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| that every execution of partisans was
preceded by a thorough examination on the basis of a regular procedure. The
defendant himself gave one highly illuminative demonstration on his idea of
regular procedure. He was asked what he would do to a man he came upon
lecturing on communism, and he replied that, after taking a look at him
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"If I was under the impression he
would put his theoretical conviction into deed in that case I would have him
shot." |
| Another example of his idea of justice arose
out of his voluntary narrative of an episode involving the shooting of three
girls who, according to the defendant, were about to form a partisan
group. He explained that the case of these three girls was investigated for
eight days. Whether such an investigation actually took place or not can only
depend on the credibility of the defendant himself. In this respect it must be
remarked that, if his concern for the girls' civil rights rose no higher than
his regard for their spiritual comfort, the victims could not have had much of
a chance to defend themselves. Steimle himself commanded the firing squad, and
he was asked if the girls were afforded any religious assistance before the
shots were fired. He replied that, since they were Communists, they could not
have had a religious conviction. Then the question was put to him as to what he
would have done in the event they were religious. His reply was
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"If the wish had been uttered I can
imagine that this would have been done. I, myself, wouldn't have
bothered." [Emphasis supplied.] |
The defendant undertook to deny
responsibility for various executions performed by his two units by stating
that the alleged investigations were conducted by his subordinates. His
admission, however, that he reviewed investigations and ordered death sentences
makes him coresponsible with the persons in charge of the examinations. A
superior may not delegate authority to a subordinate and then plead
noninvolvement for what the subordinate does. Especially, when the superior
reserves the right of supervision, as Steimle testified he did.
The
Tribunal is satisfied from the evidence in the case that the defendant
understood his responsibility in this regard but failed to meet it.
The
Tribunal further finds that the credible evidence in the case does not support
any conclusion that all Jews admittedly executed under Steimle's orders were
accorded a trial and judicial process guaranteed by the rules of war and
international law.
The defendant then claims that no Jews were executed
by either of his sub-Kommandos while he was chief. In his pretrial affidavit he
stated |
540 |