies and even willful exaggeration concerning the number of exterminated people. The defense also claimed that the author of the reports had no first-hand knowledge of the observations contained therein, that his identity was unknown, and therefore the documents constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Selections from the evidence of the prosecution concerning the authenticity of the reports in describing the form in which they were compiled are set forth in pp. 97 to 102. Objections of the defense against the introduction of Einsatzgruppen reports as documentary evidence and extracts from the closing brief on behalf of the defendant Blobel, the closing statement on behalf of defendant Naumann, and from the testimony of the defendant Nosske follow in pp. 102 to 117.

b. Evidence

Prosecution Documents

Doc. No.        Pros. Ex. No. Description of Document              Page

NO—2716 ....         4          Affidavit of Heinz Hermarm Schu- 97
                                                             bert, 4 February 1947.

NO—4327 ....         6          Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 21 July          99
1947.

NO—4134 ...         7           Extracts, 21 and 27 October 1941, 100
                                                      from Operational Situation Re-
                                                            port U.S.S.R. No. 126.

Testimony

Extracts from the testimony of defendant Nosske.........................................113

 Page 97

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2716
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 4


AFFIDAVIT OF HEINZ HERMANN SCHUBERT, 4 FEBRUARY 1947

 

I, Heinz Hermann Schubert, swear, depose and declare—

1. I was born in Berlin on 27 August 1914. I went to school at Eisenberg (Thuringia) and at Berlin-Lichterfelde, including a trade school. In March 1931 I left school having obtained my school certificate [Obersekundareife].

2. From April 1931 to August 1933 I worked for a lawyer. Later on I became a civilian employee in the Bremen office of the Reich Chancellery.

3. On 10 October 1934 1 became a civilian employee with the SD and remained there until the end of the war. On 1 May 1934 I was taken over from the Hitler Youth into the Party and held membership card No. 3,474,350. On 10 October 1934 I became a member of the SS with the membership No. 107,326.

4. In October 1941 I was assigned to the Einsatzgruppe D. I did not take part in the courses and set-up of the Einsatzgruppe in Dueben which took place previously, neither did I take part in the beginning of the Russian campaign.

5. When arriving at Nikolaev in October 1941 I was ordered to a conference with gruppenfuehrer Otto Ohlendorf, who at that time was the chief of Einsatzgruppe D. Ten more men who had arrived in a transport together with me attended this conference. The purpose of this conference was that Ohlendorf wanted to find out for which post a man was suited and could be used. None of us was meant to be leader of an Einsatzkommando. We were delegated to different units, most of them went to an Einsatzkornmando, while I stayed with the staff. We only got acquainted with the work of the Einsatzgruppen, Einsatz— and Sonderkommandos after having joined these units. When leaving Berlin we were not told about the activities of these units. I became Ohlendorf’s adjutant.

6. During this period I leaned that two new leaders came to Ohlendorf who later on received an Einsatzkommando each. After their arrival they had a lengthy conversation with Ohlendorf; I was not present. Based on my own experiences, I can say for certain that these two leaders during their conversation with Ohlendorf received instructions regarding their services. The reports of these leaders arriving at our headquarters were written in the manner prescribed by Ohlendorf and also contained information as to the number of Russians and Jews executed.

Page 98

7.The Einsatzgruppe reported in two ways to the Reich Security Main Office, once through radio, then in writing. The radio reports were kept strictly secret and, apart from Ohlendorf, his deputy Standartenfuehrer Willy Seibert and the head telegraphist Fritsch, nobody, with the exception of the radio personnel, was allowed to enter the radio station. This is the reason why only the above-mentioned persons had knowledge of the exact contents of these radio reports. The reports were dictated directly to Fritsch by Ohlendorf or Seibert. After the report had been sent off by Fritsch, I received it for filing. In cases in which numbers of executions were reported a space was left open, so that I never knew the total amount of persons killed. The written reports were sent to Berlin by courier. These reports contained exact details and descriptions of the places in which the actions had taken place, the course of the operations, losses, number of places destroyed and persons killed, arrest of agents, reports on interrogations, reports on the civilian sector, etc.

8. When Ohlendorf was absent from the staff of the Einsatzgruppe, no reports were sent to Berlin. As a rule his deputy Seibert accompanied him on his journeys of inspection and I was ordered "to look after the house", without, however, being allowed to solve any problems which might occur. I was never initiated into secret orders and when Ohlendorf and Seibert were absent from the staff, no decisions could be made. I do not know whether Ohlendorf had any secret files or whether he had statements as to the total number of executions.

