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| to hurriedly establish personal contact with
the commanders of the armies and with the commander of the army of the rear
area. It must be stressed from the beginning that cooperation with the armed
forces was generally good, in some cases, for instance with Panzer Group 4
under General Hoepner, it was very close, almost cordial. Misunderstandings
which cropped up with some authorities in the first days were cleared up mainly
through personal discussions. |
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At the start of the eastern campaign it
became obvious for the security police that its special work had to be done not
only in the rear areas, as was provided for in the original agreements with the
high command of the army, but also in the combat areas, and this for two
reasons on the one hand, the development of the rear area of the armies
was delayed because of the quick advance and on the other hand, the undermining
Communist activities and the fight against partisans took place mainly within
the areas of actual warfare especially when the Luga sector was reached.
To carry out security police tasks, it was desirable to enter into the
larger towns together with the armed forces. We had our first experiences in
this direction when a small advance Kommando under my leadership entered Kovno
together with the advance units of the armed forces on 25 June 1941. When the
other larger towns, especially Lepaya, Yelgava, Riga, Tartu, Tallin, and the
larger suburbs of Leningrad were captured, a Kommando of the security police
was always with the first army units. Above all, Communist functionaries and
Communist documentary material had to be seized, and the armed forces
themselves had to be safeguarded against surprise attacks inside the towns; the
troops themselves were usually not able to take care of that because of their
small numbers. For this purpose the security police, immediately after capture,
formed volunteer detachments of reliable inhabitants of all three Baltic
provinces who carried out their duties successfully under our command. As an
example it may be mentioned that the armed forces suffered considerable losses
through guerrillas in Riga, on the left of the Dvina [Daugava] river; on the
right bank of the Dvina river, however, after these volunteer detachments had
been organized in Riga, not a single soldier was injured, although members of
these Latvian detachments were killed and wounded in fighting against dispersed
Russians.
Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, though this
inducement proved to be very difficult. Following out orders, the security
police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and
determination most decisively. But |
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