. NMT03-T0148
Volume III · Page 148
of trade, the construction of Autobahnen [super highways], the elimination of unemployment, the creation of great social institutions, as for instance the National Socialist Public Welfare Association (NSV) and the Winter Relief Scheme (WHW), continuously, year in, year out, were in the limelight with the German public and overshadowed everything else, not to mention events in the field of foreign policy like the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, international sport events such as the Olympic games, etc. The greater part of the population, even the educated classes, were not aware that unemployment was only eliminated by an ever more formidable increase of the economic capacity for the purpose of the coming war, and that the donations and subscriptions which the people collected by hard work for their social institutions, disappeared in the gorge of rearmament. Did not Hitler's protestations that the construction of Autobahnen was to be considered proof of Germany's peaceful intentions of reconstruction, and not as the expression of militaristic mentality, sound entirely convincing in view of the fact that should it come to the point these same Autobahnen would operate strategically to Germany's disadvantage which actually did happen?
By his systematic and indubitably extremely cunning propaganda policy, Dr. Goebbels brought about step by step a constantly increasing isolation from foreign countries which made it more and more impossible to form a truly objective judgment about other countries and questions of foreign policy. It is true, treaties with foreign countries were heralded with much publicity as proof of the desire for amicable cooperation with other nations. Considering these circumstances, were men, even those in higher positions, as for instance, Dr. Rothenberger, who did not have the slightest insight into matters of foreign policy, to show less confidence in the National Socialist leadership of the state than evidently was manifested by the foreign statesmen who concluded treaties with the Third Reich. Suspicious events were not discussed by the press and the public and thus escaped public attention and judgment to a large extent. Insofar as dangerous practices of national socialism were still discernible in domestic and foreign policy, they never appeared as naked facts before the German public as is stated by the IMT verdict but were exhaustively "disguised" in comments rendered harmless or even excused and justified as the results of alleged intrigues by the opposing camp.
Without wishing to deny that there exists a certain predisposition on the part of the German people for the reception of authoritarian wisdom, bad though it may often be, one cannot get around the fact, that, based on the circumstances described above, the
