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Volume IV · Page 87
| what an SS leader had to expect in the event of noncompliance with orders. Himmler stated, among other things — |
"I want to lay down one directive. Should you ever know of a man who is disloyal to the Fuehrer or to the Reich, be it only in his thoughts, you have to see to it that this man is excluded from the order and we shall see to it that he loses his life * * *. I want to make a clear and unambiguous statement. It goes without saying that the little man has to obey * * *. Even more it goes without saying that all high SS chiefs are a model of unconditional obedience * * *. But orders must be sacred. If generals obey, the armies obey automatically * * *. The only commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty, loyalty, and obedience * * *." |
| Under Frederick the Second of Prussia,
Colonel von der Marwitz could refuse obedience in spite of his oath of
allegiance, because the carrying out of an order of the king would have meant
for him a conflict with morality and conscience. Marwitz' tomb bears the
characteristic inscription, "He saw Frederick's heroic epoch and fought with
him in all his wars. He chose disgrace, where obedience brought no honor." In
Adolf Hitler's Germany, men who refused obedience were either put in a
concentration camp or shot dead, regardless of person and rank, as is proved
above all by the measures against the participants in the events of the 20 July
1944.* In reality there was no chance to make a choice in accordance with the moral law; this applies also to the defendant Blobel. For either he had to carry out the order or if he refused to do so, he would lose his liberty, or he would even have been shot dead by a summary court martial. In addition the National Socialist regime during the war introduced the truly devilish device of family liability, in order to eliminate the last remnant of a will to disturb the machinery of its system. The fear to endanger even the closest relatives made the internally reluctant man abandon every better motion of his conscience. But the legal conclusion to be drawn from this situation must be that the defendant was in a genuine emergency, at least in a presumptive emergency. But this is a justifying reason according to the general principles of penal law. Even if the defendant Blobel, like so many other Germans, who have remained decent at heart, should be reproached with cowardice and egoistic self-preservation, the short statement may be sufficient, that this may not establish any punishable form of participation. At the end of the opening speech of the prosecution, reference |
*Abortive attempt to assassinate Hitler and overthrow his government.