9. I do not know whether the Einsatzgruppen or the Einsatzkommandos received orders concerning the execution of Russian prisoners of war. If these orders had come in through the normal channels, I would have seen them. This, however, does not exclude that Ohlendorf had them as secret files in his office.

10. From summer 1942 until the end of 1944 I was Ohlendorf's adjutant in office III of the Reich Security Main Office and later on I worked under Dr. Hans Ehlich in office III B of the Reich Security Main Office. It is known to me that both of them received the compiled reports of the Einsatzgruppen which were issued as reports on the situation from the occupied eastern territories. I have read the foregoing deposition consisting of 4 pages in the German language, and declare that it is the full truth to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have had the opportunity to make alterations and corrections in the above statement. I made this declaration voluntarily without any promise of reward and I was not subjected to any duress or threat whatsoever.
Nuernberg, Germany, 4 February 1947.

[Signed] HEINZ HERMANN SCHUBERT 98


Page 99

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-4327
PROSECUTlON EXHIBIT 6

AFFIDAVIT OF KURT LINDOW, 21 JULY 1947

I, Kurt Lindow, swear, state, and depose-

1. I was born on 16 February 1903 in Berlin and attended the Lessing-Gymnasium and the Kirchner Oberreal-School. I studied commercial science and law, without, however, passing the government examination, and was a business apprentice from 1922 to 1928. In April 1928 I joined the criminal police, Berlin, as a candidate and was transferred to Altona as assistant inspector later on where I remained until 1932. I was subsequently transferred to Elbing and later on to Hannover where I remained till 1938. In Hannover I was chief of the counter intelligence service, holding this office from 1935 to 1937. In 1938 I was retransferred to the political police later renamed state police, where I worked with the protective custody subdepartment from 1938 to 1940. Until 1941 I was attached to the counter-intelligence subdepart-ment and was transferred later on to the subdepartment dealing with Communists where I remained until the middle of 1944. At that time I received the order to report to the Reich Security Main Office, office I, and was attached to this office as instructor for the training of inspectors.

2. In 1935 I joined the SS; my membership number is 272,350. On 1 May 1937 I joined the Party, my membership number is 4,609,289.

3. In October 1941, till about middle of 1942, I first was deputy chief and later on chief of subdepartment IV A 1. This subdepartment deaIt with communism, war crimes, and enemy propaganda; moreover, it handled the reports of the various Einsatzgruppen until the command staff was set up in 1942. The Einsatzgruppen in the East regularly sent their reports to Berlin by wireless or by letter. The reports indicated the various locations of the Gruppen and the most important events during the period under survey. I read most of these reports and passed them on to inspector Dr. Knobloch of the criminal police who made them up into a compilation which at first was published daily under the title "Operational Situation Reports U. S. S. R.". These reports were stencilled and I corrected them; afterwards they were mimeographed and distributed. The originals of the reports which were sent to the Reich Security Main Office were mostly signed by the commander of the Einsatzgruppe or his deputy. 4. The reports "Operational Situation Reports U. S. S. R.", Nos.

[Pages 100-103 to be added]

Page 104

mechanical difficulty in the actual photographing of the document. Do I understand you to say, Dr. Bergold, that you insist on the presentation of the original report itself, and how would that help you any more than the photograph would?

DR. BERGOLD: No, the photostat isn't always the same. Sometimes one can see, by looking at an original, that, for example, different kinds of paper were used so that the original might be composed of different reports. Or that various typewriter ribbons were used. But you can only see that by looking at the original. The photostat does not show these 'color differences nor does it show the differences in the quality of paper.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Well, Mr. Ferencz, what have you to say to this?

MR. FERENCZ: Your Honor, there are two different objections to this document. The first objection made is that document which we have offered as a photostat of the original has, on the first page, the date 29 October 1941, whereas, on one of the pages next to the end, it has the date 2'7 October 1941. It seems quite immaterial to me whether the date was 29 October or 27 October. We have offered the document for a completely different purpose.

The second objection, if that is what there is on the document, as you pointed out, is a matter which will be seen by the Court and which will be given weight in judging the probative value of this particular exhibit. The second objection made, however, is that this photostat copy may not be a true copy of the original. Either because-

Pardon me, I'd understood it as being an objection that there may have been some error in copying the original. However, I see that defense counsel does not agree with me.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Well, Dr. Bergold, just what is your objection? The Tribunal had also understood it that way.

