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Volume III · Page 976
"It was the Nazi confidence that we would never chase and catch them, and not a misunderstanding of our opinion of them, that led them to commit their crimes. Our offense was thus that of the man who passed by on the other side. That we have finally recognized our negligence and named the criminals for what they are is a piece of righteousness too long delayed by fear."¹ |
| That the conception of retrospective legislation which prevails under constitutional provisions in the United States does not receive complete recognition in other enlightened legal systems is illustrated by the decision in Phillips vs. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 [27 (1870-71) ) described by Lord Wright as "a case of great authority." We quote: |
"In fine, allowing the general inexpediency of retrospective legislation, it cannot be pronounced naturally or necessarily unjust. There may be occasions and circumstances involving the safety of the state, or even the conduct of individual subjects, the justice of which, prospective laws made for ordinary occasions and the usual exigencies of society for want of prevision fail to meet, and in which * * * the inconvenience and wrong, summum jus summa injuria." |
| We quote with approval the words of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe: |
"With regard to ‘crimes against humanity’, this at any rate is clear. The Nazis, when they persecuted and murdered countless Jews and political opponents in Germany, knew that what they were doing was wrong and that their actions were crimes which had been condemned by the criminal law of every civilized state. When these crimes were mixed with the preparation for aggressive war and later with the commission of war crimes in occupied territories, it cannot be a matter of complaint that a procedure is established for their punishment."² |
| Concerning the mooted ex post facto issue, Professor Wechsler of Columbia University writes: |
"These are, indeed, the issues that are currently mooted. But there are elements in the debate that should lead us to be suspicious of the issues as they are drawn in these terms. For, most of those who mount the attack on one or another of these contentions hasten to assure us that their plea is not one of immunity for the defendants; they argue only that they should have been disposed of politically, that is, dispatched out of hand. This is a curious position indeed. A punitive enterprise launched on the basis of general rules, administered in an adversary |
¹ The Nuremberg Trial: "Landmark in Law"; Foreign Affairs, January 1947, pages 180 and 184.
² Maxwell-Fyfe, foreword to "The Nuremberg Trial" (London, Penguin books. 1947), by R. W. Cooper.
