. NMT05-T0022
Volume V · Page 22
| same level as a Reich ministry, and had been
authorized in accordance with the constitution to pass legally binding decrees
in its particular field, like a ministry. Consequently, the Decree 67/I both to the German citizen and the Lebensborn was a law endowed with all the guarantees of binding force as such. Therefore, the first aspect to be dealt with is the question whether this fact in itself cancels the criminal responsibility for the Lebensborn, as it did no more than to comply as ordered with a German law which was binding for it. This question is closely linked to the general problem of to what extent, or whether at all, reference can appropriately be made to a national law to exempt individual persons from any criminal responsibility as far as international law is concerned, or whether each individual citizen is obliged under international law personally to examine his government's laws for their legality arid validity under international law, and to adjust his actions in accordance with whatever result he arrives at — whether he should obey the law or resist it considering the consequences which would arise for him by his actions as a matter of course. As the most recent achievement in its development, international law has established criminal responsibility of the individual under international law. Control Council Law No. 10, which according to prevailing views is a partial codification of currently valid international law, which specifies the criminal responsibilities applicable to the individual, in Article II, section 7c, has answered the above-mentioned question in the negative, i.e., whether reference to national laws can exclude responsibility under international law as applied to crimes against humanity. This rejection of exculpating circumstances based on national law requires, however, a restrictive interpretation because of reasons connected with international law. In keeping with its character, international law is not so much a product of abstract reasoning, but is rather the general precept which common sense prescribes for all human activities. Cardozo's question, "How does the precept work? Is it a sensible rule for the governance of mankind," is far more justified in the face of the difficult attempts to codify international common law than anywhere else. One criterion for determining whether a principle can be approved in the light of international law is the question, among others, whether it is reasonably consistent with the practical functioning of any national legal system, in other words, the question of legal security. This, however, would be totally incompatible with the fact of demanding of each individual citizen without exception that he himself should examine the national laws by which he had to abide for their value under international law. Logically |