DR. BERGOLD: No, I merely say that the photostat is surely correct, but sometimes one can only judge a doubtful document if one looks at the original and sees if the original in itself is a closed document or doesn't consist of several reports. The photostat is, of course, always correct. The photostat is unimpeachable. My request is merely to submit the original. Then we can decide whether we can maintain the objection or not.

MR. FERENCZ: I would like to point out that the certificate which goes with every exhibit certifies that it is a true photostatic copy of the original. In most other cases it has not been necessary to present the original. However, in order that these defendants are convinced that they have been given every opportunity, I have had the originals brought here from Berlin. They are available in my office and defense counsel are welcome, at any

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time, to compare the photostatic copy with the original and I will be very glad to correct any errors.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Very well. That answers it very completely.

DR. BERGOLD: I thank the prosecution for their cooperation.

EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR
DEFENDANT BLOBEL

Documentary evidence in general

Case 9 has a special feature; it is the fact that this trial, at least as far as the submitting of evidence by the prosecution is concerned, is conducted with purely documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is frequently used in the Anglo-American way of conducting trials, but it is also used in German law and it is applied there in civil as well as in criminal law.

When considering the documents submitted by the prosecution as evidence, we have first of all a reason to discuss these documents in general and especially to raise considerable scruples which could be brought up against the unrestricted admitting of these documents as evidence.

Without doubt, every written article is a document which can be used as evidence, that is to say every article on which a human being expressed in writing, handwritten, typed or printed, an idea. Thus the documentary evidence consists of the setting-up of ideological contents. In its function as evidence, a document has either the character of an ordinary report document or that of a constitutive document. There is an additional viewpoint which is important in the classification of documents. A document may either designate somebody as the person from which the statement originates as his own, especially if the signature appears on it-the so-called signatory or signed documents-or it is submitted anonymously if the writer of the document cannot be identified-so-called anonymous documents. In the first case the document is "genuine" if it really originates from the person who is, in the document, said to be the writer; if it is not so, the document is "false". In the second case it cannot be inquired whether it is "genuine" or "false" as long as the identity of the person who has drafted the document has not been established.

Most of the documents which were submitted as evidence and

Page 106

which are to prove the guilt of the individual defendants concerning the punishable acts set forth in the indictment are the so-called situation reports U. S. S. R. and the so-called situation reports of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD (Reich Security Main Office).

According to the explanation given at the beginning, we are here concerned with report documents of the Reich Security Main Office; these documents attempt to furnish a survey of the activity of the units operating in the East-especially of the Einsatzgruppen, Einsatzkommandos, and Sonderkommandos-after 22 June 1941. Which units in this connection are concerned in detail will be discussed more thoroughly later on.

It will not and cannot be denied that the documents submitted are "genuine" evidence, that is to say, that the documents in question were actually drafted by the Reich Security Main Office. However, this does not exclude the established fact that the reported incidents may not be the pure truth, and actually all the defendants who up to now have testified under oath on the witness stand stated that these situation reports and operational situation reports of the Reich Security Main Office are highly unreliable, inaccurate and faulty, and that not only with regard to figures, but also with regard to the contents and the actual wording. (Tr. PP. 434 ff., 537 ff., 6.24 ff., 1104-05, 2684, 3102 ff 3490-91, 3495 -96.)

It is comprehensible, if, at least on the part of the prosecution, it is tried to invalidate the objection of the incorrectness of the documents by saying that if the defendants make statements to that effect, these statements cannot be true, because the documents speak for themselves and their value as evidence is established beyond any reasonable doubt. In view of the fact that the documents submitted constitute, with the exception of the affadavits made by the defendants themselves, nearly the entire evidence, such a defense which is directed against the trust-worthiness and correctness of documents could be understood and perhaps could be considered as the only defense which would be of any purpose. However, the general objection is not based on technical reasons of expediency in connection with the procedure, but it is justified and was made in order to be able to master at all the highly responsible task of finding the objective truth.

In order to be able to judge the documents submitted in an objective manner, the following question must be raised and answered: How were the "Situation Reports U. S. S. R." and the "Operational situation reports" of the Reich Security Main Office drafted ? And the additional question: What sources of mistakes were thus provided and what effect did they have?

