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26 Nov.
45
following the successful annexation
of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary
to revise the Plan Grün to take into account the changed attitude,
as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. I shall now read
item number 2 of this file:
"Berlin,
22 April 1938. Bases of the Dissertation on 'Grün.'
"Summary
of discussion between Führer and General Keitel of 21 April:
"A. Political aspect.
"1. Strategic
surprise attack, out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility
of justification, has been turned down. As result would be: hostile
world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure
is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the
mainland.
"2. Action after a time of diplomatic
clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
"3.
Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, the
assassination of German Ambassador in connection with an anti-German
demonstration.)
"B. Military conclusions.
"1.
The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and
3). Case 2 is the undesired one since Grün will have taken
security measures.
"2. The loss of time caused by
transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail-which is unavoidable,
but should be cut down as far as possible-must not impede a
lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.
"3.
'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately with a view to
penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a
strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to
the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of
the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks
by the Army and Air Force.
"The Air Force is to support
the individual columns (for example dive-bombers; sealing of
installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of
reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating
the garrisons).
"4. Politically, the first 4 days of
military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective
military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise.
Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military
intervention, draw 275
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