. NMT03-T1127
Volume III · Page 1127
| caused to a German national but only to a racial German. Insofar as the German statutes required punishment of acts done with the intention of causing serious detriment to a national of the Reich, they extended the concept of treason in a manner unknown to the criminal law of any civilized state, and this law was made applicable in occupied and purportedly annexed territory. Notwithstanding the extremes to which the German laws of treason were extended, the defendant Lautz stated that he agreed with the Reich Leader SS and the president of the People's Court that a direct application of the German law of treason protects only German nationals and does not apply to racial Germans. He then stated: |
"Furthermore, I concur with the conception that the general political development which has meanwhile come about, particularly during the last years, which has enabled the Reich largely to protect its racial members of foreign nationality to a greater extent than it has been possible hitherto, must be borne in mind in this particular instance. Therefore, I find it necessary, on principle, to protect by means of the German penal code those racial Germans who have seriously suffered through action such as mentioned in paragraph 92, subparagraph 2, of the Penal Code, provided that action deserves punishment in accordance with sound German sentiment, but where such punishment, considering the elements of wrongdoing of that particular case, cannot be brought home on the strength of any other directly applicable penal regulation." |
| In conclusion the defendant Lautz stated
that in the majority of cases which have been committed by foreign nationals
abroad against racial Germans he would "have to report in each individual
case." Stated in plain language, Lautz proposed that the courts should try and convict Poles for acts which violated no statute of any kind, if they deserved punishment according to sound German sentiment. This proposal violates every concept of justice and fair play wherever enforced, but when applied against a Pole for an act done in his own country in time of peace, the proposition becomes a monument to Nazi arrogance and criminality. Such a Pole owed no duty of loyalty to any state except Poland and was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of no state but Poland. The prosecution of the Pole Golek would constitute a palpable violation of the laws of war (see: citations to the Hague Convention, supra), and any official participating in such a proceeding would be guilty of a war crime under C. C. Law 10. The document discloses that cases similar to that of Golek had been tried by the People's Court and that more prosecutions were expected in the future. As a |