Page 107

Drafting of the Operational Situation Reports
in the Reich Security Main Office

a. Construing of the Reports in the Reich Security Main Office

According to the result of the evidence taken up to now, especially the definitely trustworthy statements of the defendant Nosske as witness in his own case (Tr. pp. 3490-91, 3495-96),the following picture is given. The reports submitted as prosecution exhibits were drafted by the suboffice IV A l-communism, war crimes, enemy propaganda--of office IV of the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. Until about the end of April 1942 suboffice IV A 1 was the collection and evaluation center of all information and reports submitted by the Einsatzgruppen operating in Russia. In nearly daily reports-nearly 200 reports from July 1941 to April 1942-the original reports submitted to the Reich Security Main Office were summarized into the so-called operational situation reports U. S. S. R. The persons who were employed with the handling of the east reports were the suboffice chief Lindow and as collaborators Dr. Knobloch and Fumy. Only the Einsatzgruppen reported to Berlin and they sent either telegrams or written reports. (NO-4327, Pros. Ex. 6.) The reports which were sent by the Einsatzgruppen to suboffice IV A 1 for evaluation covered field III (living space [Lebensgebiete] ) as well as IV (executive). This fact alone, namely that the suboffice specialized on executive matters in the Reich Security Main Office (IV) was thus forced to handle also fields which were completely unknown to it and also, in addition, were covering an extensive sphere, had to lead to insufficiencies and mistakes. To this the fact is added that suboffice IV A 1, having only a small staff of personnel, was not in a position to handle such an extensive additional task and besides that the technical facilities which in doubtful cases would have permitted to consult a map or to inquire at the unit concerned did not exist. As additional source of deficiencies the. insufficiency of the communication installations should not remain unmentioned. Frequently the stations and Einsatz-areas were more than 1,000 kilometers distant from Berlin and therefore the transmission was rendered more difficult. It is true that a report transmitted by telegram or courier does not change its contents because it is being transmitted over a few additional hundreds of kilometers or is perhaps 2 weeks longer on its way. But in this connection the decisive fact is that according to experience, sources of mistakes cannot be eliminated completely where teletypes are concerned and that the transmission of

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written reports is to a great extent subject to the contingencies of more or less rapidly functioning transport communications. The irregular arrival of the report which was a consequence thereof had to lead to considerable distortions and misrepresentations. In this connection the possibility that reports arrived by teletype and the same reports arrived a second time later on by courier also existed. The taking of evidence showed several examples of the fact that reports with a later date were registered earlier than reports which on account of their being longer on the way were received at a later time by the evaluation center. In cases of doubt it was considered better to use a figure twice, in any case always the higher one. On no account were the Einsatzgruppen and their detachments to represent a bad picture, because the reports in the Reich Security Main Office were compiIed by order of Heydrich. It should be obvious that such insufficiency impairs the evidence value of documents drafted under such conditions to a considerable degree. But neither should a psychological element be overlooked. These insufficient conditions, which finally, in April 1942, brought about an essential change in the evaluation of the reports (Tr. pp. 3495-96) were known to all the persons handling these matters. In this way is it a surprise if they, on account of the hopelessness of being able to do away with these insufficiencies, being completely aware that only half of the material was to be shown anyway, simply did not care? They entered no risk-at least from the viewpoint of the conditions at that time-that any undesirable and unpleasant consequences should arise. Russia was far way. Furthermore, who was to check the reports and who was to complain? Third persons had no insight and the chief of the Einsatzgruppen with his detachment chiefs had other troubles and perhaps only a favor was done to him, because nobody was to be left out in case of promotions and awarding of orders. But it is irrelevant whatever the reasons for an untrue reporting may have been; it is a fact that during the course of the war this untrue reporting increased more and more. Himmler's statements in his Posen speech on 4 October 1943 are an important proof for that and nobody will be able to say that this warning was given without reason and and was not to be taken seriously. I quote:

"I now come to a fourth virtue which is very scarce in Germany-truthfulness. One of the major evils, which developed during the war, is untruthfulness in reports, statements, and informations, which subordinate offices send to their superior offices in civilian life, in the state, Party, and armed forces. Reports or statements are the base for every decision. The

Page 109

truth is that in many branches one can assume in the course of this war that 95 out of 100 reports are plain lies or only half true or half correct." (Blobel 11, Blobel Ex. 10.)

b. Procedure of inclusion of the report in the situation report
drafted by the Reich Security Main Office

