| |
| null and void."¹ The foregoing fact
alone demonstrates that the Polish Government was still in existence and was
recognized by the Government of the United States. Sir Arnold D. McNair
expressed a principle which we believe to be incontestable in the following
words: |
| |
"A purported incorporation of
occupied territory by a military occupant into his own kingdom during the war
is illegal and ought not to receive any recognition. * * * " ²
|
We recognize that in territory under
belligerent occupation the military authorities of the occupant may, under the
laws and customs of war, punish local residents who engage in fifth column
activities hostile to the occupant. It must be conceded that the right to
punish such activities depends upon the specific acts charged and not upon the
name by which these acts are described. It must also be conceded that Poles who
voluntarily entered the Alt [old] Reich could, under the laws of war, be
punished for the violation of nondiscriminatory German penal statutes.
These considerations, however, do not justify the action of the Reich
prosecutors who in numerous cases charged Poles with high treason under the
following circumstances: Poles were charged with attempting to escape from the
Reich. The indictments in these cases alleged that the defendants were guilty
of attempting, by violence or threat of violence, to detach from the Reich
territory belonging to the Reich, contrary to the express provisions of section
80 of the law of 24 April 1934. The territory which defendants were charged
with attempting to detach from the Reich consisted of portions of Poland, which
the Reich had illegally attempted to annex. If the theory of the German
prosecutors in these cases were carried to its logical conclusion it would mean
that every Polish soldier from the occupied territories fighting for the
restoration to Poland of territory belonging to it would be guilty of high
treason against the Reich and on capture, could be shot. The theory of the
Reich prosecutors carries with it its own refutation.
Prosecution in
these cases represented an unwarrantable extension of the concept of high
treason, which constituted in our opinion a war crime and a crime against
humanity. The wrong done in such prosecutions was not merely in misnaming the
offense of attempting to escape from the Reich; the wrong was in falsely naming
the act high treason and thereby invoking the death penalty for a minor
offense. |
__________ ¹ Department of State
Bulletin, 4 November 1939, page 468, cited in Hyde's International Law, Volume
1 (2d rev. ed.), page 391. ² "Legal Effects of War" 12d ed.)
(Cambridge. 1940), footnote on page 320.
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