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Volume IV · Page 436
out orders, the security police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively. But it was desirable that the security police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. [Emphasis added.] It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period." ( L-180.) |
| Stahlecker was surprised and disappointed that in Lithuania it was not so easy to start pogroms against the Jews. However, after certain prodding and assistance, results were attained. He reports — |
"Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit, mentioned above, who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detachment [Vorkommando] acting in Kovno, and in such a way that no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish dwelling district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following night about 2,300 Jews were made harmless in a similar way. In other parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who had been left behind." (L-180.) |
| In working up special squads to initiate and
carry through pogroms in Lithuania and Latvia, Stahlecker made it a point to
select men who for personal reasons had a grudge against the Russians. Somehow
these squads were then made to believe that by killing Jews they were avenging
themselves on the Russians for their own griefs. Activity and Situation Report No. 6, prepared in October 1941, complained that Einsatz units operating in Esthonia could not provoke "spontaneous, anti-Jewish demonstration with ensuing pogroms" because "adequate enlightenment was lacking." However, as stated before, not everything was lost because under the direction of the Einsatzgruppe of the security police and security service, all male Jews over the age of 16, with the exception of doctors and Jewish elders, were arrested and killed. The report then states, "At the conclusion of the operation there will be only 500 Jewesses and children left in the Ostland." (NO-2656.) Hermann Friedrich Graebe, manager and engineer in charge |