The statements made hitherto were concerned only with the working conditions which existed in suboffice IV A 1. If the unsatisfactory conditions which prevailed there were already enough to cause this office to turn out piece work and incomplete results only, the sources of deficiency were further extended by the so-called report or information channel from subordinate to superior offices. We established-suboffice IV A 1 received the reports directly from the Einsatzgruppcn. However, these reports were again only a summary of that which the individual detachments reported in writing, orally, or by teletype; added to this were other sources which, in case of measures to be taken by other, independently working units, or in case of cooperation of several units, were supplied. There is no doubt that the evaluation of the reports collected by the Einsatzgruppen was handled differently and was subject, to a great extent, to the attitude of the group chief and his departmental assistants. But this had taken place once already in a similar manner in most of the Einsatz-or Sonderkommandos, because it was not expedient to have the reports sent directly from the Teilkommando to the Einsatzgruppe, which might have resulted from a particularly difficult task or from special conditions of the area of operations. It was a rule to send the reports of the Teilkommandos first to the Kommando chiefs. He based his activity report to the Einsatz-gruppen on the reports received by him, or he had them drafted by his assistant [Sachbearbeiter], according to the distribution of task which was in force in his detachment. If the exhibits submitted by the prosecution were identical with the above mentioned original reports and if they perhaps even bore the signature of the Kommando chief concerned, then objection against their correctness would have little hope to be successful; then the fact that the author of the document would have lied either when drafting the document or now in the trial because he is not brave enough to state the truth would be established.

The defense too-its interest in the establishing of the unrestricted truth is just as great as that of any other party in the trial-regrets that it is not possible to submit the original reports of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatz or Sonderkommandos as documentary evidence.

[Page 110-111 omitted]

Page 112

doubted the reporting. Worth mentioning in this respect is that Ohlendorf too declared while in the witness stand that the execution of Jews and Communists happened in the first part of the campaign more often than in the year 1942. As evidence of the fact that the numbers mentioned in the operational situation reports do not have an absolute value as evidence, reference may finally be made yet to the affidavit of Fumy who is very well acquainted with the matter as he collaborated in the compilation of the operational situation report, and who due to his own observations is best able to judge whether these reports are reliable. If Naumann states therefore on the witness stand that according to its form the compilation of the Operational Situation Report dated 21 April 1942 is not at all familiar, then this appears credible; for this form obviously does not originate from the report of the Einsatzgruppe B. In its rebuttal the prosecution offered as proof for the numbers mentioned in the Operational Situation Report dated 21 April 1942 regarding executions carried out, the Documents U. S. S. R., 48 and 56, Prosecution Exhibits 234 and 235.

These documents have no value as evidence as I stated when the documents were offered. First of all I point out that the text of both documents corresponds in part word for word. The numbers mentioned also correspond exactly. Both documents are obviously parts of the same record. The contents of the documents have no connection at all with the acts of Naumann. There reference is rather made to how many dead were found in the mass graves, and that in a small percentage of cases, death was due to gunshot wounds. The cause of death is unknown otherwise. One should not overlook the fact that the less immediate vicinity of Smolensk in which the graves were found was twice within two years the theater of stubborn fighting. If one assumes that, insofar as gunshot wounds were the cause of death, these were due to executions, which is also not an established fact, then the further question arises, by whom and on whose orders these executions took place. I would also briefly like to mention in this respect that the victims of Katyn, for instance, were also mentioned in these reports, those, who according to German reports have always been designated as victims of executions carried out by Russian agencies. It has not been ascertained to this day who actually carried out these executions. Before the International Military Tribunal this question has also not been cleared despite the fact that three witnesses of the Russian prosecution and three witnesses of the German defense have been interrogated in this respect.

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Aside from these arguments, which in themselves already show that the mentioned documents are absolutely without value as proof of the act incriminating Naumann, I would like to mention in addition that Naumann was active in Smolensk only during part of the period into which, according to the reports, the death of the bodies found would fall. Besides, any connection between the crimes mentioned in the reports and Naumann's activity is missing. None of the persons mentioned in the reports with the exception of Naumann was a member of the Einsatzgruppe. What Naumann is supposed to have done is also not mentioned in the reports. The contents of the reports contain nothing but what was shown by the film offered by the prosecution as evidence. That is why I objected at the time against the acceptance of the film 1* as evidence and the Tribunal sustained this objection, too. Documents U. S. S. R., 48 and 56, and Prosecution Exhibits 234 and 235, have therefore no value at all as evidence in the proceedings against Naumann and are thus eliminated as evidence. Only Prosecution Exhibit 76 remains as evidence, but due to the reasons already mentioned by me, it has only insignificant value as evidence.

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT NOSSKE**

DIRECT EXAMINATION
[Tr. pp. 3493-6]

DR. HOFFMANN (counsel for defendant Nosske) : I now return to your activity. You were then in charge of a department in this office, and what was the size of this department?


