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Volume IV · Page 360
| important communication lines of the German
Army Group North ran through Esthonia, namely from the naval port of Tallin
over Narva and Pskov to the front end, from the Reich border over Tartu in the
direction of Leningrad. To nip such movements in the bud, or to keep them to as
small a size as possible, severe measures were necessary for the sake of
preservation of the whole fighting front. Added to this, there was the
particular type of enemy. The eastern man is capable of a fanatical toughness,
almost unlimited endurance, and simply limitless faith. For him the fight
against the "fascist German troops" was a crusade. The idea of the Bolshevist
state of the future was an idol for him, which he worshipped as he did the
Icons in former times. Hitler as Supreme War Lord had to decide what measures necessitated by the war he regarded as essential. Hitler expected a total war in the East, which did indeed develop. That such a war would to a greater part upset the existing principles of international law was clear to him, faced with an enemy like bolshevism. For he knew its attitude toward international law, which meant nothing else but to keep its hands essentially free in case of a collision with a "capitalist state". (Compare also the opinion of University professor Maurach, Document Books Ohlendorf II and Sandberger II-A.) The well-known British authority on international law, Lauterpacht, by the way, expressed a similar opinion for the case of total war (British Yearbook of International Law 1944, p. 72) |
"But original proceeding before the municipal courts of the victors may seem to many a questionable method of removing outstanding doubts and laying down authoritatively the existing law on subjects of controversy." |
| Total war has altered the complexion of many
rules. At a time when the "scorched earth" policy with regard to the
belligerents' own territory has become part of a widespread practice, general
destruction of property ordered as an incident of broad military strategy will
not properly form the subject matter of a criminal indictment.
Furthermore, in 1941 Hitler may have been convinced that in such a war strong shock effects may be obtained by certain draconic measures, which as a final result may cause the weakening or disintegration of the enemy's will to resistance. Measures of such effect were regarded as admissible in the war against Japan. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War from 1940-1945, reports in his article: The decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (excerpts) |
"To extract a genuine surrender from the emperor of Japan and his military advisers, a tremendous shock must be adminis- [...tered] |
