c. Elimination of badly
needed tradesmen who were in many instances indispensable even in the interests
of the armed forces.
d. Consequences as to foreign policy
propaganda which is obvious.
e. Bad effects on the troops which
in any case get indirect contact with the executions.
f.
Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the executions
regular police. Scooping off the agricultural surplus in the Ukraine for the
purpose of feeding the Reich is, therefore, only feasible if traffic in the
interior of the Ukraine is diminished to a minimum. The attempt will be made to
achieve this
1. by annihilation of superfluous eaters (Jews,
population of the Ukrainian big cities, which like Kiev do not receive any
supplies at all);
2. by extreme reduction of the
rations allocated to the Ukrainians in the remaining cities;
3. by
decrease of the food of the farming population. |
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PARTIAL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2827 PROSECUTION EXHIBIT
74 |
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| EXTRACTS FROM
OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT U.S.S.R. NO. 143, 8 DECEMBER 194 |
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1 The Chief of the Security
Police and of the SD B. No. IV A 1 1B/41 Top
Secret |
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| Berlin, 8 December
1941 |
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| [Stamp] Top
Secret |
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65 copies 51st
copy |
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| Operational
Situation Report U.S.S.R. No. 143 |
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I. Locations and Lines of
Communication.
The locations and lines of communication reported in
Operational Situation Report No. 141 of 3 December 1941 have remained
unaltered.
II. Reports from the Einsatzgruppen and
Kommandos. Einsatzgruppe A
Location: Riga.
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