DEFENDANT NOSSKE: The department consisted of four people besides myself, one co-worker, one registrar, and two stenog-raphers.

Q. And what was your task in detail?

A. My task was to deal with reports which had been sent us

* The prosecution offered a fllm into evidence aa Document NO. U. S. S. R.-81. Prosecution Exhibit 173. Counsel for the defendants Naumann and Seibert objected to the showing of the film. and pointed out that it was without probative value. After seeing the film, the Tribunal sustained defense counel's objection. (Tr. P. 257.)

**Complete testimony is recorded in mimeographed transcript, 4, 8, 9 December 47, pp.3424-3687

Page 114

by the main office about partisan reconnaissance, activity and counter-measures, and to evaluate these reports, and to compile them clearly and concisely. Particular care had to be taken that the organizational form of the partisan groups was recognized, their tactics had to be established, the means with which they worked, and so forth, in order to inform the field agencies dealing with partisan reconnaissance how partisan activity was develop ing in the whole eastern territory.

Q. Did you have to combine any executive power with this activity?

A. No. Executive power could not arise out of this purely receptive activity. Furthermore, no directives were even prepared in this particular department. Directives could only be issued through the ordinary channel of command in existence, that was only through the office chief, the Chief of the Security Police, or Himmler himself.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Dr. Hoffmann, was it his office which prepared the operational reports, his office?

DR. HOFFMANN: Yes, as the witness says, but only those concerning partisan activity, whereas reports concerning shootings, based on the Hitler order we know of, went to Eichmann who was in charge of Jewish affairs.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: But the operational reports covered all activities. Activities against partisans, activities against Jews, activity against saboteurs, everything?

DR. HOFFMANN: Yes, and perhaps the witness can comment on this again.

DEFENDANT NOSSKE: Your Honor, these activity reports which were issued in the Reich Security Main Office are to be distinguished from those which bear the title "Reports from Soviet Russia". These reports, about two hundred, which also are the subject of the indictment here were issued between June [1941] and about the end of April 1942. These reports contained everything, partisan warfare as well as Jewish actions and all the activities taking place in the occupied eastern territories reported by the Einsatzgruppen. These reports only appeared as top secret matters. In the spring, the basic change occurred ; from this time on reports were not issued concerning Soviet Russia, but the new reports were called "Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories". Already the name shows that there was a basic difference in these reports, and these new reports, which are also available here in the Document Center but which have not been introduced in evidence, contain these reports from the occupied eastern territories.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: But who actually made up the

Page 115

reports in that office, the reports that have been introduced here in the document books?

DEFENDANT NOSSKE: The reports which have been submitted in evidence here by the prosecution were issued by department IV Al. That is a subdepartment of office IV in the Reich Security Main Office. The people concerned are known, the man in charge was Lindow, and his collaborators were Dr. Knobloch and Fumy.

Q. And who?

A. Fumy and Dr. Knobloch.

Q. Then these three men are the ones who actually prepared the reports which we have here as evidence, Lindow, Knobloch, and Fumy ?

A. That is correct.

DR. HOFFMANN: But until when, Witness?

A. These reports of events from U. S. S. R. came to a stop at the end of April 1942. The last copies bear number about 194 or 196. The reports from the occupied eastern territories which were issued after that, and only weekly, bear new numbers which begin with one.

PRESIDING JUDGE MUSMANNO: Then, do I understand that the modus operandi was for these three men, either acting separately or collectively, to receive the reports from the field and then to combine them and issue them as reports from Berlin?

A. Yes, that is correct.

DR. HOFFMANN: But, Herr Nosske, that was not your activity, was it?

A. I had nothing to do with reports that have been submitted here as evidence by the prosecution. They had been concluded at a time before I joined the office.

Q. Do you know what the reason was for this new kind of reporting?

A. As my predecessor had told me, it was for the reason that the manner of reporting until then had been most unreliable, incorrect, and inaccurate. I myself personally learned from Fumy at a later date that these two people, Dr. Knobloch and Fumy, were so much overworked and had to work under such bad conditions that it can easily be explained why these reports were so inaccurate. Therefore, the evaluation of the reports later on was not only transferred to this one particular office but was distributed to a number of individual departments.

CROSS EXAMINATION [Tr. PP.. 3615-3618]

MB. WALTON: In your direct examination you said you first

[Page 116-117 omitted]

Document compiled by Dr S D Stein
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Stuart.Stein@uwe.ac.uk
S D Stein

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